Favor prevalence in emerging markets: A multi-level analysis

Favors are a medium of exchange for social capital. Social capital creates social, political, and economic benefits for individuals, organizations, communities, and societies around the world. Favors promote cooperation between individuals and are used to bond individual actors with other individuals, groups, communities, and institutions. Favors are prevalent in business in emerging markets because of the presence of institutional voids, limited social and geographic mobility, and strong reciprocity norms. Favors create benefits and liabilities for business organizations and their networks. They produce outcomes beyond the favor exchange process that can be characterized as productive or perverse. Despite their prevalence and importance, favors and their dynamics are not well understood. We explore the antecedents, content, process, and consequences of favors. We conclude our multi-level analysis of favors with a discussion of the “breakeven” point for favors—the point where favors tip from having a positive effect to having a negative effect on organization performance. We present an integrated framework to explain the dynamics of favors in emerging market business contexts, and develop propositions to guide future research.     

Housing Finance in a Stochastic Economy: Contract Pricing and Choice

An empirical analysis of macroeconomic time series from the mortgage, housing, capital and labor markets is based on life-cycle consumption and mortgage option pricing considerations. Vector autoregression techniques characterize the long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics of the mortgage market as it relates to the other sectoral markets. A simultaneous-equations model characterizes the partial equilibrium in the differentiated products market for fixed- and adjustablerate mortgage contracts. The empirical results reveal the impacts that market conditions have on mortgage volumes and prices, and they generally support the implications of the consumption and pricing theories.     

The Structure of Hiring Costs in Germany: Evidence from Firm‐Level Data

This paper analyzes the structure of hiring costs of skilled workers in Germany. Using detailed and representative firm‐level data on recruitment and adaptation costs of new hires, we find that average hiring costs amount to more than 8 weeks of wage payments (€4700). The structure of hiring costs is convex, as an increase in the number of hires by 1 percent increases hiring costs by 1.3 percent. We find moderate effects of labor market institutions on the magnitude but none on the structure of hiring costs. Furthermore, we provide evidence in favor of monopsony power in the German labor market.     

Getting a Good Job: Mobility in a Segmented Labor Market

This study examines the process by which men in three ethnic neighborhoods of Boston move from secondary to primary employment in a segmented labor market. Workers who successfully make this transition belong to neighborhood-based social groups that have customary linkages to particular primary jobs. Members of such groups costlessly learn how to perceive and act in the labor market in ways that faciliate their entry into the primary sector. Workers' labor market perceptions reflect objective characteristics of the primary jobs to which their social groups are linked.     

Hierarchical Careers

A model of hierarchical careers that integrates the career concerns of workers and the production concerns of firms is presented. The model generates standard supply side age earnings profiles. It also explains intermittent career events such as promotions, quits, layoffs, lateral mobility, and early retirement. The model is also able to explain several labor market institutions such as fast track jobs, up or out rules, internal labor markets, primary and secondary jobs, and insider/outsider labor markets.     

Workers' Views of the Impact of Trade on Jobs

This article uses new data to examine how workers' perceptions of the impact of trade on jobs like theirs are related to economic variables representing their career paths, job characteristics, and local labor market conditions. We find that only 17 percent of workers think trade creates jobs. And even fewer workers (4–7 percent) in any industry think trade has created better jobs. We find that workers' perceptions do not reflect their job characteristics or the movability of their jobs. Their perceptions of trade primarily reflect local labor market conditions (hiring and separation rates) and education. The determinants of workers' perceptions of trade present a different pattern compared with their perceptions of job security.     

Gender Sorting at the Application Interface

We document gender sorting of candidates into gender‐typed jobs at the point of initial application to a company. At this step of the hiring process, the firm has implemented a policy whereby organizational screeners’ discretion has been eliminated such that there is no opportunity for contact between hiring agents and applicants. Thus, the job choices studied here offer unique insight as they are uncontaminated by screeners’ steering of candidates toward gender‐typed jobs. Even in the absence of steering, we find clear patterns of gendered job choices that line up with gender stereotypes of job roles. Moreover, these gendered patterns recur both within individuals and within race groups. Comparing our findings to the pattern of job sorting in the external local labor market, we find that supply‐side factors do not fully account for the levels job sex segregation observed in the open labor market. Although probably not the entire story, we show clear evidence that supply‐side sorting processes are important factors contributing to job sex segregation.     

The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of trading favors

Trading favors is a pervasive business practice, especially in emerging economies. To date, a range of theories has been utilized to explore trading favors, but most extant studies focus especially on negative aspects of favors (e.g., corruption and bribery). We adopt transaction cost economics (TCE) to analyze systematically trading favors as an economizing practice serving efficiency purposes. From the TCE perspective, trading favors is a component of the relational contracting portion of transaction governance, and contributes to economizing on bounded rationality and bounded reliability. We hypothesize that trading favors will be more prevalent in (1) macro-contexts characterized by a vacuum of formal institutions as well as by excessive formal rules; (2) cultural contexts where in-group membership is highly valued; (3) high bounded rationality/low bounded reliability contexts where frequent opportunities exist for indirect reciprocity; and (4) cases whereby no asset-specific investment(s) in innovation need to be made by the supplier of the favor. Enforcement mechanisms such as in-group sanctions, access to formal contracting as a complement to favors, possibility of image scoring and incentive compatibility can function as critical components of the trading favors practice. We suggest a classification of favor trading practices based on their link to formal contracting and rate of recurrence, and describe a range of likely impacts.     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

The Changing Spatial Relationship Between Residences and Worksites in the New York Metropolitan Region: Implications for Public Policy

In recent decades, most new metropolitan population and job growth has occurred in the suburbs. Conventional wisdom suggests that because of the selective nature of suburban labor market development, most metropolitan workers currently live further from their jobs. Distance, in turn, fragments urban labor markets and creates physical and informational barriers to employment.
This article examines the selective pattern of central city-suburban labor market development within the New York Metropolitan Region between 1960 and 1975 and analyzes the extent to which worker residences have adapted to spatial shifts in employment.     

Buyer power with atomistic upstream entry: Can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare?

This paper investigates the effects of buyer power on entry into an atomistic upstream market and economic welfare. Under reasonable market conditions, we show that industries with a few buyers induce more upstream entry than industries with a larger number of firms. In particular, monopsony can be more conducive to entry and lead to higher social welfare than more fragmented industry structures. This seeming paradox arises because a single buyer better internalizes the positive effects of entry on later-periods’ supply conditions than a collection of firms. This result is relevant in a number of market settings, including markets for specialized labor and processing markets for agricultural products.     

Local Energy Markets*

In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth-telling behavior and restores first-best welfare.     

The economics of networks

I analyze the salient features of networks and point out the similarities between the economic structure of networks and the structure of vertically related industries. The analysis focuses on positive consumption and production externalities, commonly called network externalities. I discuss their sources and their effects on pricing and market structure. I distinguish between results that do not depend on the underlying industry microstructure (the ‘macro’ approach) and those that do (the ‘micro’ approach). I analyze the issues of compatibility, coordination to technical standards, interconnection and interoperability, and their effects on pricing and quality of services and on the value of network links in various ownership structures. I also briefly discuss the issue of interconnection fees for bottleneck facilities.     

Corporate sexual equality and firm performance

Research summary: Previous studies have mixed findings on the relation between corporate socially responsible policies and firm performance. This paper focuses on a specific type of corporate social responsibility—corporate sexual equality, measuring how a firm treats its lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees, consumers, and investors—and examines whether and how it relates to firm performance. Using a longitudinal dataset of public firms in the U.S. during the period of 2002–2006, we demonstrate that firms with a higher degree of corporate sexual equality have higher stock returns and higher market valuation. We also identify one of the mediating channels, the labor market channel, that brings higher productivity to firms that embrace sexual equality. Managerial summary: Corporate sexual equality measures how a company treats its lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees, consumers, and investors. It is an important dimension of corporate social responsibility policies and diversity management. Using a longitudinal dataset of public firms in the U.S. during the period of 2002–2006, we demonstrate that firms with a higher degree of corporate sexual equality have higher stock returns, higher market valuation, and higher labor productivity. Our findings suggest that discriminatory hiring behaviors based on sexual orientation hurt employers and shareholders financially and that implementing corporate sexual equality policies can enhance firms' financial performance, generating competitive advantages in labor markets and mutual benefits between employers and employees. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

University – industry collaboration in R&D: the role of labor market rigidity

We investigate how R&D university – industry collaboration (R&D UIC) is influenced by labor market rigidity. While it is well-established that an educated and skilled workforce will facilitate R&D UIC, another aspect of these alliances has been under-researched: the role of labor market rigidity, in particular the difficulties employers face in hiring and firing workers. We hypothesize that the size of the R&D labor pool in a country will encourage R&D UIC, and that the ease with which employers are legally allowed to hire and fire will directly and indirectly influence R&D UIC. Integrating data from various sources, we test our model on a sample of 73 countries for which information on the size of the R&D labor pool and labor market regulations are available. We also conduct a robustness test using a different proxy for R&D labor pool on a larger sample of 109 countries. Results confirm the strong link between a country's R&D labor pool and R&D UIC, as well as direct negative impacts of hiring and firing rigidity and an indirect negative impact of hiring rigidity. The findings have implications for managers, policy makers, and researchers of R&D collaboration between universities and industry.     

企业内部市场定价:基于行为的理论模型

本文从行为的视角探讨内部市场定价问题。根据内部市场主体之间的合作、竞争行为提出并界定了内部市场结构的概念，将内部市场划分为简单型、合作主导型、竞争主导型、复合型四种结构类型；通过分析企业战略、内部定价对内部市场主体之间合作、竞争行为的影响，得出了企业战略决定内部市场结构应然、内部定价调节内部市场结构实然的结论：以内部市场结构的实然与应然相一致为原则．构建了企业内部市场定价的理论模型，阐述了在各种内部市场结构应然要求下的内部定价方法、决策权安排、绩效考核标准和激励机制等。     

Spatial Price Discrimination in Input Markets with an Endogenous Market Boundary

This paper examines the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination in a vertically related market with one upstream monopolist that sells its input to a continuum of downstream markets. Assume that the market boundary of the monopolist is endogenously determined. It is found that social welfare is necessarily lower under discriminatory than uniform pricing, even if the market area of the former is greater than that of the latter. This finding is contrary to that in the extant literature on price discrimination in final goods markets.     

Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks

A new class of access pricing problems is analyzed in which upstream firms compete for customers and access to these customers is required by downstream markets. Using fixed–to–cellular calls as an example, a model is presented which shows that the determination of cellular termination charges is quite different to standard access pricing problems. Competition between cellular firms leads to access prices being set either at, or above, the monopoly level. Applications are given for other market settings, including the termination of long–distance calls on competing local exchange networks and the setting of interchange fees in payment systems.     

The information paradox in a monopolist’s credence goods market

Credence good markets, such as those for car repairs and medical treatments, are generally characterized by an ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry between the uninformed customers and the informed expert. In this paper, we allow for both uninformed as well as informed customers to exist in a monopolist credence goods market. We analyze the implications of this kind of informational heterogeneity for the expert’s pricing decisions, incentives to commit fraud, as well as market efficiency and social welfare under different institutional arrangements. Most importantly, our approach enables us to evaluate endeavours to improve the level of customers’ information. Contrary to basic intuition, we find that recent developments and policy measures originally aimed at improving social welfare by increasing the level of information might actually backfire.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.