Heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution and public spending: A cross-country analysis

Political coordination and policy outcomes may be the result not only of the position of the ‘median voter’ in a political scale but also of the heterogeneity of preferences around the median. Depending on the level of government and the type of policy, such heterogeneity may lead to lower public spending and redistribution. We assess this issue empirically by analyzing the relationship between the distribution of preferences for redistribution and the amount of public expenditure at different levels of government and for several types of spending in 23 European countries. Our results suggest a negative and significant correlation between heterogeneity of preferences for redistribution and public spending that is stronger at the local level and for redistributive functions, independent of the median individual's preferences.     

Preferences for redistribution—A country comparison of fairness judgements

This paper seeks to explain within- and between-country variation in redistributive preferences in terms of self-interest concerns and an input-based concept of fairness, which we examine by looking at the effects of beliefs regarding the causes of income differences. Results of estimations based on data for 25 countries indicate that both factors are indeed important determinants of redistribution support, in line with hypothesised patterns. We find that while differences in beliefs on what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining within-country variation in redistributive preferences, they do little to explain between-country differences. Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, are important for explaining between-country variation in redistributive preferences, suggesting considerable heterogeneity across societies in what is considered as fair.     

Spatial Heterogeneity of Willingness to Pay for Forest Management

The paper investigates the spatial heterogeneity of public’s preferences for the implementation of a new country-wide forest management and protection program in Poland. Spatial econometric methods and high resolution geographical information system data related to forest characteristics are used to explain the variation in individual-specific willingness to pay (WTP) values, derived from a discrete choice experiment study. We find that respondents’ WTP is higher the closer they live to their nearest forest, and the scarcer forests are in the area where they live. Interestingly, the higher the ecological value of forests in respondents’ area, the more people prefer extending areas of national forest protection. We also investigate spatial patterns in individual-specific WTP scores and in latent class membership probabilities, finding that preferences are indeed spatially clustered. We argue that this clustering should be taken into account in forest management and policy-making.     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

Heterogeneous preferences and in-kind redistribution: Theory and evidence

This paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in-kind redistribution. We contribute to the previous literature in two ways: we consider (i) the provision of several public goods and (ii) agents different not only in income, but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector. In this setting, both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences. Our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in-kind redistribution, while income inequality tends to increase it. An empirical investigation based on United States Census Bureau data confirms these theoretical findings.     

Latent preferences and valuation of wetland ecosystem restoration

We employ a latent class choice model to evaluate the effects of alternative ecological characterizations of wetland functions and services on individual preferences, and to determine whether socioeconomic factors and psychometric measures of environmental attitudes can explain differences in individual's preferences and values for wetland restoration. This analysis combines a multiattribute choice model with information on individual's characteristics to evaluate preferences for restoration of the Greater Everglades ecosystem, one of the largest and most comprehensive wetland ecosystem restoration projects. To identify potential endpoints for Everglades restoration, two alternative ecological characterizations of the ecosystem were developed using the familiar distinction between function and structure. Survey data from a representative sample of the general population were used in a split-sample design based on the ecological characterization treatment. Within each subsample, the latent class analysis identified three groups who varied in their preferences for ecosystem restoration and socioeconomic profiles. The ecological characterizations had a significant influence on respondents' preferences and willingness to pay (WTP). The subsample responding to the structural characterization had a significantly larger share of respondents in the group who favored proposed restoration plans than the functional attribute subsample. In both subsamples, the group who favored restoration had a higher WTP for restoration than other groups. The latent class analysis also revealed socioeconomic and attitudinal factors that explain some of the heterogeneity in preferences and WTP within each subsample; this heterogeneity would not be identified with a standard choice model. In the context of Everglades restoration, the results provide a baseline assessment of public support and WTP that suggests an emphasis on structural rather than functional restoration endpoints. The approach described in this article can be used in other policy studies of wetland ecosystems because multiple ecosystem services can be represented within a stated choice survey and differences in preferences and values for these services can be measured.     

Voting for Redistribution under Desert‐Sensitive Altruism*

We endow individuals who differ in skills and tastes for working, with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences are desert‐sensitive (i.e., when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard‐working to the lazy), we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We provide empirical evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish, and that desert‐sensitive motivations play a significant role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert‐sensitive in the US than in Europe.     

再分配倾向的决定:对既有文献的考察

本文对再分配倾向决定领域的既有文献进行详尽考察,认为从内在动力角度来理解各种决定因素才是根本,归纳提炼了再分配倾向决定的四大动机:经济利益动机、风险规避动机、公平信念动机和声誉理想动机。再分配倾向决定的四大动机通过不尽相同的理论逻辑机制和多种实证影响因素对人们的再分配倾向产生影响,四大动机的框架为实证研究中的因素筛选提供了有力的工具。对于该领域进一步的研究,本文提出应用实验手段的重要性,并应注意宏观变量对再分配倾向的内生性影响。     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.     

Work values,endogenous sentiments redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral “work values”. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of “social cohesion” and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.     

Political ideology and the intragenerational prospect of upward mobility

We re-examine the effect of prospects of upward mobility (POUM) on the support for redistribution. Unlike previous studies, we analyse this relation in an intragenerational context and consider the moderating effect of political ideology through which mobility expectations affect redistributive preferences. We find that the POUM effect is conditional on political preferences. That is, we find that only for right-wing individuals expected upward income mobility negatively affects support for redistribution. Left-wing individuals prefer redistribution, regardless of expected upward income movements.     

Redistributive taxation in democracies: Evidence on people's satisfaction

Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the International Social Survey Programme. Individuals categorized as having high, middle, or low incomes were asked whether they consider the overall tax burden in their countries too high, too low or about right. Very few citizens indicated that they were satisfied with tax systems; most believed that taxes on low and middle incomes are too high, while taxes on high incomes are too low. Support for tax systems is bimodal within the income classes, with the richest 5% being the most supportive, and the median in a population being second. Ideological values have a strong impact on political support for redistribution across all income classes. The results bear witness to the multidimensional nature of preferences for redistribution, and to the delicate question of the effectiveness of democracy in implementing citizens' preferences.     

Revisiting the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution: Comment

In this paper, we revisit the question raised in Dahlberg et al. ( 2012 , Journal of Political Economy 120, 41–76) concerning a causal relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution. We find that their results are based on (i) an unreliable and potentially invalid measure of preferences for redistribution, (ii) an endogenously selected sample, and (iii) a mismeasurement of the refugee placement program. Correcting for any of these three problems reveals that there is no evidence of any relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution. We also discuss what is currently known about the refugee placement program, and to what extent it can be used for estimating causal effects more generally.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

The democratization process: An empirical appraisal of the role of political protest

This paper analyses the role of peaceful and violent protest in the democratization process. We interpret the democratization process as a sequence of phases so as to allow citizens' and elites' preferences for democracy to vary according to the particular phase that a country is experiencing. By doing so we jointly model the probability of protest and of moving through different phases of democracy taking into account time-constant and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we develop a multivariate finite mixture model that introduces a latent variable to capture unobservable factors. On a sample of 171 countries from 1971 to 2010, we provide evidence that protest matters in all phases of democratization, especially peaceful citizens’ demonstrations. On the contrary, violent protest has ambiguous consequences, as it favours initial democratic transitions but at the cost of threatening democratic consolidation. We also find that, after conditioning for economic and institutional controls, there is evidence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity.     

Revisiting the redistribution hypothesis with perceived inequality and redistributive preferences

It is a long-standing puzzle whether or not changes in economic inequality lead to changes in redistribution. However, there has been a lack of conclusive evidence about this relationship. Moreover, redistributive preferences as an intervening factor between inequality and redistribution, which are taken for granted implicitly or explicitly in redistribution theories, have been largely overlooked in the existing analyses. Besides, recent comparative studies of inequality and redistribution have started paying attention to inequality perceptions that deviate from actual inequality. Thus, this inquiry aims to reconstruct the classical redistribution theory by employing perceived inequality and preferences for redistribution and to test the reformulated redistribution hypotheses. One of the most challenging efforts for the analysis is to develop a country-level measure of perceived inequality. To this end, the Gini coefficient of perceived social position (perceived Gini) was first created by using data from 16 rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 1987 to 2014), covering 34 OECD countries. The empirical results show robust evidence that perceived inequality, not actual inequality, is significantly associated with redistributive preferences, while preferences for redistribution do not translate into any type of redistribution.     

A Discussion of “Using Angler Characteristics and Attitudinal Data to Identify Environmental Preference Classes: A Latent-Class Model”

In the current issue of Environmental and Resource Economics, Morey et al. (2006) discuss a new approach to using attitudinal data in latent class modeling. We compare this approach with the one taken in Boxall and Adamowicz (2002), in the context of a discrete choice, random utility framework with heterogeneous preferences. We derive the respective likelihood functions of the two approaches to show that they are structurally similar, and discuss their implications for the use of attitudinal data. We conclude with a discussion comparing the relative merits of latent class and random parameters (mixed logit) modeling, offering the view that as a practical matter, choosing between them depends on the analyst’s judgment about the correlation of preference parameters.     

A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.     

Inequality Perceptions,Distributional Norms,and Redistributive Preferences in East and West Germany

This paper analyzes differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences between East and West Germany. As expected, there are substantial differences with respect to all three of these measures. Surprisingly, however, differences in distributional norms are much smaller than differences with respect to inequality perceptions or redistributive preferences. Moreover, individuals from East Germany tend to be more supportive of state redistribution and progressive taxation and they are less likely to have a conservative political orientation. I finally show that a substantial part of these differences in political preferences can be explained by underlying differences in redistributive preferences.     

Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.