农业非点源污染控制与管理分析系统及其应用

以Bower和Hufschmidt提出的流域管理和水资源管理系统为基础,建立了农业非点源污染控制与管理三维分析系统.该系统分为3个层次即农业非点源污染控制与管理的过程层次、要素层次和活动层次,包括45个单元块.系统中的每一个层次代表了实践中农业非点源污染管制问题的不同断面或处理层次.系统中的45个单元块基本涵盖了农业非点源污染控制与管理问题的全部内容,为研究不同流域农业非点源污染管制提供了一个共同的分析平台,弥补了目前理论分析和实际问题研讨中缺乏系统性的不足之处.     

新制度时期滇池流域农业非点源污染控制对策建议

近年来,农业非点源污染已经成为导致滇池水体富营养化的主要因素之一,控制农业非点源污染已经成为滇池流域水体污染防治工作的重中之重.本文分析了当前滇池流域农业非点污染控制现状及存在的问题,并分析了自2004年起中央连续三年出台一系列扶农、支农政策以来给滇池流域农业非点源污染控制带来的转机.最后结合当前宏观制度背景的变化情况,对滇池流域农业非点源污染控制提出了多项对策建议.     

农业非点源污染防治及管理措施研究

继点源污染得到有效控制之后,非点源污染的防治工作成为环境保护工作的重点.农业作为非点源污染的主要来源,对农业生产、环境以及人类健康构成了巨大的隐性危害,因而其防治工作的进展对整个环境污染问题的解决有着重大意义.本文在分析农业非点源污染的含义、特征、来源、危害的基础上.介绍了农业非点源污染的防治和管理措施,分析了现阶段我国农业非点源污染的防治面临的问题.并提出了相关政策建议.     

农业非点源污染的外部性及其内部化途径分析

农业非点源污染是典型的负外部行为，但非点源污染的发生与点源污染有着显著不同的特征，这就决定了非点源污染外部性内部化方法的独特性。相比之下，采用政府直接管制和庇古手段的效果更加明显，关键是如何提高政府管制的效率并不断完善税费系统，而科斯手段在这方面难以发挥重要的作用。社会准则约束的方法在控制非点源污染方面也有独到的效果。     

美国加州等湖泊流域管理及蓝藻治理

美国加利福尼亚州等地方有长期的湖泊流域管理规划、具体的工作方案、相应的经费预算和相对庞大的工作人员队伍.管理规划的重点在非点源污染.在制定规划中,特别是涉及到非点源污染时,注意广泛征求流域内农民、牧民、居民、机构、公司企业、当地政府等各方面的意见.对点源污染,科学设定排放标准,认真监测,严格执法.对非点源污染,以开展宣传教育为主,提高公众环境意识和责任感.最好的管理方案实质上是一种社区和公众积极参与的方案,重点在于调整和规范流域内公众日常生活的行为方式,达到减少对环境影响、实现长期治理的目的.     

水资源系统分析AnnAGNPS模型在双阳河流域的应用

农业非点源污染是水质下降与环境恶化的主要原因。运用AnnAGNPS模型对双阳河流域农业非点源污染物进行模拟,研究结果表明预测结果与实测结果在一定误差范围内基本一致,表明该模型应用于农业非点源污染负荷估算及评价是可行的。     

汾河流域农业面源污染的治理

山西省环境保护的一项重要内容就是加强汾河流域的农业面源污染的治理。农业面源污染的治理是系统工程,涉及到农业基础、技术条件、行政管理等各个层面。立足于农业的可持续发展和山西农业的现实状况,汾河流域的农业面源污染的治理应以生物技术为先导,推进生态农业的发展。汾河流域农业面源污染的治理不仅关系到山西省社会经济的发展,同时可进行农业产业结构的调整,具有综合效益和可操作性,是一项具有良好发展前景的事业。     

“十一五”及未来15年我国环保科研主攻的七大重点

区域性、流域性环境污染形成机理与综合防治技术。主要任务是：完成区域和流域污染控制环境分区与环境承载力的评估指标体系，研发流域水污染防治与修复的关键技术。阐明区域性大气污染的成因，提出控制途径，查明土壤污染成因，建立控制及修复受污染土壤的技术体系，开发固体废弃物控制与治理新技术，区域性复合污染形成机理与防治技术。     

基于产业结构调整视角的农业面源污染控制政策研究

从农业面源污染控制的微观政策着手,把经济产出最大化、经济结构最优化作为目标,把污染物排放量作为主要约束条件,构建多目标线性规划模型。并以洱海流域为例,求出既能有效从源头控污,又能使农业经济稳步增长的基于产业结构调整的控污减排方案。最后,提出整个流域面源污染控制的政策建议。     

农业面源污染控制的制度选择分析

基于国内外相关文献研究和农村实际考察实践基础上,文章以农业面源污染控制的制度选择为切入点,整合国际国内农业面源污染控制的各类制度安排,并对其进行分析,提出了进一步加强我国农业面源污染控制的制度措施：第一,在加强宏观调控的基础上,进一步完善相关法律法规,优化农业环境管理体制。第二,建立多部门合作的农业面源污染监管体制。第三,建立健全农业面源污染控制的支持保障体系,强化经济税收政策对农户农业生产行为的调节作用。第四,农业面源污染控制管理权下放,建立农业面源污染控制的全民参与机制。     

The difficulties of "polluter pays" policy in agricultural pollution in UK and methods to improve it

Agricultural wastes pollution became serious after great improvement in technology and the encouragement of production for the government since the end of the World War Ⅱ. Economists and environmental scholars suggested that "polluter pays" policy be employed in agricultural pollution control. However, it was hard to implement "'polluter pays " policy alone in agricultural wastes pollution. In practice, there were two social factors which contributed to the improvement of water quality in the southwest of United Kingdom. One method is to communicate with farmers and then give farmers some advice or exhortation on facilities and management. The other method is to get up a telephone hotline for public to report water quality and probable pollution. Therefore, the consideration and combination of social factors in the control of agricultural wastes pollution are necessary and important. Education of basic natural sciences relevant to agricultural pollution, system management of agricultural pollutants and laws relevant to agricultural pollution is suggested to be the third social factor that British government can consider.     

排污权交易应用于农业面源污染研究

农业面源污染正在成为全球水污染的主要因素，对其进行有效控制直接关系到全球农业和社会的可持续发展。本文首先阐述了农业面源污染的来源、特点及危害，并对控制农业面源污染常用的税费、补贴、押金——退款等经济手段进行了分析。通过深入探讨排污权交易应用于农业面源污染的可行性和操作办法，得出点源与农业面源的排污权交易能够减少工业和农业的治污成本，实现社会收益最大化；农业面源之间的排污权交易能够增强农民技术革新的积极性，减少化肥农药的用量，保证农业可持续发展的结论。     

Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed

We consider a model of regulation for nonpoint source water pollution through non-linear taxation/subsidization of agricultural production. Farmers are heterogenous along two dimensions, their ability to transform inputs into final production and the available area they possess. Asymmetric information and participation of farmers to the regulation scheme put constraints on the optimal policy that we characterize. We show that a positive relationship between size of land and ability may exacerbate adverse selection effects. We calibrate the model using data on a French watershed and we simulate the optimal second-best policy and characterize the allocation of the abatement effort among the producers.Authorship is equally assigned among the different authors.     

Co-ordinated environmental regulation: controlling non-point nitrate pollution while maintaining river flows

Environmental policy often addresses multiple targets, yet much economic analysis of pollution control is based on a single-target objective. In this paper, we present an analysis of policies to control non-point source nitrate pollution in the presence of minimum river flow restrictions. A non-linear bio-physical economic optimisation model of an intensively cultivated Scottish agricultural catchment was constructed. The presence of minimum river flow controls in the catchment was found to reduce nitrogen pollution. However, by themselves, river flow controls were found not to be a cost effective means to reduce non-point pollution. We quantify the improved social welfare from coordinating the environmental regulation of river flows and pollution, and determine the conditions under which such coordination is beneficial. The paper also investigates whether the benefits of such coordination can be sustained under wetter (winter) weather conditions implied by current climate change predictions.     

Endogenous Transport Coefficients: Implications for Improving Water Quality from Multi-Contaminants in an Agricultural Watershed

The effectiveness of imperfect pollution control instruments is examined for a diffuse source, multi-contaminant problem in which the transport coefficients for sediment-bound residuals are endogenous. Similar evaluations fix the percentage of sediment deposited and optimize either for a single firm managing the whole watershed or on a firm by firm basis. This study shows that ignoring the dependence of the transport coefficients on intervening land uses creates a positive externality. The filtering potential of activities conducted by firms close to the receptor permits firms further away to undertake more profitable but erosive practices. Optimizing management choices, and consequently endogenizing the transport coefficients, for all firms simultaneously removes the externality. An empirical application combines hydrological simulation models with an economic optimization model for nutrient pollution of surface and ground water within an agricultural watershed. Although firms are homogeneous in abatement costs, differences in spatial location leave uniform instruments unable to achieve the water quality goal efficiently. An ambient tax/subsidy scheme can achieve the water quality goal efficiently but the informational requirements will be excessive in most situations where the transport mechanisms for residuals are dependent upon the practices of independent decision making units.     

Agricultural producer service subsidies and agricultural pollution: An approach based on endogenous agricultural pollution

Agricultural producer service is an indispensable link in promoting agricultural modernization in developing countries, while agricultural pollution has become the largest source of pollution in many developing countries. Given that agricultural pollution is different from industrial pollution due to its endogenous characteristics, we linked agricultural pollution with the human capital level of labor and propose an endogenous model that reflects the agricultural pollution path, which is different from the traditional path. We studied the effects of government price subsidy, interest subsidy, and wage subsidy to agricultural producer service on agricultural pollution and other economic indicators by constructing a three-sector general equilibrium model including agricultural producer service. We found that the rise of price subsidy for the agricultural producer service and the wage subsidy of the agricultural producer service sector would increase the output of agricultural sector and reduce the output of agricultural producer service under certain conditions, but aggravate agricultural pollution; at the same time, the rise of interest subsidy of the agricultural producer service sector would decrease the output of the agricultural sector, enhance the output of agricultural producer service conditionally, and decrease agricultural pollution. Preconditions of the three subsidies to improve national welfare have been obtained.