The effects of the external debts of Mexico,Brazil, Argentina,Venezuela, and the Philippines on the United States

The external debts of developing countries have become a major issue recently, prompting debate among both academicians and policy markers. In this paper, the author describes the origins and history of debt problem, summarizes proposals for policies for creditor nations, and estimates the effects of debt-related austerity in five major debtor nations on US imports, exports, net exports, and output in 1985. He concludes that debt-related austerity was responsible for 11.0% of the US merchandise trade deficit in that year, caused decreases in US net trade in 40 to 61 non-service industries studied and decreases in output in 46 industries, and caused a decrease of 0.5% in GNP.

Neither a borrower nor a lender be;

For loan oft loses both itself and friend,

And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.

William Shakespeare (Hamlet, I. iii. 75)     

Specialization,product development,evolution of the institution of the firm,and economic growth

This paper considers the effects of the division of labor on economic growth and welfare in a general equilibrium environment where changes in individual specialization and product development can proceed simultaneously. The nature of the dynamic equilibrium is shown to depend on the interaction of transaction efficiency, economies of specialization, and economies of complementarity. Where the dynamic equilibrium involves evolution in the division of labor, this will be associated with increased per capita real income and hence economic growth. It is also shown that the emergence of firms is an aspect of the evolution of division of labor if transaction efficiency for a producer good is lower than that for labor used to produce this good.     

Uncertainty,trust, and the regulation of the banking industry

This paper suggests that, in presence of uncertainty, individual choices are made on the basis of subjective evaluations, and the transmission of information is too expensive, so that the decision-making process must largely be based on other agents’ knowledge. Banks operate by developing a network of personal relationships, based on trust, that allows agents to make use of the subjective knowledge of others. The deregulation process of the financial industry of the 1990s was based on the principle that information disclosure would make the market for securities more efficient, increasing risk diversification, and making the financial system safer. Many innovative financial contracts, however, were not backed by trust and reputation mechanism as traditional banking activities. The shadow banking system emerging from these market-based transactions was thus much more risky and fragile than the traditional one, based on private information and unwritten rules of conduct.     

Information, Evolution of the Institution of the Firm, and the Optimal Decision Horizon

This paper introduces an information problem into Yang and Ng's model of the firm, to study the process of social searching for the efficient structure of residual rights. The analysis adopts the concept of Walrasian sequential equilibrium developed in the literature of endogenous specialization to model this searching process. The main finding is that more organizational patterns will be experimented with, and therefore an efficient organizational pattern is more likely to be achieved as the pricing efficiency increases. The problem of determining the optimal decision horizon is solved by specifying a tradeoff between the benefits and calculation costs from longer decision horizons.     

中国的宪政、"三个代表"与法治

由于植根于本国的意识形态和宪政观念,西方的评论家常常误解中国的意识形态、宪政和法治的发展."三个代表"思想不仅能够充当中国共产党执政地位的意识形态基础,而且能够充当国家政治和意识形态权力的合法性来源.因此,它不仅仅是一种意识形态,而且能够推动中国宪政理论和实践的发展.     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.     

Sraffa,Okun, and the theory of the imperfectly competitive firm

Piero Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities is wedded to Arthur Okun's Prices and Quantities to bring out important implications for the theory of the imperfectly competitive firm. The implications relate to firm objectives and to firm behavior in both the ‘vertical’ environment (relations with suppliers) and the ‘horizontal’ environment (relations with customers and competitors).     

Factor Endowment,the Choice of Technology,and the Volume of Trade

Abstract

This paper studies impacts of factor endowment on international trade in a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their technologies endogenously. Although countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen technologies. If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in equilibrium, the volume of trade is zero. None of the four theorems applies.     

Taxes,Risk Aversion,and the Size of the Underground Economy

Non‐parametric regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between the effective tax rate and the relative size of the underground economy, using New Zealand data. The underlying theoretical framework is established, and it suggests an ambiguous prediction regarding the sign of the relationship we are studying. However, our non‐parametric empirical analysis, which also allows for the non‐stationarity of the time‐series data, produces a positive and ‘S‐shaped’ relationship, and this supports earlier empirical studies that imposed such functional forms. The estimated model is used to simulate the effects of hypothetical tax changes on the size of the New Zealand underground economy, and to draw policy conclusions.     

Commitment, Exchange Autonomy, and the Boundary of the Hierarchical Firm

In this article, I present a theory of the boundary of the firmthat accounts for some important characteristics of real-worldmultidivisional firms: operative decisions are in the handsof middle managers who are rewarded based on the performanceof their units, managers' decisions are subject to approvaland intervention by the top management of the firm, and managersare better informed regarding the affairs of their divisions.In this setup, the integration of an intermediate input supplierand its buyer as separate divisions within a single firm isdesirable, as long as the choice of trading partners can becredibly delegated to the divisions' managers. I show that thisis satisfied not only under the assumption of full commitmentby the general office of the firm but also, remarkably, if ithas no commitment power whatsoever. An explanation of the boundaryof the firm emerges only if the general office retains somelimited commitment power. I show that the general office mandatesinternal trades in more instances than would have been optimalwith full commitment, adversely affecting the levels of investmentundertaken by the divisions' managers. In such cases, it canbe optimal to have the trade conducted between nonintegratedparties.     

Taxation, growth, and the spirit of capitalism

This paper uses a general two-sector model of endogenous growth to examine how the spirit of capitalism affects the relation between public finance and growth. The spirit of capitalism is defined as acquisitive personal objectives. We find that if the spirit of capitalism is present, an increase in the share of government spending in output reduces the long-run growth rate. The negative relationship between fiscal spending and growth is consistent with empirical evidence.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Status, the Distribution of Wealth, and Growth

We analyze a simple model of endogenous growth in which individuals care about both consumption and their rank in the distribution of wealth. We show that the steady-growth rate of the economy increases with both the strength of the status-seeking motive and the initial equality of the wealth distribution. Contrary to the basic model of endogenous growth, the equilibrium growth rate is not necessarily smaller than in the social optimum, and we identify the circumstances under which the two coincide.     

Networks,Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation

There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the free market in defense services favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.     

Capitalists,workers, and the burden of debt

Abstract

This paper analyzes the burden of debt in a growth model that combines overlapping generations of workers who save for life-cycle reasons and dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). Ricardian Equivalence prevails, but capitalists regard the debt serviced out of taxes on workers as net wealth. In the long run, the Cambridge Theorem holds: the relationship between the rate of profit and rate of growth is determined by the capitalist saving function, independently of worker or government saving. Two alternative closures are considered. Under exogenous growth constrained by a fully employed labor force, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the distribution of income but permanent effects on the distribution of wealth. Under endogenous growth constrained by a fully utilized capital stock, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the growth rates of the components of wealth and permanent effects on the level and distribution of capital.