The evolution of corruption and development in transitional economies: Evidence from China

It is widely accepted in the literature, that the level of corruption is negatively and robustly related to economic development. However, skeptics argue that for transitional economies, this relationship may not hold. Economic reform loosens up the control of local officials and can increase corruption; Corruption and per capita income can be positively related. Using panel provincial data of China from 1995 to 2014 on prosecuted cases of corruption, we discover that during the early phase of China’s economic reform (during Zhu Rongji and Hu-Wen administrations), a positive short-run relationship is indeed observed. But, there is a robust negative long-run cointegration relationship between corruption and per capita income. The development of the market economy improves private wage and income in the long-run. The relatively inefficient and low returns to ordinary corruption cannot compete with rising market returns, which lead to dwindling corruption. However, the share of major corruption cases is increasing over time to be able to compete with rising market wages.     

Rethinking the Role of State-owned Enterprises in China’s Rise

The massive overseas expansion of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a central aspect of China’s ‘rise’ to great-power status. There is significant disagreement, however, over how to interpret SOEs’ role. Are they instruments of Chinese statecraft, being directed purposefully from Beijing as part of a ‘grand strategy’? Or are they relatively autonomous, profit-maximising businesses, their free-wheeling behaviour often undermining Chinese foreign policy? Finding that there is evidence for both theses, we provide a framework to explain this. We propose theorising party-state/SOEs relations using the concepts of state transformation and regulatory statehood. We show that the Chinese state’s fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation since the late 1970s has substantially increased SOE autonomy and weakened but also transformed the executive’s control, reconfiguring it towards a regulatory mode of governance. Party-state/SOEs relations are thus characterised not by direct command and control but weak oversight and ongoing struggles within the party-state. We illustrate this using a case study of China Power Investment Corporation and its Myitsone hydropower dam project in Myanmar. Here, a central SOE clearly defied and subverted central regulations, profoundly damaging Sino-Myanmar state-to-state relations. Party-state authorities are now struggling to rein in this and other central SOEs.     

对外经济开放、区域市场整合与全要素生产率

本文在新增长理论的框架下,构建了一个对外经济开放和区域市场整合内生化全要素生产率的模型。在此基础上,利用中国1985—2008年的省际面板数据,采用工具变量两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)实证检验了对外经济开放和区域市场整合对省际全要素生产率的影响。研究结果表明,对外经济开放和区域市场整合对中国省际全要素生产率都产生了显著的正向影响效应,而且二者存在替代关系。进一步的分析指出,在对外经济开放水平较高的沿海地区,区域市场整合对省际全要素生产率的影响效应较低,而在内陆地区则恰好相反。本文为理解中国省际全要素生产率的变化提供了新的视角,对后金融危机时代如何提升地区技术水平、转变经济增长方式也具有一定的启发意义。     

What leads to official corruption in China? A politico-economic analysis of economic opportunities and government corruption across China’s provinces

This paper investigates the relationship between economic opportunities and official corruption in China. We construct a cross-province sample of corrupted officials to analyse the effects on official corruption of mineral reserve, coal production, real estate and road construction, while including control variables such as population, GDP per capita, economic growth rate, private assets, provincial government capacity, fiscal transparency and distance of the province from Beijing. Spanning from December 2012 to November 2015, our sample contains 526 high-level government officials who worked in various provinces in China. We find through multivariate regression that economic opportunities represented by coal, minerals, real estate and road construction all have a positive and significant effect on official corruption in China at the levels of provincial department director or deputy director; meanwhile, capacity of political extraction, road construction and coal production are better indicators of official corruption at the level of governor or deputy governor.     

Corruption clubs: empirical evidence from kernel density estimates

A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Countries characterized by the same economic, social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption. In this article, we use Kernel Density Estimation techniques to analyse the cross-country distribution of corruption. Particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak. We find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks. We also provide some evidence on the intra-distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption. We find the group of countries classified within the two ‘clubs’ to be very stable. Corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon. Substantial changes in the economic, political and cultural environment of countries within the ‘corruption club’ are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected.     

Wy are the transition paths in China and Eastern Europe different?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework linking communist regime collapse and privatizing economic reforms. The framework permits us to explain why certain communist regimes lost their monopoly of political power while others have not. We show that the essential difference between those communist regimes which survived economic reform and those which did not, lies in the nature of the privatization reform introduced by the communist leadership. The privatization that we call ‘Market‐Leninist’, was implemented in China and Vietnam while the second type of privatization, termed ‘Embezzlement for a rainy day’ was the type of privatization implemented in Eastern Europe. We show, in the context of a game between rulers and the population, that the size of the repressive apparatus is the key element determining the type of privatization chosen by the rulers. JEL classification: P2, P3.     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。     

Environmental performance,corruption and economic growth: global evidence using a new data set

This study investigates the relationship between environmental performance, corruption and economic growth using panel data of 87 countries covering the period from 2002 to 2012. The Environmental Performance Index is used for the first time to evaluate the environmental quality on economic growth. By employing both ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ panel models, we find that environmental performance is positively related to economic growth and is more significant in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries. Moreover, when corruption is incorporated, the empirical estimation results indicate that although lower corruption helps economic growth in non-OECD countries, the negative coefficients of the three interactive terms show that the positive effect of environment performance on economic growth will drop, while greater environmental performance combined with natural resource abundance inevitably leads to inefficient bureaucracies and hence disadvantageous economic growth. As a result, policymakers in non-OECD countries should carefully ensure better government quality when they exhibit strong environmental performance so as to avoid any disadvantageous impact upon economic growth.     

Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries.     

The effects of vertical and horizontal incentives on local tax efforts: evidence from China

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously.     

Corruption,product complexity and African exporters

Several studies have shown that African manufacturers perform poorly, especially in comparison to their counterparts from other developing countries. We build on these studies by (a) examining the decision to stop exporting among African manufacturers and (b) investigating whether these decisions can be linked to institutional dimensions (such as corruption). Consistent with previous studies, we observe that a significant fraction of African firms stop exporting every year. Using product complexity as a measure of an industry’s ‘sensitivity’ to corruption, we find that firms in more ‘corruption-sensitive’ industries are more likely to stop exporting if there is an increase in overall corruption in the exporting country. Firm characteristics (such as size and productivity) also seem to influence the decision to stop exporting. Our finding about the relationship between corruption and the decision to stop exporting supports the conventional wisdom that corruption is detrimental to economic performance.     

Initial conditions and privatisation as causes of post-communist corruption

This article investigates the economic determinants of corruption in post-communist countries. We conduct an empirical verification of two research hypotheses using EBRD and World Bank data on 27 post-communist economies over the 1996–2014 period. The first hypothesis suggests that corruption is rooted in the communist past, when these countries embraced communist institutions, social norms, as well as low-development structural factors broadly defined as initial conditions. The second hypothesis is that the flawed transition process led corruption to increase because politics and business were never separated. The elites pushed measures that preserved their status while obstructing reform policies that might endanger their interests. Our empirical results demonstrate that both hypotheses are valid to a limited extent, while revealing a more complex view of the reforms and initial conditions. Corruption seems to be related to the natural resource curse, to the lack of small-scale privatisation and to a long history of underdevelopment that could have preceded communism.     

A SIMPLISTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF CORRUPTION

The author's simplistic view of corruption is that all politicians and government officials—like everyone else—are constrained self-maximizers. They therefore establish or maintain regulations and controls with the intent to facilitate corruption, which then becomes a source of income for them. Under private enterprise, where resources are transferable and movable, competition limits the ability to corrupt. However, in state enterprises, limiting corruption through competition is difficult. Corruption can help offset the inefficiencies of a communist or hierarchical system, as the economy makes a transition toward private property. But the danger is that corruption will become institutionalized and develop well-defined, transferable rights. Once that happens, the economy gets stuck there, as it has in India. Thus, in reforming a communist system—as that of China—into a private property system, gradualism will not do.     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? Rethinking the Core and Periphery in the Eurozone Crisis

Recent literature on the eurozone crisis has begun to rethink those explanations of its origins that rely on narratives stressing the ‘immaturity’ of political and economic governance in the countries of the European periphery. These narratives are typically challenged by frameworks which understand the eurozone as a region characterised by a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ hierarchy between the economic growth of Germany, which leads to precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery. Yet, this article shows that core–periphery scholarship is unable to adequately challenge the immaturity thesis due to its preoccupation with German ‘victimisation’ of the European periphery. By exploring country-specific direction of trade and capital lending statistics, I shows that there is little basis for the argument that Germany is to blame for the origins of the eurozone crisis in the individual countries of the European Periphery. This article shows that by bringing core–periphery analysis into dialogue with Comparative Political Economy, a critical approach to the Eurozone crisis can be developed which leaves behind the myth of the German ‘big bad wolf’. Instead, I show that imbalances between the core and periphery are a product of a flawed construction of the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union.     

How local leaders matter: Inter-provincial leadership transfers and land transactions in China

We study how local leaders matter for economic growth by examining the impacts of exogenous transfers of leaders across China’s provinces on land transactions in the primary market. We find that new provincial leaders attract investment in industrial land from the provinces of their previous positions. The leaders’ impacts are greater when their freedom to deploy their business connections in the land market is greater. More importantly, we find evidence of positive impacts of land transactions on economic growth, which should bode well for the careers of the local leaders, albeit there is some evidence of rent seeking among officials especially when they are too old for further promotion.     

Corruption: The good,the bad,and the uncertain

This paper argues that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is dependent upon the uncertainty involved. Employing data on a cross‐section of countries, this paper uses an interaction between the frequency of bribery payments and the uncertainty regarding the delivery of the service in exchange for these bribes to show that corruption has a negative association with growth unless the uncertainty is minimal. Furthermore, the negative association becomes larger in magnitude with higher levels of uncertainty. At extremely high levels of uncertainty a relatively small increase in corruption, equivalent to moving from Sweden to the United States for example, is associated with economically large decreases in economic growth.     

Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnel control in post-reform China. Employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 and 1995, we find that the likelihood of promotion of provincial leaders increases with their economic performance, while the likelihood of termination decreases with their economic performance. This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. We also find that the turnover of provincial leaders is more sensitive to their average performance over their tenure than to their annual performance. We interpret these empirical findings as evidence that China uses personnel control to induce desirable economic outcomes. Our study adds some basic evidence to a growing theoretical literature emphasizing the role of political incentives of government officials in promoting local economic growth.     

农村劳动力流动的过去、现在和未来

回顾新中国成立以来农村劳动力流动的历史,世界上还没有哪个国家像中国一样,在推进现代化过程中,伴随如此大规模人口的迁移,并且在今后很长一段时间还将继续保持,并指出农村劳动力流动对中国的经济崛起发挥了重要作用。而当前农村劳动力转移也在发生变化,这是基于中国的政策变迁、地方政府行为和劳动者自身行为的变化所导致的。未来中国的城市化和工业化能否深度推进,农村劳动力流动起着重要作用。适时调整政策以适应农村劳动力流动的变迁将是对中国政府新的考验,如果成功,将走出中国独特的农村劳动力迁移道路。     

基于PCA-ESDA的中国省域旅游经济时空差异分析

以中国大陆31个省级区域为研究单元,选取1999—2008年反映旅游经济的相关指标,利用SPSS16.0软件对数据进行主成分分析,计算出每个省份旅游经济的综合得分,然后对综合得分进行空间自相关分析。结果表明:中国旅游经济的发展水平总体上呈现从"长三角"及"珠三角"向内陆逐渐降低的特征。1999—2008年中国旅游经济发展全局空间自相关不显著,但局部空间自相关却表现出一定的规律性:沿海省份位于HH区,西部省份位于LL区,西南、部分东部和中部省份位于LH区和HL区。中国省域旅游经济发展呈现出一种持续的非均衡态势,1999—2008年中国省域旅游经济的总体空间格局并没有发生根本性的变化。省域旅游经济集聚的空间依赖性、省域经济发展水平、区位与资源禀赋、政府政策是影响中国省域旅游经济空间差异的主要原因。