中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜--基于劳动力价格扭曲视角北大核心

本文通过建立生产部门的要素买方垄断市场均衡模型,利用1996-2016年中国省级面板数据测算中国劳动力价格扭曲程度,并使用固定效应模型(FE)及面板固定效应的工具变量(IV)估计方法加以分析,从劳动力价格扭曲视角解答了中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜,即中国经济如何在赶超阶段面临资本深化不断加剧和TFP增长乏力的情况下,依靠劳动力价格扭曲实现低资本产出与高资本回报水平共存,从而维持长期高速资本积累以及优质的资本流向结构。实证研究表明:劳动力价格扭曲降低了资本产出效率,但这并不能掩盖由劳动力向资本方转移的垄断利润对资本回报的直接补贴,因此劳动力价格扭曲对中国维持高资本回报水平起到了重要的支撑作用,并通过高资本回报水平实现了地区资本快速积累,劳动力价格扭曲对资本流向的积极作用还体现在抑制资本"脱实向虚"及吸引外资流入。因此,应正视劳动力价格扭曲在赶超阶段的特殊作用,在矫正扭曲的过程中循序渐进,更积极采取措施规避其对资本回报和资本流向可能产生的不利影响。     

Sharpening the intangibles edge

Intangible assets--patents and know-how, brands, a skilled workforce, strong customer relationships, software, unique processes and organizational designs, and the like--generate most of a company's growth and shareholder value. Yet extensive research indicates that investors systematically misprice the shares of intangibles-intensive enterprises. Clearly, overpricing wastes capital. But underpricing raises the cost of capital, hamstringing executives in their efforts to take advantage of further growth opportunities. How do you break this vicious cycle? By generating better information about your investments in intangibles, and by disclosing at least some of that data to the capital markets. Getting at that information is easier said than done, however. There are no markets generating visible prices for intellectual capital, brands, or human capital to assist investors in correctly valuing intangibles-intensive companies. And current accounting practices lump funds spent on intangibles with general expenses, so that investors and executives don't even know how much is being invested in them, let alone what a return on those investments might be. At the very least, companies should break out the amounts spent on intangibles and disclose them to the markets. More fundamentally, executives should start thinking of intangibles not as costs but as assets, so that they are recognized as investments whose returns are identified and monitored. The proposals laid down in this article are only a beginning, the author stresses. Corporations and accounting bodies should make systematic efforts to develop information that can reliably reflect the unique attributes of intangible assets. The current serious misallocations of resources should be incentive enough for businesses to join--and even lead--such developments.     

Information and the Cost of Capital in a Mean‐Variance Efficient Market

Before information ? arrives, market observers must be uncertain whether the stock price conditioned on ? will be higher or lower than the current price. Otherwise there is an obvious arbitrage opportunity. By assuming this minimal condition of efficient markets, it is shown under the mean‐variance CAPM that information that leaves the future value of a firm more certain, in the sense that its perceived covariance with the market is reduced towards zero, can lead to a higher expected return on that asset. A further result is that it is theoretically possible that the required return on the stock will necessarily fall after observing signal ?, or (in other circumstances) that it will necessarily rise. In general, information that allows better discrimination between firms leads some firms to have higher costs of capital and other firms to have lower costs of capital. Less obviously, better discrimination between firms can induce a higher average cost of capital across the market.     

Managing for creativity

A company's most important asset isn't raw materials, transportation systems, or political influence. It's creative capital--simply put, an arsenal of creative thinkers whose ideas can be turned into valuable products and services. Creative employees pioneer new technologies, birth new industries, and power economic growth. If you want your company to succeed, these are the people you entrust it to. But how do you accommodate the complex and chaotic nature of the creative process while increasing efficiency, improving quality, and raising productivity? Most businesses haven't figured this out. A notable exception is SAS Institute, the world's largest privately held software company. SAS makes Fortune's 100 Best Companies to Work For list every year. The company has enjoyed low employee turnover, high customer satisfaction, and 28 straight years of revenue growth. What's the secret to all this success? The authors, an academic and a CEO, approach this question differently, but they've come to the same conclusion: SAS has learned how to harness the creative energies of all its stakeholders, including its customers, software developers, managers, and support staff. Its framework for managing creativity rests on three guiding principles. First, help employees do their best work by keeping them intellectually engaged and by removing distractions. Second, make managers responsible for sparking creativity and eliminate arbitrary distinctions between "suits" and "creatives". And third, engage customers as creative partners so you can deliver superior products. Underlying all three principles is a mandate to foster interaction--not just to collect individuals' ideas. By nurturing relationships among developers, salespeople, and customers, SAS is investing in its future creative capital. Within a management framework like SAS's, creativity and productivity flourish, flexibility and profitability go hand in hand, and work/life balance and hard work aren't mutually exclusive.     

Success that lasts

Pursuing success can feel like shooting in a landscape of moving targets: Every time you hit one, five more pop up from another direction. We are under constant pressure to do more, get more, be more. But is that really what success is all about? Laura Nash and Howard Stevenson interviewed and surveyed hundreds of professionals to study the assumptions behind the idea of success. They then built a practical framework for a new way of thinking about success--a way that leads to personal and professional fulfillment instead of feelings of anxiety and stress. The authors' research uncovered four irreducible components of success: happiness (feelings of pleasure or contentment about your life); achievement (accomplishments that compare favorably against similar goals others have strived for); significance (the sense that you've made a positive impact on people you care about); and legacy (a way to establish your values or accomplishments so as to help others find future success). Unless you hit on all four categories with regularity, any one win will fail to satisfy. People who achieve lasting success, the authors learned, tend to rely on a kaleidoscope strategy to structure their aspirations and activities. This article explains how to build your own kaleidoscope framework. The process can help you determine which tasks you should undertake to fulfill the different components of success and uncover areas where there are holes. It can also help you make better choices about what you spend your time on and the level of energy you put into each activity. According to Nash and Stevenson, successful people who experience real satisfaction achieve it through the deliberate imposition of limits. Cultivating your sense of "just enough" can help you set reachable goals, tally up more true wins, and enjoy lasting success.     

Understanding "people" people

Nearly all areas of business--not just sales and human resources--call for interpersonal savvy. Relational know-how comprises a greater variety of aptitudes than many executives think. Some people can "talk a dog off a meat truck," as the saying goes. Others are great at resolving interpersonal conflicts. Some have a knack for translating high-level concepts for the masses. And others thrive when they're managing a team. Since people do their best work when it most closely matches their interests, the authors contend, managers can increase productivity by taking into account employees' relational interests and skills when making personnel choices and project assignments. After analyzing psychological tests of more than 7,000 business professionals, the authors have identified four dimensions of relational work: influence, interpersonal facilitation, relational creativity, and team leadership. This article explains each one and offers practical advice to managers--how to build a well-balanced team, for instance, and how to gauge the relational skills of potential employees during interviews. To determine whether a job candidate excels in, say, relational creativity, ask her to describe her favorite advertising campaign, slogan, or image and tell you why she finds it to be so effective. Understanding these four dimensions will help you get optimal performance from your employees, appropriately reward their work, and assist them in setting career goals. It will also help you make better choices when it comes to your own career development. To get started, try the authors' free online assessment tool, which will measure both your orientation toward relational work in general and your interest level in each of its four dimensions.     

On the consequences of demographic change for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare

This paper employs a multi-country large-scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital.     

WHY SOCIETY NEEDS "IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE"—AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR VALUATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY

Despite all the talk of a New Economy and the revolutionary import of the Internet, this article suggests that there is nothing really new under the sun. When Christopher Columbus was building the ships for his expeditions to the East Indies, only the vaguest estimates could be made of their potential value. At this stage, nobody knew if Columbus would be able to manage the crossing, when the ships would return, and what cargo they would eventually carry. In this sense, Columbus's venture bears a striking resemblance to many of today's Internet stocks. This paper raises and attempts to answer a number of interesting questions. For example, how do risky ventures with very high fixed (startup) costs but very low expected variable costs raise the capital necessary to fund the fixed costs? What role should government (and, in particular, monetary) policy play in encouraging (or discouraging) funding for such ventures? And how does one establish the value of such ventures when there is little or no revenue and, in some cases, no clearly defined product? The answer to the first question is investor enthusiasm–or, in Alan Greenspan's terms, “irrational exuberance.” Irrational exuberance plays a very important economic role in giving entrepreneurs access to the cheap financing necessary to fund ventures with heavy startup costs. Indeed, “irrational exuberance” may be the best solution for financing large fixed costs, not only because it is a private (as opposed to a government‐financed) solution, but because it gives investors direct access to the risks and rewards of promising investment opportunities. Before the recent “democratization” of capital markets, such ventures would have been funded by large corporations if not government agencies. As for the third question, this paper suggests there is only one useful way to estimate the value of ventures without revenues or products. The author provides a back‐of‐the‐envelope, “Fermitype” valuation method that is based on the principle of “human capital arbitrage.” For those Internet startups that lure top executives away from established firms with large grants of stock options but relatively low salaries, there is a “breakeven level” for the future stock price that can be calculated using a fairly modest amount of information about the executive's past and current compensation plans. For outside investors, such movements of human capital provide what is perhaps the most reliable basis for estimating the value of the firm.     

Why Capital Efficiency Measures Are Rarely Used in Incentive Plans, and How to Change That

Despite the wide acceptance of DCF valuation and its corollary that value is created only by earning more than the cost of capital, very few companies use performance measures that focus on corporate efficiency in using capital—measures such as return on capital (ROC) or economic value added (EVA)—as the main basis for their top management incentive programs. In this article, the authors begin by documenting the surprisingly limited use of such measures in management incentive plans. Next they analyze three often cited problems—difficulty in retaining managers, discouragement of growth investment, and complexity—that could account for the limited use of such measures. Third and last, they suggest a number of adjustments to standard capital efficiency measures that are designed to address these problems and, in so doing, to give corporate directors more confidence in using measures like EVA to reward and hold managers accountable for value-adding performance.
In illustrating the problems encountered when using such performance measures, the article uses case studies of three long-time "EVA companies"—Briggs & Stratton, Herman Miller, and Manitowoc—to highlight the difficulty of using a "bonus bank" (or "clawback") system to hold managers fully accountable for earning a minimum return on capital. After presenting empirical data that shows "delayed productivity" of invested capital, the authors suggest that conventional capital efficiency measures can discourage value-increasing growth.
The article concludes by recommending that although measures like EVA used in combination with negative bonus banks provide the right incentives, EVA capital charges should be phased in gradually to reflect the delayed productivity of capital. At the same time, corporate boards should consider providing bonus bank "relief" when market and industry factors have excessively large negative effects on the performance measures and bonus awards.     

Riding the waves of technology through the decades: The relation between industry-level information technology intensity and the cost of equity capital

This paper examines the effect that information technology (IT) investments have on the industry cost of equity capital. We find that industry IT intensity, defined as the relative amount of IT investment to total fixed asset expenditures, is negatively related to the industry cost of equity capital. These results indicate that industries with higher levels of IT investment have lower cost of equity capital. We also find that the relation between IT intensity and cost of equity capital changes over time. Initially, investors viewed IT investments as risky ventures and demanded higher levels of cost of equity (or higher return on their investment) for those industries investing in IT. However, beginning in the 1980s, as IT became more reliable, more cost effective, and had the ability to transform businesses, investors viewed IT Intensity as a positive business strategy with less associated risks and reduced their required cost of equity capital (or lower return on their investment). Extrapolating from our industry results, IT investments allow firms to potentially raise capital at a lower price so they have more assets to employ, indicating that IT investments can be a key factor for business success.     

Let's hear it for B players

In the much-heralded war for talent, it's hardly surprising that companies have invested a lot of time, money, and energy in hiring and retaining star performers. For most CEOs, recruiting stars is simply more fun; for one thing, the young A players they interview often remind them of themselves at the same age. For another, A players' brilliance and drive is infectious; you simply want to be in their company. Besides, in these troubled times, when businesses are so vulnerable, people who seem to have what it takes to turn around a company's performance are almost irresistible. But our understandable fascination with star performers can lure us into the dangerous trap of underestimating the vital importance of the supporting actors. It's true that A players can make enormous contributions to performance. Yet, as the authors have found, companies' long-term performance--even survival--depends far more on the unsung commitment and contributions of their B players. These capable, steady performers are the best supporting actors of the corporate world. Companies are routinely blinded to the important role B players serve in saving organizations from themselves. They counter-balance the ambitions of the company's high-performing visionaries, whose much-esteemed strengths, when carried to an extreme, can lead to reckless or volatile behavior. In this sense, B players act as a stabilizing force for charismatic A players who might otherwise destabilize the organization. Unfortunately, organizations rarely learn to value their B players in ways that are gratifying for either the company or these employees. As a result, they see their profits sinking without understanding why. This article will help you to rethink the role of your organization's B players. The authors show how you can mentor and nurture B players to ensure their continued participation in the company.     

Improving the Health of Healthcare Companies

The healthcare sector has been extremely effective in improving human health while at the same time delivering outstanding returns to shareholders, at least on average. But averages can hide a lot of poor performance, and careful examination of the sector shows a sizable disparity between the long‐run productivity and value added of the top companies and the rest. To better understand the reasons for this disparity, the authors undertook a comprehensive study of how differences in capital deployment strategies, financial policies, and measures of corporate operating performance such as sales growth and return on capital are associated with returns to shareholders. Perhaps the most striking finding is the strong positive correlation in the healthcare industry between higher rates of reinvestment, especially in the form of spending on R&D and acquisitions, and stock price performance. And given the importance of such reinvestment, it is not surprising that maintaining financial flexibility by paying down net debt and otherwise limiting corporate leverage—and even issuing significant equity—are all associated with higher stock returns. When it comes to operating performance, moreover, it's not enough just to be good; it takes growth and improvement in cash flow and earnings to drive share prices higher. Measures of changes in performance such as increases in EBIT and ROIC, and high rates of growth in sales, all show consistently strong and positive relationships with stock returns while measures of levels of performance, especially EBIT margins and EBITDA margins, demonstrate relationships that are weak and in some cases even negative. Last, and consistent with the findings reported above, despite often vocal investor demands to pay dividends and buy back shares, in the case of healthcare as a whole such distributions have a clearly inverse relationship with share price performance. That is to say, the larger the payouts to shareholders, the lower the shareholder returns.     

Factor price misspecification in bank cost function estimation

Many studies of bank productivity implicitly assume that banks face imperfect factor markets in accessing labor and capital such that, in renting the same factor of production, at the same time, one bank will pay a price that will vary greatly from that of another bank. Usually, this implicit assumption is introduced by researchers’ simple expedience in calculating a factor price by dividing total cost attributable to a factor by the number of units rented. The range of factor prices so obtained, however, exceeds the reasonable bounds commonly observed in integrated factor markets. Our study contends that the wide variety of labor factor prices implicitly assumed is in fact a reflection of a variegated labor market and that the wide variety of financial capital costs is a reflection of incomplete specification of funds’ costs. We contend that, particularly in cross-sectional studies, it would generally be better for researchers to assume that banks faced competitive factor markets, thereby allowing the factor price term of cost functions to be eliminated. Not only would such elimination allow for a better estimate of true economies of scale and efficiency; it would also simplify greatly the estimation of many models. In this paper, we review briefly the significance of specifying factor prices in cost functions. Then we look at some actual factor prices that are reported in studies and used as inputs to cost function estimation. We conduct some simple tests to show what the reported factor prices in banking may actually represent. Having shown that factor prices reported are subject to misspecification, we estimate a set of cost functions with and without factor price specifications. We conclude by demonstrating that the improper specification of factor prices can affect inferences regarding measurement of inefficiency and returns to scale. Finally, we suggest methods by which these misspecifications may be rectified by use of time series, regional and international factor pricing data.     

Risk Capital: Theory and Applications

After a brief review of the current theory and practice of risk capital by financial firms, the authors define the concept of risk capital and identify the costs and benefits of using more or less of it. Next, they present their procedure for allocating risk capital to assets and lines of business on the basis of marginal default values, and in a way designed to prevent risk shifting and internal arbitrage. Then, they show how allocations of risk capital are likely to be affected by, and in turn influence, a financial firm's decisions about both the scale and composition of its portfolio of businesses. Finally, the authors present a number of applications and consider their implications for maximizing the value of financial firms. In so doing, the authors also show how their method produces very different allocations of risk capital than those based on two measures that have long been widely used by financial firms: value at risk (VaR) and risk‐adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Moreover, the adjusted present value (APV) rule for evaluating investment opportunities is shown to be workable for nonfinancial as well as financial firms.     

Energy Infrastructure Investment and the Rise of the Uncorporation1

While most large U.S. businesses have long been organized as corporations, a significant portion of our economy, including major parts of our energy infrastructure, are organized as other types of legal entities. These “uncorporations” include such business forms as Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). Many practitioners have dismissed these alternative entities as merely tax devices and only peripherally important to mainstream business. But this view misses important features of the uncorporation that make it an important alternative in dealing with the “agency” costs that arise in public companies from separating managerial control from equity ownership. Corporate governance relies heavily on agents such as auditors, class action lawyers, judges, and independent directors to protect shareholders from managerial self‐interest. The obvious costs and defects of relying on these governance mechanisms have generally been seen as a reasonable price to pay for the benefits of the corporate form. But this conclusion depends on the availability and effectiveness of the alternative mechanisms for addressing agency costs. Uncorporations provide such an alternative by tying managers' economic well‐being so closely to that of their firms that corporate monitoring devices become less necessary. Uncorporate governance mechanisms include managerial compensation that is based largely (if not entirely) on the firm's profits or cash distributions, and restrictions on managers' control of corporate cash through liquidation rights and requirements for cash distributions. Business people and policy makers should evaluate the potential benefits of uncorporations before concluding that the costs of corporate governance are an inevitable price of separating ownership and control in modern firms.     

Raising search costs to deter window shopping can increase profits and welfare

Consumers tend to browse products they are interested in and firms often invest resources in selling to them. A consequence, I show, is that it is optimal for a firm to increase the cost of browsing (even though this drives away potential customers) because doing so allows it to target sales efforts at those consumers most likely to buy. Despite representing pure waste, this can increase welfare by facilitating efficient allocation of sales or marketing resources. For a similar reason, consumers often benefit from search costs in aggregate, and prefer them to other means of screening, such as price increases.     

Strategy and your stronger hand

There are two kinds of businesses in the world, says the author. Knowing what they are--and which one your company is--will guide you to the right strategic moves. One kind includes businesses that compete on a complex-systems model. These companies have large enterprises as their primary customers. They seek to grow a customer base in the thousands, with no more than a handful of transactions per customer per year (indeed, in some years there may be none), and the average price per transaction ranges from six to seven figures. In this model, 1,000 enterprises each paying dollar 1 million per year would generate dollar 1 billion in annual revenue. The other kind of business competes on a volume-operations model. Here, vendors seek to acquire millions of customers, with tens or even hundreds of transactions per customer per year, at an average price of relatively few dollars per transaction. Under this model, it would take 10 million customers each spending dollar 8 per month to generate nearly dollar 1 billion in revenue. An examination of both models shows that they could not be further apart in their approach to every step along the classic value chain. The problem, though, is that companies in one camp often attempt to create new value by venturing into the other. In doing so, they fail to realize how their managerial habits have been shaped by the model they've grown up with. By analogy, they have a "handedness"--the equivalent of a person's right- or left-hand dominance--that makes them as adroit in one mode as they are awkward in the other. Unless you are in an industry whose structure forces you to attempt ambidexterity (in which case, special efforts are required to manage the inevitable dropped balls), you'll be far more successful making moves that favor your stronger hand.     

Capital Allocation in Financial Firms

This paper develops a theory of capital allocation in financial intermediaries where the cost of "risk capital" is a critical consideration. The implication for capital budgeting is that financial firms should use a modified NPV rule in which projects are valued by calculating the NPV of cash flows using marketdetermined discount rates and then subtracting a deadweight cost of capital that reflects the project's marginal contribution to firm-wide risk.
By taking account of deadweight costs—mainly monitoring and moral hazard costs associated with having too little equity capital as well as "free cash flow" agency costs and higher taxes associated with having too much—the capital allocation model predicts that financial firms will diversify across businesses with similar deadweight costs. Such diversification reduces the cost of risk capital for the individual businesses, thereby creating more profitable investment opportunities at the margin and enabling the businesses to operate on a larger scale. The authors note that their model has similarities to but also important differences from the standard applications of RAROC models.     

BEHIND THE CORPORATE HEDGE: INFORMATION AND THE LIMITS OF "SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION"

The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk-taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re-duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche.