Environmental Multi‐dimensionality and Staff Localization in Multinational Enterprises: The Case of Korean Firms

The person–environment fit theory posits that the term “environment” can be defined at different levels. This study delineates two environmental dimensions (strategic and organizational) and empirically examines the potential moderating effects of two strategic factors (intra‐ and inter‐regional diversification) on the relationship between two organizational factors (subsidiary ownership and host‐country experience) and MNE subsidiary staffing composition. The results indicate that strategic and organizational dimensions have impacts on subsidiary staffing composition. This study also finds that the interaction effects between strategic and organizational factors are significant only when there is congruence between demands from different environmental dimensions.     

Hedge fund ownership and voluntary disclosure

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Using 13F filings from 1996 to 2011, we document that hedge fund holdings are negatively associated with the subsequent frequency of portfolio...     

Global Liquidity and Commodity Prices

While monetary easing and increasing participation of financial institutions in commodity trading have enhanced the financialization of commodity markets, this paper investigates empirically whether the impact of global liquidity on commodity prices has grown since the crisis. For each commodity group, this paper uses a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to address the short‐run relationship between global liquidity and commodity prices. The key finding is that the effect of global liquidity on commodity prices becomes more salient since the global financial crisis. This paper also suggests a price‐based liquidity indicator has a greater explanatory power for the commodity price dynamics than monetary aggregates.     

The role of perceived behavioural control in the constraint-negotiation process: the case of solo travel

This study extends the leisure constraint-effects-mitigation model to the perceived behavioural control (PBC)- constraint-negotiation model by adding PBC. Three competing models were tested to determine which model best fits the data. Results suggested that PBC mediates the relationship between motivation and negotiation, and there is a direct path from motivation to participation. Findings contribute to deepening and broadening the theory of leisure constraint negotiation because the new variable was successfully added to the original model and the model was extended to new settings (i.e. solo travel and non-Western).     

Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis

We consider a strategic situation in which a firm may conceal the illegal activity of violating environmental regulations and a regulator seeks to verify the illegality to punish the firm. We study two main factors, fines and social monitoring, that influence the firm’s decision in that situation. First, we find all the possible equilibria of our model and examine conditions of those two factors that lead to each equilibrium. Using the equilibrium conditions, we then study the optimal enforcement policies that induce the most socially desirable equilibrium and improve social welfare within each equilibrium. Our main findings are as follows. First, the two factors have a complementary relationship in getting the most desirable equilibrium: Certain high levels of fines and social monitoring are both needed. Second, if making the social monitoring above the certain critical level is impossible, setting the level of the fines as high as possible may be the optimal enforcement policy. Finally, if setting the fines above the certain critical level is not available, either, setting the level of the fines as low as possible might be optimal, and the higher level of the social monitoring does not necessarily bring higher social welfare.     

Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests

We examine players' equilibrium effort levels in a contest with difference-form contest success functions in which two players compete with each other to win a prize. We show the following. At the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game, and in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a sequential-move game, only one of the players expends effort or neither player expends effort. If one player's composite strength is far greater than the other player's, only the player with greater composite strength expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially. If the players' valuations for the prize and their marginal probabilities of winning at (0, 0) are sufficiently small, neither player expends effort whether they move simultaneously or sequentially.     

Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation

We consider two-player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player's behalf. Endogenizing delegation contracts, we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates. We first show that each player's equilibrium contract is a no-win-no-pay contract. Then, we examine the delegates' equilibrium compensation spreads, effort levels, probabilities of winning, expected payoffs, and the players' equilibrium expected payoffs. We show that economic rents for the delegates may exist.     

Slaapmiddelen en karaktertype

Before the war the Institute of Praeventive Medicine issued an inquiry about the personal use of narcotics by physicians, part of it regarding the influence of the character. The scheme of Heymans and Wiersma being considered most apt to render characterising numbers, questions were included to diagnose whether "activity", "emotionality" and/or "secondary function" are present. Statistical analysis of the returns from 1593 physicians, shows that emotionality highly enlarges the use of narcotics (not only by the fact that it is combined with more disturbances in sleep). Activity showed no influence, whereas it is possible that secondary function stimulates the use in a small degree. The different types of character act by their different amount of these three qualities only.