首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 140 毫秒
1.
为了探究知识产权保护对技术创新影响的行业差异,本文运用中国37个行业2006~2011年的面板数据,基于技术差距和相对规模,探究了知识产权制度变革对产业创新影响的行业异质性。研究发现:人均专利数量是衡量技术创新的理想指标;加强知识产权保护,有利于促进技术进步;技术创新渠道正在发生变化,即更注重国内自主创新和内部技术转移;技术差距越小越有利于技术进步,相对规模越大越有利于技术创新。本文建议:在研究技术创新时,可以选择从业人员人均专利数量作为创新指标;加强知识产权执法水平,提升知识产权保护力度;技术创新过程中更应该注重自主创新和内部技术转移,不断缩小与发达国家的技术差距,同时还应该扩大行业相对规模。  相似文献   

2.
专利对医药行业技术创新成果的保护作用非常重要,而专利战略是企业经营管理战略的重要组成部分,我国医药企业应当加强专利战略在技术创新中的运用.本文从技术开发、产业化和市场化这三个阶段出发对我国医药企业目前技术创新的现状和专利问题进行了分析,对医药企业技术创新各阶段中专利战略的选择进行了研究,并提出建议.  相似文献   

3.
随着技术保护主义与“逆全球化”趋势不断增强,国有企业的技术选择将对本国产业链供应链的稳定性产生重大影响。本文构建了国际混合寡头竞争模型,考察同时存在国内国外技术交易渠道下国有企业的最优技术选择策略。研究发现,国有企业最优技术国产化比重随专利价值的提升而增加。当专利价值较低时,国有企业应当同时使用本国与国外的技术以平衡研发效率与专利使用成本,即“国际分散选择”;当专利价值足够大时,为避免国外企业拒绝授权带来的供应链产业链冲击,国有企业应实现产品技术的完全国产化,即“本土集中选择”。偏离最优技术选择策略,国有企业采用先进技术可能降低整体社会效益,特别是国有企业完全依赖国外技术的选择会降低本国产业链供应链的创新效率与利润水平,损害社会福利。进一步,本文通过比较静态分析发现,在专利价值足够高时,为推动国有企业加快实现选择技术的完全国产化,应在产品市场上鼓励跨国研发企业间竞争以提高整体创新动力,同时在技术交易渠道上鼓励跨国研发企业深度合作以提高整体创新效率。本文揭示了技术市场中国有企业的策略性技术选择的影响机制,为提高产业链供应链韧性提供了新的分析视角与政策启示。  相似文献   

4.
作为知识产权保护重要制度之一,专利执行保险通过降低技术溢出损失和外部融资约束提升企业技术创新,进而对企业绩效产生深远影响。本文基于沪深A股2012~2019年上市公司微观数据,实证研究专利执行保险实施背景下专利保护对企业技术创新和财务绩效的影响。研究发现:专利执行保险对企业技术创新存在显著的“创新激励”效应,特别是对创新投入和创新产出的提升作用明显,在考虑控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍成立;技术溢出损失效应和外部融资约束是影响专利执行保险创新激励效应的重要机制和渠道;专利执行保险和企业技术创新对企业财务绩效影响显著,其中对滞后5期内的企业财务绩效提升最为明显。研究为完善知识产权保护对创新激励作用探讨,加快专利执行保险试点推广以及如何激发企业创新提供理论价值和政策启示。  相似文献   

5.
化工行业专利工作管理办法(一九九回年二月十五日)第一章总则第一条为了加强化工行业的专利工作,保护发明创造的专利权,鼓励发明创造,促进技术进步以适应改革开放的需要,根据《中华人民共和国专利法》(以下简称《专利法》)和《中华人民共和国专利法实施细则》(以...  相似文献   

6.
现在,广大企业对于技术进步都十分重视。然而,由于一些企业专利实施的成功率不高,甚至有的企业还因此坠入亏损的泥潭。因此,提高专利实施的成功率,已成为企业技术进步的重要课题。专利实施成功率不高的负面影响企业专利实施成功率不高,不是个别现象。调查表明,真正实现专利开发目标的只占小头,而未能实现开发目标的占大头,其中开发完全失误的竟占近回/3o可见,专利实施成功率不高的情况不但客观存在,而且问题还不小。由于专利实施成功率不高,已经给实施科教兴国战略带来了不少负面影响:一是影响企业技术进步的积极性;二是影响…  相似文献   

7.
构建一个药品专利保护强度指标体系,并对药品专利保护强度进行客观的测量,不仅是经济学研究的基础,也是对各类理论模型加以验证的前提条件,更为重要的是,可以借此进行药品专利保护强度的国际比较,本研究遵循药品专利保护强度应是立法强度与执法强度综合的原则,构建了由2个一级指标、11个二级指标以及37个三级指标组成的药品专利保护指标体系。  相似文献   

8.
专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域   总被引:41,自引:4,他引:41  
专利联盟是基于专利许可而组成的一种战略联盟形式。本文在对专利联盟相关概念和对美国专利联盟历史回顾的基础上,从专利垄断、交易成本和资源基础理论等角度,综述了专利联盟的理论研究及其研究中存在的不足。本文指出,加强专利联盟的研究对于正处在技术追赶阶段的我国企业参与全球竞争具有十分重要的现实意义。  相似文献   

9.
构建一个药品专利保护强度指标体系,并对药品专利保护强度进行客观的测量,不仅是经济学研究的基础,也是对各类理论模型加以验证的前提条件,更为重要的是,可以借此进行药品专利保护强度的国际比较。本研究遵循药品专利保护强度应是立法强度与执法强度综合的原则,构连了由2个一级指标、11个二级指标以及37个三级指标组成的药品专利保护指标体系。  相似文献   

10.
供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术?以此问题为基点,本文运用演化博弈论,在共性技术外部性、外部性引发价格战及政府干预治理情形下对供应商技术研发决策行为进行分析。研究发现:共性技术外部性的存在使得博弈演化稳定于由选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡;在外部性引发价格战情形下,当外部性较强时,零部件降价幅度越大,供应商越倾向于选择研发专用技术,反之,当外部性较弱时供应商越倾向于选择研发共性技术;当考虑外部干预治理时,政府价格干预效果依该行为所引致的市场额外需求降低状况,而政府补偿干预有效引导着供应商选择共性技术研发策略。  相似文献   

11.
An important branch of the literature on research and development expenditures has focused on the timing of innovation under different assumptions about the degree of inventive railway. This paper examines the timing decision under conditions of growing technological opportunities. Unlike earlier work, we explicitly treat social welfare in a second-best world where patent protection is used to spur innovation. We find that, given reasonable parameters, the orderings of private introduction times vis-á-vis the socially optimal time are ambiguous. We conclude that any welfare ranking would require a complete specification of all parameters (technical, behavioral and structural) surrounding each specific technological opportunity.  相似文献   

12.
In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.  相似文献   

13.
This paper studies the decision of whether to apply for a patent in a dynamic model in which firms innovate stochastically and independently. In the model, a firm can choose between patenting and maintaining secrecy to protect a successful innovation. I consider a legal environment characterized by imperfect patent protection and no prior user rights. Thus, patenting grants probabilistic protection, and secrecy is effectively maintained until rivals innovate. I show that (1) firms that innovate early are more inclined to choose secrecy, whereas firms that innovate late have a stronger tendency to patent; (2) the incentives to patent increase with the innovation arrival rate; and (3) an increase in the number of firms may cause patenting to occur earlier or later, depending on the strength of patent protection. The socially optimal level of patent protection, which balances the trade-off between the provision of patenting incentives and the avoidance of deadweight loss caused by a monopoly, is lower with a higher innovation arrival rate or a larger number of firms.  相似文献   

14.
The paper analyses an often overlooked aspect of the patent system, namely, that a monopoly franchise for production of a new good could lead to a second-best welfare optimum event when there was no future prospect of inventions being induced by the patent. It is shown that a paten may improve economic welfare relative to a regime of competitive supply when there are learning externalities or ‘spillovers’ from experience in the process of production. Comparative statics show that stronger learning effects at low levels of experience tend to strengthen the case for ex post grant of a monopoly franchise.  相似文献   

15.
We study sequential innovation in two pyramidal structures, in which patent pools are socially desirable. Patent pools are stable, in a regular pyramid structure but not in an inverse pyramid structure under a standard pool formation process. We propose a more elaborate formation protocol that allows for the creation and stability of the largest possible pool. We also examine the welfare implications of introducing patent protection in both structures. Patent protection increases the likelihood of innovation as the pyramid becomes wider in the regular pyramid structure while patent protection always decreases the likelihood of innovation in the inverse pyramid structure.  相似文献   

16.
In this paper, we draw upon the concepts of chaos theory to examine technological change as a pattern of punctuated equilibrium through the alternation of continuity and discontinuity across time. We advocate the application of the chaos mathematical technique of time‐varying local Lyapunov exponents to estimate the rates of change, timing of technological transitions and the continuity–discontinuity loop time periods. To illustrate our framework of ideas, we investigated and compared the development of four technologies – semiconductor, display, software, and biotechnology – from 1976 to 2005, using time series patent data. Implications for theory, method, and practice are discussed.  相似文献   

17.
In this study, the author tests for economies of scale with the use of patent citationsand assesses the impacts of technological opportunity on research productivity inthree global industries, namely, computer, chemical, and electrical and electronic.Technological opportunity in an industry is jointly represented by knowledgespillovers, inter-firm research overlap and scope of research. In particular, the effect of knowledge spillovers is decomposed into internal, intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers. The results suggest no evidence for economies of scale, but the impacts of various aspects of technological opportunity on research productivity are significantly positive. Moreover, the data indicate that if the number of firms in each overlapping research area is small, a rise in the number of these areas enhances research productivity.  相似文献   

18.
Recently, the range of R&D management has expanded to include management of technological assets such as technology information, product/process data, and patents. Among others, patent map (PM) has been paid increasing attention by both practitioners and researchers alike in R&D management. However, the limitation of conventional PM has been recognized, as the size of patent database becomes voluminous and the relationship among attributes becomes complex. Thus, more sophisticated data–mining tools are required to make full use of potential information from patent databases. In this paper, we propose an exploratory process of developing a self–organizing feature map (SOFM)–based PM that visualizes the complex relationship among patents and the dynamic pattern of technological advancement. The utility of SOFM, vis–à–vis other tools, is highlighted as the size and complexity of the database increase since it can reduce the amount of data by clustering and visualize the reduced data onto a lower–dimensional display simultaneously. Specifically, three types of PM, technology vacuum map, claim point map, technology portfolio map, are suggested. The proposed maps may be used in monitoring technological change, developing new products, and managing intellectual property.  相似文献   

19.
This paper studies the role of technological innovation as an antecedent of changes in corporate scope. It argues that technological innovations prompt the firm to reconfigure its corporate portfolio—to redeploy resources to areas of new opportunity while it divests out of marginal businesses. Results from a cross‐industry sample of U.S. manufacturing firms show successful innovation by a firm is followed by both expansion into new areas through complementary resource seeking acquisitions and divestment out of existing noncore businesses. This relationship is found to be moderated by the level of investible resources available to the firm, and supports the notion of scarce resources as a constraint on firm scope. In addition, firms are found to change their corporate scope in response to rival innovation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号