CEO Age,Risk Incentives,and Hedging Strategy

We test whether managerial preferences explain how firms hedge, using hand‐collected data on derivative portfolios in the oil and gas industry. How firms hedge involves choosing between linear contracts and put options, and deciding whether to finance these hedging positions with cash on hand or by selling call options. The likelihood of being a hedger increases with chief executive officer (CEO) age, and near‐retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data.     

Why do firms engage in selective hedging? Evidence from the gold mining industry

The widespread practice of managers speculating by incorporating their market views into firms’ hedging programs (“selective hedging”) remains a puzzle. Using a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms, we find no evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among firms that are believed to possess an information advantage. In contrast, we find strong evidence that selective hedging is more prevalent among financially constrained firms, suggesting that this practice is driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.     

Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium

We analyze the hedging decisions of firms, within an equilibrium setting that allows us to examine how a firm's hedging choice depends on the hedging choices of its competitors. Within this equilibrium some firms hedge while others do not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The fraction of firms that hedge depends on industry characteristics, such as the number of firms in the industry, the elasticity of demand, and the convexity of production costs. Consistent with prior empirical findings, the model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the decision to hedge in the most competitive industries.     

Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies

We show theoretically that while cash allows financially constrained firms to hedge future investment against income shortfalls, reducing current debt is a more effective way to boost investment in future high cash flow states. Thus, constrained firms prefer higher cash to lower debt if their hedging needs are high, but lower debt to higher cash if their hedging needs are low. We provide empirical evidence that supports our theory. Our analysis points to an important hedging motive behind cash and debt management policies. It suggests that cash should not be viewed as negative debt in the presence of financing frictions.     

Hedging and liquidity

This article develops a model for evaluating alternative hedgingstrategies for financially constrained firms. A key advantageof the model is the ability to capture the intertemporal effectsof hedging on the firm's financial situation. We characterizethe optimal hedge. A wide range of alternative hedging strategiescan be specified and the model allows us to determine in eachcase if the hedging strategy raises or lowers firms value andby how much. We show that hedging firm value, hedging cash flowfrom operations and hedging sales revenue are not optimal. Thearticle highlights the fact that every hedging strategy comespackaged with a borrowing strategy which requires careful consideration.     

Handling Weather Related Risks Through the Financial Markets: Considerations of Credit Risk, Basis Risk, and Hedging

The profits of many businesses are strongly affected by weather related events, and insurance against weather related risks (acts of God) has been a traditional domain for transfer of (certain) of these risks. Recent innovations in the capital market have now provided financial instruments to transfer and hedge some of these risks. Unlike insurance solutions, however, using these financial derivative instruments creates a situation in which the return to the purchaser of the instrument is no longer perfectly correlated with the loss experienced. Such a mismatch creates new risks which must be examined and evaluated as part of ascertaining cost effective risk management plans. Two newly engendered risks, basis risk (the risk created by the fact that the return from the financial derivative is a function of weather at a prespecified geographical location which may not be identical to the location of the firm) and credit risk (the risk that the counterparty to the derivative contract may not perform), are analyzed in this article. Using custom tailored derivatives from the over the counter market can decrease basis risk, but increases credit risk. Using standardized exchange traded derivatives decreases credit risk but increases basis risk. Here also the effectiveness of using hedging methods involving forwards and futures having linear payoffs (linear hedging) and methods using derivatives having nonlinear payoffs such as those involving options (nonlinear hedging) for the purpose of hedging basis risk are examined jointly with credit risk.     

Foreign Currency Derivatives versus Foreign Currency Debt and the Hedging Premium

This paper compares the effect on firm value of different foreign currency (FC) financial hedging strategies identified by type of exposure (short‐ or long‐term) and type of instrument (forwards, options, swaps and foreign currency debt). We find that hedging instruments depend on the type of exposure. Short‐term instruments such as FC forwards and/or options are used to hedge short‐term exposure generated from export activity while FC debt and FC swaps into foreign currency (but not into domestic currency) are used to hedge long‐term exposure arising from assets located in foreign locations. Our results relating to the value effects of foreign currency hedging indicate that foreign currency derivatives use increases firm value but there is no hedging premium associated with foreign currency debt hedging, except when combined with foreign currency derivatives. Taken individually, FC swaps generate more value than short‐term derivatives.     

On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging

Finance theory indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of financial distress, or other agency costs. This paper provides evidence on these hypotheses using survey data on firm's use of forwards, futures, swaps, and options combined with COMPUTSTAT data on firm characteristics. Of 169 firms in the sample, 104 firms use hedging instruments in 1986. The data suggest that firms which hedge face more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging substitutes.     

Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions

This paper uses commercial aircraft transactions to determine whether capital constraints cause firms to liquidate assets at discounts to fundamental values. Results indicate that financially constrained airlines receive lower prices than their unconstrained rivals when selling used narrow-body aircraft. Capital constrained airlines are also more likely to sell used aircraft to industry outsiders, especially during market downturns. Further evidence that capital constraints affect liquidation prices is provided by airlines' asset acquisition activity. Unconstrained airlines significantly increase buying activity when aircraft prices are depressed; this pattern is not observed for financially constrained airlines.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

Hedging,financing, and investment decisions: Theory and empirical tests

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.     

Corporate debt issues and interest rate risk management: Hedging or market timing?

Apart from the obvious reasons for raising capital, a firm can hedge its interest rate exposure by issuing debt, the value of which moves in an opposite direction from the value of its assets as interest rate varies. We examine whether firms in the UK market make full use of debt issuances for hedging purposes or if they have other considerations. Our evidence shows that firms’ choices of debt issues are primarily driven by debt market conditions in an effort to lower their costs of capital rather than managing their firm-specific interest rate exposures. This suggests that market timing, as opposed to hedging, is the primary motivation behind corporate debt issuances.     

Pricing and hedging contingent claims using variance and higher order moment swaps

This paper suggests perfect hedging strategies of contingent claims under stochastic volatility and random jumps of the underlying asset price. This is done by enlarging the market with appropriate swaps whose pay-offs depend on higher order sample moments of the asset price process. Using European options and variance swaps, as well as barrier options written on the S&P 500 index, the paper provides clear cut evidence that hedging strategies employing variance and higher order moment swaps considerably improves upon the performance of traditional delta hedging strategies. Inclusion of the third-order moment swap improves upon the performance of variance swap-based strategies to hedge against random jumps. This result is more profound for short-term out-of-the money put options.     

Hedging and competition

We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital (due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework. We show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. In addition, hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed. Further, with hedging, the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative, and is more negative, the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor.     

The determinants of Norwegian exporters’ foreign exchange risk management

Abstract

This paper examines foreign exchange (FX) hedging by Norwegian exporting firms to provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the hedging decision. The paper contributes to prior studies by, first, focusing on exporters to ensure that the companies in the sample have FX exposure, thereby allowing a more rigorous test of the theoretical determinants of hedging, and, secondly, in contrast to most previous studies that have focused on FX external hedging instruments, the use of both internal and external instruments is examined. Univariate, multivariate and multinominal analyses all provide evidence consistent with the firm value maximization hypotheses of underinvestment and risk aversion. Also, the following characteristics of firms—size, extent of internationalization and liquidity—are found to be related to the decision to hedge FX risk. However, the evidence on the links between the firm characteristics and the decision to hedge is not consistent across internal and external FX hedgers, and also varies for individual hedging instruments. Therefore it is argued that the empirical evidence on the theoretical determinants cannot be generalized to cover the full range of FX hedging strategies (which includes internal hedging instruments). Unlike empirical studies for other countries the evidence for Norwegian firms does not support the hypothesis that the avoidance of financial distress and the need to resort to external capital markets is a significant determinant of the hedging decision. Whilst the evidence suggests that country-specific factors may play a role in determining the use of FX hedging, it does not imply that the different policies adopted are necessarily inconsistent with the firm value maximization hypothesis.     

The risk implications of insurance securitization: The case of catastrophe bonds

Catastrophe (Cat) bonds are insurance securitization vehicles which are supposed to transfer catastrophe-related underwriting risk from issuers to capital markets. This paper addresses key, unanswered questions concerning Cat bonds and offers the following results. First, our findings show firms that issue Cat bonds exhibit less risky underwriting portfolios with less exposure to catastrophe risks and overall less need to hedge catastrophe risk. These results show that the access to the market for insurance securitization is easiest for firms with less risky portfolios. Second, firms that issue Cat bonds are found to experience a reduction in their default risk relative to non-issuing firms and our results, therefore, demonstrate that Cat bonds provide effective catastrophe hedging for issuing firms. Third, firms with less catastrophe exposure, increase their catastrophe exposure following an issue. Therefore, our paper cautions that the ability to hedge catastrophe risk causes some firms to seek additional catastrophe risk.     

The governance of risk management: The importance of directors’ independence and financial knowledge

We test the effects of the independence and financial knowledge of directors on risk management and firm value in the gold mining industry. Our original hand‐collected database on directors’ financial education, accounting background, and financial experience allows us to measure the effect of financial knowledge on risk management activities. We show that directors’ financial knowledge increases firm value through the risk management channel. This effect is strengthened by the independence of the directors on the board and on the audit committee. Extending the dimension of education, we show that, following unexpected shocks to gold prices, firms with financially educated directors are more effective in hedging than average firms in the industry. Firms that hedge more also attracts highly educated directors on their board and audit committee. As a policy implication, our results suggest adding the experience and education dimensions to the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange requirements for better governance.     

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

Empirical evidence is presented to show that in modern times banks can hedge liquidity shocks but could not do so prior to FDIC insurance. However, the government's limitations in properly pricing FDIC insurance are leading to many current examples of moral hazard. A model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be “actuarially fair,” incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain. Motivated by empirical evidence that money market mutual funds also can hedge liquidity shocks, I consider an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies.     

DURATION,IMMUNIZATION, AND HEDGING WITH INTEREST RATE FUTURES

The recent advent of the interest rate futures markets has greatly enriched the hedging opportunities of market participants faced with undesired interest rate risk. The variety of futures contracts presently spans a number of instruments with different risk, maturity, and coupon characteristics. This paper modifies the concept of duration and extends the duration hedging approach to cases where futures contracts are used as the hedging instrument. The derived hedge ratios take into account differences in coupon, maturity, and risk for three different regimes. Usage of these hedge ratios should lead to more efficient hedging of interest rate risk.     

Hedging index exchange traded funds

This paper presents an empirical comparison of the out of sample hedging performance from naïve and minimum variance hedge ratios for the four largest US index exchange traded funds (ETFs). Efficient hedging is important to offset long and short positions on market maker’s accounts, particularly imbalances in net creation or redemption demands around the time of dividend payments. Our evaluation of out of sample hedging performance includes aversion to negative skewness and excess kurtosis. The results should be of interest to hedge funds employing tax arbitrage or leveraged long–short equity strategies as well as to ETF market makers.