FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY OF A PRICE LEADERSHIP CARTEL

This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.     

Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices

In a linear oligopoly model with antitrust enforcement, the optimal cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price. The set of sustainable cartel prices does not shrink to the competitive price. We identify necessary conditions for this counter-intuitive convergence result.     

Bidder collusion

We analyze bidder collusion at first-price and second-price auctions. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels and collusive mechanisms that do not rely on auction outcomes. We show that cartels that cannot control the bids of their members can eliminate all ring competition at second-price auctions, but not at first-price auctions. At first-price auctions, when the cartel cannot control members’ bids, cartel behavior involves multiple cartel bids. Cartels that can control bids of their members can suppress all ring competition at both second-price and first-price auctions; however, shill bidding reduces the profitability of collusion at first-price auctions.     

CARTEL PROBLEMS: THE INCENTIVE TO LIE ABOUT COSTS*

Osborne noted five problems a cartel has in restricting output to the mutual benefit of its members. Here, we examine one of these: the problem of location of the contract surface. We first model the situation where one firm is able to mislead cartel members about the level of its cost function. We show there is often, in theory, an incentive to do this and thereby increase profit if marginal costs are rising, though not if they are falling. We go on to examine the case where both firms cheat, and to consider possible solutions the cartel might adopt.     

When imperfect collusion is profitable

This paper studies cartel stability under the assumption that member firms can choose intermediate degrees of collusion as well as the joint-profit-maximizing solution in determining the quota to be produced by each firm. After showing that firms can increase the number of participants by decreasing the degree of collusion, I prove that individual members' profits are maximized when firms choose a (possibly low) degree of collusion such that all firms in the industry want to take part in the cartel. More precisely, if the number of firms in the industry is four or less, then all of them want to take part in the cartel even if the maximum degree of collusion is chosen (i.e., the monopoly output is produced); if the number of firms is greater than four, firms will still create an industry-wide cartel but they will produce a higher quantity than the monopoly output.     

Endogenous Cartel Formation

This paper investigates the endogenous formation of cartels in a supergame framework in which cheating on the cartel agreement results in the ejection of only the defector from the cartel while collusion continue s amongst the non-cheating members. A more sophisticated notion of cartel stability than has been analysed hitherto is developed here, and it is shown that cartels are even less stable than they are generally believed to be. When firms produce heterogeneous goods and set prices, cartels comprising a small fraction of the industry's firms are shown to be viable. The emergence of two or more cartels within the same industry is seen not only to be a distinct possibility but also to be quite likely     

A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

We use the concept of cartel stability defined by d’Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16(1):17–25, 1983) to obtain that the sequence of play between the cartel and the fringe affects cartel stability in a quantity-competition setting where firms tacitly collude. We also prove that an endogenous sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends on the discount factor. If the discount factor is large enough, the cartel and the fringe simultaneously choose quantities since the stable cartel may contain more firms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. This is due to the fact that under simultaneous play cartel firms have incentives to participate in the cartel because otherwise no collusion is possible.      

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.     

Oil market share dynamics: A Markov chain analysis of consumer and producer adjustments

We develop an “optimal market share rule” model of cartel behavior which when applied to the OPEC cartel appears capable of explaining its stability and responses to changed market events. In particular, by attaching importance to market shares based approximately on costs, OPEC members can by maintaining optimal shares deter deviant member attempts to break cartel rules. After a thorough discussion of the theory, the model is tested empirically using a Markov probability model. The estimated Markov transition matrix is further decomposed into what Theil has called the exchange matrix and the mean passage matrix. Dynamic adjustment processes in the market are revealed by the latter while an emerging pattern of OPEC member surveillance of consumers is revealed by the former which facilitates cartel stability. Inspection of these matrixes further suggests that after the formation of OPEC there is evidence of less potential for producer conflict while there appears more evidence for consumer conflict. While these results must be tentative in view of the fact that they have been estimated using a simplified two consumer — two producer model and limited data, it is argued that the results are highly suggestive and the approach in this study can be extended to cover all producer and consumers, and can be integrated into a complete model of the world oil market.     

A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

This paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the 1980s. In both states firms were convicted of bid-rigging. The data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways: One cartel divides the market among members, while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding. We show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal, provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large.
In the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non-cartel bidders. The presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction. The selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non-cartel bidder. The data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels.     

Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points—and the corresponding Nash solution—is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values. Our results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for bargaining, and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.     

On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel–fringe game à la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel–fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel–fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel–fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash–Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies.     

OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*

The dynamic behavior of a price‐fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady‐state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages.     

On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

The conventional wisdom is that cartels which merely lead to lower production levels and higher prices are detrimental to social welfare. This paper explores the extent to which this is generally valid. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a hard core cartel that is beneficial for firms and society at large. Considering both strong (with side payments) and weak (without side payments) hard core cartel contracts, we find that (i) both strong and weak welfare-enhancing cartels exist when at least one firm makes a loss on part of its sales in competition, (ii) a welfare-enhancing strong cartel exists whenever there is a difference in unit cost at competitive production levels, and (iii) a welfare-enhancing weak cartel exists when the profit margin on all sales is positive and the cost difference is sufficiently large.     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

Behaviour of cheaters as N → ∞

We consider a problem involving cheating in a ‘cartel’ of finite lifespan. Cheaters may either maximise one period profits or pre-empt further cheating. The choice is shown to depend upon the number of firms relative to the duration of the cartel.     

产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨

在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上，通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来，并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实：当企业间技术差距较小时，完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利；而当技术差距较大时，研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入，还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外，与完全合作相比，局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性，尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下，研发卡特尔最为稳定。     

A SPATIAL MODEL OF CARTEL STABILITY: THE INFLUENCE OF PRODUCTION COST CONVEXITY

We uniquely introduce convex production costs into a cartel model involving spatial price discrimination. We demonstrate that greater convexity improves cartel stability and that for sufficient convexity first best locations will be adopted. We show that allowing locations to vary over the game reduces cartel stability but that greater convexity continues to improve that stability. Moreover, when the degree of convexity does not support the first best collusive locations, other collusive locations exist that require less stability and these may either increase or decrease social welfare relative to competition. Critically, these locations that require less stability are more dispersed in sharp contrast to the known result assuming linear production costs.     

IS THE REVENUE ALLOCATION SCHEME OF FORMULA ONE MOTOR RACING A CASE FOR EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY?

Recent allegations from participants of the FIA Formula One World Championship (F1) suggest that its authorities violate European competition law in two ways. First, they allegedly abuse market power by forcing unfavorable contracts on media revenue allocation upon teams as a whole and on smaller teams in particular (vertical allocation of media revenue). Second, they allegedly form a cartel with selected teams to the detriment of smaller teams by providing unjustified extra payments to these teams (horizontal allocation of media revenues). In doing so, the cartel members allegedly secure supracompetitive rents from the authorities and cement an unfair competitive advantage over the outsider teams. Employing concentration measures from empirical economics, we present an assessment of whether the current antitrust allegations against F1 may be considered valid or not. We show that the allocation scheme employed in F1 considerably differs from those in other professional sports championships. We find the empirical picture to be consistent with an anticompetitive interpretation of F1 media revenue structures and policies. We conclude that there is merit in initiating an in‐depth antitrust investigation of Formula One motor racing. (JEL K21, L12, L40, L83, Z20)