Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY IN A SEARCH MODEL*

We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and policy implications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. The main characteristics of our environment are that wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and the number of agents is finite. The decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms. A minimum wage exacerbates the inefficiencies by forcing the low‐productivity firms to increase their wage. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare by improving the workers’ outside option.     

Optimal policy and the role of social contacts in a search model with heterogeneous workers

This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks. High‐ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts. Firms can choose between a vacancy in the regular market and a job opening in the referral market. The model predicts that a larger number of social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high‐ and low‐ability workers and a larger difference in the unemployment rates. The net welfare gain of referrals is estimated at 1.2%. There are three reasons for the inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. First is the traditional search externality described by Hosios. Second, firms share their profits with workers, whereas the social optimum implies that full surplus should be given to firms in the referral market. This inefficiency can be internalized by means of referral subsidies. Third, there is the “pooling inefficiency” in the regular market. If high‐ability workers are sufficiently more productive they impose a positive externality on low‐ability workers and should be rewarded by positive transfers. On the contrary, if productivity differences are small, high‐ability workers achieve unreasonably high wages by referring each other and reduce employment chances of low‐ability workers. In this latter case, high‐ability workers should be penalized. If optimal policy is implemented the net welfare gain of referrals rises up to 1.8%.     

Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm. We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms) exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium. No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion,Firm Size,and Growth

This paper analyzes a model of equilibrium wage dynamics and wage dispersion across firms. It considers a labor market where firms set wages and workers use on-the-job search to look for better paid work. It analyzes a perfect equilibrium where each firm can change its wage paid at any time, and workers use optimal quit strategies. Firms trade off higher wages against a lower quit rate, and large firms (those with more employees) always pay higher wages than small firms. Non-steady-state dispersed price equilibria are also analyzed, which describe how wages vary as each firm and the industry as a whole grow over time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, J41.     

Schooling, Training, Growth and Minimum Wages

We examine how the long-run growth performance of an economy is affected by a labor market distortion. In our model, growth occurs through skill formation, and skills are generated through schooling and training of unskilled workers. We analyze how a minimum wage legislation affects long-run growth. In general, the effects are ambiguous. The reason is that while a minimum wage discourages training, it also encourages schooling. The net effect then depends on whether training or schooling dominates the long-run increases in labor productivity.
JEL classification : I 20, J 31, O 40     

Wage differentials, discrimination and efficiency

I analyze a large labor market where homogeneous firms post wages to direct the search of workers who differ in productivity. I show that the model has a unique equilibrium. The wage differential depends positively on the workers’ productivity differential only when the latter is large. When the productivity differential is small, high-productivity workers get a lower wage than low-productivity workers. This reverse wage differential remains even when the productivity differential shrinks to zero. However, the equilibrium is socially efficient. High-productivity workers always get the employment priority and higher expected wages than low-productivity workers. Although discrimination in terms of expected wages does not exist, conventional measures are likely to incorrectly find discrimination in the model.     

The role of the wage-productivity gap in economic activity

This paper argues that wages lagging behind productivity is a long-run structural phenomenon due to the interplay of wage dynamics and productivity growth. We call this interplay frictional growth, a term that can only be nullified in the utopian case of zero growth and/or no dynamics. In that vein, we challenge the prevailing view of the neutrality of the labour income share and investigate its impact on the evolution of employment. We thus estimate wage setting and labour demand equation systems – for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US over the 1960–2008 period – and find that the labour share is negatively associated with employment even when the conventional assumption of a unitary long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity holds. Acknowledging the presence of the wage-productivity gap in both the short and long run, this work stands as the building block for assessing the effect of the falling labour share on economic activity. As recent work has shown that the widening wage gap is also an important factor prompting inequality, it can be argued that by supporting employment the falling labour share ‘sweetens’ the impact of rising income inequality, and, as such, deserves the attention of policy makers.     

Corporate profit tax,firm entry with unemployment,and income inequality

In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium analysis of corporate profit tax on income distribution, unemployment, and wage inequality. With firm dynamics in industrial sector, we identify a new channel through which profit tax affects income and wage inequality: profit tax cut will widen not only the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, but also exacerbate the wage inequality of unskilled labor among different sectors. The welfare effect of profit tax cut depends on unemployment deepening (labor-distortion effect) and more manufacturing firms enter the market (business-creation effect), eroding the market share of incumbent firms (business-stealing effect).     

一个古典经济周期波动模型——对Goodwin古典周期模型的重构

基于古典主义思想对于劳动与资本这一经济运行核心关系的论述,本文对Goodwin周期模型进行了重构,构建一个由工资份额与资本存量组成的二维古典经济周期波动模型.稳定性分析结果表明,模型的均衡状态为非稳定焦点均衡,一旦脱离均衡点,经济将在工资份额与资本存量相互作用的驱动下围绕均衡点做周期性波动,且波动的幅度逐步加大.产生这一现象的根本原因在于工资性收入与资本性收入即资本存量之间比例结构的波动.     

The Choice of Technology and Equilibrium Wage Rigidity

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. Second, the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock. Third, a higher level of capital stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. That is, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate.     

Wage posting without full commitment

Wage posting models of job search typically assume that firms can commit to paying workers exactly the posted wage. We relax this assumption and impose “downward” commitment; firms can commit only to paying at least their advertised wage. As each firm can only commit to pay at least their advertised wage, workers may demand that the firm pay more than the advertised wage. In labor markets with a finite number of workers and firms, the strategic interaction between firms makes it costly for firms to provide applicants the incentive not to demand wages in excess of the advertised wage. In equilibrium, firms may settle for running job auctions at the cost of losing control of the number of applicants that they can attract. When this strategic interaction between firms vanishes, workers never choose to demand more than the advertised wage.     

The Choice of Technology and Rural-Urban Migration in Economic Development

This paper studies a general equilibrium model of rural-urban migration in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Urban residents incur commuting costs to work in the Central Business District. Surprisingly a change in the size of the population or an increase in the exogenously given wage rate will not affect a manufacturing firm’s choice of technology. This helps to explain why firms in developing countries may not adopt labor intensive technologies even under abundant labor supply. An increase in the number of manufacturing firms increases both the employment rate and the level of employment in the manufacturing sector. However, manufacturing firms choose less advanced technologies. Capital accumulation leads manufacturing firms to choose more advanced technologies, but may not increase employment in the manufacturing sector.     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION*

This article develops a model that incorporates workers' fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. In a setting where the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity of the firm they are working in, we study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within‐group wage inequality. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization, thereby pointing to distributional conflicts that have so far not been accounted for: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within‐group wage inequality.     

Capital and saving in a share economy

Weitzman is correct in his claim that, in long-run equilibrium, the capital stock will be identical in wage and share systems. But a corollary of Weitzman's excess demand for labor in the short run is that the firm is holding too much capital at any given moment. The reduction in demand for capital goods following a shock might create a new channel for the accelerator. A share system also exposes workers to increased capital risk.     

为何改革没有提高国有企业的相对劳动生产率

本文用一个国有企业工资和就业决定模型为不同所有制企业间劳动生产率差距越来越大的现象提供了一个理论解释。本文认为,在国有企业的工资和就业决定受到管制的情况下,一些通常被认为有效的改革措施(如提高管理者固定收入和利润分成比率)反而会阻碍企业重构。另外,在改革过程中,国有企业的产值份额越来越小,但其就业份额却仍然非常之大,这就使得政府更加强调国有企业稳定社会的功能。因此,放松管制对于成功的市场化改革和企业重构而言是至关重要的。     

Search,Concave Production,and Optimal Firm Size

This paper demonstrates that in a free entry search and bargaining economy with concave production firms over-employ. Bargaining allows the worker's wage to depend upon marginal productivity. As such, with strictly concave production, the wage declines as firms employ more labor. Firms react to this declining wage function by choosing an inefficiently large number of workers. However, in equilibrium, fewer firms are likely to enter causing aggregate employment and vacancies to fall.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: J30, J41, J50.     

The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State‐Dependent Offers and Counteroffers*

We construct an equilibrium job search model with on‐the‐job search in which firms implement optimal‐wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms. Productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms. Workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects. Equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated. Productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin‐tailed, as typically observed in the data.     

Policy volatility and growth

The paper aims to examine how fiscal and monetary volatility might affect the balanced economic growth rate using a standard monetary growth model characterized by nominal wage rigidity and productive public spending. The model shows that any type of shock — monetary or fiscal — can generate either a negative or positive relationship between short-run volatility and long-run growth, critically depending on the size of government and the elasticity of output with respect to labor/capital. In particular, given the labor income share, it shows that excessive government spending may cause the impact of fiscal volatility on long-run growth to turn from positive to negative. In addition, a rise in the volatility of the monetary shock is capable of generating either an increase or decrease in the mean of growth. With the range of the labor share values in reality, the model produces results consistent with the fact that the relationship between volatility and growth is generally found empirically to be more negative in developing than in developed countries. The model can be seen as a further explanation for the ambiguous empirical evidence in the existing literature.