Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

Identifying development blocks—a new methodology

The paper specifies a quantitative methodology for exploring development blocks. The concept of ‘development block’ was a major contribution to the historical analysis of industrial transformation by the late Erik Dahmén, but development blocks have mainly been analyzed by qualitative methods and indirect indicators and not statistically identified. In this paper, development blocks are identified by means of a combination of co-integration analysis and Granger causality. Using these techniques, we are able to identify two partially overlapping development blocks in the Swedish economy, formed around the electricity generating sector: one with metal, metal goods, machinery and railways; and another with pulp and paper, chemicals, and machinery.

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

After Hayek: On Theodore Burczak’s socialism after Hayek

Burczak reformulates socialism to escape Hayek’s strictures against central planning. While Hayek supports a social safety net as well as other liberal reforms, Burczak points out that these reforms fall outside Hayek’s theoretical framework. We explain that this is because Hayek narrowed the classical economists’ conception of sympathetic agency to imitation and rule following. By contrast, liberal reform proposals follow from the theoretical framework of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. For Smith and Mill, sympathy is a richer concept in which people change places imaginatively with others. Sympathetic agency allows a wide range of other regarding actions and political reforms.

On the distribution of product price and quality

We investigate the structure of demand by focusing on the distribution of prices within narrowly-defined classes of goods. We observe considerable heterogeneity—products that are functionally similar but presumably of different ‘quality’ may sell at very different prices. We analyze distribution of prices for bottles of wine, used cars, houses in London and week-long holidays in Majorca, and observe in each case that the the resulting distribution is more skewed than the lognormal but less skewed than a Pareto distribution. We then present a theoretical model whereby products can distinguish themselves along multiple hedonic dimensions of ‘performance’, with these product attributes being random variables subject to multiplicative interactions. Variations of this model can reproduce a lognormal price distribution and a Pareto distribution as lower and upper bound benchmarks (respectively).

Inputs and institutions as conservative elements

Ludwig von Mises argued that capital goods were “conservative elements” that constrain future production decisions. Similarly, social capital and institutions also constrain future production decisions. These insights are applied to the institutional transformation of the post-Reconstruction American South. It is argued that the structure of social capital that developed in the South was inappropriate to the formal institutions that emerged as a result of the Civil War and Reconstruction. The tensions between institutions and social capital are examined in the context of racist lynching.

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

The interaction of firing costs and firm training

By allowing firms to invest in their workers’ human capital, this paper extends the traditional analysis of firing costs with respect to two points, both of them positive in terms of welfare. On the one hand, firing restrictions reduce turnover, thereby enhancing incentives to provide training. On the other hand, training gives firms the opportunity to lower the costs of firing restrictions since well-trained workers are less likely to be fired. In this way the negative effects of firing costs on firm profitability and workers’ job-finding rates are reduced.

Violence against women, social learning, and deterrence

We develop a simple model of sexual and domestic violence. By assumption, the potential victim’s threat to report if she is victimized is not credible, which implies that the only sequential equilibrium involves violence. However, a realistic social learning process converges to a non-sequential equilibrium without violence from all nearby states if the expected punishment for offenders whose victims report to the police is sufficiently high. A policy to increase the sentences for sexual and domestic violence convictions could therefore substantially reduce such violence in the long run, even if it is powerless to make women’s threats to report credible.

The Social Economics of Neoliberal Globalization

The recent period of intensive and extensive development of global economic integration, or globalization, has reached a crossroads. The regime of the neoliberal Great Capitalist Restoration is not sustainable and fundamental governance changes must be made. This paper adds perspective to the choices that must be made at this critical juncture of the global social economy by applying the master concepts of Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction and Polanyi’s Protective Response.

Kids Cause Specialization: Evidence for Becker’s Household Division of Labor Hypothesis

We examine the division of labor within households and marital matching patterns in the USA using both the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We use Becker’s theory of marriage markets by estimating household production functions and using the estimates to test for positive or negative assortive matching. We also construct match matrices, which are used to judge how well our model fits Becker’s theory. We find positive assortative matching on all traits in young marriages and couples without children, and negative assortment along some traits in marriages with children. This suggests that children induce specialization whereas couples without children exploit household public goods.

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience

The fall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in July 2000 marked a milestone in Mexico’s political history. Throughout its 71 years of incumbency, the PRI had incarnated the set of social, political and economic institutions of the country to the extent of becoming synonymous with governance and stability. Using a simple model in which institutional change is the result of the strategic interaction between citizens, an incumbent ruler and a potential new ruler or entrant, we provide a systematic interpretation of this experience emphasizing the role of evolutionary factors such as history, uncertainty, learning and experimentation.

Situational logic in social science inquiry: From economics to criminology

Karl R. Popper proposed that the method of explanation in economics, or situational logic, should become the general model for analyses across the social sciences. This article makes good Popper's proposal by extending situational logic to a social problem outside the traditional scope of economics: crime. Specifically, the discussion reviews models developed by economist Gary S. Becker and criminologist Ronald V. Clarke. Becker's ‘economic approach’ to crime incorporates essential features of situational logic. Clarke's ‘situational crime prevention’ offers an even better demonstration; it explicitly incorporates the ideas of piecemeal social engineering and unintended social repercussions. Popper took situational logic from Menger and the Austrians, making this emerging area of criminology an extension of Austrian economics.

Cournot competition and endogenous firm size

The paper studies the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unknown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both a demand parameter and its rival’s output choice. However, this learning game is in the background, as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run evolution of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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Building blocks in the economics of mandates

The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investigate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers’ insurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more ‘deserving’ workers. The risk is that it may also reduce output. The more diverse are free market contracts—separating the various worker types—the more likely it is that such output effects will on balance serve to reduce welfare. It is shown that adverse effects can be reduced by restricting mandates to larger firms. An alternative to a mandate is direct government provision. We demonstrate that direct government provision has the advantage over mandates of preserving separations.

Financial Development and Income in North Africa

We explore the short-run dynamics and long-run relationship between income and financial development in Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. We use co-integration and VECM models and four indicators of financial development. The empirical results indicate that there is a long-run relationship between income and each financial development indicator, except credit to the private sector in Algeria. On the other hand, Granger-causality test results indicate that the evidence on the direction of causality is mixed.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Ludwig von Mises on the epistemological foundation for social sciences reconstructed

This paper focuses on Ludwig von Mises’s attempt to establish an epistemological/methodological foundation for the social sciences (praxeology). I reconstruct Mises’s writings by disentangling the distinct realms of ontology and epistemology in his arguments. Although Mises’s line of reasoning is squarely based on the distinction between ontology and epistemology, he nonetheless tends to mix ontological and epistemological viewpoints in his argumentation, thereby clouding the issue involved. I believe this is one reason why the writings of Mises appear to be so difficult and engendered different as well as competing readings amongst Austrian economists. Furthermore, this analysis also allows us to assess whether or not Mises offers a sound theory of knowledge. I conclude that praxeology displays internal tensions and explain the reasons for these tensions.