Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation

Research indicates that there is a positive association between accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation; however, evidence also suggests that this positive association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are related to both current and future firm performance. Our results indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation (particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.     

Powerful CEOs,cash bonus contracts and firm performance

We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power and the proportion of ex-ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex-ante bonus ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related non-financial performance targets is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-financial performance targets is negatively associated with subsequent firm performance. These results are robust to alternative econometric specifications and variable definitions.     

An investigation of the short‐ and long‐run relations between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a pitch

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Risk-taking in new project selection: Additive effects of bonus incentives and past performance history

The goal of this study is to investigate how past project performance history and bonus incentive pay schemes affect managers' propensity to select more or less risky projects. Performance history is manipulated via past positive outcomes (i.e. beating a target profit rate) and negative outcomes (i.e. missing a target profit rate). Two types of bonus incentive pay schemes (hurdle bonus and graduated bonus) were employed in the study. The findings are consistent with prospect theory that predicts that prior bad outcomes (negative performance history) motivate greater risk-taking than prior good outcomes (positive performance history). In addition, we find evidence that hurdle and graduated bonus incentive schemes also affect risk taking. Overall, we find an additive effect of these two factors, such that the greatest (least) risk taking occurred when participants had negative (positive) prior experience coupled with a graduated (hurdle) bonus scheme.     

Balancing difficulty of performance targets: theory and evidence

We examine how firms balance difficulty of performance targets in their annual bonus plans. We present an analytical model showing that managerial allocation of effort is a function of not only relative incentive weights but also the difficulty of performance targets. We find that relative incentive weights and target difficulty can either be complements or substitutes in motivating effort depending on the extent to which managers have alternative employment opportunities. To test the predictions of our model, we use survey data on performance targets in annual bonus plans. Our sample of 877 survey respondents consists primarily of financial executives in small- and medium-size private companies where annual bonuses are important both for motivation and retention. Consistent with our model, we find that relative incentive weights are negatively (positively) associated with perceived target difficulty when concerns about managerial retention are high (low). It follows that performance measures included in annual bonus plans have sometimes easy and other times challenging targets depending on their relative incentive weights and retention concerns.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Implicit racial prejudice against African-Americans in balanced scorecard performance evaluations

A dominant theme in critical accounting theory concerns the relation between human identities and accounting discourse and practices. Though this theme has strong antecedents in Marxist-inspired critique of ideology, research into this theme has employed diverse approaches; among them, genealogical studies (e.g., Miller and O’Leary, 1987), deconstructive studies (e.g., Shearer and Arrington, 1993), psychoanalytic studies (Roberts, 1991, Roberts, 2009) and critical-rational studies (e.g., Power and Laughlin, 1996). We offer a different approach grounded in social-cognitive concerns with how implicit attitudes about race influence evaluation of others. We report on the results of an empirical, lab-based study of balanced scorecard evaluations and bonus allocations where race is a treatment effect and where the well-established tenets of Implicit Association Testing (IAT) are used to reveal that there are, indeed, propensities to unwillingly let racial prejudice intervene into our accounting-based evaluations of others. That intervention influences identity in ways that are morally unacceptable, degrading to black workers, and loaded with potential for negative material consequences for workers (e.g., less compensation due to racially determined and irrational performance evaluations). The paper illustrates one area of research in which methodologies adapted from conventional empirical, statistical approaches can enhance the emancipatory potential of critical accounting research.     

Size effect in January and cultural influences in an emerging stock market: The perspective of behavioral finance

This study aims to explain the size effect in January with the utilization of some theoretical arguments drawn from behavioral finance, such as mental accounting and house money, in a Chinese culture-oriented emerging stock market. Under Chinese tradition, employees are rewarded with a generous bonus before Lunar New Year, most often paid in January. This gain, analogous to the concept of house money, enhances the propensity to bear increased levels of risk, which in turn stimulates the demand for higher risk securities, particularly in a market that is mainly dominated by individual investors, as in Taiwan. The empirical results are consistent with our culture bonus hypothesis, that only small firms with higher risk in the Taiwanese stock market exhibit the apparent size effect in January, especially for the years when the bonus payments were in January and when the whole market had positive performance growth in the preceding year.     

Preparer versus user introductory sequence: the impact on performance in Intermediate Accounting I

The normal subject matter in the first semester of a traditional introductory accounting course closely parallels the content in Intermediate Accounting I. Because research shows that student performance in college accounting courses is influenced by prerequisite courses, one would expect that those who take a user-approach introductory sequence will not perform as well in later courses. The research reported in this paper compares the performance of students in a traditional Intermediate Accounting I course who took either a preparer-or-user approach introductory sequence. Of the 150 accounting majors in the sample, 53 (97) took a user-approach (preparer-approach) introductory sequence. Of the 97 preparer-approach students, 47 (50) were four-year (transfer) students. The results are consistent with prior research and indicate that SAT scores and student effort are significant for each of the individual tests and for the overall average in course examinations. Gender is not consistent a factor in performance, which also supports prior research. The data indicate that students who took a preparer-approach sequence did not score higher in Intermediate Accounting I and that entry status is not a factor in this performance. This finding leads to the question of whether or not a user-approach would better service those students in our introductory accounting courses who are not accounting majors.     

Goode Food Trucks Inc.*

This fictional case centers around a young Dutch couple who emigrated to Canmore, Alberta. Upon arriving, Saul and Rens opened two successful food trucks and are now looking to promote each truck's main chef to truck manager. They plan to offer a performance bonus based on the net income of each truck and have requested a local accounting student to advise them on the new bonus structure. Goode Food Trucks Inc. presents an opportunity for students to demonstrate technical competence in managerial accounting (rate methods, period cost allocation, and data visualization); strategy and governance (employee performance incentives); and financial reporting (reporting needs) while incorporating enabling competencies (communicating and adding value). The case and teaching notes were adapted from principles used to train and evaluate Chartered Professional Accountant (CPA) candidates and tailored to an appropriate level for undergraduate learners. MBA instructors may also use this case to apply multiple concepts in a defined context, thus enhancing a course's “real-life” applicability.     

The influence of international status and operating segments on firms’ choice of bonus plans

This paper investigates why firms select different accounting measures of performance when determining executive bonus compensation. Specifically, we investigate whether firms with a greater multinational presence and with more operating segments are more likely to use after-tax bonus plans. Newman (1989) investigated the relation between multinational status and bonus plan choice for the mid-1970s and did not find strong results. However, given the increased global implications of business decisions over the last two decades, it should be beneficial to investigate this issue for a more recent time period. We obtained financial information from 266 firms, 70 with after-tax compensation plans, 186 with before-tax compensation plans, and 10 with hybrid compensation plans. Logistic regression analysis suggests that large firms reporting a large number of operating segments and having a high level of multinational operations are more likely to select after-tax rather than before-tax compensation plans.     

The impact of accounting restatements on CFO turnover and bonus compensation: Does securities litigation matter?

This paper examines the association between accounting restatements, class-action securities litigation and chief financial officer (CFO) turnover and bonus compensation. We identify income-decreasing earnings restatements that were the result of aggressive accounting policies, and hypothesize that these restatements will result in higher CFO turnover rates, and lower bonus compensation, especially when the firm is the target of a restatement-related class-action securities lawsuit. Our results indicate that CFO turnover and bonus compensation are affected by restatements, but only when the restatement firm is the target of a class-action suit. When we expand the analyses to consider other types of executives (e.g., CEOs and COOs), we continue to find that turnover only occurs in the presence of a class-action suit. However, bonus compensation penalties to other types of executives are not limited to litigation-related restatements.     

Disciplinary measures in response to restatements after Sarbanes–Oxley

This study examines whether boards discipline CEOs and CFOs more severely for accounting restatements after passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). The disciplinary actions I focus on are job termination and reductions in bonus payouts. Boards have incentive to take the highly visible action of terminating a manager to satisfy demands by outsiders for more vigilant corporate governance after SOX. However, terminating an executive entails the risk of hiring an inferior replacement and other costs. Imposing these costs on the firm and shareholders may not be justified after SOX because the severity of the restatements declines significantly. Despite the pressure on boards to appear vigilant, I find that when disciplining CEOs after SOX, boards gravitate away from termination and toward bonus penalties, a development commensurate with the less severe restatements of the post-SOX period. In contrast, boards appear to strengthen disciplinary action against CFOs after SOX despite the decline in restatement severity.     

高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究

本文在对国内外文献进行综评的基础上,立足于中国资本市场的特殊制度背景,分别选择会计绩效指标(ROA、ROE)、市场指标(Tobinq)以及股东财富指标(OF)构建模型,对我国上市公司高层管理当局的薪酬激励、特别是现金薪酬与上市公司业绩之间的相关性进行了经验研究,并减弱了相关的多重共线性现象。我们发现,高层管理当局薪酬与公司以及股东财富前后两期的变化,均成正相关关系;而与本期Tobinq的变化成负相关关系,与上期Tobinq的变化成正相关关系。公司的董事会或薪酬委员会在决定高层管理当局薪酬时青睐于会计盈余指标的变化更甚于信任股东财富指标。     

The Effect of Reversibility on a Manager's Decision to Record Asset Impairments

Over time, accounting standards have moved toward presenting more items at fair value on the balance sheet. Consistent with this trend, IAS No. 36 permits an impairment loss on a long‐lived asset to be reversed if the economic value of the asset recovers. This article uses empirical data from an experiment conducted with 118 managers to explore the implication of allowing impairment reversals on a manager's decision to record the loss. Results suggest that permitting reversals significantly increases the likelihood that a manager will record the impairment, especially if the manager has a bonus plan. The bonus plan effect is not caused by the manager's intention to smooth income through impairment reversals, but by his disutility from a bonus forgone if the value of the asset recovers but accounting rules prohibit him from reversing the loss.     

Stock performance and the mispricing of accruals

I investigate the relationship between contemporaneous stock-price performance and the persistence of accrued earnings, and its impact on the accrual anomaly. I find that, in a fiscal year, accrued earnings for stocks that have performed poorly are less persistent in predicting future earnings than accrued earnings for stocks that have performed moderately. I further find that a hedge-strategy based on accruals earns greater abnormal returns following bad-news years. The results are consistent with conservative accounting causing accrued earnings to be even less persistent in bad-news years and investors failing to efficiently price this differential in persistence.     

Performance choice,executive bonuses and corporate leverage

This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. Estimates also indicate that firms with fewer debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. These findings lend strong support to the efficient contracting hypothesis. The conflicting interests of corporate stakeholders, especially between stockholders and creditors, encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like return on assets (ROA) that will strike the optimal balance between the agency costs of debt and the agency costs of equity.Data availability: all data are available from public sources.     

CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation

This study investigates the impact of CEO compensation structure on post‐acquisition purchase price allocation, an accounting procedure that involves fair value estimation of various assets and liabilities. We find that CEOs whose compensation packages rely more on earnings‐based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill, the largest asset recorded post‐acquisition. Because goodwill is not amortized, the overallocation likely increases post‐acquisition earnings and bonuses. We also find that, when the acquirer's CEO bonus plan includes performance measures that are not affected, or are less affected, by the overstatement of goodwill, such as cash flows, sales, or earnings growth, the overallocation to goodwill motivated by bonus plans diminishes.     

Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers

Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.