VMCI 下基于批发价决策权转移的供应链效率改进研究

本文在VMCI 模式下，考虑销售努力水平对市场需求的影响，研究批发价决策权由供应商转移至零售商的两级供应链效率改进问题。假定零售商决策批发价和销售努力水平，供应商决策寄售量，建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型，证明了集中决策下的最优解和分散决策下的均衡解均存在且唯一，集中决策下的寄售因子大于分散决策下的对应值。随后，引入收入共享与销售努力成本共担契约，论证了系统中寄售因子保持不变、批发价降低，且当契约参数满足一定条件时，可实现帕累托改进，实现供应链的效率改进。最后，分析了契约参数对于系统决策变量及利润的影响。     

经销商再制造的闭环供应链收益-费用契约协调研究

针对经销商从事再制造的闭环供应链最优决策及协调问题，考虑消费者对新产品和再制造品的接受程度不同，本文构建了集中决策和分散决策两种模式下闭环供应链差别定价模型。研究发现，分散决策会造成整个闭环供应链的效率损失；消费者接受度对闭环供应链系统中各方的最优决策及利润具有一定影响，并提出了收益共享-费用分担契约来实现闭环供应链的协调和效率优化。最后通过算例分析，进一步验证了本文所提出的协调机制对闭环供应链的有效性。     

基于收益共享的供应链中断协调研究

本文假定市场需求不确定和供给存在中断危机，同时考虑订货过剩损失和缺货成本，研究了由零售商、主供应商和备份供应商组成的供应链网络，构建了收益共享合同协调模型，通过相关参数的设定达到供应链协调。供应链协调时的供货量及整体利润均大于分散模型；备份供应商的供货量及利润随着中断危机的增大而增加，零售商利润也随之增加。     

零售商主导的创新成本共担期权契约研究

本文在不确定市场环境中，考虑期权契约在零售商主导的单周期二级供应链成员间创新投入的协调，分别讨论在是否允许期权信用违约情形下，要实现供应链协调各决策主体的决策模型。研究发现单纯的期权契约难以实现供应商单方面创新投入行为，为此引入创新投入成本共担机制，对原契约加以修正则可以实现供应链协调。研究表明在创新成本共担下的期权契约机制可以满足零售商主导的供应链协调，能够提高供应商和零售商的期望收益，实现帕累托改进。     

基于CVaR的第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调

利用条件风险值理论研究了第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调问题。在随机需求与收益共享———费用共担契约下,建立了由单个风险规避零售商、单个风险规避制造商和单个风险中性第三方回收商组成的三阶闭环供应链的条件风险值模型和基于条件风险值的最优订购与定价决策模型。在对模型进行分析的基础上,揭示了制造商和零售商的风险规避水平对最优订购量、最优定价、条件风险值及闭环供应链协调性的影响。最后通过一个算例验证了研究结论。     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

云制造环境下制造能力共享的动态策略分析

本文在物联网环境下,考虑制造商剩余制造能力共享的动态性及对需求产生的影响,借助微分博弈研究了单个云平台和制造商构成的两级供应链制造能力共享问题。分析了供应链中制造商占主导的Stackelberg博弈、纵向合作以及云平台提出成本分担契约的情形,构建了相应的动态模型,得到反馈均衡策略及利润;发现合作共享能提高供应链整体利润,一定条件下实施的成本分担契约能实现供应链的协调;最后,通过数值分析,验证了结论的有效性。     

传统品牌与网货品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价研究

基于传统制造商品牌的双渠道供应链，引入网货品牌的网络直销渠道，构建了两个品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价模型。并考虑了两条网络渠道的双重搭便车行为，通过Nash博弈得到供应链成员在分散和集中式决策下的均衡策略。研究表明各博弈方的最优定价和利润是关于渠道间及品牌间交叉价格弹性系数的增函数，且渠道竞争的影响显著于品牌竞争；两个制造商的搭便车行为与自身的最优定价和利润呈正相关，但它们的相互影响取决于直接价格弹性系数；搭便车行为对零售商是不利的。最后采用价格加成契约来协调多渠道供应链，以弥补分散决策下双重边际效应带来的损失。     

Dynamic supply chain coordination under consignment and vendor-managed inventory in retailer-centric B2B electronic markets

This study examines the dynamic performance of vertically decentralized two-echelon channel coordination for deteriorating goods under consignment and vendor-managed inventory (VMI) contracts with revenue sharing from retailer-centric business-to-business transactions in both traditional markets and electronic markets (EMs). The research presents the profit-maximization problem and devises a method for making cross-enterprise dynamic joint decisions by combining calculus with dynamic programming for a retailer-led Stackelberg supply chain under cooperative and non-cooperative game settings over a multi-period planning horizon. The applicability of the proposed model is assessed using a case study involving a highly perishable product, sliced raw fish, in a supply chain comprising a regional seafood supplier and a local store belonging to a large national retail chain. The analytical results show that, in a cooperative setting, the EM with a consigned revenue-sharing VMI contract tends to achieve lower retail prices, larger stock quantity, improved channel efficiency, and increases in both retailer and supplier profits through an additional one-part tariff. Additionally, consumers benefit from lower retail prices and society benefits from increased overall channel profits in the cooperative channel and EM.     

Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract

This paper develops a model to study channel coordination and risk sharing in a retailer-led supply chain. Such chains are characterized by a dominant retailer who aims to coordinate the upstream production quantity. We investigate a coordinating contract based on an option with two parameters. An option price is paid by the retailer for each additional unit of product reserved beyond the initial order. An exercise price serves as the unit purchasing price when the retailer sets a second order if realized demand is more than the initial order. A successful coordination needs two conditions. One condition is to maintain a negative correlation between exercise price and option price. Particularly, we draw the functional form. The other is that the firm commitment must be lower than the optimal production quantity in a centralized system. In a risk sharing mechanism, we prove that such a contract brings benefit to each party.     

Managing channel coordination in a multi-channel manufacturer-retailer supply chain

With the rapid development of e-commerce and the adoption of dual channels, increasingly manufacturers and retailers are implementing differentiated branding and profit sharing strategies in order to improve channel coordination and supply chain performance. In this study, we focus on the strategic roles played by differentiated branding and profit sharing in a multi-channel manufacturer-retailer supply chain. We use an analytical model to investigate this issue. Our results show that although differentiated branding effectively alleviates channel competition and conflict, it is general not sufficient to achieve full channel coordination, and an additional coordination mechanism is necessary. The additional coordination mechanism we consider is profit sharing, using the Nash bargaining model. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify probable paths for future research.     

闭环供应链回收渠道与成本分摊机制研究

本文基于废旧产品的回收再制造，研究了零售商和制造商组成的闭环供应链。作者分别建立零售商回收和制造商回收两种模型，运用逆向归纳法求解分析不同模型对各成员利润的影响，指出成本分摊机制可以使闭环供应链达到协调。最后，选取合理的数据对结论进行验证，并就需求对价格的敏感系数及分摊比例等参数对回收率和利润值的影响做了分析。结果表明：一定条件下，制造商负责回收废旧产品要优于零售商负责回收；成本分摊契约可以提高回收率和各主体的利润值。     

A serial supply chain of newsvendor problem with safety stocks under complete and partial information sharing

We consider a supply chain where multiple members are serially connected. The decision is to determine the ordering quantity of a member to the next upstream member in the supply chain. The basic cost model is similar to the newsvendor problem with additional consideration to safety stock. This paper presents optimal approaches for coordination of the supply chain under both complete and partial information sharing in order to maximize the total expected benefit. For complete information sharing we develop an optimal coordination algorithm. For partial information sharing, we propose an optimal coordination algorithm based on the Alternating Direction Method and the Diagonal Quadratic Approximation Method. A numerical example is discussed to show the optimal convergence of ordering quantities and discuss the properties of the proposed algorithms.     

供应链弹性契约下的信息共享激励

在供应链弹性契约的约束下,要让供应链合作的双方有实现信息共享的积极性,就必须让双方在信息共享的条件下获取的利益至少不低于在未实现信息共享下的所获得的利益,这样才能实现双方利益的帕累托改善,也才能激励下游企业积极向上游企业共享需求信息,这必然要依赖于供应链弹性契约的科学设计。文章通过确定一个弹性数量契约来分析供应链上的合作双方在信息共享与信息不共享的条件下对双方运作绩效的改进,并考虑了在信息显示成本较大的情况下,对供应链中合作的双方进行信息显示成本分担的供应链弹性契约设计,从而获取满意或最优的契约参数。     

Managing the supply chain during disruptions: Developing a framework for decision-making

Business-to-business firms have traditionally encountered disruptions, but the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic was extraordinary as it interrupted global supply chains by causing unprecedented shocks to supply and demand. Firms experienced extraordinary pressure and struggled to minimize the immediate and long-term impact of supply chains disruptions. Applying chaos theory, this study employs a single-case method to understand the disruptions to the business-to-business oil and gas supply chain. We make three major contributions. First, we examine firm decision-making during significant disruptions. Second, we use chaos theory to better understand the decision-making process. Finally, we develop a framework to explicate the decision-making process and provide guidelines for decision-making during disruptions. Our findings provide theoretical insights and have important implications for practitioners addressing supply chain disruptions during crises.     

Impact of RFID information-sharing strategies on a decentralized supply chain with reverse logistics operations

The integration of environmental practices in a supply chain has been study for the past few decades. However, most of the work relies on centralized decisions made by one player. Few papers address the complex dynamics of environmental decentralized supply chains and how these dynamics can affect environmental and economic outcomes. To study this problem, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer and two different suppliers: a recycled-material and a raw-material supplier. The players make individual inventory decisions to satisfy demand and reduce cost. Further, this supply chain encompasses stochastic elements such as in demands, returns, and collection leadtimes. These decentralized decisions and random factors can cause underperforming results; therefore, new inventory models and technologies are needed to help companies increase coordination within these systems. We model the implementation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the supply chain to determine if real-time inventory monitoring and information sharing can help the system attain higher environmental benefits (more returns) and higher economic benefits (less cost). We study two scenarios through a simulation-based analysis: No RFID and RFID. Numerical studies show that environmental benefits are significantly increased with the attainment of more returns. However, although economic benefits are realized, they are less significant than the environmental benefits. Further regression and sensitivity analyses on the cost performance measures reveal that economic benefits depend on several drivers inside the system. We present managerial insights that illustrate what configurations within this complex system can lead to the achieving of environmental as well as economic benefits.     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.     

排污权交易情境下基于微分博弈的环境服务供应链决策

本文研究由排污企业与提供治污服务的第三方企业组成的一对一环境服务供应链,基于排污权交易,分别构建排污企业与第三方的分散与集中决策微分博弈模型,以探讨供应链最优决策及协调机制设计。研究表明:较高的消费者环保意识与较低的治污项目运营成本系数均有利于供应链成员治污形成合力;当排污权价格超过一定阈值时,排污企业委托治污的经济效益可以抵消排污权价格作用下生产削减造成的损失,此衍生的红利驱使排污企业转向积极治污;排污企业与第三方任一方污染损害系数的增大都会使对方受益,而自身利润受损,仅当第三方污染损害系数增大时,排污企业出现“搭便车”行为;激励与收益分配机制协调了供应链,企业各方利润及污染控制效果均实现帕累托改善。     

Streamlining inventory flows with time discounts to improve the profits of a decentralized supply chain

We consider a decentralized supply chain, whereby a supplier sells a product to a group of independent buyers, and develop a strategy for the supplier to offer an all-units price discount or cash rebate for orders that are synchronized with its replenishments. As synchronized orders can be met with inventory directly from receiving to shipping without warehousing, the proposed strategy streamlines system inventory flows to minimize inventory and, hence, the related costs. On the other hand, by increasing the replenishment interval of the supplier, the proposed strategy is able to induce buyers to order in large quantities and hence achieve the objectives of quantity discounts. We show that the proposed strategy can achieve nearly optimal (minimum) system cost, and is much more effective than the existing coordination strategies for decentralized supply chains in the literature.     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing: A discussion

This paper discusses some aspects of the centralised version of the supply chain coordination method that uses the so-called Alternating Direction Method (ADM) presented by Jeong (2012, A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing. International Journal of Production Economics 136 (1), 110–115). We show that the method requires both from the retailer and the manufacturer to faithfully follow the proposed algorithm, without any attempt to follow their own interests in gaining higher profits. We also warn that the condition of the information privacy is violated also in partial information sharing model. Furthermore, we correct an error in one of the equations.