Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.     

The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in understanding stock return volatility

This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility. We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information” dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information” is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.     

Adjustment costs of institutional tax changes from the audit pricing perspective: Empirical evidence from the VAT reform

Institutional changes inevitably impose adjustment costs on firms while also generating benefits. However, empirical evidence regarding the adjustment costs of institutional changes is limited, with much of the focus centered on benefits. Using data on China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 and the nation’s staggered adoption of the “business tax to value-added tax reform” (hereafter, “VAT reform”) as a natural experiment, we examine the impact of this reform on a particular corporate cost: audit fees. We find audit fees to be 8.11% higher for VAT reform firms than for non-VAT reform firms. This difference does not exist before or after the reform year. That is, it is only observed in the year of VAT reform implementation. This indicates the existence of an adjustment cost specifically related to the VAT reform. Furthermore, we observe larger fee increases among firms audited by Big 4 international audit firms, firms that require more audit work, firms that are more complex, and firms with weak internal controls. From the audit pricing perspective, we provide evidence of the economic consequences of tax reform. The corporate adjustment costs that arise from institutional changes deserve more attention from decision-makers.     

The effect of unionization on firms’ earnings management and employee compensation: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design

This study examines the effect of unionization on US firms’ accruals-based earnings management and future employee compensation expenses by employing a research design that overcomes the inherent endogeneity issue of the relationship between unionization and earnings management. First, by comparing firms that just pass unionization by a small number of votes to those that just barely lose elections, the regression discontinuity design estimations document significant downward accruals earnings management for firms that barely pass unionization, compared to those that barely fail to pass unionization. Second, the association between unionization and earnings management is only significant in US states without right-to-work legislation, where unions are more powerful. These findings are consistent with recently unionized firms’ incentives to report lower earnings in order to mitigate unions’ demands for greater employee compensation. Further, for firms that barely pass unionization, we find that: (1) unions cannot fully “undo” the effects of earnings management, that is, downward managed earnings depress future compensation expenses, and (2) firms cannot fully “undo” the effects of unionization, that is, compensation expenses increase after unionization despite the downward earnings management.     

Information Aggregation Bias and Samuelson's Dictum

Under the assumption of incomplete information, idiosyncratic shocks may not dissipate in the aggregate. An econometrician who incorrectly imposes complete information and applies the law of large numbers may be susceptible to information aggregation bias. Tests of aggregate economic theory will be misspecified even though tests of the same theory at the microlevel deliver the correct inference. A testable implication of information aggregation bias is “Samuelson's Dictum” or the idea that stock prices can simultaneously display “microefficiency” and “macroinefficiency;” an idea accredited to Paul Samuelson. Using firm-level data from the Center for Research in Security Prices, we present empirical evidence consistent with Samuelson's dictum. Specifically, we conduct two standard tests of the linear present value model of stock prices: a regression of future dividend changes on the dividend-price ratio and a test for excess volatility. We show that the dividend price ratio forecasts the future growth in dividends much more accurately at the firm level as predicted by the present value model, and that excess volatility can be rejected for most firms. When the same firms are aggregated into equal-weighted or cap-weighted portfolios, the estimated coefficients typically deviate from the present value model and “excess” volatility is observed; this is especially true for aggregates (e.g., S&P 500) that are used in most asset pricing studies. To investigate the source of our empirical findings, we propose a theory of aggregation bias based on incomplete information and segmented markets. Traders specializing in individual stocks conflate idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to dividends. To an econometrician using aggregate data, these assumptions generate a rejection of the present value model even though individual traders are efficiently using their available information.     

Decoding Inside Information

Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative about firms’ futures. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic” traders yields value‐weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, nonexecutive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?

Many dividend theories imply that changes in dividends have information content about the future earnings of the firm. We investigate this implication and find only limited support for it. Firms that increase dividends in year 0 have experienced significant earnings increases in years ?1 and 0, but show no subsequent unexpected earnings growth. Also, the size of the dividend increase does not predict future earnings. Firms that cut dividends in year 0 have experienced a reduction in earnings in year 0 and in year ?1, but these firms go on to show significant increases in earnings in year 1. However, consistent with Lintner's model on dividend policy, firms that increase dividends are less likely than nonchanging firms to experience a drop in future earnings. Thus, their increase in concurrent earnings can be said to be somewhat “permanent.” In spite of the lack of future earnings growth, firms that increase dividends have significant (though modest) positive excess returns for the following three years.     

Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance

We investigate firms that stop providing earnings guidance (“stoppers”) either by publicly announcing their decision (“announcers”) or doing so quietly (“quiet stoppers”). Relative to firms that continue guiding, stoppers have poorer prior performance, more uncertain operating environments, and fewer informed investors. Announcers commit to non-disclosure because they (i) do not expect to report future good news or (ii) have lower incentives to guide due to the presence of long-term investors. The three-day return around the announcement is negative. Stoppers subsequently experience increases in analyst forecast dispersion and decreases in forecast accuracy but no change in return volatility or analyst following.     

Director Quality and Firm Performance

Many financial economists argue that the board of directors' efficacy in the monitoring of managerial behavior depends upon the quality of the directors. Assuming that there is a link between the stock performance of target firms and the quality of their directors, we empirically categorize directors receiving additional directorships following a takeover as “above average” and “below average.” We then follow the stock performance of firms hiring new directors for three years after their hiring. We match the two categories of directors with the performance of hiring firms after a director's appointment. Accounting for other contemporaneous effects, we regress the hiring firms' post‐performance on director quality and other attributes. The results indicate that directors of “above average” quality are related to hiring firms with “above average” post‐performance.     

The impacts of “shock therapy” on large and small clients: Experiences from two large bank failures in Japan

A “shock therapy” might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks; LTCB and NCB. We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed new LTCB to adopt a “shock therapy” but new NCB to keep “soft budget constraints”. We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms terminated the relationship by the new bank experienced significant decline in their profits.     

Earnings management strategies for meeting or beating expectations

In this study, we dispel several popular notions regarding the meeting or beating expectations/thresholds (MBE) phenomenon that permeates the research design of many empirical papers. First, MBE is not unequivocally associated with aggressive earnings management. Second, MBE does not necessarily obfuscate the truth. Third, MBE may be consistent with the well-documented reporting strategy of smoothing. Specifically, we characterize the reporting strategy of firms that engage in MBE in a two-period game. Some firms value MBE in the first period more than in the second (short-run firms), and other firms are less concerned with missing a threshold in the first period but must meet or beat expectations in the second (long-run firms). The analysis yields additional insights: we also show that MBE, by a small amount, is driven by the demand for a truth-revealing report, since the extremely small margin is designed to vary with the truth. In addition, MBE explains the richness of the menu of reporting strategies (“taking a bath,” “cookie-jar reserve,” and marginal threshold beating). Moreover, MBE is good news when the firm is a long-run MBE firm because it signals that the firm will also meet or beat expectations in the future. Finally, MBE has a favorable economic effect, as it induces boards of directors to incentivize managers to expend more effort.     

The power of the pen reconsidered: The media,CEO human capital,and corporate governance

By examining the post-retirement outside board seats held by former CEOs of S&P 1500 firms, we find that CEOs’ post-retirement outside board memberships are influenced by the level and the tone of media coverage given to the CEOs’ firms while the CEOs were “on the job.” These results provide evidence of a direct economic link between media coverage of CEOs’ performance today and CEOs’ future opportunity sets. These results lend support to the proposition that the media can play a role in corporate governance by influencing the value of CEOs’ human capital.     

上市企业员工满意度与创新——来自“中国年度最佳雇主100强”的经验证据

本文以2011－2017年沪深两市的A股上市企业为研究对象,以是否入选“中国年度最佳雇主100强”榜单衡量上市企业的员工满意度,考察员工满意度对企业创新的影响。研究表明,入选榜单的企业平均而言比其它主要特征相似的匹配企业的专利申请总数高约47%。这一效应主要体现在发明专利和实用新型专利上,而在外观设计专利上不显著。进一步地,员工满意度可以通过提高失败容忍度来提升企业创新。最后,经济后果检验表明,员工满意度的提高可以显著提升员工的创新效率和企业全要素生产率,说明较高的员工满意度有助于企业效率和长期价值的提升。     

Non-GAAP earnings disclosures around regulation G – The case of “implicit non-GAAP reporting”

We identify a phenomenon related to non-GAAP earnings disclosure and examine its prevalence around Regulation G (RegG). Specifically, we analyze to what extent firms only disclose adjustments to GAAP earnings instead of entire adjusted earnings figures thereby not providing the ideal non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation promoted by RegG. We refer to this reporting behavior as “implicit non-GAAP reporting” and ask three different questions: How is “implicit non-GAAP reporting” related with the adoption of RegG? What type of firm reports implicit non-GAAP measures? What are the motives for “implicit non-GAAP reporting” post-RegG? Our analyses yield three key findings. First, the frequency of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” spikes after the regulatory intervention but to a lesser degree also existed before. Second, during the post-RegG time period, the prevalence of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is much higher among firms who only started to report non-GAAP earnings after RegG was enacted (starters) than among those, which continued to disclose non-GAAP earnings across the regulatory intervention (continuers). Third, we show that only for starters, “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is associated with motives of beating analyst earnings forecasts as well as experiencing GAAP losses. Our study provides important insights for regulators, firms and academics into "implicit non-GAAP reporting" by examining properties and determinants of implicit vs. explicit non-GAAP earnings for different types of firms around RegG.     

“原罪”嫌疑、制度环境与民营企业慈善捐赠

2018年11月1日,习近平同志在民营企业座谈会上的讲话指出,要落实按照罪刑法定、疑罪从无的原则,切实保护民营企业家的人身和财产安全,这是因为"原罪"嫌疑是中国民营企业发展史上无法回避的一个重要问题,长期使得企业家面临企业合法性地位能否获得政府与社会公众认可的担忧,产生了诸多的微观经济后果。本文以2004-2016年间中国A股民营上市公司作为研究样本,根据企业初始产权获取过程中是否涉及公有产权到私有产权的转变作为对民营企业"原罪"嫌疑的度量,实证检验了"原罪"嫌疑是否以及如何影响民营企业的慈善捐赠行为。结果发现,由于"原罪"嫌疑所引致的民营企业合法性得不到正式认可与保护的威胁,背负"原罪"嫌疑的民营企业有动机通过慈善捐赠来讨好政府和社会公众以便降低这种威胁,而且这一正向影响关系随着企业所在省市的制度环境的完善而减弱。进一步本文还发现,"原罪"嫌疑对民营企业慈善捐赠水平的正向影响关系在不存在政治联系的企业以及实际控制人登上富豪榜后表现得更为明显。     

Do Delaware CEOs get fired?

Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable. We argue that Delaware corporate law attracts firms with particular financial and governance characteristics. We find that Delaware attracts growth firms in industries with more takeover activity. Delaware firms have smaller boards, and their directors are paid more and serve on more boards. In addition, Delaware firms attract greater institutional ownership. We also provide a bottom-line test of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis by examining forced CEO turnover. After controlling for differences in firm characteristics, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware are more likely to terminate CEOs. We also find that that termination decision is less sensitive to poor performance. Overall, we see no clear pattern supporting the “race to the bottom” hypothesis.     

The effects of audit technology on auditor efficiency: Auditing and the timeliness of client earnings announcements

The organizational theory and sociology literatures have long been concerned with the concept of structure, both as a dependent and an independent variable. Relatively recently, auditing researchers have found that public accounting firms differ in the degree of structure their audit technologies exhibit, and that the voting pattern of the Auditing Standards Board appears to be influenced by its members' firm affiliations with respect to their structure orientation. To date, however, the influence of accounting firm structure on client financial reporting characteristics has not been to subjected study.The purpose of this article is to examine hypothesized relationships between the structure orientation of public accounting firms and client earnings announcement dates, expressed in terms of “early” vs “late”. In addition, the impact of the nature of information conveyed, expressed in terms of surprise “good news” or “bad news”, is studied. Empirical evidence drawn from the Wall Street Journal Index, COMPUSTAT and a prior classification of Big Eight firm audit technologies with respect to structure, suggests that systematic relationships do exist. Implications for future research and audit practice are discussed.     

Bank Lending Standards and Access to Lines of Credit

This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre‐existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that “credit crunches” are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre‐existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.     

Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.