The market power of OPEC 1973–2001

We apply a multi-equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of OPEC as a whole or different sub-groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973–2001. Our results indicate that the producers outside OPEC can be described as competitive producers, taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits. The OPEC members do not fit the behaviour of price-taking producers. Our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for OPEC underpin the potential market power of the producer group, and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies. On the other hand, our findings indicate that neither OPEC nor different sub-groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973–1994. However, we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit OPEC-Core as from 1994. Thus, although OPEC clearly has affected the market price, the producer group has not behaved as a pure profit-maximizing dominant producer.     

TERRORISM AND THE RETURNS TO OIL

The effect of terrorism on global oil prices has been largely explained through demand-side effects. We estimate an empirical model to re-examine the effect of terrorism on the price of global oil stocks across oil market regimes that reflect different supply constraints. We believe that terrorism will have larger impacts when global capacity is tight (i.e. when global demand is close to global supply). This means that any shock to capacity (say by conflict) should have the largest impact on profits before the first OPEC shock in the early 1970s. Since then, conflict shocks would not allow firms to exploit production in the same way, thus reducing the available profits that could be garnered by such production manipulation. If capacity constraints are binding when a conflict occurs, then we predict that a positive stock price reaction can be expected for oil firms from such a shock. We exploit a new panel dataset to investigate the relationship between oil profitability and conflict, using conflict data from the top 20 oil producing and exporting countries in the world. We show that in the later part of our sample, 1974–2005, as cartel behavior of OPEC member countries has diminished and as conflict has become more regular and thus the information surrounding it noisier, oil stock prices do not increase in response to conflict. However, in earlier capacity constrained eras, we find that oil stocks can in fact increase in response to conflict. In some cases, the impact of conflict may cause the return of oil stocks to increase by as much as 10 percentage points.     

Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points—and the corresponding Nash solution—is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values. Our results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for bargaining, and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.     

What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels?: The case of OPEC

In this paper, we analyze the question of membership in a non-renewable resource cartel, with specific application to OPEC. One would expect the benefits of cartel membership to be positively related to the size of remaining reserves, while domestic petroleum consumption should be negatively related to membership if countries care about consumer interests. Our econometric analysis indicates that larger reserves and lower consumption are positively associated with OPEC membership. On the other hand, membership does not appear to be systematically related to countries’ religious makeup. Our regressions correctly predict membership for the vast majority of oil-producing countries.     

Producer and Consumer Interests, the State-Owned Pipeline, and Public Authority Pricing of Natural Gas*

This paper considers producer and consumer interests when state ownership of a pipeline provides a public authority with monopoly and monopsony power. In contrast with the producer/consumer conflict in the regulatory setting where self-interested authorities choose the price at which producers and consumers directly transact with one another, in the pipeline case producers and consumers have a commonality of interest which is sustained even if the authorities take the view that it is politically inexpedient to take advantage of monopoly power with respect to consumers.     

The structural effect of cooperatives on price volatility in the European dairy sector

Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that high market shares of cooperatives can force investor-oriented firms to pay higher producer prices within a region. In the same vein, cooperatives may force investor-oriented firms to reduce price volatility. We use panel data from 27 European Union member states over the period 2001–2015 to investigate how the market share of cooperatives in a country affects milk price volatility. Our key finding is that a higher market share of cooperatives reduces price volatility at the national level. Volatility is influenced by a number of other variables, such as fluctuation in raw milk production, oil price volatility spillover and the number of dairy processors. Policymakers should consider that the promotion of cooperatives might positively affect price stability in the dairy sector.     

Power Structure and Rent Competition

This paper presents a model of rent competition in a mixed economic system in which wealth maximizing interest group coalitions share wealth according to their relative political power. The model solves for optimal lobbying expenditures of a producer group, a consumer group, and individual firms. The existence of monopolistic rent is not presupposed. Instead, the equilibrium market price, output, and market shares of firms are determined endogenously. As a result, the distribution of rent depends upon the relative political power of each interest group coalition and total lobbying expenditure decreases as the asymmetry in marginal political power among interest group coalitions increases.     

OPEC and the monopoly price of world oil

The paper presents a dynamic model of the behavior of OPEC viewed as a monopolist sharing the oil market with a competitive sector. The main conclusion is that the recent increase in the price of oil was a once and for all phenomenon due to the formation of the cartel and that prices should remain approximately constant during the next twenty years.     

Supply‐ versus Demand‐Side Policies in the Presence of Carbon Leakage and the Green Paradox

We consider a climate coalition that seeks to reduce global emissions in the presence of carbon leakage and resource exhaustibility. We show that a credible announcement of future unilateral supply‐side policies delays foreign emissions, and we derive the optimal combination of consumer taxes and producer taxes when we consider leakages from free riders, both within periods and across periods. The tax shares generally differ over time. A decline in the present value of the social cost of carbon over time supports a time path where the consumers’ tax share of the total carbon tax also declines over time. We illustrate our findings with a numerical model.     

Modelling price transmission and volatility spillover in the Slovenian wheat market

Interdependence between first and second moments of producer and consumer wheat prices in Slovenia is assessed, in light of the recent major historical events that the country has undergone, as well as the recent rumours of cartel agreements between millers causing a decline in farm-gate prices, while leaving consumer prices untouched. A threshold vector error correction and multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model with exogenous variables is applied. Results indicate that price-level adjustments mainly favour retailers by increasing their marketing margins. Important second-moment interactions are also identified. Increases in international wheat stocks reduce producer prices, while higher interest rates increase their instability.     

Resource exploitation theory and the behavior of the oil cartel

This paper examines the implications of the partial equilibrium theory of optimal exploitation of a non-renewable resource for the behavior of the OPEC cartel. A relatively general extraction cost structure is assumed, and several new theoretical results are derived. The influence of oil-exporting countries' ultimate objectives on cartel behavior is examined under alternative assumptions about trading and investment opportunities. Some implications for the policies of oil importing nations are discussed.     

基于混合溢出效应的产业共性技术研发组织模式研究

研究了共性技术的R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、RJV(ResearchJointVenture)竞争3种基本研发组织模式;在考虑投入溢出和成果溢出共存、溢出总量随时间T变化的基础上,引入研发风险率函数,通过对各组织模式的生产者剩余、消费者剩余和R&D投资率进行比较,总结出更适合共性技术研发和扩散的组织模式。结果表明:市场机制下,企业不一定会选择RJV;从社会福利角度,RJV产生的社会剩余大于R&D卡特尔和R&D竞争模式的社会剩余;为使社会福利最大化,政府应引导企业形成RJV。     

Price discrimination of digital content

This paper considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self-production is more efficient than that of a producer.     

A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

This paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the 1980s. In both states firms were convicted of bid-rigging. The data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways: One cartel divides the market among members, while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding. We show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal, provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large.
In the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non-cartel bidders. The presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction. The selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non-cartel bidder. The data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels.     

QUALITY-ASSURING PRICE AND BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY

If consumers cannot discern quality prior to purchase, firms may use both court enforcement and the market mechanism to assure quality. But the level of warranty protection that firms choose to offer depends on the efficiency of the market. As the ability of consumers to communicate information concerning quality among themselves (market efficiency) increases, the level of warranty protection that maximizes consumer surplus falls. In highly efficient markets, producers do not offer a warranty. Thus, courts should not imply a warranty if producers do not specify one. In addition, the level of warranty protection depends on the courts' ability to distinguish between producer and consumer moral hazard.     

Effects of global trade liberalization on softwood lumber markets

This study develops a world spatial equilibrium softwood lumber model comprised of the major importing and exporting countries/regions to analyse the impacts of global trade reform on the world softwood lumber market. The results show that free trade leads to an increase in lumber trade, and Canadian producers and US consumers are the biggest beneficiaries. Trade liberalization improves the overall world welfare as world producer and consumer surpluses increase. The result highlights the importance of moving towards free trade in the global softwood lumber market.     

Advertising,learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an empirical examination*

This article empirically analyzes different effects of advertising in a nondurable, experience good market. A dynamic learning model of consumer behavior is presented in which I allow both “informative” effects of advertising and “prestige” or “image” effects of advertising. This learning model is estimated using consumer level panel data tracking grocery purchases and advertising exposures over time. Empirical results suggest that in this market, advertising's primary effect was that of informing consumers. The estimates are used to quantify the value of this information to consumers and evaluate the welfare implications of an alternative advertising regulatory regime.     

Beyond the need to boast: Cost concealment incentives and exit in Cournot oligopoly

This paper studies the incentives for production cost disclosure in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Whereas the efficient firm (consumers) prefers information sharing (concealment) when the firms choose accommodating strategies in the product market, the firm (consumers) may prefer information concealment (sharing) when it can exclude its competitors from the market. Hence, the rankings of expected profit and consumer surplus can be reversed if exit of the inefficient firms is possible. Although the efficient firm has stronger incentives to share information when it shares strategically, there remain cases in which the firm conceals information in equilibrium to induce exit.     

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.