Optimal cartel trigger price strategies

A dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at Cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price. In this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price. The market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component, so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a “downward” demand shock.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis

We study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality-cost differentiated firms. Strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise. In equilibrium, only the top two firms advertise, earning “Bertrand-like” profits. Welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost, with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the “wrong” firm. When firms are symmetric, the symmetric equilibrium yields perverse comparative statics and is unstable. Our key results apply when demand is elastic, when ad costs are heterogeneous, and with noise in consumer tastes.     

Imperfect Forward Markets and Hedging

This paper considers a hedging model of a risk-averse competitive firm facing output price uncertainty. Imperfections exist in forward transactions in that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function for its forward sales. We show that the optimal output and hedge ratio of the firm are, in general, not separable, and are related in a deterministic manner. We also derive some economic implications of production and hedging decisions when firms differ in their attitudes towards risk. A more risk-averse firm is shown to produce less and hedge more than a less risk-averse firm.
(J.E.L.: D21, D81).     

Aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for “pairwise aggregation” of the demand functions of a group of consumers (conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the Slutsky restrictions) when the distribution of income is fixed. The sufficient conditions imply existence of a “representative” competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group. The necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or, alternatively, if for each price vector, all the consumers' income expansion paths lie in the same plane.     

Average-cost pricing: Some evidence and implications

We present new survey evidence on pricing behavior for more than 14,000 European firms, and study its macroeconomic implications. Among firms that are price setters, roughly 75% respond that their prices are set as a markup on total costs, a business practice termed “full cost pricing”. Only 25% set prices as markups over variable or marginal costs. Moreover, using industry data for the U.S., we find that the correlation between changes in output prices and changes in variable input prices is significantly lower when fixed costs are likely to be more important.Since our results are similar to the findings in the classic and controversial paper of Hall and Hitch (1939) and subsequent survey evidence, we believe it worth studying the implications of full cost pricing for macroeconomics. We first propose a problem for the firm where full cost pricing can arise as optimizing behavior. We embed this problem, featuring an occasionally binding constraint, into a simple general equilibrium model. We show that when the model is hit by a shock that makes the constraint binding, the response of endogenous variables is amplified significantly more than it would be under the unconstrained regime.     

以行业自律价来干预降价竞销并不明智

降价竞销是近年总供求关系发生逆转后的正常现象,不应被贬斥为“不正当竞争行为”。靠实施行业自律价来人为阻止降价促销并不明智,也没有经济法规依据,是价格改革的倒退,导致保护落后、阻碍行业技术进步等适得其反的后果。靠行业垄断定价来保证利税收入会得不偿失。降价压库是扩大内需的重要途径。随着扩张性财政货币政策的落实到位,普遍削价热潮将逐渐退温,行业自律价更成多余     

Multi-item EOQ model while demand is sales price and price break sensitive

In this paper, the authors study a multi-item deterministic EOQ (economic order quantity) model for a vendor when the demand rate of the essential commodities decreases quadratically with increasing sales price and increase exponentially with increasing level of price breaks. A price discount is offered to the customers when the revenue of the vendor crosses the level of price break. The main aim of the present article is to find out the optimal order quantities, optimal selling prices and optimal level of price break in order to maximize the average profit of the whole products. Numerical examples are also illustrated to test of our proposed model.     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Strategic use of futures and options by commodity processors

The impacts of input–output price relationships on end-users' demands for positions in futures and options are analyzed using a mean-variance portfolio model and applied to price risk management in the bread manufacturing industry. A production relationship was assumed between the input and resultant output, and correlation between the input and output prices were introduced into the portfolio model. The optimal hedge ratio can be either positive or negative depending upon the relationship between the input and output price standard deviation adjusted for production technology and input–output price correlation. Introduction of a call option into the portfolio (in addition to the futures) does not change the hedging demand for futures; however, the speculative component changes. The results show that the addition of input–output linear production and price correlation relationships would not justify a hedging role for options unless there is bias in the futures and/or options markets.     

COMPETITIVE LONG RUN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND FACTOR-PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

In this paper we have considered competitive long run industry equilibrium with factor-price uncertainty. We discussed the long run equilibrium output of firms with risk neutrality, output price and their responses to changes in uncertainty, factor price and industry demand. In the first part of this paper we have derived a result that, given risk neutrality, the firms operate at proper capacity, i.e. where expected long run marginal cost is equal to expected long run average cost, as shown in the case of output-price uncertainty. This result is, however, different from that obtained from Sheshinski and Dréze (1976). From the comparative static analysis we first discovered that even under risk neutrality factor-price uncertainty affects the long run industry equilibrium: that is, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty leads firm's to enter the industry, because they can decrease expected long run costs as the variability of factor price increases. Consequently, output price goes down. In contrast, firm size is kept invariable in response to its increase as long as the cost function is separable, i.e. the separability of the cost function holds when production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and CES types used commonly in empirical work, although firm size might, generally, be affected by the increase. It is an interesting fact that firm size and industry size will express different responses to a change in risk. The result that the long run industry equilibrium with cost uncertainty is explicitly affected is a sharp contrast to the result under output-price uncertainty and provides a new aspect for understanding about the behaviour of the industry with uncertainty. Secondly, increased factor-price causes the number of firms in the industry to decline and output price to rise. In addition, firm's size will expand with its increase if that factor is inferior, while the effect on firm size is ambiguous if it is normal. The firm's output, i.e. firm size, is, however, kept constant if the cost function is separable. Thirdly, the long run equilibrium output of the firm remains intact but the number of firms increases as industry demand rises. This result holds, regardless of the firm's attitude towards risk. Finally, we find throughout the paper that the functional form of the cost function plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of the industry with factor-price uncertainty.     

Endogenous growth and changing sectoral composition in advanced economies

We study how changing sectoral composition in employment and output shares affects aggregate growth by modeling a two-sector economy with a technologically “progressive” industry, which produces for consumption and investment, and a technologically “stagnant” industry producing only for consumption. Hence, unbalanced improvements in total factor productivity interact with changes in the composition of final demand in shaping the growth process. Within this endogenous growth framework, we show under what conditions on preferences Baumol's asymptotic stagnancy occurs. Beside studying the limiting behavior of the economy, numerical examples are presented to analyze the structural change going on along the transition path.     

BUYING LOCALLY

‘‘Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another instead of the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I'll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements and are often championed on social or environmental grounds. We show that in a monopolistically competitive economy, buy local arrangements can have salutary effects even for selfish agents immune to social or environmental considerations. Buy local arrangements effectively allow firms to exploit the equilibrium price–cost gap to profitably expand their sales at the going price.     

A Keynesian general equilibrium model with competitive firms and rational expectations

A Keynesian general equilibrium model is developed from neoclassical principles. The model is based on competitive firm behavior, and optimizing agents that form expectations rationally. Firms determine their product price to maximize expected profits. Non-neutrality results follow from micro foundations that view firms as committing to a price and output level before actual demand is observed. It follows that optimal output levels are in part determined by demand conditions. In the general equilibrium framework, increases in government spending lead to welfare-improving increases in aggregate output.I thank Tom Cosimano, Strat Douglas, Douglas Gale, Norm Miller, Nick Rowe, Geoffrey Woglom, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. The responsibility for potential errors remains entirely my own.     

Money growth rules and price level determinacy

Do exogenous money growth rules produce price level determinacy? This is a classic topic in monetary theory. This paper contributes to this literature by examining the effect of money demand timing. The paper demonstrates how conditions for determinacy vary depending upon whether the theoretical model uses “cash-in-advance” timing or “cash-when-I'm-done” timing. This issue is addressed in an endowment economy and a standard production economy.     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Soviet agricultural procurement pricing: A study in perversity

The relationship between Soviet agricultural procurement prices and quantities is examined in the light of the existence of bonuses for above-trend sales (BATS) and zonal price differentiation (ZPD). That BATS leads to a positive relationship between prices and quantities as harvest conditions vary is shown to hold for the individual farm. Planners are apt, however, to be more concerned with the “average” price of a crop, which is closely related to the subsidy bill. This price is more likely to be “perverse” under ZPD than BATS, although neither guarantees perversity. Data suggest that such perversity is a common occurrence. J. Comp. Econ., March 1985, 9(1), pp. 24–45. Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois 61761.     

Money in the pure consumption loan model

The purpose of this paper is to show how modern techniques of Temporary competitive equilibrium analysis can be applied to models of the “pure consumption loan model” type. One considers Samuelson's simplest model where traders live two periods and where money is the only store of value. It is proved that a temporary equilibrium exists if price expectations are sufficiently independent of current prices. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to exist if there is a set of traders (i) whose total resources are greater when they are young than when they are old, (ii) who are indifferent between present and future consumption. It is proved that this existence theorem still holds if the economy is sufficiently “close” to an economy which has this property. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to be Pareto optimal if all traders hold positive cash balances. It may be inefficient if this condition is not satisfied, for some traders may then be willing to borrow, which they cannot do in this model.     

Optimal inventories and equilibrium price behavior

This paper departs from the established tradition of equilibrium inventory theory by examining the relationship between inventories and market prices when production is instantaneous but distribution is costly. Inventory holdings are not buffer stocks and do not facilitate production smoothing; rather, production variability exceeds the variability of final sales. Voluntary holdings of marketable finished goods are not restricted to occasional “speculation” during periods of unexpectedly low demand, but may persist even when capital losses are anticipated. In these respects, the paper reconciles important features of the inventory decision problem with the results of modern investment theory.     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.     

Advertising and pricing policies in the equine breeding industry or sex and the single stallion

A unique aspect of the equine breeding industry is the way in which the current year's demand for stud services depends on the previous year's production levels. In a monopolistically competitive market, product differentiation and product promotion and advertisement are important aspects of industry conduct. A stallion's reputation and therefore demand for his services depend on the stallion owner's ability to differentiate the product.

The price a stallion owner charges depends on the quality of the stud himself, and also on the quality of his offspring. The producer's output (foals) become advertisements for the stallion when they are raced, shown, etc. They also can become substitutes for the stallion, since they are an alternative source of the stallion's genes. Stallion owners are in the special position that they need to prove their stallion's ability to sire quality offspring, while bearing in mind they are producing possible substitutes. Outstanding offspring will generate demand for the parent's services if they are successfully shown, raced, etc. Conversely, progeny who compete unsuccessfully will decrease demand by contributing to a poor reputation for themselves, their breeder and their sire. But, outstanding individuals eventually become breeding stock and therefore offer an alternative source for the ‘winning genes’.

This intergenerational dependence has led to pricing policies and practices in the equine breeding industry which have important implications. Common practices include: incentives to compete, rebates for gelding male offspring, price discrimination in favour or quality mares and limited bookings. These policies illustrate aspects of industry conduct commonly discussed in industrial organization literature such as first-degree price discrimination, non-linear pricing and non-price competition. The use of artificial insemination and other new breeding technologies and thus the potential for a stallion to breed larger numbers of mares, further compounds the extent and results of such practices.

This paper investigates pricing policies in the equine breeding industry, using a case study approach. A model of indsutry pricing policies is developed and tested using data for American Quarter Horses.