Sustaining superior performance in an emerging economy: an empirical test in the Indian context

We demonstrate a negative relationship between pro‐market reforms and the sustainability of superior profits in an emerging economy. The decline in sustainability of superior profits shows that pro‐market reforms bring significant threats in addition to the various opportunities such as greater availability of production factors and greater freedom to enter and operate businesses highlighted in the extant literature. Our study thus contributes to a more complete conceptual understanding of the performance consequences of pro‐market reforms in emerging economies. We also show that investment in research and development and greater investments in marketing and advertising are firm‐level resources that provide a measure of protection against the erosion in sustainability of superior profits associated with pro‐market reforms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Economics of Maintenance for Real Estate Investments

We propose a theory of urban decay. Following a negative real estate demand shock, property managers optimally suspend maintenance and the probability that they ever restart can be modest. Because maintenance expenditures are proportionately less risky than are the incremental building profits they generate, managers impose a more demanding profit standard on maintenance than on the initial investment. This differential in profit standards means that rather than maintain existing investments, property managers favor new investments, which, if marginally acceptable, they also leave unmaintained. Contractually required maintenance ( e.g ., for publicly subsidized real estate investments), increases the minimum profit for the initial investment acceptance and discourages subsidized real estate investments in favor of unsubsidized investments. However, the required profit for acceptance of a permanently maintained investment is below the profit boundary for maintenance if maintenance is not contractually required. Consequently, the subsidy that induces the investment is least expensive if maintenance is not required, more expensive if maintenance is permanently required and most expensive if maintenance is induced immediately after initial construction but thereafter is at the discretion of the manager. All of our findings are strongest for poorer quality properties.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sufficient Decisions in Multi‐Sided and Multiproduct Markets

We show that in many models where firms make multiple decisions, analysis can be made more tractable by re‐formulating the model into one in which each firm makes a single choice, which we call a sufficient decision. The transformation allows application of standard techniques in these settings, including pass‐through for tax incidence and upward pricing pressure for merger analysis. The transformation works because the assumption of profit maximization links the firms’ decisions together. Examples include models of monopoly and oligopoly in two‐sided markets, where a natural sufficient decision may be the number of transactions that the firm facilitates, and multiproduct markets.     

Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Breakeven Time on New Product Launches: An Investigation of the Drivers and Impact on Firm Performance

The ability to break even faster on new product projects is becoming increasingly critical for firms in fast‐moving industries where continually reinvesting in research and development efforts matters greatly for survival. However, most research to date has focused on studying the impact of two primary innovation outcomes: sales and profits. The exclusive emphasis on sales and profit may be warranted for certain types of goods such as durable goods, but when examining the effects of new products in fast‐moving consumer goods or in the entrepreneurial sphere, where cash to cash matters greatly for survival, it is critical for both researchers and practitioners to not only consider the profits and sales generated by the new product but also the time to breakeven. This paper develops a theoretical framework using the competency‐based literature to examine the effects of innovation drivers (customer idea source, speed to market, product quality, and product newness) on breakeven time (BET) and project profits, and their subsequent impact on firm performance. A three‐stage least square estimation method was employed using longitudinal data on 945 new product development projects and launches in the morning (breakfast) foods category. The results clearly pinpoint that for successful product innovation, managers need to consider the time taken to breakeven on new product development. Specifically, the results demonstrate that speed to market and product quality shorten BET, but customer idea source extends BET. Second, the analysis also empirically demonstrates that BET is an equally effective predictor of firm performance as project profits in the short run, but significantly a stronger predictor of firm performance in the long run (t + four years), suggesting that BET should be regarded as a superior leading indicator of firm performance versus product profitability for fast‐moving consumer goods segment. This is an important finding that suggests firms that recoup their cash investments more quickly experience greater short‐term and significantly more long‐term success.     

Unions and Profits: A Meta‐Regression Analysis1

The effect of unions on profits continues to be an unresolved theoretical and empirical issue. In this paper, clustered data analysis and hierarchical linear meta‐regression models are applied to the population of forty‐five econometric studies that report 532 estimates of the direct effect of unions on profits. Unions have a significant negative effect on profits in the United States, and this effect is larger when market‐based measures of profits are used. Separate meta‐regression analyses are used to identify the effects of market power and long‐lived assets on profits, as well as the sources of union‐profit effects. The accumulated evidence rejects market power as a source of union‐profit effects. While the case is not yet proven, there is some evidence in support of the appropriation of quasi‐rent hypothesis. There is a clear need for further American and non‐American primary research in this area.     

Opportunity costs and non‐scale free capabilities: profit maximization,corporate scope,and profit margins

The resource‐based view on firm diversification, subsequent to Penrose ( 1959 ), has focused primarily on the fungibility of resources across domains. We make a clear analytical distinction between scale free capabilities and those that are subject to opportunity costs and must be allocated to one use or another, thereby shifting the discourse back to Penrose's ( 1959 ) original argument regarding the stock of organizational capabilities. The existence of resources and capabilities that must be allocated across alternative uses implies that profit‐maximizing diversification decisions should be based upon the opportunity cost of their use in one domain or another. This opportunity cost logic provides a rational explanation for the divergence between total profits and profit margins. Firms make profit‐maximizing decisions to increase total profit via diversification when the industries in which they are currently competing become relatively mature. Due to the spreading of these capabilities across more segments, we may observe that firms' profit‐maximizing diversification actions lead to total profit growth but lower average returns. The model provides an alternative explanation for empirical observations regarding the diversification discount. The self‐selection effect noted in recent work in corporate finance may not be indicative of inferior capabilities of diversifying firms but of the limited opportunity contexts in which these firms are operating. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity‐based incentives and collaboration in the modern multibusiness firm

Research summary : This paper examines the role of equity‐based incentives in fostering cross‐business‐unit collaboration in multibusiness firms. We develop a formal agency model in which headquarters offers equity and profit incentives to business‐unit managers with the objective of maximizing total expected firm returns. The resulting compensation contract provides a rich mechanism for aggregating value from collaborative interactions across business units, aligning managers' efforts with the firm's growth prospects and organization structure and managing the dual risks in profits and firm market value. The inclusion of equity incentives elicits higher levels of own‐unit and collaborative efforts over the profits‐only contract. Our results suggest that equity‐based incentives are most beneficial when profitability is uncertain relative to long‐term growth prospects, in firms pursuing related diversification strategies, and in periods of rising equity markets. Managerial summary : Equity‐based compensation such as restricted stock grants and options are increasingly common, not only for CEOs and other top executives, but also for business unit managers and other non‐C‐suite employees. The paper studies the role of such “global” incentives in enabling multibusiness firms to benefit from cross‐unit collaboration. Results from our model show that managerial contracts that include appropriate levels of equity incentives, in addition to profit‐based incentives, generate higher own‐unit and collaborative efforts. We also find that equity incentives are likely to be most beneficial for large firms in high‐growth sectors, for firms pursuing a related diversification strategy, and in periods of rising stock markets. The model can also provide useful guidance on designing return‐maximizing compensation contracts for business unit managers in different firm, organizational, and industry contexts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political capabilities,policy risk,and international investment strategy: evidence from the global electric power generation industry

Whereas conventional wisdom holds that multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest less in host countries that pose greater policy risk—the risk that a government will opportunistically alter policies to expropriate an investing firm's profits or assets—we argue that MNEs vary in their response to host‐country policy risk as a result of differences in organizational capabilities for assessing such risk and managing the policy‐making process. We hypothesize that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policy makers or greater redistributive pressures associated with political rent seeking will be less sensitive to host‐country policy risk in their international expansion strategies. Moreover, firms from home countries characterized by sufficiently weak institutional constraints or sufficiently strong redistributive pressures will seek out riskier host countries for their international investments to leverage their political capabilities, which permit them to attain and defend attractive positions or industry structures. We find support for our hypotheses in a statistical analysis of the foreign direct investment location choices of MNEs in the electric power generation industry during the period 1990–1999, the industry's first decade of internationalization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The measurement of conjectural variations in an oligopoly industry

Using independently derived estimates for the market demand elasticity and firm marginal cost, this paper measures the conjectural variations (cv's) of the eight largest U.S. steel firms for the years 1920 to 1972. Comparisons are then made between the measured cv's and those predicted by certain industry conduct hypotheses. Specifically the hypotheses are those for competitive behavior, Cournot behavior, imperfect collusion, and industry profit maximization (perfect collusion). One of the two extreme theories of firm behavior, industry profit maximization, is rejected, but the acceptance or rejection of the other theories depends on the assumptions made about the cost structure of the sample firms.     

Clinging to Slim Chances: The Dynamics of Anticipating Regret When Developing New Products

This paper focuses on the effects of anticipated regret during large‐scale investment projects—namely new product development. Anticipated regret means worrying about the future, and decision‐makers experience it prior to both making a decision and knowing the outcome of that decision. It is forward‐looking while actual regret is backward‐looking. Decision‐makers must make project continuation/termination decisions with conflicting pressures. If they continue it, they might receive disconfirming information in the future and therefore regret their decision. If they stop it, they also might regret that decision later, too, if they subsequently conclude it was an error to do so. We term these conflicting pressures anticipated “keep” and “drop” regret, respectively. In the main study, nearly 300 individuals completed a decision‐making exercise in which a failing new product development project was evaluated, and various factors were measured, including both types of anticipated regret at multiple points in the project. The results show that decision‐makers anticipate regret when making project continuation decisions, and anticipated keep and drop regret exert pressures that differ in direction and magnitude. Most interestingly, anticipated drop regret does not diminish as the failing project progresses whereas anticipated keep regret increases as more negative information is received over the course of the project. A second, smaller study was conducted using a different population, and the results of the main study were replicated in this supplemental study, thereby adding confidence in these findings.     

Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.     

The competitive implications of the deployment of unique resources

The ‘resource‐based’ view focuses on unique resources as the fundamental sources of competitive advantage and superior profits. We use a game‐theoretic model to analyze the impact of the deployment of unique resources on product market competition, and the impact of unique resources and sustainable competitive advantages on profits when the competitive implications of resource deployment are taken into account. We find that some of the core propositions of the resource‐based view do not necessarily hold when the impact of resource deployment on product market competition is explicitly considered. Specifically, the accumulation and deployment of unique resources does not necessarily increase the firm's profit and the difference between its profit and competitors' profits. Furthermore, achieving a sustainable competitive advantage does not necessarily lead to higher profits. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO MULTIATTRIBUTE DECISION METHODOLOGIES USED IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISION ANALYSIS

Two multicriteria decision methodologies applied to evaluating capital investments are the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the Non-Traditional Capital Investment Criteria (NCIC) model. In this paper we demonstrate that a mathematical relationship exists between these two models. In-particular, a data set obtained by one method can be mapped into an equivalent data set obtained using the other method. It is suggested that this offers an opportunity of empirically assessing decision makers judgmental capabilities under varying data collection methods. An example problem illustrates the manner in which such comparisons can be made.     

Unions and Firm Profits

This study examines the effect of unionization on manufacturing firm profits, extending earlier research by combining industry-level and firm-level measures of unionization. Using several profit measures, we find that quasi-rents from firm investments in intangible assets are a relatively greater source of union profit effects than product market concentration and that union profit effects occur largely in the first 10 percent of firm coverage, suggesting spillover effects on nonunion employees.     

零售商开辟电子渠道的双渠道供应链定价决策

研究两层双渠道供应链中，在制造商实施直销渠道的基础上，零售商开辟电子渠道对供应链的影响。建立了双渠道供应链的定价决策模型，针对零售商未开辟电子渠道和开辟电子渠道两种情形，分别求解集中决策、Stackelberg博弈分散式决策模式下的零售商和制造商各自的最优定价及利润，并利用数值算例，进行对比分析。研究发现零售商开辟电子渠道的影响是多重的，一方面零售商的市场被拓展，竞争力增强，利润显著提高，有利于其与制造商进行抗衡。另一方面，制造商的利润有所下降，且整个供应链系统的渠道冲突加剧。因此，面对制造商的直销渠道，零售商可以选择开辟电子渠道来增强其话语权，与制造商进行谈判，实现互利双赢。     

A Model of the Asset Disposition Decision of the RTC

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the asset disposition decision for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). In this paper, we focus on the primary goal of the RTC—to maximize the net present value of the cash flows generated through holding and selling the assets it acquires. A major decision it faces is whether to hold or sell assets. This decision ultimately depends on the RTC's discount rate versus that of the marginal buyer. A second question relates to the decision of which assets to sell first and which ones to delay sale. The model developed in this paper characterizes the asset disposition decision process of the RTC for different types of assets. We develop a set of optimal disposition rules based on the simple premise of a multi-period cash flow maximization. In addition, we test some of these rules by analyzing RTC disposition performance. Through this exercise, we hope to provide some guidance to the RTC in implementing its enormous task as well as to policy makers in charting the progress of the RTC. The main results of this analysis indicate that liquid assets and retail deposit franchises should be sold as quickly as possible. Illiquid assets that are performing and do not have high servicing costs are good candidates to finance through senior/subordinated securities or sale with seller financing by the RTC. Illiquid non-performing assets are good candidates for equity participation financing by the RTC. The sales proceeds obtained by the RTC will be increased if buyers have greater certainty with respect to expected cash flows and RTC sales policies.