Welfare Effects of Banning Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market: The Case of BRCA1/2 Genes

We investigate whether regulations that ban insurance companies from access to individuals' genetic tests are likely to lead to substantial adverse selection costs for the specific example of the so‐called breast cancer (BRCA1/2) genes. Using a data set including economic, demographic, and relevant family background information to simulate the market for 10‐year term life insurance, we find generally only modest adverse selection costs associated with such a regulatory ban. However, for family background groups that are at high risk for carrying one of these genes, the efficiency cost of adverse selection may be significant should the test become widely adopted.     

Mutual fund insurance

During the 1970's, mutual fund insurance was sold in the U.S. by the Harleysville and Prudential Insurance Companies. This paper examines the valuation and demand for this insurance. It illustrates that because of its design, for many plausible combinations of model parameters, a competitive premium need not exist for the Harleysville contract. A competitive premium will always exist for the Prudential policy, however the value is directly related to the age of the purchaser. Harleysville charged the same premium to all funds and therefore was subject to adverse selection. Evidence of this effect is provided by illustrating that the demand for the insurance was directly related to its competitive market value.     

Are Farmers’ Behaviors Rational When They Pay Less for Social Endowment Insurance? Evidence from Chinese Rural Survey Data

In recent years, farmers have had high participation rate in the rural social endowment insurance in China, for which personal contribution and government subsidy are the main funding source. There have been increasingly more farmers participating into the program. However, their enthusiasm for high premium payment was rather low as most of them selected the minimum premium for insurance. In this article, the discounted utility theory from behavioral economics was adopted to analyze insurance selection behaviors of farmers; in addition, a discounted incremental utility model with a hyperbolic discounting function was also further constructed to describe their insurance decision-making processes. Based on the investigation of time preferences of farmers, their insurance participation behaviors of diverse natures were simulated. The corresponding results indicated that active insurance participation and low insurance premium payment were rational choices for most farmers; in comparison, for the elders with higher income, different choices can be made. Therefore, policy makers could formulate differentiated subsidy policies directing at farmers from different groups, so as to stimulate their enthusiasm for premium payment.     

Insurance loss coverage and social welfare

Restrictions on insurance risk classification may induce adverse selection, which is usually perceived as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society. However, a social benefit of modest adverse selection is that it can lead to an increase in ‘loss coverage’, defined as expected losses compensated by insurance for the whole population. We reconcile the concept of loss coverage to a utilitarian concept of social welfare commonly found in the economic literature on risk classification. For iso-elastic insurance demand, ranking risk classification schemes by (observable) loss coverage always give the same ordering as ranking by (unobservable) social welfare.     

中国寿险市场存在逆向选择吗?——来自CHARLS数据的经验证据

我国寿险市场是否存在逆向选择问题,在理论和实证两个方面缺乏细致的讨论。本文利用CHARLS数据和正相关理论检验了我国定期寿险和终身寿险市场中的逆向选择问题。我们选取了死亡率这一远期指标和健康状况这一近期指标来衡量消费者的死亡风险,从广延边际和集约边际两个方面利用正相关理论进行了深入的研究。实证结论表明,以死亡率和健康状况衡量的死亡风险与寿险消费负相关或者不相关,即我国寿险市场并不存在逆向选择问题。然后,我们讨论了模型的内生性问题,并根据年龄变量检验了结论的稳健性,实证结果表明我们的结论是稳健的。最后,本文利用双变量Probit模型设计了一个机制,并利用该机制验证了利他动机是我国寿险市场不存在逆向选择的原因之一。     

中国寿险市场存在逆向选择吗?——来自CHARLS数据的经验证据

我国寿险市场是否存在逆向选择问题,在理论和实证两个方面缺乏细致的讨论。本文利用CHARLS数据和正相关理论检验了我国定期寿险和终身寿险市场中的逆向选择问题。我们选取了死亡率这一远期指标和健康状况这一近期指标来衡量消费者的死亡风险,从广延边际和集约边际两个方面利用正相关理论进行了深入的研究。实证结论表明,以死亡率和健康状况衡量的死亡风险与寿险消费负相关或者不相关,即我国寿险市场并不存在逆向选择问题。然后,我们讨论了模型的内生性问题,并根据年龄变量检验了结论的稳健性,实证结果表明我们的结论是稳健的。最后,本文利用双变量Probit模型设计了一个机制,并利用该机制验证了利他动机是我国寿险市场不存在逆向选择的原因之一。     

Addressing insurance price discrimination in an era of diversity,equity, and inclusion

The early 2020s diversity, equity, and inclusion movement has prompted debate about banning the use of suspect insurance pricing variables because they discriminate against protected classes, such as gender. This paper demonstrates how banning an insurance pricing variable currently used in insurance pricing models can result in regulatory adverse selection if the ban heterogeneously combines policyowners with different expected losses into the same risk class, contrary to risk-based pricing. The paper begins by describing several recent regulatory and judicial decisions to ban insurance pricing variables. It next describes the process used by insurers to set insurance prices, followed by a discussion of applicable insurance discrimination laws. Using a simple risk aversion model, the paper next examines whether a ban on gender-based auto insurance pricing in California in 2019 results in regulatory adverse selection. The paper concludes by describing possible alternative pricing variables available to auto insurers if gender-based pricing is banned.     

“Skewness and Stock Option Prices”, Hans Gerber and Bruno Landry,July 1997

We determine the optimal amount of life insurance for a household of two wage earners. We consider the simple case of exponential utility, thereby removing wealth as a factor in buying life insurance, while retaining the relationship among life insurance, income, and the probability of dying and thus losing that income. For insurance purchased via a single premium or premium payable continuously, we explicitly determine the optimal death benefit. We show that if the premium is determined to target a specific probability of loss per policy, then the rates of consumption are identical under single premium or continuously payable premium. Thus, not only is equivalence of consumption achieved for the households under the two premium schemes, it is also obtained for the insurance company in the sense of equivalence of loss probabilities.     

An Examination of the Biases in Estimating the Benefit of Debt Insurance

This paper examines the biases in previous studies of estimating the benefit of debt insurance. We identify three possible sources of estimation biases: selection bias, marketability bias, and premium bias. Our findings indicate that both the selection bias and the marketability bias cause an underestimation of the actual benefit of bond insurance, while the premium bias results in an overestimation. Future research could benefit from this study by explicitly accounting for these estimating biases in obtaining a more accurate evaluation of the role of debt insurance in the market.     

Marktversagen auf dem geförderten Pflegezusatzversicherungsmarkt?

This study analyzes the supply side of the private German long term care insurance market. It compares loads and comprehensiveness of subsidized and unsubsidized insurance policies for three age groups. The results show that subsidized insurance policies are less comprehensive than unsubsidized insurance policies. In addition the premiums of subsidized policies are marked up substantially above expected benefits compared to unsubsidized policies. All in all these results indicate market failure due to adverse selection within the subsidized private long term care insurance market. Furthermore, the results show that due to unisex pricing, private long term care policies are in general more attractive to women than to men. As this is not reflected in demand, other factors than supply side failure seem to contribute to an overall low demand for private long term care insurance policies.     

寿险保单贴现业务的发展与思考

保单贴现是一种投资者以折扣价买进即将到期的人寿保单,到期获得保险公司给付的保险金,同时解决了绝症患者和老年病患高额医疗费的需要,以及老年人养老费用的需要,这是一种多赢的投资工具,在国外发达国家已经存在多年,并发展越来越快;随着我国金融市场的开放和人们保险意识的加强,发达国家保单贴现业务值得我国借鉴,尽快推出这一创新的保险业务,以满足部分保单持有人提前变现保单的需求。     

Do Property–Casualty Insurance Firms Locate to Minimize Insurance Premium Taxes?

States levy insurance premium taxes, which are essentially gross receipt taxes on premiums, with insurance companies paying the higher of the tax rate in the state in which the company is domiciled and the state in which the policy is written. Using firm‐level data for the property–casualty (P‐C) insurance industry, we estimate the extra insurance premium tax that P‐C insurance firms pay by not locating in the state that minimizes their insurance premium taxes. We find that only 4.78 percent of P‐C firms are located in the state that minimizes their insurance premium taxes. We explore the relationship between the extra tax paid and other factors that are thought to be associated with firm location choice. We find that P‐C firms appear to trade off higher taxes to locate in a state that is more urban.     

Adverse Selection in an Insurance Market With Government-Guaranteed Subsistence Levels

We consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government‐sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals' demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects the equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection.     

Wealth, Income, and Optimal Insurance

This article considers the decision to purchase insurance against possible losses of a property or wealth. The decision involves a standard economic trade‐off between the benefit of protection against loss and the cost of insurance premium. The premium is paid out of the income and decreases the consumption of other goods and services, rather than out of wealth and decreases the property or wealth. The demand for insurance depends mainly on the income and preferences. As a result, unlike in the standard model, a fair premium is neither necessary nor sufficient for the optimality of full coverage insurance. Rather, the individuals with higher incomes purchase full coverage insurance even at unfair prices of insurance while the individuals with lower income purchase partial coverage insurance at a fair price.     

Cream Skimming: Innovations in Insurance Risk Classification and Adverse Selection

We demonstrate how innovations in insurance risk classification can lead to adverse selection, or cream skimming, against insurers that are slow to adopt such pricing innovations. Using a model in which insurers with insufficient pricing data cannot differentiate between low‐ and high‐risk policyholders and therefore charge both the same premium, we show how innovative insurers develop new risk classification data to identify overcharged low‐risk policyholders and attract them from rival insurers with reduced prices. Less innovative insurers thus insure a growing percentage of high‐risk customers, resulting in adverse selection attributable to their informational disadvantage. Next, we examine two cases in which “Big Data” innovations in risk classification led to concerns about cream skimming among U.S. auto insurers. First, we track the rapid adoption of credit‐based insurance scores as pricing variables in personal auto insurance markets. Second, we examine the growing popularity of usage‐based insurance programs like telematics, plans in which insurers use data on policyholders’ actual driving behavior to set prices that attract low‐risk customers. Issues associated with the execution of such pricing strategies are discussed. In both cases, we document how rival insurers quickly adopt successful innovations to reduce their exposure to adverse selection.     

A Voluntary Deductible in Social Health Insurance with Risk Equalization: “Community‐Rated or Risk‐Rated Premium Rebate?”

On January 1, 2006 a new mandatory basic health insurance will be introduced in the Netherlands. One aspect of the new scheme is that the insured can choose to have a deductible. This option should increase the individual responsibility and reduce moral hazard. In the new scheme, a risk equalization system is aimed at avoiding preferred risk selection and insolvency of insurance companies with a relatively high‐risk pool. A crucial issue with respect to a voluntary deductible in this type of social health insurance is whether the premium rebate should be community rated or risk rated. The Dutch government has chosen the former, which means that the premium rebate will be independent of health status and risk. Our analysis shows that, in a situation with “accurate” risk equalization, a community‐rated premium rebate could lead to an adverse selection spiral. Over time, this spiral results in none of the insured taking a deductible and thus no reduction in moral hazard.     

Prämienkalkulation und die „Sanierung“ von Versicherungsverträgen

For assessing the risk adjusted insurance premiums, we always face the challenge that we don’t know the respective distribution functions of the probable claims and the probability of occurrence. Purely chance-based deviations from expected damages are no sufficient reason for premium increases. This means that for preparing for such deviations we have to distinct between chance-based and other deviations from expected and realised damage events. For adjusting insurance contracts due to new information, there are three possible strategies: first, we could ignore the past premium and calculate them based on the new data sample. Alternatively we could make use of a Bayesian learning process, which means to adjust the past premiums by taking into account the new information. The third strategy refers to a statistical test of hypotheses. This means to only adjust a premium if the original assumptions on the possible distribution of claims have to be rejected statistically. Looking at the certainty of the contracts and a steady calculation basis, there are many reasons in favour of the statistical test of hypotheses. The stringent usage of this method can lead to a sound basis for negotiations between insurance provider and holder. The improvement of transparency of taken risks is regulatorily desirable as well as helpful for evaluation of solvency.     

The effect of information disclosure on demand for high‐load insurance

Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high‐load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive‐compatible insurance demand experiment, in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most commonly suggested disclosures affect insurance demand, disclosing either (1) the true probability of loss, (2) the contract's expected loss, or (3) the insurer's profit on the transaction. Similar to consumers in naturally occurring insurance markets, subjects in the laboratory demonstrate significant demand for high‐load insurance against modest stakes. However, we find no effect of any of the three disclosure treatments on subjects' insurance choices. We discuss the implications of our results for possible public policy initiatives in insurance markets.     

Participating Insurance Contracts and the Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium Puzzle

We extend the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) insurance market model with adverse selection by allowing insurers to offer either non-participating or participating policies, that is, insurance contracts with policy dividends or supplementary calls for premium. It is shown that an equilibrium always exists in such a setting. Participating policies act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim to attract low-risk individuals only. The model predicts that the mutual corporate form should be prevalent in insurance markets where second-best Pareto efficiency requires cross-subsidisation between risk types.     

Life insurance demand and borrowing constraints

The literature devoted limited attention to exploring the relationship between financial development and life insurance demand. Financial development supports life insurance supply by providing confidence in the financial system, more efficient payment systems, and higher availability of financial instruments. However, financial development reduces households' needs to save by relaxing borrowing constraints, indirectly affecting life insurance demand. We contribute by providing a demand‐driven explanation of the negative consequences of financial development on life insurance development. We find that more credit‐constrained countries have higher life insurance penetration on average. Indirectly, the role of borrowing constraints signifies the importance of life insurance policies as a financing tool in case of the realization of various background risks. This study integrates the knowledge from life insurance theory, life insurance lapse, policy loans demand, and saving under liquidity constraints literature and produces implications for researchers, policymakers, and life insurers.