Limited Liability and Market Power

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of limited liability on firm behavior when market power is present. A risk-neutral monopolist facing uncertain demand (with constant returns to scale technology) produces higher output, yielding higher expected profits when costless exit is induced by limited liability. The higher output may increase social welfare (monopolist profit plus consumer surplus) even though the monopolist may overproduce relative to the quantity that maximizes social welfare. When no market power is present, the overproduction resulting from the provision of limited liability results in loss of social welfare. Appropriate use of liability limitation laws can thus provide policy makers an additional policy instrument with which to mitigate the effects of market power.JEL Classification: D24, D41, D42, G32, G38     

Exchange risk, exposure, and the option to trade

Rather than impeding trade, increased exchange rate uncertainty may on average create trade as it implies a higher probability that ex post deviations from Commodity Price Parity will exceed tariffs and transportation costs. We demonstrate such an effect in a small-country, short-term model, under the alternative assumptions of perfect competition and of a monopolist trader-producer. The proofs rely on the fact that such firms' exposures can be replicated (and hedged) by standard options. Under partial monopoly scenarios, the effect of volatility is ex ante unclear, though. (JEL F31)     

Investment under demand uncertainty: The newsboy problem revisited

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty, but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk-neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that of the risk-averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk-neutral and the risk-averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff with a kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger [1991, 1995].     

Money,interest rates,and risk

This paper analyzes the role of the risk in the form of the volatility of open market interest rates as a factor in the demand for money. We demonstrate, using an inventory theoretic model of money demand, that increases in interest rate volatility will increase the demand for money. We then present empirical evidence that the demand for money has been influenced by alterations in the volatility of open market rates using standard specifications of the demand for money.     

Vertical relations,opportunism, and welfare

This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms' profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms.     

Strategic IPOs and product market competition

We examine firms' incentives to go public in the presence of product market competition. As a result of their greater ability to diversify idiosyncratic risk in the capital market, public firms' owners tolerate higher profit variability than owners of private firms. Consequently, public firms adopt riskier and more aggressive output market strategies than private firms, which improves the competitive position of the former vis-à-vis the latter. This strategic benefit of being public, and thus, the proportion of public firms in an industry, is shown to be positively related to the degree of competitive interaction among firms in the output market, to demand uncertainty, and to the idiosyncratic portion of this uncertainty. Additional empirical predictions concern the effect of a firm's initial public offering on its market share and on its rivals' valuations. We test the model's predictions and find empirical support for most of them.     

Saving under uncertainty: A bivariate non-expected utility approach

We adopt the multivariate non-expected utility approach proposed by Yaari [1986] to provide a characterization of the comparative statics effects of greater risk aversion and of mean-preserving increases in risk on saving and borrowing in the presence of income and interest rate risk.We show that in Yaari's model, it is possible to extend the applicability of the Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] and Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] (DSKM) single-crossing property to establish a relationship between greater risk aversion and saving (or borrowing) on the basis of the individual's ordinal preferences as long as the two risks are independent. We also demonstrate that the comparative statics effects of a joint mean-preserving increase in random income and interest rate on saving and borrowing can be determined by an extension of the DSKM single-crossing property.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Bank versus Bond Finance

How does uncertainty affect the costs of raising finance in the bond market and via bank loans? Empirically, this paper finds that heightened uncertainty is accompanied by an increase in corporate bond spreads, whereas spreads on bank loans remain unchanged. This finding can be explained with a model that includes costly state verification and in which banks maintain long-term relationships with borrowers and acquire information beyond what is publicly available. After an unexpected increase in uncertainty, the probability of borrower default increases. Banks leave the loan spread unchanged to maintain the relationship. In contrast, bond spreads increase because investors demand compensation for the increased default risk.     

中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜--基于劳动力价格扭曲视角北大核心

本文通过建立生产部门的要素买方垄断市场均衡模型,利用1996-2016年中国省级面板数据测算中国劳动力价格扭曲程度,并使用固定效应模型(FE)及面板固定效应的工具变量(IV)估计方法加以分析,从劳动力价格扭曲视角解答了中国资本产出、资本回报与资本流向之谜,即中国经济如何在赶超阶段面临资本深化不断加剧和TFP增长乏力的情况下,依靠劳动力价格扭曲实现低资本产出与高资本回报水平共存,从而维持长期高速资本积累以及优质的资本流向结构。实证研究表明:劳动力价格扭曲降低了资本产出效率,但这并不能掩盖由劳动力向资本方转移的垄断利润对资本回报的直接补贴,因此劳动力价格扭曲对中国维持高资本回报水平起到了重要的支撑作用,并通过高资本回报水平实现了地区资本快速积累,劳动力价格扭曲对资本流向的积极作用还体现在抑制资本"脱实向虚"及吸引外资流入。因此,应正视劳动力价格扭曲在赶超阶段的特殊作用,在矫正扭曲的过程中循序渐进,更积极采取措施规避其对资本回报和资本流向可能产生的不利影响。     

Outsourcing with long term contracts: capital structure and product market competition effects

This paper analyzes how capital structure and product market competition affect the firms’ strategic choice between outsourcing with long term contracts and outsourcing to the spot market. When outsourcing to the spot market firms are exposed to price uncertainty, whereas a long term contract allows them to set in advance the outsourcing price. We show that, to the extent that leverage and uncertainty can lead to financial distress costs in bad states of nature, firms may use long term contracts as a risk management device to hedge input price uncertainty. With a monopoly in the final product market, the outsourcing decision involves a trade-off between a positive convexity effect of input price uncertainty under the spot regime and the option to avoid financial distress costs under the long term contract regime. Moreover, product market competition among buyers can lead to an increase in financial distress costs not only for firms outsourcing to the spot market but also for firms outsourcing with a long term contract. We examine the monopolist’s outsourcing decision and derive the equilibrium for an oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of these costs and on the level of efficiency of the supplier.     

On Microfoundations of the Dual Theory of Choice

We show that Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk may be derived as an indirect utility when a risk-neutral agent faces financial imperfections. We consider an agent that maximizes expected discounted cash flows under a bid-ask spread in the credit market. It turns out that the agent evaluates lotteries as if she were maximizing Yaari's dual utility function. We also generalize the dual theory of choice for unbounded lotteries.     

A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory

While the topics of risk aversion and utility theory have been discussed extensively in the academic literature on risk and insurance, this literature does not include a pedagogical discussion that is widely accessible for classroom use. This article provides a practical introduction to risk aversion that is designed for readers with little prerequisite course work in economics or statistics. We describe a simple model of insurance demand that can be applied to the property, liability, life, and health insurance markets. We also demonstrate how risk aversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of auto insurance coverage. Exercises and practice problems are provided so that readers can test their mastery of the concepts presented in the article. An instructional note on using this article to teach risk aversion in the classroom is also provided.     

Leaders,followers, and equity risk premiums in booms and busts

We study an investment problem in which two asymmetric firms face competition and the regime characterizing the economic condition follows a Markov switching process. We derive the value functions and investment thresholds of the leader and follower. The option value of regime uncertainty is found to be quite important for the investment decision of firms. We also show the relationship between the equity risk premium and the economic cycle that has not been done in previous studies, which proxy economic conditions by the level of demand or other state variables.     

Corporate Risk Management for Multinational Corporations: Financial and Operational Hedging Policies

Under what conditions will a multinational corporation alterits operations to manage its risk exposure? We show that multinationalfirms will engage in operational hedging only when both exchangerate uncertainty and demand uncertainty are present. Operationalhedging is less important for managing short-term exposures,since demand uncertainty is lower in the short term. Operationalhedging is also less important for commodity-based firms, whichface price but not quantity uncertainty. When the fixed costsof establishing a plant are low or the variability of the exchangerate is high, a firm may benefit from establishing plants inboth the domestic and foreign location. Capacity allocated tothe foreign location relative to the domestic location willincrease when the variability of foreign demand increases relativeto the variability of domestic demand or when the expected profitmargin is larger. For firms with plants in both a domestic andforeign location, the foreign currency cash flow generally willnot be independent of the exchange rate and consequently theoptimal financial hedging policy cannot be implemented withforward contracts alone. We show that the optimal financialhedging policy can be implemented using foreign currency calland put options and forward contracts.     

Uncertainty,competition, and costs in corporate bond underwriting

The effect of a syndicate's uncertainty regarding the demand for a new bond issue on the syndicate's choice of an offer and bid price, and on the spread between those two prices, is analyzed. Then, the impact of uncertainty on the spread is empirically tested. The hypothesis that the spread varies inversely with the number of bidders for an issue is also developed and tested, and several other hypothesized determinants of the spread are examined.     

Articulation,Profit or Loss and OCI in the IASB Conceptual Framework: Different Shades of Clean (or Dirty) Surplus

Abstract

The 2015 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Conceptual Framework Exposure Draft (2015 IASB CF ED) proposes a mixed valuation and transactions approach to income determination. Nevertheless, it does not clearly choose between single or dual concepts of profit, which renders the 2015 IASB CF ED’s financial accounting model somewhat incoherent. The 2015 IASB CF ED proposes a rebuttable presumption that profit or loss should be all-inclusive. Only the IASB can rebut this presumption, but the 2015 IASB CF ED provides no clear conceptual basis on which to rebut this presumption. In spite of considering dual measurement, the IASB believes that it is neither possible, nor necessary, to distinguish between profit or loss and other comprehensive income (OCI) on a conceptual basis. This paper suggests that the 2015 IASB CF ED’s approach to measurement can be improved by introducing a deprival value measurement rule in cases where fair value and historical cost are not appropriate. Furthermore, it argues that under dual measurement it is both necessary and possible to make a conceptual distinction between the realised items of income and expense in profit or loss and those recognised by accretion in OCI.     

经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求

本文在拓展背景风险理论研究的基础上,揭示了经济政策不确定性对保险需求的影响及其受地区文化制约的理论机制。并利用2007-2017年中国30个地区的月度面板数据,检验了经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求间的内在联系。结果发现:第一,经济政策不确定性会对保险需求产生显著正影响,且这种效应在地区人身险需求上表现更明显;第二,将地区文化指标集纳入经济政策不确定性与保险需求关系的研究框架,发现地区文化差异会对经济政策不确定性影响保险需求产生调节效应。因此政府需在充分重视经济政策波动和文化对经济活动的双重影响基础上,加强国内社会保障体系建设,建立更透明的信息传递渠道,培育人们主动抵抗风险的意识和文化习惯,调整保险供给结构,以减少不确定性对社会经济行为的负面冲击。     

Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets

This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two-period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre-committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self-defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent's full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms' production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.     

On Intraday Risk Premia

This article presents a framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of anticipated large demand pressures on asset risk premia. We show that large institutions who can time their entry into the market will trade either at the open, or during periods of unusual demand pressures. We show that if these institutions do enter later in the day, they trade in the same direction as institutions which provide liquidity continuously; institutions therefore appear to exhibit “herding” behavior. We also explore how changing the uncertainty of demand pressures late in the day affects trading costs throughout the day.     

Governance,efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking

We employ a hand-collected unique dataset on banks operating in China between 2003 and 2011 to investigate the impact of board governance features (size, composition and functioning) on bank efficiency and risk taking. Our evidence suggests that board characteristics tend to have a greater influence on banks' profit and cost efficiency than on loan quality. We find that the proportion of female directors on the board appears not only to be linked to higher profit and cost efficiency but also to lower traditional banking risk. Similarly, board independence is associated with higher profit efficiency of banks; while the opposite is found for executive directors and in the presence of dual leadership of the CEO/chairperson. Among the control variables, we found that liquidity negatively affects profit and cost efficiency, while positively affecting risk. Interestingly, we find some evidence of an incremental effect of specific board characteristics on efficiency for banks with more concentrated ownership structures and state-owned institutions; while for banks with CEO performance-related pay schemes the effect on efficiency when significant is usually negative. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers in China charged with the task of improving the governance mechanisms in banking institutions.