Licensing technology to shape standards: Examining the influence of the industry context

Technology standards refer to particular technological solutions, which emerge as the accepted approach to fulfill a particular function. In light of the growing importance of technology standards and network externalities, industrial firms may not only adopt emerging standards, but they can actively shape the standardization processes based on their forecasting activities. One important means to influence standard setting towards a firm's own technology is to foster the technology's adoption by actively licensing it to other organizations. Thus, industrial firms may license technology in order to enhance their future new product performance based on a standard related to their technology. To shed light on these dynamics of standardization processes, we draw on contingency theory and conceptually examine the role of licensing in the emergence of technology standards. We further use new data from two surveys of 79 industrial firms with a three-year lag to analyze how environmental contingency factors related to appropriability, i.e., patent protection and technological turbulence, moderate the relationship between licensing to shape technology standards and a firm's subsequent innovation performance. The data provide strong support for the importance of shaping standards by licensing technology, and the findings have important implications for research into standards, licensing, and appropriability.     

Technological Choice In Voluntary Standards Committees: An Empirical Analysis

Vendors frequently compete to have their technology adopted as part of a voluntary consensus standard. In this paper we report the results of an empirical study of the factors that influence the choice of technologies in voluntary technical standards committees.

Participation in standards committees is viewed as an aspect of the product development process of corporations involved in markets where network externalities are present. The factors hypothesized to affect the technology decision are: the market power of the coalition sponsoring the technology, the installed base of the products containing the technology, the size of the firms that make up the coalition, the promotional activities of the sponsors (such as technical contributions submitted), the perceived superiority of the technology, and the political skills of the coalition.

These hypotheses were tested by collecting data concerning specific technical decisions that were made in several standards committees in the area of computer communications hardware. Two sided t-tests were used to test the hypotheses, and logit regression was used to infer the importance of each factor in predicting adoption or non-adoption of the technology. A factor analysis was also performed to gain further insight into the data.

The results suggest that the size of the firms in the coalition supporting a technology and the extent to which they support their position through written contributions are significant determinants of technological choice in the standards decisions studied. The market share of the firms in the coalition was found to be significant only for the buyers of compatible products, i.e., the monopsony power was significant, not the monopoly power. In addition, the technologies whose sponsors weighted market factors more highly than technical factors were more likely to be adopted in the standards decision studied. The proponents of both the adopted and non-adopted technologies were found to have equal belief in the overall technical superiority of their technical alternative, even after the decision. The installed base of a technology and process skills were not found to be significant predictors of the committee outcome.     

A MODEL FOR STANDARD SETTING: HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION

This paper presents a model for high definition television (HDTV) standard setting that can be applied to other technologies. The analysis examines conflict and coordination in the standardization process at three levels: international, domestic, and market. While national governments and firms share common priorities, firms are more likely to require standardization than are governments but are less likely to achieve it unless side payments are possible. Collaboration in standard setting benefits all parties and should be encouraged by the government .     

Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market

Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market.Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid (respectively, flexible) firms from this market. Meaningful comparative static results are derived.     

Market access and technology adoption in the presence of FDI

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.     

Consumer myopia, standardization and aftermarket monopolization

In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not apply when firms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period-by-period. I develop the model in the context of aftermarket. With overlapping-generations of consumers, simultaneous product offerings in the primary market and aftermarket establishes a price floor for the primary good. This constraint prevents aftermarket rents from being dissipated by the primary market competition. Duopoly firms earn positive profits despite price competition with undifferentiated products. Nonetheless, government interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market.     

Standards Migration and Peripheral Competition

The impact of competition from peripheral firms on the standards migration efforts by integrated systems firms with de facto standards control is investigated. When systems firms try to migrate their customers to a new standard, they can lose some control over their installed base because they are constrained in their product offerings. Peripherals firms do not face such constraints. Their product offerings allow the emergence of hybrid systems which systems firms are unwilling to match. Improved peripherals from independent firms make these hybrid systems possible. Such hybrid systems lengthen the economic life of the products that make up the existing standard. Historical and empirical evidence from the mainframe computer industry in the 1960s and 1970s illustrates the competition from peripheral firms and their impact on IBM's standards migration efforts. IBM pursued the establishment of a new de facto standard, while independent disk drive manufacturers supplied peripherals that enabled hybrid systems. For the computer mainframe industry, it was shown that those hybrid systems increased the economic life of IBM's older computers, although IBM was able to migrate its customers to the new standard in this case.     

Standards Migration and Peripheral Competition

The impact of competition from peripheral firms on the standards migration efforts by integrated systems firms with de facto standards control is investigated. When systems firms try to migrate their customers to a new standard, they can lose some control over their installed base because they are constrained in their product offerings. Peripherals firms do not face such constraints. Their product offerings allow the emergence of hybrid systems which systems firms are unwilling to match. Improved peripherals from independent firms make these hybrid systems possible. Such hybrid systems lengthen the economic life of the products that make up the existing standard. Historical and empirical evidence from the mainframe computer industry in the 1960s and 1970s illustrates the competition from peripheral firms and their impact on IBM's standards migration efforts. IBM pursued the establishment of a new de facto standard, while independent disk drive manufacturers supplied peripherals that enabled hybrid systems. For the computer mainframe industry, it was shown that those hybrid systems increased the economic life of IBM's older computers, although IBM was able to migrate its customers to the new standard in this case.     

Market design for standardization problems with agent-based social simulation

This paper provides a computational market model with technological competitions among standards and presents simulations of various scenarios concerning standardization problems. The market model has three features: (1) economic entities such as consumers and firms are regarded as autonomous agents; (2) micro interactions among consumer agents or firm agents have essential mechanisms interpretable in real markets; and (3) consumers’ preferences and firms’ technologies co-affect their evolutionary behavior. In recent years, consumers have experienced various inconveniences from de facto competition based on a market mechanism. Standardization communities or committees such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) need to design a compatible standard or a de jure standard in a market. However, it is difficult for market designers to decide a method or timing for the standardization. Here, by introducing a novel technique used in agent-based social simulation (ABSS), which we call “scenario analysis,” we aim to support such decision making. Scenario analysis provides the possible market changes that can occur following implementation of a design policy under a specific market situation and the market mechanisms that generate these market changes.     

电力行业专利标准化研究

随着科学技术的迅速发展和经济全球化的不断深入,标准化水平已成为企业核心竞争力的基本要素。其中专利技术的标准化又使得技术标准的强势与专利权的优势相结合,使得知识产权权利人的市场优势倍增。"得标准者得市场",专利技术标准化已成为国际竞争中新的游戏规则,更是西方大国在国际贸易中的战略手段之一。目前,国外企业利用"技术专利化、专利标准化、标准国际化"的竞争路线取得了较大的技术和市场优势。而尚处于专利标准化起步阶段的我国企业却面临着极大挑战,尤其在技术密集型的电力行业,各个主要电力企业正在积极推进"走出去"战略,其面临来自国外企业专利标准的挑战更大。因此,本文首先分析了我国企业面临的挑战及外国企业实施专利标准化战略的成功经验,并结合电力行业的特点,提出专利标准化建设建议,构建电力行业专利标准化战略。     

Oligopolistic Competition and New Technology Adoption under Uncertainty

The paper examines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex ante uncertainty about variable costs of the new technology. Each firm can either adopt the new process by bearing some up-front investment or may continue to use the old one, after which firms play a Cournot market game. If in equilibrium both technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases (decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price if the up-front investment is large (small). Our model applies readily to vertical integration if integrated firms neither buy nor sell the intermediate good on the market. However, if buying and selling is allowed, the number of integrated firms is independent of input price uncertainty.     

Systemic Innovation and the Virtues of Going Virtual: The Case of the Digital Video Disc

According to David Teece, only strong and integrated firms can successfully innovate in a systemic fashion. Looser coalitions consisting of joint ventures, alliances, or virtual partners will not be able to create a systemic innovation, let alone to set standards for it, or to control its further evolution. In this article this position is challenged, in particular, regarding the information industry. It will be argued that in view of the fact that industrial structure is changing from vertical to horizontal, and digital convergence is taking place, systemic innovation today can only be undertaken by alliance networks. Although such networks are vulnerable to opportunism, these are capable of producing systemic innovations, because mutual relations can be stabilized by forms of both substantive and procedural commitment. If standards also have to be pioneered, alliance networks will have to expand. As there are few ways in which these new allies may commit themselves, the network is weakened. It is argued that, nevertheless, the mutual competition between networks will not end in an impasse. Instead, a unique, hybrid standard is likely to emerge in the end, since contending networks are willing to compromise, and since some of the more important parties along the system chain may usefully constitute themselves as arbitrators. This argument is put to the test by examining the case of the development of the Digital Video Disc (DVD). It is shown that a battle between two alliance networks ensued (one led by Toshiba, the other by Philips and Sony), that evolved along the lines conjectured above.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

Inter‐Jurisdictional Competition for Firms*

Regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs. The redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled, who cannot work. Able individuals may work, be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market, or choose to be voluntary unemployed. Labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies. Both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore, firms’ location decisions. Allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient. If regions cannot tax firms, they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies.     

基于网络效应的我国企业技术标准竞争策略分析

本文通过分析买方互动产生的网络效应对市场的影响分析,提出我国企业在推行标准化战略的过程中要以技术创新、技术开放、技术联盟推进技术应用,以积极参与标准制定争取市场主动地位,以营销策略形成网络效应获得市场支持,以标准化为导向提高产品开发效率、巩固市场,从而建立市场优势、形成事实标准而在竞争中取胜。     

网络效应市场的技术创新障碍及策略分析

在网络效应市场,技术创新对企业竞争力有着重要的影响。然而由于网络效应的作用,需求曲线发生改变,使市场均衡表现出"赢者通吃"的特征。这意味着,如果一项新技术的用户规模达不到临界容量,正反馈效应的存在将会使该技术被市场所抛弃。静态博弈和动态博弈的分析结果都表明,用户为了避免网络规模减小带来的效用损失,对新技术的采用往往采取观望态度,这将导致新技术难以达到最小网络规模要求的临界容量,也就无法取代旧技术的统治地位。为了加快新技术的扩散速度并成功战胜旧技术,企业在进行技术创新时应采取有效的技术创新策略:一是要采取合适的技术兼容策略;二是要鼓励和授权其他厂商使用自己的技术标准;三是要吸引辅助配套厂商共同进行技术研发。     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Demand,innovation, and the dynamics of market structure: The role of experimental users and diverse preferences

The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concentration tends to grow. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many case new entrants survive and grow, and the large established firms do not make the transition. In other cases, the established firms are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. This paper explores a model which generates this pattern and has focused on the characteristics of the demand. We argue that the ability of the new firms exploring the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.

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Franco MalerbaEmail:

     

Competition vs. collaboration in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies: a game theory approach

The study provides a game theoretic exploration of firms’ decisions on whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a sequence of new technologies. Different from models proposed by previous studies, which concentrates on process innovation and a two-strategy set (innovation or do nothing), the present game theory model emphasises product innovation and a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, or do nothing). The study makes three contributions. The proposed game theory model extends current understanding of the impacts of collaboration possibilities and collaboration cost in a dynamic game theory. Further, the model clarifies the impact of transaction costs on the outcome. Finally, the study finds that the relationship between collaboration costs is not univariate, but depends on the market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness.     

Is technology acquisition enough to improve China's product quality? Evidence from firm-level panel data

As developing countries open themselves up to trade, many industrial firms in these countries are finding it difficult to compete internationally due to poor product quality and low product variety. Although China has been the largest producer of crude steel since 1996, China's steel firms have produced an overabundance of low-quality steel while domestic purchasers of steel have increasingly demanded higher quality steel products. Many have argued that for Chinese steel firms to improve product quality they must adopt more advanced technologies. Employing firm-level panel data of steel firms in China, we econometrically test the relative importance of two possible sets of factors affecting a firm's ability to utilize technology to improve product quality: technology acquisition factors and technology absorptive capacity factors. We find that technology complements such as in-house R&D and foreign knowledge must be combined with technology for Chinese firms to improve product quality.