考虑政府补贴和产出不确定的绿色供应链契约分析

以下游制造商为主导者、上游供应商为跟随者的二级供应链为研究对象,构建了批发价格契约、两部定价契约和数量折扣契约模型,探讨在政府补贴和产出不确定下,不同契约对产品绿色度及供应链绩效的影响。研究表明:两部定价契约和数量折扣契约均可协调政府补贴和产出不确定下的绿色供应链;两部定价契约下供应商的材料批发价格低于数量折扣契约,因此两部定价契约有助于降低制造商投入成本,数量折扣契约有助于供应商的资金回笼将获利期提前。     

考虑制造商竞争的绿色供应链政府补贴策略研究

为研究不同政府补贴策略对存在消费者绿色偏好以及两制造商横向竞争的绿色供应链的影响,分别建立和求解了三种补贴策略:无补贴策略、高成本制造商补贴策略、低成本制造商补贴策略。比较研究及数值仿真表明:政府补贴会提高直接受补贴产品的绿色度和需求量,但会降低无补贴产品的绿色度和市场需求量;制造商利润在直接受补贴下最高,补贴竞争者时最低;零售商和供应链总利润均在低成本制造商补贴策略下达到最高,其次是高成本制造商补贴策略;政府补贴只有在补贴力度适当时才能对供应链自身渠道利润产生正向作用。     

政府调控下绿色消费与绿色供应链实施的演化博弈分析

绿色消费是绿色供应链实施的引擎,而供应链企业是绿色供应链的实施主体,应用演化博弈理论构建在政府调控下双方绿色行为选择过程的演化博弈模型,通过分析得到不同情形下双方的演化稳定策略。研究结果表明,在绿色供应链产品溢价低于其效用时,消费者基于环保责任与政府的补贴激励会促进绿色消费,结合政府有效的激励与惩罚机制传导至供应链企业,在其能够获得超额收益时主动实施绿色供应链,从而实现绿色供应链供给与需求市场稳定均衡发展。     

碳交易和绿色补贴政策下的低碳供应链最优决策与协调

考虑政府的碳交易管制和绿色补贴政策,针对由政府、单个制造商和单个零售商组成的三级低碳供应链,运用博弈理论建立了政府主导下的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型。重点分析了消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格和减排成本系数对低碳供应链最优决策和社会福利水平的影响。利用两部收费契约和低价促销策略分别对所建模型进行了协调研究,并利用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证。研究发现:较强的消费者绿色偏好有利于提高产品的绿色度、渠道成员的利润和供应链的社会福利水平;产品的绿色度和供应链的社会福利水平在集中决策模型下最高而在分散决策模型下较低;政府的最优绿色投资补贴率在消费者绿色偏好程度较强时降低而在碳减排难度较大时上升;在参数满足一定条件下,两部定价契约和低价促销策略可实现低碳供应链的完美协调。     

基于异质消费群体的生态供应链网络均衡模型

文章针对不同消费者对新产品、再制造产品存在效用异质性的情况,构建了一个由制造商和消费者市场组成的两层生态供应链超网络模型,优化目标为经济效益最大化、环境影响和风险最小化。考虑环境规制及产品的可再造比例对整个供应链绩效的影响,利用网络均衡理论描述不同主体的独立行为和主体之间、产品之间相互影响的竞争行为。数据分析结果表明,系统整体效益以及企业对产品可再造比例的选择很大程度上取决于产品创新效率和政府补贴方式。     

绿色低碳产品消费市场活力激发研究——基于绿色家电产品的演化博弈

激发绿色低碳产品消费市场活性,对拉动上游企业低碳减排,促进低碳供应链发展具有重要作用。基于演化博弈理论,构建了政府、家电企业、消费者三方博弈模型,探索各主体策略选择及演化稳定路径,并以实际数据进行验证。研究结果表明:政府低碳决策主要受家电企业低碳决策影响,家电企业低碳决策主要受消费者低碳决策影响,消费者低碳决策受政府及家电企业决策共同影响;家电企业低碳成本、政府不监管时消费者选择低碳消费带来的家电企业额外收益、绿色家电与非绿色家电价格差、消费者低碳消费环境保护效用是促进模型向政府不用监管、家电企业积极提供绿色家电、消费者主动选择低碳消费的理想稳定状态演化的重要决定因素。为此,政府应对企业减排成本合理补贴并加强宣传教育,家电企业应扩大低碳产品供给,提高低碳产品性价比,消费者应进一步提升低碳环保意识,树立低碳消费理念,践行低碳消费。     

供应链中商业信用与订货批量协调决策

文章基于供应商提供的不同商业信用策略假设,研究了由单一供应商和单一零售商构成的二级供应链中的联合批量决策问题。文章在对现有文献进行分析和梳理的基础上,将商业信用期长度作为决策变量,并考虑每循环周期供应商可能按照零售商订货量的整数倍放大采购的情形,构建出供应商不同商业信用策略下供应商和零售商的最优批量决策模型和供应链综合成本决策模型,并给出了供应链成本节约的收益分配方案。结果表明,与不提供商业信用激励相比,供应商提供商业信用激励时零售商的订购批量会更高,供应链的综合成本也更低。考虑到供应链联合决策中可能出现的收益不均衡问题,文章提出针对供应链协同带来的成本节约,按供应商与零售商投入存货成本比例进行分配的收益共享决策方案。最后,文章通过算例验证了模型和算法的有效性。     

学习能力影响下供应链企业间知识交易的最优合约配置!

在知识买方——供应链中的供应商的学习能力为其私人信息的情况下,知识卖方——制造商通过设计将知识交易量与原材料产品折扣价格相结合的合约菜单来甄别供应商的学习能力类型。在此基础上,建立信息不对称情形下的知识交易模型,通过模型求解得出最优的合约配置,并结合信息对称情形下的基准情形对合约菜单的相关性质进行了分析。最后利用数值算例对上述相关性质进行了说明。     

供应链中断下基于两个零售商竞争的收益分享合同研究

研究在由一个占主导地位的生产商和两个竞争的零售商组成的二级供应链中,成本中断对收益分享合同的影响,并把只考虑成本中断的情况扩展到更为复杂的成本和需求同时中断。通过分析建立的模型发现：在成本中断、需求和成本同时中断两种情况下,都仅有唯一一个最优分享比例能够实现供应链协调;零售商获得的收益分享比例随偏差成本的增大而增大,而随偏差需求的增大而减少。最后应用算例验证了上述结果,并得出一些管理启示。     

外包条件下供应链企业横向专利技术转让研究

在供应链业务外包条件下,当制造商主要依靠外包供应商提供中间产品时,拥有专利技术的制造商面临着是否进行专利技术转让的决策.当制造商在一定的专利技术转让费率条件下进行转让时,制造商在最终产品市场上增加了竞争者,同时,通过收取专利转让费用也减弱了竞争者的竞争能力,使竞争者对外包供应商的供应价格更敏感,促使外包供应商在一定程度降低了价格.这样,不但制造商将获得更多的利润,其他的各方(竞争者、外包供应商和消费者)也将从中获益.另外,在专利技术费用固定的条件下,拥有专利技术的制造商在竞争中获得的利润将减少,因而将不愿进行专利技术的转让.     

A multi-echelon supply chain model for reworkable items in multiple-markets with supply disruption

The objective of this paper is to develop a multi-echelon supply chain model for multiple-markets with different selling seasons. Here, two suppliers are involved to supply the raw materials to the manufacturer where the main supplier may face supply disruption after a random time and the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive than the main supplier. In this article, the manufacturer produces a random proportion of defective items which are reworked after regular production and are sold in a lot to another market just after completion of rework. The retailer sells the finished products in different markets according to seasons. Finally, an integrated expected cost per unit product of the chain is minimized analytically by considering the lot-size ordered as a decision variable. An appropriate numerical example is also provided to justify the proposed model.     

A three layer multi-item production–inventory model for multiple suppliers and retailers

The paper deals with a production inventory model for various types of items where multiple suppliers, a manufacturer and the multiple non-competing retailers are the members of the supply chain. In this model, each supplier supplies only one type of raw material to the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces a finished item by the combination of certain percentage of the various types of raw materials. The manufacturer produces also multi-items and delivers them according to the demand of the different retailers. Finally, an integrated profit of the supply chain is optimized by optimal ordering lot sizes of the raw materials. A numerical example is provided to justify the proposed model.     

延迟制造下供应商毗邻于制造商现象分析

现有的延迟研究文献对延迟制造下供应商毗邻于制造商这种现象进行分析的很少。这种地理毗邻现象是由处于支配地位的制造商实施延迟制造策略所决定的。由于制造商的支配地位,能够促使其他供应链成员做出调整以适应延迟制造策略,而供应商地理位置毗邻于制造商是缓解产品定制化和运营绩效矛盾的一个合理方案,可以减少产品定制对制造商运营的不利影响。地理毗邻有利于原料及零部件快速可靠的供应;有利于企业间知识的共享和双方紧密的学习交流;有利于企业间关系的进一步深化;有利于制造商非核心业务的外包。丰田公司和戴尔公司延迟制造的实践为地理毗邻现象的分析提供了例证,给制造商实行延迟制造提供了一定的借鉴意义。     

Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.     

基于响应时间的供应链协调策略研究

在市场需求价格和响应时间敏感下,本文以一个供应商和一个制造商构成的两级MTO供应链为背景,通过建立供应链收益函数模型,分析响应时间对供应链企业决策的影响。给出了供应商和制造商在分散决策下的最优响应策略,得出了供应链双方在分散决策下无法实现供应链完美协调的结论。而后,对供应链协调问题进行了探讨,发现两部收费制契约在满足一定条件下能够实现供应链完美协调,并通过数值实例对上面的结论进行了释义和说明。     

The effects of rising labour costs on global supply chains: the case of China’s cotton yarn industry

Rapid economic growth in China and India has resulted in rapidly rising labour costs in those countries. In this study a Muth-type model is used to assess the potential effects of this development on global supply chains using China’s cotton yarn industry as a case study. The model considers i) product differentiation at the yarn level; ii) imperfect competition in the markets for cotton yarn and raw cotton fibre, iii) input substitution between raw cotton fibre, labour, and capital; and iv) offsetting increases in the demand for cotton yarn caused by rising consumer income. Results suggest the effects of rising labour costs on the supply chain are modest, and easily swamped or obscured by the effects of rising income. Increases in industry market power (both oligopoly and oligopsony) have the same effect on the supply chain as increases in labour costs, raising prices to consumers of cotton yarn, and lowering prices to input suppliers, including foreign suppliers of raw cotton fibre. The combined effects of increases in labour costs and income have increased the factor shares for labour and to a lesser extent capital at the expense of raw cotton fibre.     

绿色产品协同创新中契约形式对供应商创新性的影响——供应商绿色创新资源优先配置的中介及产品复杂性与技术新颖性的调节

激发供应商创新性对供应链协同创新意义重大。从契约治理视角，探讨供应商参与绿色产品协同创新中契约形式对供应商创新性的影响。来自制造业231个样本的实证研究表明：①过程控制型契约与供应商创新性之间存在倒U型关系，目标激励型契约正向影响供应商创新性；②供应商绿色创新资源优先配置在两种契约形式和供应商创新性间起中介作用；③上述中介作用分别被产品复杂性和技术新颖性调节，二者均正向调节目标激励型契约对供应商创新性的间接作用，技术新颖性负向调节过程控制型契约对供应商创新性的间接作用。     

A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation

Laffont and Tirole's [Using cost observation to regulate firms, J. Polit. Econ. 94 (1986) 614-641] pioneering analysis identifies the optimal procurement contract when the supplier can readily inflate his innate production cost without detection. When the buyer has some ability to limit such cost inflation, an alternative contract can outperform the contract identified by Laffont and Tirole. The alternative contract induces substantial pooling, discontinuous production costs and effort supply, and rent that varies non-monotonically with innate cost.     

学习能力影响下供应链企业间知识交易的最优合约配置!

在知识买方——供应链中的供应商的学习能力为其私人信息的情况下,知识卖方——制造商通过设计将知识交易量与原材料产品折扣价格相结合的合约菜单来甄别供应商的学习能力类型。在此基础上,建立信息不对称情形下的知识交易模型,通过模型求解得出最优的合约配置,并结合信息对称情形下的基准情形对合约菜单的相关性质进行了分析。最后利用数值算例对上述相关性质进行了说明。     

Subsidizing (and taxing) business procurement

This paper studies the effect of a subsidy (or tax) on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers. Subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs. That is, overshifting occurs. When the size of the subsidy is not too large, the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy. A relatively weak sufficient condition for these results to hold is that suppliers earn a positive profit margin on the marginal unit sold, before taking into account any subsidy payment. Stronger sufficient conditions, tailored to each result, are provided.