基于网络关系的公司治理

公司治理已由“股东至上”的产权治理演进为“利益相关者”的超产权治理,由单一企业的内部法人治理结构治理向网络关系的公司治理演进.企业价值评价也由财务指标逐渐转向非财务指标.在以网络关系为基础的公司治理中,企业当着力构建公司的价值网络关系、社会网络关系和顾客网络关系,并以利益相关者的公司治理理论为基点,根据不同的网络关系,实施分类治理,协调、维护好各种网络关系,使各类利益相关者协调发展.公司利用各种网络关系攫取企业发展所需的各类资源,致力于企业“Key Stone”角色的建设,保持企业的“常青基业”,以实现企业和社会效益的最大化.     

企业利益相关者的利益协调与公司治理的平衡原理

企业中不同的利益相关者所追求的利益要求之间不仅会有差异，而且很可能会有冲突。本文剖析了企业中各种利益相关者利益冲突的特性，进而将公司治理的本质理解为企业利益相关者之间利益冲突的协调机制，并阐明公司治理安排的有效性取决于它是否能够动态地满足多维度的平衡要求。     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

论企业社会责任的本质——兼与李伟先生商榷其他利益相关者在企业治理结构中的地位

基于利益相关者理论,企业的各个相关者都向企业投入了一定专用性资源,各相关者应按投入资源的比例共享企业的收益,并共同享有企业的治理权。企业社会责任的本质就是企业的各个利益相关者之间的利益分配关系和与之相联系的企业治理权配置关系。企业承担社会责任实际上就是在各利益相关者之间恰当分配企业的治理权,进而确保企业建立合适的社会责任体系来对各相关者承担相应的责任和义务,并且向各相关者履行这些责任和义务的代价占整个企业收益分配的比例,应与各相关者向企业投入的专用性资源的价值比例基本一致。只有企业的各个利益相关者分享了合适的企业治理权,才能确保企业对其履行相应的社会责任。     

中小企业技术创新的公司治理环境调查研究

公司治理结构与机制决定着中小企业技术创新行为。文章设计并发放包括中小企业公司章程、股权结构、三会状况、经营者、利益相关者五个方面内容的调查问卷,分析了中小企业技术创新的治理环境及其存在的主要问题,并为进一步提高中小企业公司治理水平提出政策建议,以更好地指导中小企业公司治理实践,进而提高中小企业技术创新的能力,培育持久竞争优势。     

Alternative Corporate Governance Systems in Japanese Firms: Implications for a Shift to Stockholder-Centered Corporate Governance

In Asia, the recent catastrophic decline in regional stock markets, continuing currency crisis and failures of major financial institutions and industrial corporations have increased domestic and international interest in corporate governance. Nowhere is this greater than in Japan where financial institution reform has catapulted this to the fore. In this paper, we use agency theory and institutional theory, together with comparative case examples, to derive some propositions on the dynamics of changing corporate governance systems in Japanese firms. We argue for the co-existence of stakeholder and shareholder-centered corporate governance systems in Japan. This argument has an important implication for corporate governance research and agency theory. Namely, changes in ownership structure and institutional expectations would force firms to focus on maximizing shareholder value even where the interests of stakeholders are more emphasized. It suggests an environmental selection mechanism to ensure the emergence of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem. Further, the loss of competitiveness and the prolonged poor performance of firms can change the institutional norms to emphasize asset efficiency and transparency rather than stability and business ties.     

Environment, governance, controls, and radical innovation during institutional transitions

Researchers pay only limited attention to the problem of drive force of radical innovation in institutional transitions, especially in China. Drawing on both institutional theory, managerial control theory, and innovation theory, this study examines the roles of external and internal drivers to firms?? radical innovation. Specifically, we examine the effects of external institutional environment and internal corporate governance on radical innovation by introducing management control systems. Based on data from a sample of 585 firms in China, this study finds that the effect of institutional environment uncertainty on radical innovation is significant but formal corporate governance is not. These results suggest that firms facing an uncertain institutional environment emphasize both financial control and strategic control, and firms that have adopted formal corporate governance prefer strategic control to financial control. The implications of these findings for research during institutional transitions are discussed.     

Board reform versus profits: The impact of ratings on the adoption of governance practices

Research summary: External stakeholders frequently attempt to influence organizations' adoption of new practices through the creation of public ratings. Based on the insights of performance feedback theory, we develop the theory of organizational reactions to external ratings to explain how firms' behaviors depend on their rating scores and their profitability. A central issue in our theory is the conflict between established internal goals and goals introduced by public ratings, with public ratings receiving lower priority than established profitability goals. Our theory suggests that, contrary to the expectations of the external stakeholders, firms targeted for criticism by ratings become less likely to adopt corresponding practices when their profitability is below aspirations. These arguments are supported in data on the diffusion of corporate governance practices in Canada. Managerial summary: Firms and their products are rated and ranked by external agencies ranging from Consumer Reports to magazine rankings of admired, environmental, or well‐governed companies. We investigate whether such ratings affect firm behaviors, and especially whether they can incentivize poorly rated firms to improve their ranking when these firms' profitability is also low. Using the leading corporate governance ranking in Canada, we find that rankings could have adverse effects: when firms have both poor governance ranking and poor profitability they are less likely to adopt governance practices, contrary to the ranking creators' intentions. The findings show that there is a hierarchy of firms' goals, where the goal of profitability comes ahead of other goals imposed by external agencies through ratings and rankings. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate Governance and Human Resource Management

This paper investigates the effect of different forms of corporate governance on the structure and nature of stakeholder relationships within organizations and the consequent impact on human resource management (HRM) policy and outcomes. The analysis shows that while performance advantages can be derived from commitment‐based HRM systems, a corporate governance regime that privileges remote stakeholders may operate as a constraint on such systems. The empirical analysis is based on the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98).     

Stakeholders, Structure and the Failure of Corporate Governance Reform Initiatives in Post-Crisis Thailand

This paper brings together institutional and political perspectives in a framework for mapping the process by which strategic change initiatives are introduced into a system but result in outcomes that may not be intended, expected or desired by the original architects of change. This general framework links stakeholders, structural elements and their interactions to emergent system-level phenomena. It also enables comparison across different systems undergoing change; for example, to understand why the outcomes of the “same” initiatives may very dramatically in different contexts. To illustrate the framework, we examine the process by which an initial flurry of corporate governance reforms in post-financial crisis Thailand have been largely stymied, in spite of a seemingly clear need for such reforms and the conviction of some domestic and foreign promoters of such reforms.     

煤炭企业混合所有制改革与公司治理机制优化

煤炭企业混合所有制改革是煤炭企业建立现代企业制度的必然要求。煤炭企业混合所有制改革要求在国有煤炭企业中引入民营投资、外商投资,形成煤炭企业投资主体多元化的格局。煤炭企业混合所有制改革要求煤炭企业按《公司法》要求改制为规范的公司制企业,构建以股东会、董事会、监事会、经理层为代表的现代公司治理结构。煤炭企业混合所有制改革拓宽煤炭企业融资渠道,引入国内外战略投资者,可优化煤炭企业的公司治理机制。总之,煤炭企业混合所有制改革有利于煤炭企业公司治理机制的形成和优化。     

企业核心利益相关者的利益要求——紫金矿业案例分析

随着现代企业利益关系多元化,利益相关者问题已成为企业治理安排中不可或缺的要素。本文通过紫金矿业案例分析,探索核心利益相关者的利益要求。分析表明,不同核心利益相关者群体,其利益要求以及要求的重视程度存在显著差异;核心股东更为关注企业的生存与发展能力,管理者和员工注重薪酬水平;但他们关注企业经济利益、长期生存与可持续性发展的基本利益取向一致。进一步的因子分析表明,管理者的利益要求可划归九类。不同核心利益相关者群体的利益要求实现程度存在差异,核心股东、高层管理者和中层管理者是充分实现型核心利益相关者,员工和基层管理者是尚未实现型核心利益相关者。     

基于资本治理理论的企业所有权安排--股东至上理论与利益相关者理论的逻辑统一

企业所有权安排有两种不同的理论流派：“股东至上”理论和利益相关者理论。公司中的利益相关者应分为资本所有者和其他利益相关者两类,只有资本所有者才是企业所有权的主体。因此,两大理论并不是绝对对立和冲突的,在企业所有权安排上,都统一于“资本”这个概念,都是基于资本治理理论下的企业所有权安排问题。物质资本和人力资本所有者在企业所有权中的最优配置份额,取决于各个资本的谈判力。物质资本和人力资本都应纳入“企业治理”范畴,不能强调一方而忽视另一方,并根据资本作用的不同．对不同企业实施分类治理,合理地安排企业所有权,以实现资本所有者利益最大化。     

企业利益相关者问题的实证研究

作者对企业不同经营目标所涉及的利益相关者的重要性及影响程度进行了排序研究．对企业在不同规模及经营目标情况下利益相关者的重要性的差异进行了系统的实证研究。研究发现．企业在追求不同经营目标时．它的利益相关者的重要性程度是不一样的：不同规模企业的利益相关者重要性是有差异的。本研究有利于不同规模企业以及相同规模企业在追求不同经营目标时能准确把握和重要关键利益相关者的关系定位。将为企业更好的平衡各利益相关者的和益．提高各利益相关者的满意度和企业综合竞争能力提供有用的理论根据。     

A Trade Union Congress Perspective on the Company Law Review and Corporate Governance Reform since 1997

This article examines the Company Law Review and other corporate governance reforms introduced by the Labour government since 1997. It argues that an opportunity has been missed to implement fundamental change by giving employees and other key stakeholders rights in companies equal to those of shareholders. However, reforms that aim to make the existing system work better by promoting responsible shareholder activity have been introduced, and proposals to increase company disclosure on employee and other stakeholder relationships are in the pipeline. The potential of the reforms to offer trade unions new tools for promoting workers’ interests is examined.     

上市公司治理结构对信息性盈余管理的影响研究

为了有效监督公司内部利害关系各方的行为,有效降低基于各种委托代理关系的代理成本,在阐述国内外盈余管理文献的基础上,假设拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,通过构建合理的并可度量的信息性盈余管理衡量方法,使用沪、深两市全部A股上市公司2014—2016年公司季度财务数据,实证研究了信息性盈余管理视角下公司治理对盈余管理的影响。结果表明,市场监管者和投资者需要关注两种不同的盈余管理行为,投机性盈余管理更倾向于误导投资者,信息性盈余管理则是通过盈余管理的手段向投资者传递有用的内部信息。股权制衡对上市公司的信息性盈余管理行为具有明显促进作用,促使管理层进行信息性盈余管理,就要优化股权结构,形成产权多样化的股东制衡机制,实现股权结构的合理优化。拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,公司治理结构对管理者进行信息性盈余管理具有积极的影响,健全的公司治理结构能够提高财务报告透明度和盈余信息含量。因此,保障财务报告的真实性和可靠性,以信息性盈余管理为动机探究公司治理对盈余管理的影响具有现实意义。     

从治理结构与组织结构互动的角度看企业的组织变革

企业组织结构形式的变革和企业治理结构模式的变革共同推动了企业组织的变革，从而使企业组织能更有效地实现其所追求的目标。在企业组织的变革过程中，组织结构形式的变革和治理结构模式的变革不单是受企业所处的内外部环境因素的影响，这二者之间本身也存在着相互影响和相互依存的关系。它们之间的相互适应程度往往就决定了企业组织有效发展的程度，决定了企业目标有效实现的程度。企业的组织变革是一个从渐变到突变的过程。当渐进的变革到达一个极限而不能适应内外部环境的变化时，就会发生突变。从渐变到突变，再从突变到渐变，这就是企业组织不断发展的过程。     

环境约束与家族企业上市时机选择

家族企业上市问题成为最近几年学术界和实业界人士共同关心的热点问题.本文认为,考虑到中国目前的制度环境约束,家族企业争取上市资格可能并非明智之举.其原因在于：一个有效率的治理结构安排是外部社会制度环境的函数,治理结构的有效性更多地体现在对外部环境的适应性方面,治理结构的变迁应该有相应的制度环境相配套,否则,家族企业进行强制性的制度变迁可能会带来企业总剩余的损失.本文还依据相关研究文献,提出了测量家族企业上市时机选择的社会环境阈值.     

公司治理评价、治理指数与公司业绩--来自2003年中国上市公司的证据

本文基于2003年的评价样本，从中国上市公司治理指数（CCGI^NK）及其所涉及的六个维度进行实证研究发现：上市公司治理指数对总资产收益率、每股净资产、加权每股收益、每股经营性现金流量、总资产周转率、总资产年度增长率、财务预警值均有显著的正面影响．这表明拥有良好的公司治理机制有助于提升企业的盈利能力、股本扩张能力、运营效率、成长能力，有助于增强财务弹性和财务安全性。公司治理中所涉及的控股股东治理、董事会治理、经理层治理、信息披露、利益相关者治理、监事会治理机制，在很大程度上决定了上市公司是否能够拥有一套科学的决策制定机制与决策执行机制。而这将对公司业绩和公司价值产生直接而深远的影响。     

Expanding the conceptual domain of governance in franchising

We propose a model that expands the conceptualization of governance in franchising that acknowledges traditionally ignored stakeholders, including debt and equity holders. Though research has examined how equity holders benefit from the organizational form of franchising, it has not examined the specific role that equity or debt holders play in governing franchise organizations. Additionally, the unique ontology of franchising, which includes semi-internal members of the organization (i.e., franchisees) that invest their own assets and maintain their own balance sheets, provides a rich context for exploring such governance issues. Franchisees exist outside traditional firm boundaries and are not employees, but they are closely linked to the brand given their significant investments in firm-specific assets. Franchisee-based organizations also are growing their own corporate structures and investments in firm-specific assets, sometimes dwarfing those of their franchisor partners. By expanding the concept of governance in franchising, we open avenues for significant scholarship that can enrich both the governance and franchising literatures. We provide several preliminary propositions and constructs to help encourage new research in this emerging arena of franchising research.