欧盟对纵向限制竞争协议的规制

纵向限制竞争协议属于欧委会竞争总司负责审查的反托拉斯业务之一。欧盟竞争总司处理纵向限制竞争协议以条约、条例和指南为法律依据,涉及大量经济分析,需要了解具体市场、行业、产品的竞争状况,是一项法律和经济分析高度结合的工作,对我国反垄断立法和执法具有参考和借鉴意义。     

欧盟建立创新评价指标体系及其与美日的比较

２０００年３月，在西班牙里斯本召开的欧盟理事会明确提出了建立欧盟创新评价指标体系的要求，并将此作为提高欧盟经济竞争力的重要手段和措施，是将欧盟建设成为世界上最具竞争力的知识经济社会的战略思想。建立指标体系的目的当前在世界经济发展的总体格局中，美国和日本是欧盟经济发展的最大竞争对手。科学地比较欧盟与美国、日本的竞争力差距，同时对欧盟成员国之间的创新能力进行比较研究，做到心中有数，是提高欧盟整体创新能力和竞争实力的当务之急，建立该评价体系正是为了满足这样的要求。首先，建立创新评价指标体系可以反映并提…     

欧盟对中小企业的扶持政策

欧盟对中小企业的扶持政策钟伟欧盟为鼓励竞争，对国家补贴进行了严格限制，以防止不公平竞争的出现；但同时对中小企业却采取补贴政策进行扶持，本文将分析上述政策的一致性以及欧盟对中小企业的界定和补贴方法。一欧盟竞争政策的主要目的是为共同市场内部的所有企业创造...     

欧盟委员会促进创新研究的政策与措施

1.前言国际科技竞争已前移到原始创新阶段。原始创新能力、关键技术创新和系统集成创新能力已经成为国家间科技竞争的核心,成为决定国际产业分工和全球经济格局的基础条件。依靠科技创新提升国家的综合国力和核心竞争力,成为越来越多国家的战略抉择。2.欧盟创新与研究现状及存在的问题欧盟在创新研究方面的投资比美国大约少1/3,近年来,欧盟与美国和日本之间的创新差距并没有缩小。欧盟委员会的一项调查称,欧盟的创新成果少得可怜,想要赶上美国可能需要花费50年以上的时间。欧盟的《创新计分牌》将欧盟25国与美国、日本等国的表现进行比较,然…     

暴光制度——欧盟环保执法新模式评析

文章着重阐述了欧盟环保执法过程中使用的一种有效的监管工具:即在依赖信息披露制度基础上,"暴光"主体的违反环境相关法律的纪录.首先,分析了欧盟当前环保执法所面临的困难,其次,讨论了暴光制度作为环保政策工具在实践中的有效性,以及欧盟在一些领域里是如何使用这一措施的;最后,得出结论,欧盟应该把暴光制度作为一项执法战略,因为它是提高欧盟成员国共同遵守欧盟环境法律的一个有效方法.     

反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同的平台经济监管研究——理论分析与中国的模式创新

2018年以来，世界主要经济体掀起了一场平台经济领域的反垄断立法执法热潮，政府行业规制机构参与其中，单独或协同监管平台运营商的反竞争行为。学术界对这种以行业规制代替反垄断执法的现象，是否会妨碍竞争政策基础地位的建立、削弱反垄断法的权威性等问题存在争议。本文从反垄断监管实践和平台经济特性出发，分析了行业规制机构监管平台经济的原因、优势和弊端，并以加快建立平台经济“全方位、多层次、立体化监管体系，实现事前事中事后全链条全领域监管”为目标，构建了反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同监管模式。国家市场监督管理总局和金融监管机构对阿里巴巴集团相关行为调查、处罚和救济的实践，是中国政府监管平台经济的模式创新，也证明反垄断执法主导与行业规制协同监管模式的可行性和有效性。     

欧盟面向2030年的集成电路发展战略分析

分析了欧盟实施面向2030年的集成电路发展战略的背景，欧盟集成电路发展具有的独特优势和面临的挑战，概述了欧盟面向2030年加快集成电路发展的战略目标、思路和重要部署。欧盟提出，到2030年先进芯片产值要占全球份额的20%。为此欧盟将实施《欧洲芯片法案》，强化对研发和创新的支持，完善产业生态系统，开展教育与技能培训行动，建立平衡的半导体伙伴关系，确保其在集成电路研究和创新方面的领导地位。基于欧盟政策动向的分析，从立法引领、全局统筹、技术攻关、金融支持、人才引进和培养等方面提出了加快中国集成电路技术和产业发展的思考与建议。     

浅述欧盟制定对华政策政治经济背景

2001年又有新政策出台，欧盟的对华政策是要在经济领域中表现为贸易方面对中国的依赖与竞争，投资的渗透，利用与限制，货币金融的相互依存和控制。目前，欧盟已成为中国重要的贸易和投资伙伴，因此，细致，认真地分析和研究欧盟对华政策的政治经济背景，有利于我们更好地开展与欧盟的经贸合作。     

在竞争中求生存 创新中求发展-2006年欧盟的竞争与创新政策回顾

创新是一个民族进步的灵魂。科技创新能力是一个国家科技发展的决定性因素，是国家竞争力的核心。在当今全球化的竞争中，创新更是强国富民的重要基础，是国家安全的重要保证。2006年欧盟政府相继出台了鼓励创新的相关政策。以加强基础科研，维护并增强国家的竞争力。     

欧盟建设技术创新联盟的做法和经验

推进产学研相结合，关键是要建立产学研一体化的有效运行机制。欧盟拥有良好的教育和研究体系，是世界研发创新的重要一极。为促进创新，欧盟创立了欧洲创新与技术研究院，旨在以知识创新共同体为核心，有效整合大学、科研机构和企业的研发创新资源。对欧洲创新与技术研究院的组织形式和运作模式进行了研究和分析，该研究院在培育科技创新与创业复合型人才及促进成果转化等方面进行了创新化探索，取得了良好的效果。     

Lobbying and innovation in the European Union

Aside from anecdotal evidence, lobbying activities and the role of vested interests in the EU have not been scrutinized. This article attempts to cast focus on the relationship between lobbying and aspects of innovation in the EU. The modest performance of the EU compared to the innovation frontier has been attributed to an array of factors, one of which is the adverse effect of vested interests. The lack of new, innovative enterprises has been identified as a decisive factor behind the productivity stagnation and lobbying by incumbents poses as a credible culprit. In this article, I create a novel firm-level database through the cross-fertilization of data from the growing Transparency Register (EC and EP), AMADEUS (BvD), the OECD, Eurostat, and the European Commission in order to address the complex relationship between vested interests, innovation, and competition. The preliminary findings indicate that more R&D intensive firms tend to spend significantly larger amount of funds on lobbying, primarily competing for EU grants and government procurement. Using data for country-sector concentration, I find that the relationship is stronger in the presence of low competition. Despite the improvements required in the documentation of lobbying activities, these results provide preliminary tangible evidence on the effect of vested interests on innovation performance.     

Sustainability-oriented tax-based own resources for the European Union: a European carbon-based flight ticket tax

The failed attempts of several European countries to introduce a flight ticket tax and the pressure on those European Union Member States still levying such a tax clearly demonstrate the limits of national aviation taxation. Assigning a carbon-based flight ticket tax to the EU level would reduce the tax enforcement problems inherent to mobile tax bases and put a stop to harmful tax competition between EU Member States. By replacing a part of national contributions to the EU budget a flight ticket tax can strengthen sustainability-orientation of the EU system of own resources. Using a new data set, which assigns to approximately 75 to 90% of the respective intra and extra EU routes flown in the year 2014 the corresponding carbon emissions per passenger, the paper estimates the expected revenue from implementing a carbon-based flight ticket tax at the EU level for carbon tax levels between 25 and 35€ per ton of carbon emissions.     

算法合谋的反垄断规制及工具创新研究

在数字经济领域,数字商务企业采用算法定价会明显提高合谋的可能性和可实施性,具有较大的价格合谋风险,因而成为反垄断法关注的重点。学理上,尚待明确的问题有:算法定价促进合谋的内在机理和类型化机制;如何创新反垄断执法体制以有效规制自主学习算法;在反垄断事后执法无效情况下,是否需要以及如何实行事前规制等。研究表明:算法合谋的反垄断规制宜坚持分类治理原则,采取事后反垄断禁止为主并辅之以事前规制的政策组合,反垄断政策工具创新应主要针对自主学习算法合谋。算法合谋反垄断规制政策需重新界定构成非法合谋的"协议"要件,明确当事企业的主体责任,重在采取以"软执法"为主的反垄断执法体制。事前规制政策应坚持"基于设计来遵守法律"的原则,强化算法审查机制和审查能力建设,并将提升算法透明度和可问责性作为重点。     

科技法迭代视域下芯片国产化的法律规制与引导——也谈“华为”如何破局

芯片应用的广度和深度使其成为国际竞争的核心战略资源,并且,近年来因部分国家对于中国进口的封锁和阻力,芯片国产化的意义进一步凸显,这一关键技术的自主研发及生产也成为科技法迭代时期面临的重要难题。一方面,从芯片特异性出发,在厘清现存问题的基础上,以“内发型”法的现代化为视角,应革除科技法律责任虚置化并完善给付义务,同时,纠正科技创新市场失灵、完善产业链条规划;另一方面,以“引导向”科技法为目标,推进“监管向”转变、加强科研引导的有效性和针对性,同时,鼓励多元化创新,构建中国特色调控体系,助推芯片国产化进程,服务“十四五”建设,造福国计民生。     

Product Market Reform and Innovation in the EU*

European Union countries have implemented widespread reforms to product markets to stimulate competition, innovation, and economic growth. We provide empirical evidence that the reforms carried out under the EU Single Market Programme (SMP) were associated with increased product market competition, as measured by a reduction in average profitability, and with a subsequent increase in innovation intensity and productivity growth for manufacturing sectors. Our analysis exploits exogenous variation in the expected impact of the SMP across countries and industries to identify the effects of reforms on average profitability, and the effects of profitability on innovation and productivity growth.     

Young leading innovators and the EU's R&D intensity gap

Europe's innovation gap relative to the USA is often attributed to its industrial structure in which new firms do not play a significant role, especially in high-tech sectors. This view of a structural European Union (EU) innovation deficit is popular in European innovation policy discussions, but has received little or no thorough empirical investigation. This article aims to address this ‘evidence gap’. Using industrial R&D Scoreboard data from leading world innovators, we find that compared to the USA, the EU has fewer young firms among its leading innovators. Using a decomposition analysis, we show that having fewer young firms accounts for about one-third of the EU–US differential in R&D intensity, while 55% of the differential is due to the fact that young leading innovators in the EU are less R&D intensive than their US counterparts. Further analysis shows that this is almost entirely due to a different sectoral composition. We thus confirm that the EU–US private R&D gap is indeed mostly a structural issue.     

二元体制下我国军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境与对策

军民融合发展是统筹经济建设与国防建设、实现富国强军与构建一体化国家战略体系和能力的必由之路。我国军民融合从初步融合走向深度融合,涉及多方主体的关系调整与利益重塑,需要在法治轨道上通过法律规范与法律运行两个维度整合各类主体力量、配置各类要素资源。目前,军民融合法治实施受制于“军”“民”二元分离体制结构的现实约束,在法律规范层面处于制度供给不完备状态,在法律运行层次面临主体实践不协调困境。二元体制下破解军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境,宜从静态规范层面和动态运行层面综合调整军民融合行为。一方面,通过适时制定和颁布具有统一效力的军民融合发展法,清理、废止和修订不适应军民融合发展需要的法律法规和政策文件,在规范层面建立健全统一完备的军民融合发展法律法规体系;另一方面,探索建立“委员会统一领导、各小组分工负责”的军民融合法治实施领导体制和统一领导、军地协调、顺畅高效的军地联合法律执行机制,形成诉调对接、诉仲结合的军民融合案件多元化纠纷解决机制暨法律适用机制,在法律运行层面建立协调高效的军民融合发展法律实施体系。     

The organisation for economic cooperation and development

The global financial and economic crisis has prompted some scholars to suggest that a fundamental regulatory shift away from neoliberalism will take place – both in general and in the field of EU competition regulation. This paper shows that so far no radical break with the neoliberal type of competition regulation is heaving into sight. It sets out to explain this from the vantage point of a critical political economy perspective, which identifies the circumstances under which a crisis can result in a regulatory paradigm shift. Contrasting the current situation with the shift in EC/EU competition regulation after the crisis in the 1970s, the paper argues that the preconditions for a fundamental shift in this issue area are not present this time around. Several reasons account for this: the current crisis has been construed by economic and political elites as a crisis within and not of neoliberal capitalism; the social power configuration underpinning the neoliberal order remains unaltered; no clear counter-project has surfaced; the European Commission has been (and remains) in a position to oppose radical changes; and finally, there are no signs of a wider paradigm shift in the EU's regulatory architecture.     

Does the Law of One Price Hold within the EU? A Panel Analysis

This paper empirically tests the law of one price by applying unit root tests to three panels consisting of data on 90 consumer price indices for the EU-25, the EU-15 and the 10 new EU member countries that joined the EU in 2004. The four major findings of this paper are: (1) panel unit root tests find evidence of price convergence for about 70% of all product groups, (2) the results are sensitive to the choice of the numeraire country implying that any conclusions must be based on all bilateral combinations, (3) the average half life across all product groups is 2.0 years, (4) the overall evidence for the law of one price is weaker in the 10 new EU member countries than in the EU-15.

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.