Managerial efficiency and human capital: an application to English association football

The problem of hidden action in organizations makes direct measurement of managerial performance problematic. But in English association football hidden action is unlikely to be as serious a problem because the owner observes the manager's performance each time the team plays. In this situation production frontier analysis may be used to measure managerial performance and analyze the variation in performance across managers in terms of manager human capital. Having some kind of prior affiliation with the club and achieving international recognition as a player are especially important. Overall, initial experience matters more than specific and general managerial experience. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rewarding employee performance: line managers' values,beliefs and perspectives

This article explores managerial perceptions of the effectiveness and fairness of individual performance-related pay schemes. It draws upon findings from a two-part study of middle managers' interpretation and application of performance-related pay processes in a variety of organizational contexts. The analysis reveals that middle managers all too often do not share the principles or the stated objectives of the schemes they are required to operationalize. It concludes that the importance of managerial values and beliefs about rewarding individual contribution has been an overlooked and underestimated dimension in the design and application of individual performancerelated pay schemes (IPRP) despite the significance of the manager's role in their organizational effectiveness.     

Using economic impact analysis for arts management: an empirical application to a music institute in the USA

Economic impact analysis can be used strategically by arts managers to provide information pertaining to making and justifying effective managerial and marketing decisions. The three aspects of economic impact analysis—direct, indirect and induced—reveal information such as arts participants' expenditure patterns, rationale for expenditure, relationships between participant demographics and expenditure, and amount of expenditure outside arts institutions. Arts managers can use the information and data to match product offerings of the institution with those of its participants; increase the participants' participation in, satisfaction with and loyalty to the institution; increase the stature and validity of the arts institution within the community; price the products of the arts institute; and increase community and financial support for arts institutions. This synergistic use of economic impact analysis information with marketing information is illustrated using a music institute in the USA. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Hiring Managers in the Manufacturing Industry of Malaysia

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the staffing practices of managerial positions among manufacturing companies in Malaysia. The results are based on responses from 68 hiring managers. A person needs to have at least three years of orking experience before the person can be selected for a middle-level managerial position. Sources for recruiting 60% of the managerial positions are determined by the human resource managers. The top management had the final say in hiring 69% of the managers. Media advertisement is the most highly utilized source to recruit managers. Testing is seldom used to choose managers.     

An Exploration of Two Competing Perspectives on Informational Contexts in Top Management Strategic Issue Interpretation

Two disparate theoretical views of how informational contexts affect managerial sensemaking and decision making appear in organizational research. An organizational information processing perspective posits that increasing the flow of information within and between organizations will enhance environmental awareness. In contrast, behavioural decision making and social cognition research suggest that information may increase the occurrence or magnitude of overconfidence and illusions of control. These competing predictions were examined by means of an investigation of the relationship between informational contexts and top managers' strategic issue interpretation. Findings indicate that managers whose organizations have environmental information readily available to them perceive higher control over issues than managers in organizations with lower informational availability. Moreover, managers in top management teams with higher information processing capacity seem to perceive higher degrees of control and manageability, and search for less data in issue interpretation, than managers in teams with lower information processing capacity. These results offer some support for the behavioural decision making and social cognition perspective, and question the organizational information processing prediction that organizations engaging in active information processing are more aware of the environment and more likely to assess environmental developments, trends or events in a more vigilant manner.     

Combining the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process and the fuzzy Delphi method for developing critical competences of electronic commerce professional managers

This study proposes a novel approach that integrates the qualitative approach, the quantitative approach, and fuzzy set theory for developing a framework of critical managerial competences of electronic commerce (EC) professional managers. The approach combines a focus group, a fuzzy Delphi method and the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fuzzy AHP) for identifying competences via experts’ opinions and questionnaires for developing the framework of managerial EC professional managers. Comparing the competences of traditional managers and EC managers reveals main differences in the emphasis on EC manager professional skills. Furthermore, competency weights for EC managers lie particularly in domain knowledge and information management skills. Research results reveal that our proposed EC competence framework not only help firms in selecting/hiring high quality EC professional managers more objectively, but also in evaluating the performance of EC managers.     

Models of changes in managerial salaries in five economies

International comparisons of many kinds are hindered by the lack of data that are consistent between countries. This has been the case particularly with comparisons of managerial remuneration and, along with the lack of consistent data, there has been no satisfactory theory of differentials in managerial remuneration either in absolute terms for example, as between a given-status manager in, say, Canada and the UK – or in relative terms - for example, the differential between two managers of different status in each country. This article uses some recently published, and expensively gathered, data on managerial remuneration in five countries with the purpose of extending the usage of the data, which were published more or less merely as information, and introducing some tentative steps towards a better understanding of absolute and relative differences in managerial salaries.     

Information disclosure ratings and managerial short-termism: An empirical investigation of the Chinese stock market

Information asymmetry between managers and outside investors creates agency problems and impedes efficient capital allocation. Information disclosure is critical in alleviating information asymmetry in capital markets. This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry on managerial short-termism by examining information disclosure ratings (IDRs). Using real earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, our analysis of a sample of Chinese A-share companies during 2001–2018 indicates that high IDRs mitigate managerial short-termism. The results also indicate that the effect of IDRs in reducing managerial short-termism is driven mainly by stock liquidity. This conclusion holds after consideration of endogeneity and application of two-stage least-squares and generalized method of moments methods, adjustment of the definition of IDRs, consideration of alternative proxies for managerial short-termism, and control for firm characteristics that might affect the extent of managerial short-termism. This study also examines the effects within three subsamples: companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board, small and medium enterprise board, and growth enterprise market board. IDRs substantially reduce managerial short-termism among firms listed on all three boards. These findings indicate that enterprises have corrected previous internal governance problems, and IDRs have helped to improve internal governance through stock liquidity. Therefore, external supervision also helps to reduce the agency problem of managerial short-termism.

     

The Contingent Effects of Social Network Sparseness and Centrality on Managerial Innovativeness

Prior research has highlighted that network sparseness and network centrality enhance innovativeness through access to information and influence, respectively. We advance this perspective by exploring the extent to which individual actions are needed to mobilize information and influence accessed through social networks, and whether such information and influence would mutually reinforce to enhance managerial innovativeness. Our findings found partial support for the idea that actions are needed to actualize potential resources embedded in social networks, as centrally positioned managers enjoy higher innovativeness when they engage in ambassador activities. We also found that advice network sparseness and advice network centrality had independent, not interactive relationships with managerial innovativeness, suggesting that they offer distinct routes to achieving managerial innovativeness. Overall, our research clarifies the relationships of two important social network attributes on managerial innovativeness, and also sheds new light on how managerial action matters in realizing social network advantages for innovative ends.     

Should managers refrain from and investors ignore noisy dividend surprises? Some experimental evidence

A series of experiments is conducted in an asset market that contains a high productivity firm and a low productivity firm. Managers' compensation is a positive function of the market determined value of the firm. Investment decisions are made endogenously and are private information to the managers. The results of the experiments indicate that managers signal earning's information via noisy dividend announcements that result in suboptimal investment decisions. A manager's overinvestment in the signal does not generate significant increases in managerial compensation. The noisy signal does not pay off and in fact would result in a tendency for the market to underpredict earnings. This implies that even in the presence of suboptimal contracts between the managers and the firms, managers are not overcompensated. Thus, in these experiments the signal does not “solve” the dividend puzzle.     

Managerial incentives for undertaking exchange offers

This paper empirically examines management's motivation to convey information regarding firm value through exchange offers. We report a positive relation between stock price reactions to announcements of exchange offers and managerial stockholdings, and a weak negative relation with salary plus bonus. These findings are consistent with the incentives required for managers to signal firm value through exchange offer-induced leverage change.     

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.     

Bank monitoring,managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India

The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small‐sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

Managerial skill utilization: work environment,gender, and training incentive

Past studies have demonstrated that a supportive work environment can positively influence managerial skill utilization. Adopting the instrumentality-expressiveness perspective, the present study extended the past research by illustrating the moderating effect of gender on this relationship. It found that the relationship between the work environment and managerial skill utilization is stronger among female managers than among male managers and further, that this interactive effect is more pronounced in a low incentive situation than in a high incentive situation in terms of reaching a high level of training performance. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.     

A study of impending derailment and recovery of middle managers across career stages

Why do some fast‐track managers derail? Why do some recover and return to the fast track? This study investigates these questions by analyzing managerial skills and self‐awareness during different career stages. The results suggest that derailers have significantly lower skill profiles than do successful managers at all career stages. The study also identifies specific skills that managers need to be successful in their careers; furthermore, it reports that derailers overestimate their skills in comparison to successful managers at all career stages. The results imply that one can avoid derailment or recover from derailment by developing both self‐awareness and specific managerial skills. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

高管持股、会计稳健性与并购绩效——来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据

选取2007—2010年发生并购交易事件的上市公司为样本,检验了并购方高管持股与并购绩效之间的关系,发现高管持股与短期并购绩效之间没有显著关系,而与长期并购绩效之间呈非线性关系。进一步验证会计稳健性确实能够缓解高管与股东之间的代理冲突。与会计稳健性程度高的并购方相比,会计稳健性程度低的并购方高管持股对并购绩效的影响更大。这些发现意味着,高管持股不会在并购后短期内对绩效有显著影响,而是需要一段时间之后才能得以显现,且其影响程度因公司间会计稳健性不同而存有一定的差异。     

PUBLIC SERVICES MANAGEMENT: ACTIVITIES, INITIATIVES AND LIMITS TO LEARNING

Private sector-style management initiatives to ensure UK public services managers’ learning from private sector management practice are examined, and their rationale questioned. The lack of a coherent, systematic and agreed view of what constitutes ‘management’ and ‘managerial work’ in the private sector is discussed. It is argued that there are reasons for believing that the particular character and organizational contexts of public services will require different managerial behaviours. The manner in which experimental managerial initiatives in some public services have shifted into mandatory innovations is examined. Such innovations can be incompatible with the values of those managing in the public service, who frequently fail to recognize the advantages of late innovation, incrementalism and circumspection. In public services particularly, many managerial activities are the province of ‘non managerial’ staff. Though frequently not considered, the values of these de facto managers may be central to the progress of such innovations. It is further argued that risk-taking as applied in a business context is inappropriate to the degree that public services managers must be concerned with the common weal, equity and accountability. The article concludes with a detailed research agenda to support the need to recognize public services management as a rich and varied area of managerial behaviour in its own right. Its character and variation warrants further investigation as a basis for formulating more appropriate management concepts against which to measure public services managers’ behaviour and performance.