Local institutional investors,information asymmetries,and equity returns

We examine the informational role of geographically proximate institutions in stock markets. We find that both the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future stock returns, particularly for firms with high information asymmetry; in contrast, such predictive abilities are relatively weak for nonlocal institutional ownership. The local advantage is especially evident for local investment advisors, high local ownership institutions, and high local turnover institutions. We also find that the stocks that local institutional investors hold (trade) earn higher excess returns around future earnings announcements than those that nonlocal institutional investors hold (trade).     

Information content of credit ratings in pricing of future earnings

This paper examines whether credit ratings convey information about the firm’s future earnings to the capital markets. Using the future earnings response coefficient methodology, we find that the current stock returns of rated firms reflect more future earnings than do the stock returns of non-rated firms. We also find that the market reflect more future earnings in current returns for higher-rated firms. In addition, we present evidence that returns impound future earnings to a greater extent after a ratings initiation or upgrade. We empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by earnings smoothing, market liquidity or omitted default risk factors associated with ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for potential omitted variables, endogeneity bias, loss versus profit firms, and serial correlation of error terms. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit ratings help disseminate private information to reduce information uncertainty about the firm’s future profitability among market participants.     

Do political connections affect stock price crash risk? Firm-level evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in the period from 2003 to 2012, this paper empirically investigates how the presence of politically connected directors affects stock price crash risk. We thereby make a distinction between listed state-controlled firms and privately controlled firms due to their different incentives to appoint politicians as directors on the board. Our empirical results show that politically connected directors exacerbate stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms, an effect driven by the appointment of local government officials as directors. In contrast, hiring politicians as directors, particularly central-government-affiliated directors, helps listed privately controlled firms to reduce stock price crash risk. Finally, good quality of institutions does not help to alleviate the positive relationship between political connections and stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms. However, it does weaken the role of political connections in reducing crash risk in listed privately controlled firms.     

Underreaction to Political Information and Price Momentum

In this study, we examine whether momentum in stock prices is induced by changes in the political environment. We find that momentum profits are concentrated among politically sensitive firms and industries. From 1939 to 2016, a trading strategy with a long position in winner portfolios (industries or firms) that are politically unfavored and a short position in losers that are politically favored does not generate significant momentum profits. Furthermore, our political‐sensitivity‐based long‐short portfolio explains 23% to 27% (42% to 43%) of monthly stock (industry) momentum alphas. This explanatory power is concentrated around presidential elections, when the level of political activity is high. Collectively, our results suggest that investor underreaction to political information generates momentum in stock and industry returns.     

The impact of XBRL adoption on local bias: Evidence from mandated U.S. filers

This paper investigates how eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) adoption affects the information advantage of local investors relative to their non-local counterparts. By employing the recent staggered SEC mandates of XBRL as a natural shock, we show that institutional investors’ local bias decreases after firms adopt XBRL when preparing their financial statements. These results hold in a difference-in-difference research design with firm and year fixed effects or using matched nonadopting firms as controls, as well as a regression discontinuity design. The impact of XBRL adoption on reducing local bias can be explained by three economic channels: decreased information processing costs, increased corporate disclosures, and improved analyst coverage. We further find that institutions’ superior stock returns in geographic proximate equity investments significantly reduces after the XBRL mandate. The observed reduction in institutional investors’ local bias within U.S. companies following the XBRL mandate also applies to the international setting. Overall, our findings support regulators’ claim that XBRL adoption levels the playing field between local and non-local investors.     

Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.     

Board connections and crisis performance: Family,state, and political networks

We introduce a novel concept of network interactions in which board connections provide access to external spheres of political influence, state ownership, and family control. We posit this form of indirect access via board association enables connected firms to benefit from information privy to external networks while avoiding their resource-based costs of membership. Board network data are assembled for 1290 East Asian firms and linked to hand-collected data on political connections and corporate ownership around the 2008–09 crisis. Companies with board connections to state-owned firms and family business groups had greater crisis-period accounting performance and stock returns. In countries with weak institutional development, board connections to politically connected firms were also beneficial.     

Business groups and the incorporation of firm-specific shocks into stock prices

Firm-specific information has a damped effect on business group-affiliated firms’ stock prices. Such firms’ idiosyncratic stock returns are less responsive to idiosyncratic commodity price shocks than are the idiosyncratic returns of otherwise similar unaffiliated firms in the same country and commodity-sensitive industry. Using global commodity shocks means we assess responses to common idiosyncratic shocks of the same magnitude, frequency, and observability. Further identification follows from difference-in-difference tests exploiting successful and matched exogenously failed control block transactions. We conclude that business group firms’ stock prices provide less firm-specific information to capital providers and managers.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

Liquidity and Returns to Target Shareholders in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence from the US Markets

In this paper we analyze how stock market liquidity affects the abnormal return to target firms in mergers and tender offers. We predict that target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive larger announcement day abnormal returns based on the following considerations. First, target firms with poorer stock market liquidity receive greater liquidity improvements after a merger or tender offer. Second, deals that involve less liquid targets are less anticipated and/or more likely to be completed. Third, less liquid stocks have more diverse reservation prices across shareholders and thus require a higher takeover return. Consistent with these expectations, we show that abnormal returns to target firms’ shareholders are significantly and positively related to the difference in liquidity (measured by the bid‐ask spread) between acquirers and targets as well as the magnitude of target firms’ liquidity improvement.     

Do foreign investors insulate firms from local shocks? Evidence from the response of investable firms to monetary policy

Extant research shows that stock returns of investable firms are highly sensitive to foreign market and global information shocks, suggesting that having foreign investors might insulate investable firms from shocks to local fundamentals. Examining 24 emerging markets, we find that both investable and non-investable firms are sensitive to local monetary policy shocks. This allays the concern that emerging-market opening reduces the efficacy of local monetary policy. We also find that in 11 countries (46% of our country-sample), investable firms are more sensitive to local shocks than non-investable firms. Differences in leverage, stock liquidity, size, domestic product-market exposure, or industry cyclicality do not drive this finding.     

Finding diamonds in the rough: Analysts’ selective following of loss‐reporting firms

Investors face greater difficulty valuing loss‐reporting than profit‐reporting firms: losses may be due to very different reasons (e.g., poor operating performance or investments in intangibles, and financial accounting information is of more limited use for valuing loss‐making firms than profit‐making firms. Because of increased uncertainty about loss firms’ future financial and business viability, we hypothesize that financial analysts will be more selective when choosing to follow loss firms than profit firms, with the result that “abnormal” analyst following will be more informative to investors regarding the future performance of loss firms than profit firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that abnormal analyst coverage is useful for predicting firms’ future prospects, and is more strongly associated with future performance (stock returns and ROA) for loss firms than for profit firms. The market, however, does not seem to use this useful information when pricing loss firms: for loss firms a portfolio investment strategy based upon abnormal analyst following can generate positive excess returns over 1‐ to 3‐year holding periods. These results are stronger for persistent‐loss firms than for occasional‐loss firms. We conclude that abnormal analyst following contains useful information about firms’ future prospects, and even more so for loss firms than for profit firms.     

Earnings quality and the heterogeneous relation between earnings and stock returns

We adopt a heterogeneous regime switching method to examine the informativeness of accounting earnings for stock returns. We identify two distinct time-series regimes in terms of the relation between earnings and returns. In the low volatility regime (typical of bull markets), earnings are moderately informative for stock returns. But in high volatility market conditions (typical of financial crisis), earnings are strongly related to returns. Our evidence suggests that earnings are more informative to investors when uncertainty and risk is high which is consistent with the idea that during market downturns investors rely more on fundamental information about the firm. Next, we identify groups of firms that follow similar regime dynamics. We find that the importance of accounting earnings for returns in each of the market regimes varies across firms: certain firms spend more time in a regime where their earnings are highly relevant to returns, and other firms spend more time in a regime where earnings are moderately relevant to returns. We also show that firms with poorer accrual quality have a greater probability of belonging to the high volatility regime.     

EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH STOCK SPLIT ANNOUNCEMENTS

Recent studies document abnormal stock returns at stock split announcements. Three hypotheses related to expected future earnings—the trading range, attention, and signaling hypotheses—have been offered as explanations. Evidence has also been provided that splitting firms have greater postannouncement earnings growth than control nonsplitting firms. Using earnings expectation data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, significantly greater forecast revisions are found in this study for split firms than for control nonsplit firms. The difference is significantly related to abnormal stock returns of splitting firms.     

Short Interest,Returns, and Unfavorable Fundamental Information

Several months before information becomes public, the level of short interest contains value‐relevant information about publicly traded corporations. Short interest predicts future bad news, negative earnings surprises, and downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. This informational content is stronger for stocks that are harder to short. We also find that nearly half of the well‐known cross‐sectional relation between short interest and future stock returns is related to future changes in firms’ value‐relevant information. Our results suggest that short interest predicts future returns, in part, due to short sellers’ ability to uncover unfavorable information about firms.     

Individuals’ Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper investigates the relationship between individuals’ net trading and stock price movements before and after annual earnings announcements for the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We conduct an event study on the effects of pre‐event individual trade imbalances on pre‐ and post‐announcement abnormal returns. With a unique and comprehensive dataset, we accurately classify executed orders by aggressiveness of order price. The evidence indicates that while individuals, as a group, are not informed about impending earnings announcements, individuals who place aggressive orders are informed as their net trading coincides with contemporaneous and future stock returns. Aggressive individuals lose their edge during the financial crisis. More importantly, the advantage (disadvantage) for individuals who adopt aggressive (passive) orders weakens when foreign institutions own concentrated equity in firms. We also find that net individual trading contains information about abnormal returns that either past returns or volume does not subsume. Controlling for past returns, trading volume and volatility, or using an alternative measure of net individual trading does not change our conclusions.     

Political Interference and Stock Price Consequences of Local Bias

Politics can interfere with capital markets. We show that political interference is a necessary condition for local bias in the stock market. We extend the framework of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) and find that the inverse relation between market‐to‐book ratios and the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in a state (RATIO) is only prevalent among firms located in areas where politics has substantial influence on local markets. Our results indicate that the impact of politically induced local bias is primarily demand driven and stronger among firms that are less visible.     

Firm characteristics and the impact of emerging market liberalizations

We provide a firm level analysis of the impact of capital market liberalization in 18 emerging markets. Consistent with models of international asset pricing, we find that firms’ stock returns increase during liberalization and that a majority of firms have lower mean returns and lower dividend yields after liberalization. We also find that emerging market firms have increased exposure to the world market and decreased exposure to the home market following liberalization. These changes in returns and exposures support the predictions of theoretical international asset pricing models. We also test and find support for the importance of size, local risk, foreign exchange risk, and cross-listing status in explaining the cross-section of changes in returns.     

Is There a Size Effect in the Pricing of Stocks in the Chinese Stock Markets?: The Case of Bull Versus Bear Markets

Size effect studies generally suggest that a return premium exists for small firms. While the size effect has mostly disappeared in recent years in mature markets (e.g., US and UK), it remains mostly strong in developing markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm size and excess stock returns in the Chinese stock markets, and to examine this effect in both a bull and bear market. No studies have previously examined these relationships in the Chinese markets. The results of the study indicate that a size effect exists in the Chinese stock markets over the 6-year period from 1998 to 2003. We find small firms have significantly greater excess returns than large firms. Moreover, small firms are found to have a stronger reaction to the direction of the market than large firms. Small firms have significantly greater positive excess returns than large firms during the bull market. However, small firms have significantly greater negative returns (using total market value), or no significant difference in returns (using float market value) during the bear market period.