The portable guarantee to exchange back an old defined benefit for a new defined contribution (DC) pension plan

As a defined contribution (DC) pension plan is introduced to replace a defined benefit (DB) pension plan, the portability benefit from a DC pension plan costs the employees to bear the investment risk from managing the pension fund. To protect the retirement income and maintain the portability benefit, a guarantee to exchange back the old defined benefit is supposed to be demanded for the new DC plan's participants in the guarantee market. In light of such a demand, this article applies a claim-terminating insurance pricing model to offer a contingent claims pricing model for a portable pension guarantee. Using the new labor pension plan of Taiwan as an illustration, a guaranteed DC pension will carry an extra cost of almost 50% up to over 100% of the plan's contributions over the participant's work life, given the current mandatory minimum requirement of a contribution rate of 6%.     

Heterogeneity effects on the management of retirement fund

This article studies the importance of plan members’ heterogeneity to the management of defined benefit (DB) pension fund. We propose a new multi-member model of DB pension fund that allows for heterogeneity in plan members’ retirement ages, salary growths and other characteristics. We first solve analytically for optimal management strategy and show that the sponsor’s supplementary contribution and the fund’s allocation in risky assets are determined by the cross-product between the fund’s expected retirement liabilities and some heterogeneity-adjusted discount factors. We then demonstrate that the presence of heterogeneity can have a significant influence on the optimal management strategy and that a management decision made while ignoring heterogeneity will be suboptimal. The knowledge of desirable and undesirable effects of heterogeneity that we uncover in this article also provides implications to the grouping of fund members. Introducing a presence of young member whose salary is positively correlated with the risky asset and avoid stacking members with negative correlations will all help the management.     

The funding for a Defined Benefit (DB) pension plan based on the fair valuation of the plan's insolvency risk

This study provides a contingent claims valuation approach model to value a sponsor's claim on a salary-related, defined benefit (DB) pension plan. The model is further developed to numerically estimate a suggested optimal contribution cost that allows the sponsor to fairly bear the risk of the plan's insolvency. The results demonstrate that the traditional actuarial valuation underestimates the cost of pension benefits, and that the normal contribution cost is not enough for the sponsor to fairly charge the value of bearing the plan's insolvency.     

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS, DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS, AND THE ACCUMULATION OF RETIREMENT WEALTH

The private pension structure in the United States, once dominated by defined benefit (DB) plans, is currently divided between defined contribution (DC) and DB plans. Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on a participant's contribution behavior and on financial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is sensitive to a participant's labor market experience and to plan parameters. This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative DB and DC plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. We simulate DC plan accumulation by randomly assigning individuals a share of wages that they and their employer contribute to the plan. We consider several possible asset allocation strategies, with asset returns drawn from the historical return distribution. Our DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the HRS, and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from a sample of large private and public defined benefit plans. The simulations yield distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.     

Why Sweden's pension reform was able to be successfully implemented

Governments that do not reform pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems will eventually face a pension crisis. In a democracy, reforms require majority support. The problem is that pension reform requires today's generation to bear the burden to avoid burdening tomorrow's generation. Sweden recently passed pension legislation that specifies a gradual transition from a public defined-benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. Why was Sweden successful in reforming its pension system? We find that a political economy perspective helps to answer this question: there are more winners who would vote in favour of the reform than non-winners who would vote against it. When comparing the net effect (present value of expected benefits minus present value of remaining contributions) of the new and old systems, contributions of the working generation (age < 53) are reduced by more than their expected benefits.     

Reforming occupational pension schemes: the case of the Netherlands

In many countries, occupational plans are being reformed away from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) designs. This paper explores the case of the Netherlands, which features a particularly high ratio of occupational pension assets to GDP. Dutch occupational DB plans suffer from a number of serious weaknesses, including ambiguous ownership of assets, back-loading of benefits, and lack of tailor-made risk management. To address these weaknesses, we propose collective individual DC plans that are actuarially fair. These schemes maintain important strengths of collective schemes, such as mandatory saving, collective procurement, and pooling of biometric risks. At the same time, they eliminate intergenerational conflicts about risk management and distribution through transparent individual property rights on financial assets and tailor-made risk profiles in individual accounts. We show how the transitional burden due to phasing out the back-loading of pension benefits can be addressed without a substantial increase in contributions.     

Should income transfers be targeted or universal? Insights from public pension influences on elderly mortality in Canada, 1921–1966

Abstract. We investigate the impact of Canada's means‐tested and universal public pension programs on the mortality rates of age groups eligible for pension benefits for the period 1921–1966. We find that only the universal program significantly reduced pension eligible age group mortality rates. The implied social value of the mortality risk reduction from this program is one‐tenth of the value per statistical life associated with contemporary government policy, meaning that Canadians did not need to place a high value on the life of a senior to justify the higher cost of the universal program. JEL classification: I3, J1     

Using a 401(h) account to fund retiree health benefits from your pension plan

If a health and welfare plan covering retirees faces financial shortfalls, administrators and trustees can fund retiree health benefit payments from a related pension plan that may be in better condition. This method is legal and ethical, but it requires sophisticated accounting techniques for creating an account that provides retiree members with promised benefits while meeting statutory and regulatory requirements.     

中国城镇养老保险制度改革的收入分配效应——基于2002年城镇住户调查数据的定量分析

Using the micro data of Urban Household Survey made by the National Bureau of Statistics of China(NBS) in 2002, this paper studies quantitatively the distributional effects of Public Pension Reform in urban China, from intragenerational and intergenerational perspectives, by measuring lifetime net benefits that urban employees obtain under the public pension system in 1997 and the newest one announced in December 2005, respectively. The results indicate that the regressive income transfer existing before implementation of the reform is improved as a consequence of the 1997 reform. However, the Act of 2005 Reform generates the obvious inclination of the regressive income transfer among people who exceed 40 years old in 2002. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of intergenerational distribution, the intergenerational inequality resulted from 1997 reform is greater than that from 2005 reform. Moreover, all generations would receive higher lifetime net benefits under the Act of 2005 Reform, but it must be based on sustainable pension system and participants’ full pension contribution during their duration of employment. __________ Translated from Jingji yanjiu 经济研究(Economic Research Journal), 2007, (3): 70–80, 91     

Voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system

We explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the system is voluntary. Typically, the willingness of the young to participate depends on their belief about the future young's willingness to do so. We characterise equilibria with voluntary participation and show that the likelihood of their existence increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty. We find that mandatory participation is often necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing.     

X-efficiency and economies of scale in pension fund administration and investment

Pension funds’ operating costs impair pension benefits, so it is crucial for pension funds to operate at the lowest cost possible. In practice, we observe substantial differences in costs per member for Dutch pension funds, both across and within pension fund size classes. This article presents new estimates of scale economies of pension funds and is the first that also measures pension fund X-inefficiency. We use a unique supervisory data set which distinguishes between administrative and investment costs and apply various approaches and models. Our estimates show large economies of scale for pension fund administrations, but modest diseconomies of scale for investment activities. We also found that many pension funds have substantial X-inefficiencies for both administrative and investment activities. The two kinds of inefficiency differ across types of pension funds. Therefore, most pension funds should be able to improve their cost performance, and hence increase pension benefits.     

Campaigning for retirement: State teacher union campaign contributions and pension generosity

Since Tullock (1972) first asked why there is so little money in U.S. politics, several studies have found evidence that political activism has the potential to yield significant returns. This study is the first to directly investigate the returns to public sector union activism by leveraging a transactions-level dataset from the National Institute on Money in Politics to estimate the relationship between teachers' union campaign contributions and the generosity of teacher pension systems. Our results show that more politically engaged teachers’ unions, as evidenced by their aggregate campaign contributions, are successful at both securing a higher level of retirement benefits and at shifting a greater burden of the financing of those benefits to the sponsoring government. Our estimates are in line with recent related studies and imply an investment return on campaign contributions of nearly 1500%.     

Raising productivity with pension premium

We argue that parents underinvest in growing their own children's capability in the absence of property rights over their future income, and that causes economic waste. No amount of collaborative choice among contemporary adults for public education could eliminate it because they face a resource constraint set by their predecessors. Such intergenerational dependence requires an intergenerational contract instead. It involves rewarding parents with a pension premium tied to their own children's taxable income paired with a matching subsidy to parental expenditure. We show how it fully internalizes the intergenerational externality, related to parenting, to eliminate economic waste and, thereby, to raise labor productivity and economic welfare. Our quantitative analysis of a baseline economy reveals significant welfare gains in economies with population ageing coupled with a low degree of parental care for children's future welfare and high returns to parental expenditure on children.     

On the optimal design of pension systems

The present paper aims to quantify efficiency properties of flat and earnings-related pay-as-you-go financed social security systems of various institutional designs in order to identify an optimal pension design. Starting from a benchmark economy without social security, we introduce alternative pension systems and compare the costs arising from liquidity constraints as well as distortions of labor supply versus the benefits from insurance provision against income and lifespan uncertainty. Our findings suggest an optimal replacement rate of about 50 % of average earnings. In our model a single-tier earnings-related pension system yields the highest efficiency gains dominating flat benefits as well as two-tier systems of any form. We also show that the negative correlation between pension progressivity and pension generosity of real-world social security systems can be justified on efficiency grounds. Finally, our results indicate a positive impact of means-testing flat benefits against earnings-related benefits within multi-pillar pension systems.     

Designing the optimal public pension system

This paper uses a two‐period overlapping generations model in order to provide a theoretical design for the optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences depend on two periods' consumption and leisure and are positively homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. We present characteristic features of the optimal public pension system in this paper. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the large/small relation between the optimal net lifetime burden rates of generations. Second, we present the optimal public pension system explicitly if m < 1 and m ≠ 0. Third, the difference between the market time‐preference rate and the social time‐preference rate provides a crucial insight into the optimal burden rate of each generation.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

Public Pension Benefits Claiming Behaviour: new Evidence from the Japanese Study on Ageing and Retirement

The present study explores public pension claiming behaviour among the Japanese elderly. First, we perform financial simulations, estimate expected utility and depict the typical patterns of pension benefits over a lifecycle. We show that a beneficiary's optimal retirement age depends on that beneficiary's mortality risk, discount rate, initial wealth and risk attitude. Second, we use individual‐level data from the Japanese Study on Aging and Retirement (JSTAR) to empirically examine the determinants of claim timing. We find evidence that most of the factors examined in the simulation are, indeed, significantly associated with early claiming among wage earners of pension benefits.     

Pension expectations,reforms and macroeconomic downturn in Italy. What can microdata tell us?

We use different years of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explore how Italian workers’ expectations regarding their future level of pension benefits and retirement age changed from 2000 to 2014. Comparing expected and statutory values for future pension benefits and retirement ages, we find that knowledge of the pension system and its rules are not evenly distributed among workers. Some sections of the population, in particular, younger workers, women and the self-employed, are less precise in estimating their future pension benefits. As for retirement age, a large share of the working population still has not completely assimilated the implications of the linkage with the evolution of lifetime expectations at 65. Expectations in the final part of the period observed are dominated by increasing pessimism, which may be related to the macroeconomic crisis of the Italian economy and to the approval of a severe pension reform in 2011. Checking whether a household’s total wealth is consistent with lifetime consumption, we find that households where the head overestimates the future value of the pension benefit accumulate fewer resources than the remaining part of the population.     

Effects of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply: Evidence from Chile

In this paper, I estimate the effect of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply for a representative sample of Chilean workers. Using nonlinear patterns in pension benefit formulas and a reform that permanently changed non-contributory pensions, I estimate the effect of pension accrual and expected pension wealth on labor force and contributory-sector participation, labor earnings, and hours worked. I find that the effect is concentrated on the impact of pension accrual on the probability to contribute to the pension system. The effect is heterogeneous and is concentrated among middle-aged workers, low-skilled workers, and workers with higher financial literacy.     

Contribution-based vs. earnings-related retirement pension systems: some policy proposals for Italy

This paper analyses the relationship between contributions paid and benefits received within the current old age pension scheme, evaluating the implications of reinforcing the link between individual contributions and benefits, in a framework where welfare assistance and social security are kept separate. Section 2 describes the theoretical model, adopted to examine the factors affecting the contribution-based and the earnings-related annual pension or the total pension benefits over the entire retirement period. The consequences that different levels of relevant parameters have on the ratio between the two yearly pensions are, then, analysed. Section 3 illustrates the longitudinal sample of private employees belonging to the National Institute for Social Security (INPS–FPLD), in particular of those who will retire between 1995–96 and 2001: it is used to calculate the annual earnings-related and contribution-based pension. In aceteris paribussituation, allowing for all intragenerational redistribution transfers currently provided by the pension system (through a supplement to an established minimum pension, through ceilings and reversory rights), the annual contribution-based pension appears to be in 1995 about two thirds of the annual earnings-related one. This implies that the State could currently save one third of its expenditure for new FPLD pensioners, by simply switching to a criterion of social security fairness (giving each to his own in actuarial terms) without relinquishing any of the distributive corrections currently enacted within the pension system. Through this potential reform, in the next 7 years total State savings at constant prices would reach 14 000 billion lire, or 2·2% of the stock value of pensions in the same time interval.