SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

This paper discusses five common divisional performance measurement methods—cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, investment centers, and expense centers—and provides the beginnings of a theory that attempts to explain when each of these five methods is likely to be the most efficient. The central insight of the theory is that each of these methods offers an alternative way of aligning decision-making authority with valuable "specific knowledge" inside the organization.
The theory suggests that cost and revenue centers work best in cases where headquarters has good information about cost and demand functions, product quality, and optimal output mix. Profit centers—defined as business units whose managers have responsibility for overall profits, but not the authority to make major capital spending decisions—tend to supplant revenue and cost centers when the line managers have a significant informational advantage over headquarters and when there are few interdependencies (or "synergies") between divisions. Investment centers—that is, profit centers in which unit managers are allowed to make major investment decisions—tend to prevail when the activity is capital-intensive and when it is difficult for headquarters to identify the value-maximizing investment strategy.
In evaluating the performance of profit centers, rate-of-return performance measures like RONA (return on net assets) are likely to be effective when unit managers have little influence over the level of new investment. But, in the case of investment centers, Economic Value Added, or EVA, is likely to be the most effective single-period measure of performance because it is best designed to encourage value-maximizing investment decisions.     

Ownership,incentives, and the hold‐up problem

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold‐up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and “empire benefits.” Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low‐powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with nonintegration. Vertical integration therefore mitigates hold‐up problems even without profit sharing.     

Decentralized capacity management and internal pricing

This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multidivisional firm. In a setting where an upstream division provides capacity services for itself and a downstream division, our analysis explores whether the divisions should be structured as investment or profit centers. The choice of responsibility centers is naturally linked to the internal pricing rules for capacity services. As a benchmark, we establish the efficiency of an arrangement in which the upstream division is organized as an investment center, and capacity services to the downstream division are priced at full historical cost. Such responsibility center arrangements may, however, be vulnerable to dynamic hold-up problems whenever the divisional capacity assignments are fungible in the short-run, and therefore, it is essential to let divisional managers negotiate over their actual capacity assignments. The dynamic hold-up problem can be alleviated with more symmetric choice of responsibility centers. The firm can centralize ownership of capacity assets with the provision that both divisions rent capacity on a periodic basis from a central unit. An alternative and more decentralized solution is obtained by a system of bilateral capacity ownership in which both divisions become investment centers.     

Expansions and Contractions of Major US Shopping Centers

We analyze the determinants of expansions and contractions of shopping centers using a unique dataset of property level data for shopping centers in eleven metropolitan areas over the period from 1995 through 2005. We find that shopping centers with large operating costs are less likely to expand and are more likely to contract. Higher expected revenue per square foot increases the likelihood of expansion and decreases the likelihood of contraction. For small shopping centers the decision to change gross leasable area (GLA) is largely driven by potential revenue, while the decision to change the number of stores is largely a function of cost. We find some support for Grenadier’s theory that a larger number of competitors reduces the value of option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and contraction. The market share of competitors reduces the likelihood of increasing the number of stores as suggested by the theory of strategic positioning. Our hypotheses best explain contraction decisions of large shopping centers and expansion decisions of small shopping centers. We find that both expansions and contractions of GLA are less likely for large shopping centers in MSAs with greater uncertainty about real estate prices, indicating that the option to delay has value. Moreover, small centers are significantly less sensitive to cost and revenue; since small centers are likely to have greater idiosyncratic risk than large; this provides indirect evidence for a significant delay option.     

A remark on managerial behaviour and agency cost

This paper studies the relationship between managers’ private profit and agency cost using dynamic modelling methods. We conclude that the agency cost is a concave function of the managers’ private profit and that the managers’ private profit will lead to more investment cash outflow.     

Capital structure,executive compensation,and investment efficiency

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.     

基于碳税下的供应链碳减排融资决策研究

全球变暖日益加剧,为实现低碳理念,政府根据碳排放量征收碳税.为响应国家的低碳号召与节省缴税,供应商将进行碳减排投资,而我国中小企业居多的现状使得其必须进行碳减排融资.针对供应商向零售商进行内部融资的情形,在分散决策和集中决策下,运用两阶段Stackelberg博弈理论,根据供应链利润最大化条件进行优化.结果表明:分散决策下,低碳税率和供应商超额收益率的升高以及零售商净机会成本率的降低均会导致供应链总利润升高,单位碳减排量成本的升高会导致供应链总利润的降低,且集中决策的供应链总利润高于分散决策.     

Geographic distance and board monitoring: Evidence from the relocation of independent directors

In this study, we use a sample of independent directors (hereafter, IDs) in China, whose primary employers have changed during their tenure as IDs, to examine whether and how geographic distance affects the monitoring role of IDs. Based on 233 relocations of IDs due to the change of their primary employers, we find that when IDs are located farther from the firm headquarters, they attend fewer meetings and express a lower percentage of dissenting opinions. The results are robust with a battery of robustness checks. In addition, we find that the negative relationship between geographic distance and meeting attendance of IDs is mitigated where there are high-speed railways between firm headquarters and the ID or when firms have a higher litigation risk. We also find that the negative relationship is more pronounced for state-owned firms. Our tests on the effectiveness of monitoring show that firms with more distant IDs have more tunneling activities and earnings management, lower sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance, and lower sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment opportunities. Furthermore, we focus on the relocations that make IDs more distant from the firm headquarters and find that after the relocations, firms are more likely to acquire firms in the provinces that the IDs relocate to. We find that the market reactions of M&As in the provinces that IDs relocate to are more positive after the relocations, which suggests that distant IDs have an advisory role. Finally, we find that firms with more distant IDs have lower performance and that firms are less likely to reappoint IDs in future sessions if these IDs move farther away from the firm headquarters. Our study, based on exogenous changes in geographic distance between IDs and the firm headquarters, provides new evidence that IDs who are located farther from the firm headquarters are less effective monitors due to higher cost of information acquisition.     

A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITAL COSTS: THE CASE OF BESTFOODS

The financial management practices of many multinational corporations are at odds with both financial theory and the strategic case for global expansion. Despite the weight of academic literature, many financial executives still cling to ad hoc rules of thumb that discourage value-enhancing global growth. In particular, they tend to require large risk premiums for making foreign investments while ignoring the diversification benefits of such investments for their shareholders.
This article presents a practical method for estimating the cost of capital for use by multinationals both in evaluating foreign investment opportunities and in measuring the ongoing performance of overseas business units. The method represents a kind of "hybrid" version of the global CAPM—one that attempts to reconcile some of corporate executives' concerns about the distinctive risks of foreign investment with the finance theorist's portfolio perspective and reliance on capital market information. More specifically, the framework uses information from capital markets to determine the appropriate risk premiums for currency and sovereign risks associated with each country in an MNC's portfolio. But, at the same time, these risk premiums are partly offset by taking account of any diversification benefits that foreign investment provides for the firm's shareholders.
The method is illustrated using the case of Bestfoods, a Fortune 200 company with extensive overseas operations that recently adopted the method. For the purpose of evaluating new projects, Bestfoods produces quarterly updates of its cost-of-capital estimates for each country in which it has (or expects to have) major operations. For evaluating the ongoing performance of each country business unit, the relevant cost of capital is calculated annually (at the beginning of each fiscal year).     

The surprising economics of a "people business"

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs-that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business-or a company that includes one or more of them how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous people-oriented metrics-for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. Once you have assessed the business's true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).     

Rewarding Trading Skills without Inducing Gambling

This paper develops a model of active asset management in which fund managers may forgo alpha‐generating strategies, preferring instead to make negative‐alpha trades that enable them to temporarily manipulate investors' perceptions of their skills. We show that such trades are optimally generated by taking on hidden tail risk, and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient and when their trading skills are scalable, and generate a high profit per unit of risk. We propose long‐term contracts that deter this behavior by dynamically adjusting the dates on which the manager is compensated in response to her cumulative performance.     

Unleash innovation in foreign subsidiaries

In multinational corporations, growth-triggering innovation often emerges in foreign subsidiaries from employees closest to customers and least attached to the procedures and politeness of the home office. But too often, heavy-handed responses from headquarters squelch local enthusiasm and drive out good ideas--and good people. The authors' research into more than 50 multinationals suggests that encouraging innovation in foreign subsidiaries requires a change in attitude. Companies should start to think of foreign subsidiaries as peninsulas rather than as islands--as extensions of the company's strategic domain rather than as isolated outposts. If they do, innovative ideas will flow more freely from the periphery to the corporate center. Basing their arguments on a rich array of examples, the authors say that encouraging such "innovation at the edges" also requires a new set of practices, with two aims: to improve the formal and informal channels of communication between headquarters and subsidiaries and to give foreign subsidiaries more authority to see their ideas through. The challenge for executives of multinationals is to find ways to liberalize, not tighten, internal systems and to delegate more authority to local subsidiaries. It isn't enough to ask subsidiary managers to be innovative; corporate managers need to give them incentives and support systems to facilitate their efforts. The authors suggest four approaches: give seed money to subsidiaries; use formal requests for proposals as a way of increasing the demand for seed money; encourage subsidiaries to be incubators for fledgling businesses; and build international networks. As part of the last approach, multinationals also need to create roles for idea brokers who can link entrepreneurs in foreign subsidiaries with other parts of the company.     

Bank affiliation and mutual funds’ trading strategy distinctiveness

This study investigates the effect of commercial bank affiliation on mutual fund trading strategy distinctiveness. We find that bank affiliation has a significantly positive relationship with mutual funds’ unique investment strategies, and this phenomenon exhibits better performance, supporting the benefits of bank affiliation. This association is most pronounced around macroeconomic releases, during high economic policy uncertainty periods, and among funds located within a close distance from their parent bank headquarters. Further analysis indicates that the more talented affiliated fund managers tend to pursue the distinctive strategy. Therefore, our evidence reveals that the underlying mechanisms are that affiliated funds own information advantages or hire more skilled fund managers due to the unique position of commercial banks in the economy. Finally, our results suggest that affiliated funds with a higher Strategy Distinctiveness Index attract stronger net inflows and are less exposed to risks. Our findings remain unchanged after several robustness tests.     

CREATING VALUE IN THE OIL INDUSTRY

In contrast with current thinking that conglomerates are inefficient, this article begins by presenting arguments in favor of the size and structure of the large integrated oil companies, also known as "the supermajors." Among the advantages are tax efficiency, information flow, political and technological know-how, broad supplier and customer relationships, scale economies, cross-business economies of scope, brand power, and the ability to coordinate strategic initiatives across businesses. These advantages all translate into a lower cost of capital.
One problem, however, is that this lower cost of capital does not seem to be reflected in the target returns on capital currently set by the supermajors. Observing that the financial goal of a corporation is to maximize not its return on capital but rather the net present value of expected future cash flows and earnings, the authors argue that the majors need to make two major changes to current practice. First, their investment hurdle rates should be reduced from their current level of 14–15% to the weighted average cost of capital, which is estimated to run about 8–9%. Second, the actual returns on capital reported in published accounts are largely meaningless; and when evaluating new investments and existing operations alike, the companies must find an annual performance measure that better reflects the economic realities of the business. This paper recommends use of a performance measurement framework based on economic profit that should serve two critical purposes: it will encourage managers to undertake all value-increasing projects (not just those that will maintain or increase reported return on capital), and it will help the companies communicate their strategy and results to the investment community.     

Financial hedging and corporate investment

Building on the well-documented relationship between corporate financial hedging and firms' borrowing costs, this study examines the impact of utilizing financial derivative instruments on corporate investment. We document that engaging in financial hedging enables firms to pursue more inorganic growth opportunities in the form of M&As. Acquiring firms with financial hedging programs have a lower borrowing cost and are more likely to pay for their deals with cash and use external borrowing. While financial hedging serves as a vehicle for firms to bring their inorganic investment plans to fruition by facilitating their financing, it also leads to inferior investment choices when conflicts of interest among managers and shareholders are more likely to arise. Our study shows for the first time that the financial flexibility emanating from corporate financial hedging can give rise to agency costs by instigating entrenched managers to overinvest.     

Profit pools: a fresh look at strategy

In charting strategy, many managers focus on revenue growth, assuming that profits will follow. But that approach is dangerous: today's deep revenue pool may become tomorrow's dry hole. To create strategies that result in profitable growth, managers need to look beyond revenues to see the shape of their industry's profit pool. The authors define an industry's profit pool as the total profits earned at all points along the industry's value chain. Although the concept is simple, the structure of a profit pool is usually quite complex. The pool will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and depths will vary within an individual segment as well. Segment profitability may, for example, vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, and distribution channel. Moreover, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry will often be very different from the pattern of revenue concentration. The authors describe how successful companies have gained competitive advantage by developing sophisticated profit-pool strategies. They explain how U-Haul identified new sources of profit in the consumer-truck-rental industry; how Merck reached beyond its traditional value-chain role to protect its profits in the pharmaceuticals industry; how Dell rebounded from a misguided channel decision by refocusing on its traditional source of profit; and how Anheuser-Busch made a series of astute product, pricing, and operating decisions to dominate the beer industry's profit pool. The companies with the best understanding of their industry's profit pool, the authors argue, will be in the best position to thrive over the long term.     

Predictive analytics and centralization of authority

We examine the relation between plant-level predictive analytics use and centralization of authority for more than 25,000 manufacturing plants using proprietary US Census data. We focus on headquarters' authority over plants through delegation of decision-making and design of performance-based incentives. We find that increased predictive analytics use is associated with reduced delegation of decision-rights to local managers, increased centralization of control over data gathering and reduced plant managerial payrolls. In terms of incentives, predictive analytics use is associated with more accurate targets and tighter linkages between rewards to workers (performance-based bonuses, promotions and firings) and measured performance. Overall, our findings suggest that predictive analytics use is associated with increased centralization of authority in headquarters.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF A FIRM'S COST OF CAPITAL

The relevance of a firm's cost of capital in its investment decisions is widely recognised. The concept and associated issues have been and are likely to be increasingly important in the regulatory activities of government and semi-government bodies, e.g. prices regulation, profit regulation for semi-government enterprises, antitrust and takeover regulation. This paper outlines the principles involved in estimating a firm's before-tax and after-tax cost of capital. The paper also suggests practical approaches that may be taken when difficulties arise in estimating parameters to the problem.     

Economies of scope in financial services: A DEA efficiency analysis of the US insurance industry

This paper investigates economies of scope in the US insurance industry over the period 1993–2006. We test the conglomeration hypothesis, which holds that firms can optimize by diversifying across businesses, versus the strategic focus hypothesis, which holds that firms optimize by focusing on core businesses. We analyze whether it is advantageous for insurers to offer both life-health and property-liability insurance or to specialize in one major industry segment. We estimate cost, revenue, and profit efficiency utilizing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and test for scope economies by regressing efficiency scores on control variables and an indicator for strategic focus. Property-liability insurers realize cost scope economies, but they are more than offset by revenue scope diseconomies. Life-health insurers realize both cost and revenue scope diseconomies. Hence, strategic focus is superior to conglomeration in the insurance industry.     

ACCOUNTING DOESN'T NEED MUCH FIXING (JUST SOME REINTERPRETING)

In response to Stewart's proposal for comprehensive reform of GAAP, this article offers a classic defense of traditional accounting practices and standards. Like the recent efforts of the FASB to achieve greater balance sheet realism through "fair value accounting," Stewart's call to make economic profit the centerpiece of GAAP is said to rest on a mistaken premise–the widespread notion that audited financial statements are intended primarily to guide equity investors in setting stock prices. More important than the valuation role of public accounting is its "stewardship" function in detecting theft and gross misuse of corporate assets. And it is this stewardship role, with its emphasis on producing reliable (and conservative) numbers that can be readily verified by auditors, that is likely to be compromised by Stewart's proposal, fair-value accounting, and other well-meaning attempts to incorporate greater economic realism into GAAP statements.
At the same time, however, the author agrees with Stewart's contention that GAAP a accounting numbers have major limitations for investors seeking to establish the market values of companies and for managers attempting to make value-increasing investment and operating decisions. Accordingly, he endorses many of Stewart's proposed modifications of GAAP both for internal purposes, such as performance evaluation and incentive compensation, and for voluntary supplemental reporting to the investment community.