Testing liquidity constraints in 10 Asian developing countries: an error-correction model approach

An error-correction model is used to estimate the fraction of consumers who are liquidity-constrained in 10 Asian developing countries. Our estimates of the fraction of consumers who are liquidity-constrained range between 0.25 and 0.98. We further investigate whether financial liberalization has resulted in the reduction of liquidity constraints in these countries. However, the results find support for this only in the cases of South Korea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan.     

The tax (dis)advantage of a firm issuing options on its own stock

It is common for firms to issue or purchase options on the firm's own stock. Examples include convertible bonds, warrants, call options as employee compensation, and the sale of put options as part of share repurchase programs. This paper shows that option positions with implicit borrowing—such as put sales and call purchases—are tax-disadvantaged relative to the equivalent synthetic option with explicit borrowing. Conversely, option positions with implicit lending—such as warrants—are tax-advantaged. I also show that firms are better off from a tax perspective issuing bifurcated convertible bonds—bonds plus warrants—rather than an otherwise equivalent standard convertible.     

Liquidity shocks and equilibrium liquidity premia

We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset returns when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. This result can help us understand why some securities have high liquidity premia, despite low turnover frequency.     

Credit market discipline: Theory and evidence

Popular in the academic literature and financial press, the credit market discipline hypothesis holds that credit markets, through risk premia increasing in debt level, constrain governments from borrowing and thus, impose fiscal discipline on sovereign borrowers. While several papers document rising risk premia, none have investigated the consumption response. This paper fills this gap by using data on U.S. states' risk premia from 1973–98. An optimizing model is formulated, whereby states intertemporally smooth consumption in the face of interest rates which increase with debt. Deviations from optimality are considered by allowing for governments which consume out of contemporaneous resources. In both cases, credit market discipline is rejected. Rejection is robust to sample splits based on ideology and the stringency of balanced budget requirments.     

The Demand for, and Impact of, Learning HIV Status

This paper evaluates an experiment in which individuals in rural Malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their HIV results after being tested. Distance to the HIV results centers was also randomly assigned. Without any incentive, 34 percent of the participants learned their HIV results. However, even the smallest incentive doubled that share. Using the randomly assigned incentives and distance from results centers as instruments for the knowledge of HIV status, sexually active HIV-positive individuals who learned their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later than sexually active HIV-positive individuals who did not learn their results; however, HIV-positive individuals who learned their results purchase only two additional condoms than those who did not. There is no significant effect of learning HIV-negative status on the purchase of condoms.     

DEALER PRICING OF CONSUMER CREDIT*

Price discrimination incentives may induce dealers to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. We focus on how financial market imperfections make it possible to segment the customer population. When borrowing and lending rates differ from each other and from the rate of interest on a durable good purchase, the structure of those rates influences customers' choices to purchase on credit or cash terms, and the scope for dealers' price discrimination. Empirical analysis of a set of installment‐credit, personal‐loan, and regional interest rate data offers considerable support to the assumptions and implications of our theoretical framework.     

Commodity Price Instability and Debt-linking by Developing Countries

Most developing countries borrow in world capital markets. Typically this borrowing is denominated in one of the major currencies and requires periodic servicing. The foreign exchange required to meet the service obligation is often dependent on the export of one or a small number of commodities. This demand usually competes with a number of other claims on export earnings, including both consumption and capital goods imports. This paper investigates the use of commodity-linked borrowing by developing countries. If the interest and/or principal payments on external debt are linked to the price of a country's principal exports, the risk of default can be shifted to better-diversified lenders. The social cost of linking is much smaller than that of other compensating arrangements. In addition, commodity-linked debt may reduce the borrower's direct lending costs. This will depend on the quantity of linked debt supplied and the dispersion of expectations about the future price of the commodity. If the supply is small relative to the demand among investors who expect the commodity price to increase, the resulting reduction in the cost of borrowing may be sufficient to offset the premium for bearing the risk associated with the commodity's future price.     

Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints

We study the optimal allocation of a resource in a second-best world in which parties may be liquidity-constrained due to credit frictions and capital market imperfections. In this setting, common to various natural resource industries, agents are unable to bid more than their budget regardless of their valuation. While auction markets are widely used mechanisms for allocating natural resource extraction rights and conservation contracts, we show that in these circumstances the competitive market –which allocates items based on rank order of bids– fails to achieve the first-best allocation. The market outcome is welfare-dominated by a hybrid mechanism consisting of random assignment followed by resale in a secondary market. Via the initial lottery, the hybrid-mechanism allocates the items with positive probability to high-valuation low-wealth individuals who would not have been able to afford them in a competitive market. High-valuation high-wealth agents, on the other hand, acquire the items in the secondary market if they do not receive them in the initial lottery. Therefore, equity in the allocation of access to the resource may be justified not only by distributional concerns but also by economic efficiency. We illustrate our model using data from buybacks of harvesting rights in the seafood industry.     

QUALITY COMPETITION WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND AND COSTLY SEARCH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE VIDEO RENTAL MARKET

A theoretical model is developed to predict optimal service rates in markets where firms compete in availability. We show that firms are more likely to stock-out of popular products as the cost of consumer search increases. Carlton (1978) showed that, in a zero-profit competitive environment, firms balance the risk of not being able to serve a particular customer against the cost of holding excess capacity and that this balancing act will result in an equilibrium in which not all customers are served. The model was later adapted to oligopolistic competition by Peters (1984) and Deneckere and Peck (1995) . This paper extends this literature on competition under stochastic demand by developing a model that incorporates 1) the possibility that customers may be able to purchase from another firm in the case of a stock-out and 2) the option for firms to offer an imperfect substitute in order to persuade some customers to make a purchase when the first choice product is out of stock. Empirical evidence is presented in support of the theoretical model using data collected from video rental outlets in a midsize southeastern US city.     

Who gains from non-collusive corruption?

Non-collusive corruption, i.e., corruption that imposes an additional burden on business activity, is particularly widespread in low-income countries. We build a macroeconomic model with credit market imperfections and heterogeneous agents to explore the roots and consequences of this type of corruption. We find that credit market imperfections, by generating rents for the incumbent entrepreneurs, create strong incentives for corrupt behavior by state officials. However, non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs. If borrowing is limited, bribes prevent poorer but talented individuals from starting a business. But this is likely to benefit those who may enter anyway; the cost of capital is lower and there is less competition on the goods markets.     

Jointly optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules under liquidity constraints

We study the welfare properties of an economy where both monetary and fiscal policies follow simple rules, and where a subset of agents is liquidity constrained. The welfare benefits of optimizing the fiscal rule are far larger than those of optimizing the monetary rule. The optimized fiscal rule implements strong automatic stabilizers that primarily stabilize the income of liquidity-constrained agents, rather than output. Transfers targeted to liquidity-constrained agents are the preferred fiscal instrument. The optimized monetary rule exhibits super-inertia and a weak inflation response. Optimized simple rules perform as well as the optimal policy under the timeless perspective.     

To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

We compare the performance of markets and tournaments as allocative mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. The economy consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their initial wealth and ability level. These must be assigned to a continuum of investment opportunities or inputs of different productivity. With perfect capital markets matching is efficient under both mechanisms. Markets, however, generate higher aggregate consumption because of the waste associated with the production of signals under tournaments. When borrowing constraints are present, tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency and, for sufficiently powerful signalling technologies, also in terms of aggregate consumption.     

Test for the real option in consumer behavior

Consumers become indecisive when facing too many choices. Economic analysis suggests that when a decision involves uncertain outcome, can be delayed and is irreversible, there will be a real option in the cost–benefit analysis. For example, the option to keep alive a consumer's purchasing decision has a significant value. It allows the consumer to take advantage of any future advantageous deals while avoiding the bad choices. This renders the consumer more hesitant. When a consumer decides to exercise his buying decision, he demands a compensation for the loss of this option. Hence, the benefits of a purchase must be over and above its costs by a wide margin (the option value). Data from a survey at a Turkish university on hypothetical purchase decisions confirmed the existence of this real option. We conclude with marketing policy recommendations and future research directions. Connection to the Prospect Theory is briefly explored.Note: Although the 3rd person singular pronoun he/his was used throughout to describe the consumer, he was intended to be gender-neutral.     

Equity risk premium and time horizon: What do the U.S. secular data say?

We consider a representative investor whose wealth is made up of the equity market portfolio and the riskless asset, and who maximizes the expected utility of his/her future wealth for a given horizon. The solution of this program shows that the equilibrium value of the equity risk premium – the latter being measured by the difference between the expected equity portfolio return and the risk-free interest rate – is given by the product of the price of risk by the expected variance of stock returns. When returns are predictable, these two magnitudes are both time-varying and horizon-dependent. In accordance with this theoretical framework, our paper presents an econometric model of the equity risk premia for two traditional horizons: the one-period-ahead horizon (i.e. the ‘short-term’ premium) and the infinite-time horizon (i.e. the ‘long-term’ premium). Using annual US secular data from 1871 to 2008, and representing the expected returns by mixing the three traditional adaptive, extrapolative and regressive processes, large disparities in the dynamics of the two premia are evidenced. Concerning the determination of the equilibrium values of the two premia, the expected variances depend on the past values of the centered squared returns while the prices of risk (unobservable variables) are estimated according to the Kalman filter methodology, which enables us to capture the influence of hidden variables and of non-directly measurable psychological effects. A spread of interest rates adds to this determination. Possibly due to risky arbitrage and transaction costs, the results show that observed premia gradually converge towards their equilibrium values, this process being described by an error correction model. Overall, our model provides a rather satisfactory representation of ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ premia.     

Leaders in change : Solar energy owners and the implications for future adoption rates

Information on the characteristics of the initial wave of homeowners who installed solar energy systems is presented and then used to anticipate future solar market penetration patterns. Surveys of these adopters reveal high education and income levels; professional and executive occupations; economic, energy saving, and environmental concern as the principal purchase motivations; and high satisfaction levels. As a group, these individuals conform to the “early adopter” type identified in innovation diffusion research rather than the “innovator” type that would be expected at this early stage of commercialization. This characteristic, the influence of economic motivations, owners' high satisfaction levels, and the findings of other surveys indicate that widespread solar system adoption is probable if the initial high cost barrier can be reduced.     

The impact of mortgage interest-rate subsidies on household borrowing

The responsiveness of household borrowing to changes in the interest rate is a crucial parameter for assessing public policies aimed at promoting saving. We estimate the effect on household borrowing of a reform of a program that subsidized interest rates on mortgages signed by medium- and low-income households. The reform established a ceiling in the price of the house that could be financed with the program. First, we use triple difference estimators exploiting the fact that the reform should affect most the borrowing behavior of eligible individuals living in high-price areas, and estimate that the elasticity of the probability getting a loan to the interest rate lies between − 2.8 and − 1.3. Second, we document that after the reform, the distribution of loan sizes became more concentrated at the discontinuity point of the budget constraint of eligible individuals. Both findings are consistent with a negative response of household borrowing to increases in interest rates.     

Household savings constraints,uncertainty and macroprudential policy

We investigate the impact of macroprudential policy on Irish households' perception of savings adequacy, with a particular focus on households intending to purchase a home. These measures tighten loan-to-value ratios and raise the entry cost for home purchase. We find that the measures have had a significant impact on savings constraints. Indeed, constrained potential buyers, who are planning to purchase, but not presently saving to buy a home, are the group most affected as the macroprudential rules increase the downpayment size required. Heterogeneous effects across households indicate younger, private renting households, and those with relatively uncertain cash flows.     

Political aspects of household finance: debt,wage bargaining,and macroeconomic (in)stability

The recent literature has shown that income inequality is one of the main causes of borrowing and debt accumulation by working households. This article explores the possibility that household indebtedness is an important cause of rising income inequality. If workers experience rising debt burdens, their cost of job loss may rise if they need labor-market income to continue borrowing and servicing existing debt. This, in turn, will reduce their bargaining power and increase income inequality, inducing workers to borrow more to maintain consumption standards, and so creating a vicious circle of rising inequality, job insecurity, and indebtedness. We believe that these dynamics may have contributed to observed simultaneous increases in income inequality and household debt prior to the recent financial crisis. To explore the two-way interaction between inequality and debt, we develop an employment rent framework that explicitly considers the impact of workers’ indebtedness on their perceived cost of job loss. This is embedded in a neo-Kaleckian macro model in which inequality spurs debt accumulation that contributes to household consumption spending and hence demand formation. Our analysis suggests that (a) workers’ borrowing behavior plays a crucial role in understanding the character of demand and growth regimes; (b) debt and workers’ borrowing behavior play an important role in the labor market by influencing workers’ bargaining power; and (c) through such channels, workers’ borrowing behavior can be a decisive factor in the determination of macroeconomic (in)stability.     

A two-stage translog marginal cost pricing approach for Floridian hospital outputs

Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, issues still remain regarding the mandated purchase of insurance to ensure more universal coverage. One such issue is the pricing of these insurance packages and whether or not the reimbursements will cover necessary services. Therefore, policy concerns exist that increasing the number of insured individuals may not curtail costs. Conversely, providers may not wish to treat patients covered by excessively frugal plans such as Medicaid; hence the trade-offs between access and cost control. In this article, we present findings from a cost function and a productivity approach to determine the marginal cost of providing inpatient hospital care for hospitals operating in Florida during 2005. Using these methodological approaches, we are able to use the marginal rate of transformation to determine the relative marginal costs while controlling for hospital technical and allocative inefficiency. Our work differs from earlier articles as we avoid the Greene problem for cross-sectional models through a two-step approach. By including both reimbursement rates under conditions of hospital efficiency, we can ascertain payment schemes that should, at least in theory, cover necessary costs for patient care without leading to excessive input usage.