The Welfare Losses From Price-Matching PolicIes

Several recent papers argue that price-matching policies raise equilibrium prices. We add to this literature by considering potential welfare losses, which have two sources: Harberger triangles from high prices and Posner rectangles from over-entry. We compare price-matching markets with entry to monopoly and price-matching markets without entry, and find that price matching with entry creates greater welfare losses than monopoly in markets with a low ratio of fixed to marginal cost. We illustrate this result using parameters from the US wholesale gasoline and air travel markets, and relate our model to price matching among NASDAQ market makers.     

信息产品需求特性与垄断性市场结构

信息产业在供给、需求、市场结构等方面具有与传统产业不同的一些特征。某些特征决定了信息产业中垄断性市场结构为一种常态。本文从信息产品的需求角度出发，通过假设临界点的方法，分别针对信息产品的网络效应和局部边际效用递增效应建立模型，分析了这两种效应对于垄断性市场结构形成的影响，揭示了信息产业在一定条件下垄断性市场结构效率优于完全竞争市场结构。本文表明，信息产品的需求效应对于信息产业的垄断市场结构有着重要影响，往往使得垄断结构强化表现出有利于社会整体福利的趋势。因此，在制定针对信息产业的反垄断政策时，需要考虑信息产业与传统产业的不同特质。本文还以流行音乐产业为例，对模型进行了初步的验证。     

论经济全球化时代跨国公司垄断结构

在经济全球化时代，一国的竞争优势和影响力主要体现在其跨国公司对全球资源的支配力上。跨国公司的竞争优势来源于其垄断结构及由此带来的垄断结构利润。在全球化与信息经济条件下，跨国公司的垄断结构是有效率的，并不会妨碍竞争，这可以用新的可竞争市场理论来说明。     

Oligopoly intermediation,relative rivalry and market conduct

We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices.     

董事市场供给会影响董事会独立性吗——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

独立董事选择过程的不可观测性使得独立董事的选择机制一直被忽视,独立董事的来源在很大程度上决定了其作用的有效性。以揭开独立董事选择机制的"黑箱"为目的,通过构造董事市场供给指数的方式,我们发现,市场供给对董事会独立性产生重要影响。本地市场供给对非国有和竞争行业的公司董事会独立性的影响显著大于国有和垄断行业的公司,中心市场的辐射效应却与此相反,即辐射效应对国有、垄断和大规模的公司董事会独立性影响更大;在剔除强制性需求之后,市场供给对董事会独立性自主性需求的影响与总需求的影响基本一致。本文首次揭开了独立董事的选聘"黑箱",并为解决董事会内生性提供了新方法。     

Investment dynamics in markets with endogenous demand

I examine entry into markets where demand is an increasing function of past sales because of learning, networks, or fashion. Demand is initially unknown (with firms learning in Bayesian fashion) and grows endogenously over time. The competitive expansion path and the efficient/monopoly solution differ not only with respect to levels (the market's investment is too low), but also time patterns : externalities contribute to S-shaped diffusion. There is also path-dependence: small initial differences may determine whether the market will grow or not open. Policy arguments for subsidizing entry into new markets, especially in infant export industries, are examined.     

市场结构与横向产品差别化的相互关系分析

产品差别化对市场结构的形成有很大的作用,经典的豪特林模型只得出了产品差别最小化和最大化原则,由此模型得到的市场结构为完全竞争市场和寡头垄断市场,但垄断竞争市场却无法得到。文章在豪特林模型的基础上构造出统一框架,不但分析产品最大和最小差别情况,而且提出中间程度差别化的分析模型。得出所时应的三种市场结构。尤其是中间程度的差别化对应的垄断竞争市场。对这三种市场结构进行社会福利分析,得出在消费者不同质时,相对于完全竞争市场,垄断竞争市场是相对较好的选择。     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

The independent submarkets model: an application to the Spanish retail banking market

The aim of this paper is to test the predictions of Sutton’s independent submarkets model with data on the Spanish retail banking market. The prediction of this model for aggregates of submarkets is that the form of equilibrium outcome must involve some minimal degree of size inequality. However, within each submarket, when three conditions hold, the only form of equilibrium outcome will be an extreme ‘fragmented’ structure. To test these predictions, firstly I propose methods to identify independent submarkets. Then I analyze the degree of inequality in bank sizes for markets with different levels of aggregation (submarkets, regions and national market). Using concentration by towns’ data, I find that in single submarket towns the degree of inequality of the size among banks is zero. Moreover, multimarket towns with a significant degree of concentration are shown to be formed by a different number of independent submarkets where each bank owns one branch. Nonetheless, when the regional and the national bank markets are considered, the degree of inequality in bank sizes becomes high. These results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.     

Strategic Complementarities in Bank Branching Decisions*

I study how complementarities between rival banks’ branching decisions impacts banking deregulation. I use an instrumental variables approach to separately identify a bank’s strategic response to rivals’ branching decisions from common market factors. The results indicate that some bank types are more likely to open additional branches if their rivals do. This has important implications for expansion and merger policies. These are explored using a model of consumer demand for bank services and bank branch network choices. I find that strategic complementarities in branching decisions augment the effects of a merger or expansion, leading many banking markets to become over-branched.     

Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks

A new class of access pricing problems is analyzed in which upstream firms compete for customers and access to these customers is required by downstream markets. Using fixed–to–cellular calls as an example, a model is presented which shows that the determination of cellular termination charges is quite different to standard access pricing problems. Competition between cellular firms leads to access prices being set either at, or above, the monopoly level. Applications are given for other market settings, including the termination of long–distance calls on competing local exchange networks and the setting of interchange fees in payment systems.     

Reverse Price Discrimination with Bayesian Buyers

This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets.     

Entry under Asymmetric Regulation

In recent years, the local telephone industry has evolved from a traditionally regulated structure of natural monopoly to one characterized as having a dominant firm and competitive fringe. Yet, legacy regulation from the monopoly era still remains in this new environment, and is often applied solely to the dominant firm. Economic theory suggests that asymmetric regulation of this sort will induce competitive entry. We find support for this theory by demonstrating that the amount of entry into local telephone markets is significantly higher when asymmetric quality-of-service standards are present.     

Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets

We consider innovation incentives in markets where final goods are systems comprising two strictly complementary components, one of which is monopolized. We focus on the case in which the complementary component is competitively supplied and innovation is important. We explore ways in which the monopoly may have incentives to extract efficiency rents in the competitive sector, thus weakening or destroying incentives for independent innovation. We discuss how these problems are affected if the monopolist integrates into supply of the complement.     

产业关联与能源工业市场化改革

文从横向产品关联、纵向产业关联以及国内外市场关联三个方面分析了能源工业内部的产业关联及其对能源价格体制、市场结构、所有制结构等方面的影响。研究表明，当能源产品是替代关系时，某一能源产品价格的上涨，会使其他能源行业也获得涨价的收益：对某种能源价格进行控制，可能会引起能源供需结构的失衡。当能源产品是互补关系时，无论是上游垄断还是下游垄断，都会影响上下游产业的协调发展．而且会加快竞争性产业走向垄断的速度，并使政府的价格管制处于被动。能源工业的对外开放是第三种产业联系形式，它促进我国能源产品市场的国际化与外商直接投资的发展．但是产品市场融合和外商直接投资规模的扩大只会提高能源工业的生产集中度．而对促进非公有制经济发展的作用有限，能源工业非公有制经济的发展与所有制结构的调整要依靠政府的政策引导和支持。根据分析结果，本文提出了能源工业市场化改革要整体推进．协调进行的政策建议。     

Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry

This paper uncovers price asymmetries across oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that are seemingly identical in structure but different in competitive history. This is done by identifying “quiet life” markets that have not (yet) experienced a change in structure, and “non-quiet life” markets that have been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. Using a long panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry, we find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price significantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly. We show that the path towards a particular market structure matters for the determination of prices and explore several mechanisms that likely explain the price asymmetries, including engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, adjustment behaviour to market structure changes, and the cost heterogeneity of competing firms.     

Welfare losses under Cournot competition

In a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market structure that maximizes PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are identical, a clear indication that the assumption of identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards.     

Market dominance under U.S. antitrust

Much has transpired since Walter Adams and Horace Gray warned in 1955 about the dangers of state creation of monopoly. The dangers remain the same. But mainstream researchers have led the efforts for deregulation in railroads, airlines, gas and electric utilities, stock markets, banking, and other markets. Chicago-UCLA doctrines have played a part in the 1980s, but they have often run to excess, in advocating deregulation at any cost. One result of that approach has been the savings and loan scandal of the 1980s, where a wholesale removal of all restraints led to unforeseen economic damage.Also among the mainstream instruments, Section 2 has been applied to reduce market dominance in a number of important industries. Section 2 will continue to be only one tool for reducing market power, but it can be important. A renunciation of such an effective instrument is unwise. By helping to lead the mainstream critique of monopoly, Walter Adams has added to important policy actions. The policy-oriented tradition in the profession has been enriched by his skill and erudition.     

Potential competition and the factors influencing banking concentration

Multiple regression analysis is used to study the factors influencing market concentration in urban banking markets. The results indicate that independentde novo entry and shifts in population from the central city to the suburbs can be important deconcentrating factors in urban banking markets. In terms of the potential competition doctrine, the results suggest that attractive banking markets are likely to attract enough actual and potential entrants to mitigate any problems associated with a leading bank acquisition by a potential entrant. On the other hand, potential competition is more likely to be an issue in less attractive banking markets where the probability of entry is low.     

Price behavior in tight oligopoly

The study examines price behavior in tight oligopoly. The investigation proceeds from the premise that tacit cooperation is the rational response of firms comprising tight oligopoly. The study’s thesis is that cooperative conduct in tight oligopoly will reflect one of two general pricing patterns: (1) shared monopoly pricing, or (2) mark-up pricing. A unique empirical test of this dual price hypotheses is developed. The test focuses on the nature of price responses to cost and demand changes as reflected in a price equation that is estimated for each of fifty four-digit SIC industries. The study’s results indicate infrequent, but still notable, instances of shared monopoly pricing. More common is evidence of mark-up pricing, a general category within which demand proved to be significant in roughly half of the industries examined. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.