Political institutions,stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy: Some international evidence

In this cross-country study, we draw on the dividend liquidity hypothesis and the political economy literature to examine whether political institutions affect the relationship between stock market liquidity and a firm’s dividend policy. In countries with weak political institutions, we expect that investors are less able to demand higher dividends for stocks with low liquidity. Using a sample of 52 countries, we show that the negative association between stock market liquidity and dividends is more pronounced in countries with sound political institutions, consistent with the “outcome” model of dividends. These results are stronger in countries with better legal institutions and weaker for firms with financial constraints.     

Political rights and equity pricing

We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms' equity financing costs are lower when political rights are stronger. We further find that political institutions' direct impact on the cost of equity capital is incremental to that of legal institutions. Economically, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with a 38 basis point decrease in corporate cost of equity capital. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political rights on equity pricing is more pronounced in countries with weak legal institutions.     

Impact of the global financial crisis on Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds

This study explores the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on Islamic and conventional stock and bond indices in 11 Islamic and eight non‐Islamic countries. We find that there are benefits of Islamic stocks during the GFC, particularly during the early stage of the crisis because Islamic institutions are prohibited from holding sub‐prime mortgage securities and derivatives. The strongest benefits of Islamic stocks are in the UK and USA. We conclude that there are benefits of risk reduction and stability for Islamic stocks during a financial crisis, although not necessarily during a global recession.     

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

Political rights and the cost of debt

We examine the impact of country-level political rights on the cost of debt for corporate bonds issued by firms incorporated in 39 countries. Similar to, but separate from, the relation for creditor rights, greater political rights are associated with lower yield spreads. A one standard deviation increase in political rights is associated with an 18.6% decline in bond spreads. We find evidence that political and legal institutions are substitutes; marginal improvements in political rights produce greater reductions in the cost of debt for firms from countries with weaker creditor rights. We examine potential factors through which political rights may affect the cost of debt and find that greater freedom of the press provides an important channel for reducing bond risks. Moreover, debt of firms with cross-listed equity trades at a premium in U.S. markets, but this relation appears to be more consistent with improved visibility than with bonding effects.     

The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions in place, namely, the political system and political constraints, are important determinants of residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. Unlike previous evidence that political ideology is an important determinant of privatization policies in developed countries, we find that right- or left-oriented governments do not behave differently in developing countries. These results confirm that privatization is politically constrained by dynamics that differ between countries.     

Did institutions herd during the internet bubble?

We examine the trading behavior of institutional investors during the internet bubble and crash of 1998–2001, and its impact on stock prices. Similar to some recent findings concerning the trading behavior of hedge funds and NASDAQ 100 stocks, we find that during the bubble all types of institutions herded with great intensity into internet stocks for a comprehensive sample of institutional investors and internet stocks. In addition to this, we present three entirely new results. First, institutional herding was much greater than what can be explained by momentum trading. Second, institutions as a group continued to increase their holdings of internet stocks for two quarters past the market peak during the first quarter of 2000, and three quarters past the peak for individual stock prices, suggesting that institutions were unable to time the price peaks. Finally and most importantly, we find positive abnormal returns contemporaneous with institutional herding and negative abnormal returns (reversals) at the point that herding ceased. This finding suggests that institutions’ trading created temporary price pressures, and may have contributed to the bubble.     

Investor sentiment and stock returns: Some international evidence

We examine whether consumer confidence – as a proxy for individual investor sentiment – affects expected stock returns internationally in 18 industrialized countries. In line with recent evidence for the U.S., we find that sentiment negatively forecasts aggregate stock market returns on average across countries. When sentiment is high, future stock returns tend to be lower and vice versa. This relation also holds for returns of value stocks, growth stocks, small stocks, and for different forecasting horizons. Finally, we employ a cross-sectional perspective and provide evidence that the impact of sentiment on stock returns is higher for countries which have less market integrity and which are culturally more prone to herd-like behavior and overreaction.     

Effects of international institutional factors on earnings quality of banks

We examine the relation between legal, extra-legal and political institutional factors and earnings quality of banks across countries. We predict that earnings quality is higher in countries with legal, extra-legal and political systems that reduce the consumption of private control benefits by insiders and afford outside investors greater protection. Using a sample of banks from 35 countries during the pre-crisis period from 1993 to 2006, we find that all five measures of earnings quality studied are higher in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and political institutional structures. We also find that banks in countries with stronger institutions are less likely to report losses, have lower loan loss provisions, and higher balance sheet strength during the 2007–2009 crisis period. Our findings highlight the implications of country level institutional factors for financial reporting quality and are relevant to bank regulators who are considering additional regulations on bank financial reporting.     

Corporate social responsibility reporting in financial institutions: Evidence from Euronext

The legitimacy, the identity and the social impact of financial institutions go beyond the generation of revenues for providers of capital, through financial intermediation. Financial institutions bear significant corporate social responsibility (CSR). We produce measures of CSR disclosure and explore the determinants of CSR disclosure practices in a cross section of financial institutions. Working with financial companies whose stocks are listed in the Euronext stock exchange, we find that the extent of disclosure of CSR practices is greater in large companies and also in companies of greater financial leverage. Therefore, increased corporate visibility and financial risk increase stakeholder demand for transparency on the social impact of financial institutions and their CSR practices.     

The Politics of Sovereign Credit Spreads

Using a large sample of 35 developing countries for the period 1993–2009, we provide strong and robust evidence that the political institutions in place play a significant role in explaining sovereign spreads. In particular, we find that unconstrained presidential systems increase spreads, while political stability and higher competition for political contest decrease spreads. In addition, political cohesion (political fragmentation) depresses (increases) spreads. Instead, the latter are insignificantly related to political orientation.     

State Ownership,Political Institutions,and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence from Privatization

In this paper, we examine the relation between government ownership and stock price informativeness around the world. Using a sample of privatized firms from 41 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is associated with lower firm-level stock price variation, i.e., stock price informativeness. Furthermore, we find that the relation between state ownership and stock price informativeness depends on political institutions. In particular, the adverse effects of state ownership on stock price informativeness are more pronounced in countries with lower political rights (i.e., lower political constraints on the government).     

Concentrated Announcements on Clustered Data: An Event Study on Biotechnology Stocks

In spring 2000, three events—two political statements by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair and a breakthrough announcement by Celera Genomics—had a major impact on biotechnology stocks. We analyze their effects over a comprehensive set of biopharmaceutical companies, using a composite return-generating model with an industry-specific patent-based factor. Our results show that stocks can be clustered according to their responsiveness to political and scientific events. Furthermore, we emphasize different impacts on the market value of intangible assets for each cluster, suggesting that growth options are valued with different criteria for therapeutics, and technology-based subsectors.     

Volatility effects of institutional trading in foreign stocks

This paper examines the impact of institutional trades on volatility in international stocks across 43 countries. There is a temporary volatility spike during the trade execution period, merely reflecting the price impact costs faced by the institutions. Cross sectional regressions suggest that trade imbalances, enforcement of insider trading laws, stock prices, and an emerging market classification are positively associated with temporary volatility increases whereas the presence of market makers and better shareholders’ rights dampen such increases. In the long term, institutional trades do not destabilize markets as the levels of volatility after their trades are almost identical to their pre-decision levels.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Financial integration and the price of world covariance risk: Large- vs. small-cap stocks

We investigate whether recent country-level evidence of global pricing is particular to large-cap stocks. Specifically, we examine cross-country return correlations and conduct asset pricing tests on three size-based stock portfolios for nine developed countries over the period from 1980 to 2004. We find that large-cap stocks realize significant comovements across countries, whereas small-cap stocks realize smaller average correlations (relative to both large-cap stocks and small-cap stocks across countries). More important, asset pricing tests suggest that while large-cap stocks are priced globally, global pricing is rejected for most small-cap stocks. Finally, the evidence indicates that financial integration deepened in recent years primarily for large-cap stocks. Overall, the results suggest that the global pricing pertains chiefly to large-cap stocks.     

Does Investment Horizon Matter? Disentangling the Effect of Institutional Herding on Stock Prices

This study finds that, over short horizons, herding by short‐term institutions promotes price discovery. In contrast, herding by long‐term institutions drives stock prices away from fundamentals over the same periods. Furthermore, while the positive predictability of short‐term institutional herding for stock prices is more pronounced for small stocks and stocks with high growth opportunities, the negative association between long‐term institutional herding and stock prices is stronger for stocks whose valuations are highly uncertain and subjective. Finally, we show that the destabilizing effect of institutional herding persistence documented in the recent literature is entirely driven by persistent herding by long‐term institutions.     

The price of sin: The effects of social norms on markets

We provide evidence for the effects of social norms on markets by studying “sin” stocks—publicly traded companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. We hypothesize that there is a societal norm against funding operations that promote vice and that some investors, particularly institutions subject to norms, pay a financial cost in abstaining from these stocks. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that sin stocks are less held by norm-constrained institutions such as pension plans as compared to mutual or hedge funds that are natural arbitrageurs, and they receive less coverage from analysts than do stocks of otherwise comparable characteristics. Sin stocks also have higher expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks, consistent with them being neglected by norm-constrained investors and facing greater litigation risk heightened by social norms. Evidence from corporate financing decisions and the performance of sin stocks outside the US also suggest that norms affect stock prices and returns.     

Do locals know better? A comparison of the performance of local and foreign institutional investors

We compare the performance of local versus foreign institutional investors using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings in 32 countries during the 2000–2010 period. We find that foreign institutions perform as well as local institutions on average, but only domestic institutions show a trading pattern consistent with an information advantage. Our results suggest a smart-money effect of local institutions in countries subject to higher information asymmetry, non-English speaking countries, countries with less efficient stock markets, with poor investor protection, or high levels of corruption. The local advantage is more pronounced in periods of market turmoil and in illiquid stocks.     

Institutional investments in pure play stocks and implications for hedging decisions

We show that institutions invest in stocks within an industry that maintain exposure to their underlying industry risk factor. These “pure play” stocks have greater numbers of institutional investors and institutions systematically overweight them in their portfolios while underweighting low industry-exposure stocks of firms in the same nominal industry. Pure play stocks also have greater liquidity measured by stock turnover and price impact. An implication of these results is that catering to these preferences could be an important variable in firms' risk management decisions, potentially offsetting incentives to reduce volatility via hedging. We further characterize institutions' investments for pure play stocks across institution type, industries, and over time.