Fiscal and environmental policy under monopolistic competition

Summary Keynesian demand management offsets some of the distortions caused by monopolistic competition and thus induces multiplier effects on national income and environmental damages. The cost of public funds rises with the virtual environmental tax and the degree of competition in the product market. The virtual environmental tax rises with abatement and falls with the cost of public funds. Consequently, greener preferences induce a rise in the virtual environmental tax, the cost of public funds and public abatement, and a fall in the provision of traditional public goods. A greater preference for traditional public goods harms environmental quality, since both abatement and output fall. Protecting cartels lowers the cost of public funds and may raise the provision of both traditional public goods and abatement. Environmental quality may thus rise, but other components of social welfare will fall. The paper also analyses the effects of private abatement, pollution taxes, fiscal consolidation and the progressivity of the tax system on government policy, employment, environmental quality and welfare.This paper was prepared for the OCFEB workshop Quantitative Economics for Environmental Policy held at the Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam, March 22 1994. We thank Casper van Ewijk and Jenny E. Ligthart for useful comments.     

Public Goods,Tax Policies,and Unemployment in LDCs

We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy characterized by unemployment and producing two privately traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The provision of public good is financed with an income tax or an excise tax on the manufactured good or an import tariff. Within this framework, the paper examines the effects of such policies on the country's unemployment ratio and welfare, and it derives the efficiency rules for public good provision for each policy instrument. It shows, among other things, that the private marginal cost of the public good always overstates its social marginal cost in the case of income taxes and may overstate it in the case of an excise tax on the manufactured good or a tariff even if the taxed good and the public good are substitutes in consumption.     

Second-Best Pollution Taxes and the Structure of Preferences

We characterize optimal taxes on polluting and nonpolluting goods in Ramsey and Mirrlees second-best environments. The polluting good tax differs from the Pigouvian tax by Ramsey terms in the first and by Stiglitz/Mirrlees plus another adjustment term in the second. These terms can be positive, negative, or zero. If preferences are weakly separable in public and private goods, with the private good subutility weakly separable in labor and produced goods, nonpolluting goods are taxed uniformly and the concept of a tax differential between polluting and nonpolluting goods is well defined. The differential is then less than the Pigouvian tax in the Ramsey framework, but it can be greater, equal to, or smaller than the Pigouvian tax in the Mirrlees second best. In Mirrlees second best, if preferences are separable in labor supply and other goods, the second-best tax differential is identical to the Pigouvian tax.     

非经济性公共物品需求的实证检验——基于省级面板数据

文章利用2003—2010年中国内地地区29个省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据,估计了4类非经济性公共物品居民需求函数,实证检验与公共支出需求相关的因素,并分析非经济性公共物品的政府供给与居民需求的匹配指数.实证结果显示:非经济性公共物品需求与人均收入,人口规模和城市规模比重正相关.收入增加对教育,医疗和环境保护需求也在不断增加.居民税收负担增加,居民对公共服务的偏好就越小,但从总体上来讲,非经济公共物品供给矛盾在逐步缓解.     

Beneficial Inequality in the Provision of Municipal Services: Why Rich Neighborhoods Should Get Plowed First

This paper provides an explanation for the common observation that higher income neighborhoods typically receive better public services compared with lower income neighborhoods. Intuitively, one might expect that lower income groups, which usually form the voting majority of cities, would object to an unfair allocation of this nature. Wealthy individuals, however, have the option of moving to the suburbs. As we learn from the tax competition literature, mobile factors are generally able to command a premium. Since institutional constraints prevent regressive taxation and public goods are by definition consumed in equal quantity by all agents, only public services remain as an instrument for municipalities to use to keep wealthy agents in their tax base. We show that both rich and poor agents benefit from this differential access to public services and explore how factors like the ratio of rich to poor and the differences between their incomes affect the equilibrium allocation.     

AID US TO WIN THE ELECTIONS: FOREIGN AID AND VOTER TURNOUT

We use an innovative procedure to determine the effect of foreign aid on institutions of governance. We use voter turnout as an indicator variable which allows us to identify whether political competition in a country is based on private goods, such as vote‐buying, or on public goods. We suggest that the marginal effect of foreign aid on voter turnout depends on the wider underlying institutional setting. Contrary to popular belief, the theoretical model implies that a higher voter turnout in response to foreign aid can be undesirable when the increase is a consequence of vote‐buying in the electoral campaign. The empirical evidence we examine is consistent with private‐goods political competition, i.e., political parties use foreign aid for vote‐buying and similar electoral tactics, particularly when the underlying institutions are sufficiently bad. This is consistently estimated across specifications which address a range of endogeneity sources.     

Analysing and evaluating the taxpayer's demand for merit goods: the case of public sector education and health in Mauritius

This paper analyses the average taxpayer's demand for merit goods, namely, education and health, in Mauritius, a small developing island state. To study these development-related goods, a fresh methodology is employed that captures the characteristics of the Mauritian economy. The empirical evidence relates to the post-independence period of more than three decades, 1973 to 1999 and beyond. The respective demand elasticities for each merit good are analysed and evaluated. The findings indicate that, contrary to the conventional theory of demand, beneficiaries tend to demand more of such goods when their prices are increased, and less when they are decreased. The rationale for this behaviour is that people, in general, and taxpayers, in particular, being quality conscious, increase their demand when they are asked to pay more, expecting in return an improvement in the quality of services. However, there is evidence that over these three decades users' preferences have shifted, particularly in the case of education, towards private provision, indicating less reliance on public sector provision, and that during the years of structural adjustments the demand for these services was severely suppressed.     

农村“一事一议”制度效力的理论与案例分析

借助公共经济学相关理论，结合实地调查资料，文章从公共物品投票决策、资金约束和管护搭便车三个角度，综合分析了农村“一事一议”制度的效力。研究结果表明：由于存在制度设计缺陷和实施环境限制，“一事一议”制度在当前难以成为我国农村社区公共物品有效的供给制度，甚至可能会成为公共物品供给的一个制度“陷阱”。进一步完善“一事一议”制度，需要规范议事内容和程序、调整筹资上限标准、完善村民自治制度及公共物品管护制度。     

欠发达地区农村公共产品供给体制创新与农民增收

农村公共产品的有效供给有利于农民增收。欠发达地区农村公共产品供给严重不足制约农民增收,农村税费改革又导致了欠发达地区农村公共产品供给捉襟见肘。本文就农村税费改革后如何创新农村公共产品供给体制及增加农民收入提出一系列对策。     

农村公共物品市场化供给与政府监管

长期以来，我国农村公共物品供给一直沿袭计划经济体制下的政府主导模式，虽取得了一定的成效，却忽视了政府监管体系的建立，影响了公共物品供给的质量和效率。政府，尤其是县乡基层政府，应转变工作重点从注重农村公共物品供给转向构筑农村公共物品监管的法律框架、建立多主体参与的现代监管体系、强化政府内部激励和约束机制、放开市场准入、监控服务价格、规范服务质量、维护公平有序的竞争环境上来。     

State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?

Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention followed the procedure of requiring state votes to be determined by the majority vote of each state's present delegates, and the outcome of the vote to be decided by majority vote of the states. In establishing the new legislature, the adopted Constitution set rules such that a simple majority of all present representatives would determine the outcome of each legislative vote. We investigate how Convention vote outcomes might have changed if this voting rule was in place for the Convention. Using spatial models on 398 separate roll calls, we identify which vote outcomes would have differed under individual delegate voting. Analysis suggests only 16 of the vote outcomes would have changed but those that were predicted to change included considering unequal representation in the Senate (i.e., similar to representation in the House) and requiring two‐thirds (rather than three‐fourths) of states to ratify constitutional amendments.     

Political Party Impacts on Direct Democracy: the 2015 Greek Austerity Referendum

On July 5, 2015, Greek voters were asked whether to approve or reject the terms of an austerity program offered by the European Union (EU) to resolve an ongoing financial crisis. With a turnout rate of 62.5% overall, 61.3% of Greeks voted “no.” While a majority of voters in every district opposed the bailout’s terms, the margin against the proposed austerity measures ranged from 51.2% in Lakonias to 73.8% in Chanion. This paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of the “no” vote across Greece’s 56 electoral districts. Our analysis is grounded in public choice theories of why large numbers of people turn out to vote in mass elections. In addition to controlling for standard “instrumental” vote motives, we ask whether political party labels, which serve as summary measures of partisan positioning, and party platforms, which express partisan preferences on ballot questions, are salient in determining electoral outcomes. Holding constant the unemployment rate and average voter age (at the regional level) and the fraction of young people casting ballots for the first time on July 5, 2015 (at the district level), we find that the percentage of ‘no’ votes was reduced significantly by voter support for Greece’s leading pro-austerity party (New Democracy) in the previous nationwide election held in January 2015. In contrast, voter support in January for the anti-austerity party (Syriza), led by sitting Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, had no measurable impact on July’s referendum results. This finding offers support for both instrumental and expressive theories of voting and bolsters the claim that political parties can shape electoral outcomes on questions decided by an institution of direct democracy.     

How do trust and property security influence household contributions to public goods?: The case of the sloping land conversion program in China

Trust and property rights are generally considered to influence farmers' behavior regarding resource use and environmental management. Previous studies show that higher trust levels may enhance contributions to public goods. This paper investigates how trust and (land) property rights security influence the provision of one concrete public good: land protection through the Sloping Land Conservation Program in China. The analysis is based on household survey data from Ningxia Autonomous Region in China. From our questionnaire two trust factors are derived and distinguished, using factor analysis: general trust and kinship trust. Farm households are less likely to contribute to public goods when they perceive more secure land rights, but trust has mixed effects on public goods. The results show that general trust and kinship trust may rely on two opposite effects for influencing public goods provision. On the one hand, high levels of general trust may directly enhance people's willingness to provide contributions to public goods (by reduced likelihood to reconvert forest land) when farmers are aware of the positive environmental effects of the program, that's the public goods effect. On the other hand, general trust may also make it more likely that people invest more in their own private goods to pursue their own welfare (a more likely reconversion of forest land to arable land), that's the private goods effect. The final outcome depends on the size and direction of both effects. Compared to general trust, kinship trust is more inward-looking and self- or group-interested compared to more reciprocal general trust. Thus, unlike general trust, kinship trust may have no significant public goods effect on the provisioning of public goods.     

Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.     

Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy

Early and modern scholars both presume that bicameral chambers limit the exploitation of minorities by the ruling majority similar to supermajority voting rules. We explain theoretically why bicameralism is a unique and desirable institution for protecting minority interests. The empirical analysis examines the structure of bicameralism in the American States. Using detailed data to proxy voter preferences, we find the degree of constituent homogeneity across chambers to be an important determinant of government expenditures for several budget components. Decreased constituent homogeneity tends to reduce redistributive spending and increase spending on public goods.     

公共物品偏好显示机制综述

由于公共物品具有较强的外部性,不同消费者支付不同的价格可获得相同数量的公共物品,消费者的"理想行为"是隐瞒自己的真实偏好,企图做免费搭车者。设计良好的机制有利于公共物品偏好的真实显示,从而实现公共物品的有效供给,在对前人研究思想脉络进行梳理、对研究成果进行总结的基础上提出自己的观点。     

Policy choice and economic growth under factional politics: Evidence from a Chinese Province

This paper investigates how political elites make policy choices that have bearing on an authoritarian regime's economy, from the perspective of factional politics. A local leader makes policies primarily to secure his political survival, which is contingent on the support from either his higher-level patrons or his local grassroots constituents. Using a simple model, we show that a local politician with close factional ties to high-level patrons will invest more in sending loyalty signals to the latter to receive their protections, while a poorly-connected politician will make more effort to spur a broad-based economic growth that economically benefits his local constituents. Using a unique county level data on the factional politics of Zhejiang Province, China, we find that counties with weaker (closer) factional ties have lower (higher) tax burdens per capita, while spending more (less) on local public goods provision. The results are stable after various robustness tests.     

地方性公共产品分权式供给的效率及优势分析

市场经济中效率是公共产品供给决策的基本准则,本文对地方性公共产品分权式供给的效率优势作了分析,指出地方政府在供给公共产品上具有资源配置优势和比较成本优势,还具有溢出效应,并认为在分权体制下通过地方自治方式确保地方政府在公共产品供给上的优先权和自主权等可以保证了地方性公共产品供给的高效性。     

Expressiveness and voting: Alternative evidence

Using aggregate time series analysis, this empirical study extends the Copeland and Laband [2002] analysis of expressive voting. After allowing for economic considerations in the form of tax rates and inflation, it is found that even the aggregate voter participation rate may reflect emotional voting behavior. The Vietnam War, Watergate, public dissatisfaction with government, and the opportunity to participate in Presidential elections, each of which can be viewed at some level as an issue evoking emotional responses rather than mere cost-benefit computations, all prove to significantly affect voter participation rates.     

A note on the effect of elections subject to judicial review

The most recent U.S. presidential election raised the questions of whether or not agents who believe that losing candidates will contest the results of close elections perceive their vote as more important and whether or not they will be more or less likely to vote. The analysis involves a two-player voting game with one of the players initially in a weaker position because he loses all ties. The key variable is the probability of the weaker player winning the post-election judicial review process. The relationship between this probability and the level of voting for the weaker player is non-monotonic. Also, if this probability is sufficiently close to one-half, contesting close elections leads to increased voting, lowering social welfare.