Access regulation and geographic deployment of a new generation infrastructure

This paper addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing technologies (the “old generation network” – OGN – and the “new” generation network – NGN). This framework allows us to show that the “regulation defining access charge in order to maximize infrastructure deployment” is strictly equivalent to the case in which “no regulation applies”. We also derive from the model that these two types of regulation induce higher social welfare, but lower numbers of NGN consumers, compared to the “ex post access prices” regulation. Finally, we show that the level of infrastructure deployment (as well as social welfare and number of NGN consumers) will be highest if both investment and access charge decisions are taken by the welfare maximizing regulator. This suggests that the social optimum will be achieved through a calls-for-tender process that includes deployment and access charge requirements.     

Pricing Network Interconnection: Advantages Held by Integrated Telecom Carriers

A recurring telecommunications policy debate centers on whether incumbent, vertically integrated local exchange carriers have an incentive to discriminate in price against down-stage service rivals who interconnect to their network (a price squeeze). The concern is typically voiced in one of two claims: (1) there is an incentive for an incumbent to use a price squeeze when access prices are set above long-run incremental cost; or (2) prices set at that cost are preferred for interconnection because they eliminate incentives for a price squeeze. In principle, form (1) is generally true (Proposition 1), but form (2) is generally not (Proposition 2), The proof of these Propositions reveals why pricing access at long-run incremental cost coupled with appropriate price floors in the down-stage market does eliminate the incentive to squeeze.     

Regulatory factors influencing Internet access in Australia and China: a comparative analysis

Internet access is determined by a combination of a widely available telecommunication infrastructure and affordability of Internet services, which are closely related to government policies (IT Group. (1999). Like other countries, both Australia and China have considered the Internet a powerful tool for national development economically and socially. As Internet growth becomes more and more significant, it becomes important to address the extent to which the underlying communication policies influence current growth rates.This paper provides a comparative review of policy approaches to regulating the Internet in both China and Australia. This study aims to identify the regulatory factors affecting Internet access in terms of availability and affordability, especially those factors which encourage the creation of a policy and regulatory environment favourable to the development of Internet infrastructure and access.This paper examines the linkages between regulatory regimes, market environments and Internet access in both China and Australia. The preliminary result suggests that government policies governing the telecommunications service market and promoting information infrastructure have a significant impact on the affordability and availability of Internet access. The most significant factor is the level of competition permitted in the telecommunication sector. It has become clear that further regulatory initiatives such as deregulatory mechanisms and interconnection regimes are needed to establish a more competitive environment for Internet access in both countries, and more particularly in China.     

Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission, 2012–2013

Pointing to the role of economic analysis, this article reviews major Federal Communications Commission actions and initiatives that are related to universal service support in high-cost areas that are served by price-cap incumbent local exchange carriers, special access policy, secondary market spectrum transactions, spectrum reassignments, and rules that govern interoperability among certain licensees in the 700 MHz band and spectrum ownership. Also discussed are activities of the recently created Technology Transitions Policy Task Force and challenges to communications policy that are posed by the transition to voice over internet protocol interconnection.     

The impact of trade liberalization in telecommunications services: The case of APEC countries

This paper examines the impact of liberalizing the telecommunications services sector on investment and output in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries by estimating a system of four structural equations that takes into account the causal relationship between national income and telecommunications infrastructure. The degree of openness to trade in telecommunications is represented by a carefully constructed index that reflects a country’s trade and investment policy in terms of market access, national treatment and regulatory principles. One interesting finding from the empirical analysis is that the effects of trade liberalization depend on the risk rating of a country. In countries with relatively high risk ratings liberalization reduces investment in telecommunications.     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Long term risk sharing contracts as an approach to establish public–private partnerships for investment into next generation access networks

This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.     

A study on the deployment of high-speed broadband networks in NUTS3 regions within the framework of digital agenda for Europe

This paper investigates the high-speed broadband situation in the EU and its prospects. It uses a deployment model to estimate the investment required to meet the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) broadband targets set by the European Commission in its Europe 2020 strategy at different stages: as of 2016, after expected operators’ deployment, after public subsidies and leveraged investment, and as expected in 2020. The model uses data at the NUTS3 level, which is the most granular level that has data available on the status of broadband deployment, to arrive at a coherent and comparable framework. From the different perspectives on the investment to meet DAE targets, the paper concludes on the need for an appropriate combination of incumbent and alternative operators investments, public subsidies and leveraged investments, and new investments, both public and private and non-existing as of 2016, examining their feasibility and the impact of different regulatory, technical, and policy strategies.     

Improving the FTTH business case–A joint telco-utility network rollout model

Fiber to the home networks are seen as the most future proof technology to offer increasing bandwidth to customers. The publication of the Digital Agenda has put forward challenging goals for the broadband connectivity in Europe, but the rollout of next generation fixed access networks is still lagging. One of the reasons is the high initial investment cost associated with the rollout of these networks. To decrease this cost, a cooperation model between utility operators during the deployment phase is proposed in this paper. A model has been developed, in order to optimize the position of the different infrastructures in the trench and to allow for a fair allocation of the different costs incurred between all cooperating parties. The combination of these models has shown that a synergetic deployment phase of new infrastructures, both in Greenfield and Brownfield installations, can decrease the deployment costs for fiber infrastructure up to 21%.     

The option to expand to a next generation access network infrastructure and the role of regulation in a discrete time setting: A real options approach

Serious concerns have been raised, especially across Europe, about the role of regulation in network infrastructure investments. More specifically, the installation of optical fiber closer to customer premises, the so-called next generation access networks, requires massive investments in the face of demand and regulatory uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether specific regulatory scenarios (permanent regulation, regulatory forbearance, regulatory holidays and sunset clauses) alter the timing of the investment decision of an incumbent to expand to a new network infrastructure exploiting the binomial lattice approach from real options analysis.     

A unified framework for open access regulation of telecommunications infrastructure: Review of the economic literature and policy guidelines

The concept of open access (OA) plays a central role in the ongoing academic and political debate on the appropriate regulatory framework for next-generation access networks in Europe. However, clear policy conclusions on the effect of OA regulation were usually precluded by a fundamental lack in common understanding what actually defines an OA policy and along which dimensions of OA regulation can be structured. This paper attempts to reconcile these diverse views by offering a definition and a conceptual framework by which OA endeavors can be identified and uniquely classified. The framework encompasses, among others, mandated OA regulation of vertically integrated firms, public-sector participation, co-investments, and OA in the context of vertical separation. Along this framework, the extant economic literature is surveyed with regard to aspects of competition and social welfare, investment and innovation, as well as practical and legal issues. Based on these insights, a policy guideline is developed that shall assist policy makers in identifying the appropriate OA scenario for the regulation of telecommunications infrastructure.     

Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements With Interdependent Demands

Strategic substitutes and complements have become standard tools of analysis in industrial organization. Bulow et al. (1985) original model which introduced these concepts focused on multimarket oligopoly. Building upon that model, this paper shows that there becomes not one but two strategic interaction terms if the demands between markets is interdependent and the firms compete in prices. This new model is applied to the telecommunications industry, where the local exchange carriers face competition from competitive access providers. The theoretical model shows the critical variables in the local exchange carriers' strategic pricing decision.     

The ladder of investment in Europe,in retrospect and prospect

The ladder of investment was adopted by many European (and other) regulators in the era of copper networks as a means of implementing unbundling in a way which progressively promotes competitive providers׳ infrastructure investment in fixed networks. The paper reviews the evidence of its application and effects, in comparison with the most likely alternative, argues that it probably conferred benefits. In the more recent era of transition to fibre in Europe, regulatory priorities have shifted towards promoting roll-out. Two broad approaches are identified; one continues the focus on a programme of infrastructure competition in taking fibre to the home; another, relying on fibre to the cabinet, reverses it with bitstream used as the access product. It is soon to evaluate the two approaches.     

Promoting effective competition through interconnection policy

Incumbent telephone companies argue for reliance on voluntary negotiations to determine the terms of interconnection, or alternatively for regulated access prices equal to those that an incumbent would accept voluntarily. Such prices are justified as necessary to prevent inefficient entry, based on an economic theory called the ‘parity principle’. This paper shows that the parity principle is largely inappropriate for setting interconnection prices in most current contexts, and that the claimed efficiency properties of the rule are often based on flawed, static analyses. Under dynamic considerations the parity principle can threaten the development of effective competition. The authors analyse examples where the parity principle has been advocated in the United States and New Zealand, explaining that interconnection charges are best set by legal or regulatory authority based on the costs of providing network access.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

The deployment and penetration of high-speed fiber networks and services: Why are EU member states lagging behind?

One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging next-generation access (NGA) infrastructure should be subjected to cost-based access regulation or whether at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) should be granted. Likewise, the role of NGA-specific state aid policies is increasingly capturing the attention of policy makers and the academic literature.     

Fibre-to-the-home,high-speed and national broadband plans: Tales from Down Under

In recent years governments in many countries have acknowledged the higher complexity involved in finding the more efficient path towards a so-called broadband ecosystem. As the first decade of the twenty first century was ending, the governments of Australia and New Zealand committed to the construction of high-speed, fibre-optics next-generation access networks. This paper is about the approach followed by Australia and New Zealand to developing broadband infrastructure, the means deployed to build the network, and policy and market issues. The paper critically analyses the short history of each experience, including the political process, the reasons exhibited to justify the governments' involvement in infrastructure deployment, and the institutional arrangements introduced to manage the participation of private partners. The paper proposes a framework for analysis and uses its elements to critically analyse policy and regulatory decisions affecting the deployment rate and goals set by Australian and New Zealand government for their respective fibre-based next-generation platforms. The framework is used to draw comparisons between the two country cases and in so doing allowing the appreciation of commonalities and differences in the development and expectations for the future of telecommunications markets in the region.     

Local competition for telephone services

A policy discussion and overview of the development and scope of local exchange competition in U.S. Telecommunications markets is presented. The primary focus is on access and cable competition. In the future, we will see policies which encourage cable to enter telephone services, telephone companies to develop a video dialtone, and transportation networks which allow interexchange carriers to bypass the access charges of the local network. Regulatory policy needs to manage these competitive changes so that there is parity between the various service providers.     

Public and private intervention for next-generation access deployment: Possibilities for three European countries

How next-generation access (NGA) deployment can be encouraged is a challenge that many countries are facing, and one that has been widely and actively discussed around the globe. This discussion has highlighted a dilemma that ultimately shapes investment—how to encourage the widespread deployment of NGA while enabling operators to achieve reasonable returns. This paper focuses on the tensions that arise as a consequence of this investment challenge in three countries – the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) – and uses the analysis of extensive data collection with k7ey actors to argue the case for the injection of public or private incentives. The paper finds that markets with competitive infrastructure will not benefit from public investment while markets with geographical constraints are in need of public support. The paper also explains that regulatory intervention is necessary in the early stage of NGA roll-out, even in currently competitive markets. In all the discussions it becomes evident that, among the three cases, the UK is most in need of public intervention.