The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty

Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust‐based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta‐analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust‐based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta‐analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low‐to‐moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust‐based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust‐based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of uncertainty and asset co‐specialization on governance in biotechnology alliances

We explore transaction cost economics (TCE) and real option (RO) rationales for alliance governance and find the predictive power of each depends upon the type of uncertainty confronted. Our review of alliance activity from 1995 through 2000 for 642 alliances confirms that governance is influenced directly by partner, task, and technological uncertainty and by interactions among asset co‐specialization, partner uncertainty, and task uncertainty. Consistent with TCE, co‐specialized assets increased the likelihood of hierarchical governance. Partner and task uncertainty increased this effect. Consistent with RO, we find technological uncertainty decreased the likelihood of hierarchical governance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to manage strategic alliances in OEM-based industrial clusters: Network embeddedness and formal governance mechanisms

The rapidly growing original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-based industrial clusters have been a prominent form of economic organization in several emerging Asian markets. Characterized by close interdependence and intertwined personal linkages, firms of Asian OEM-based industrial clusters participate in the phenomenon of strategic alliances. However, how these alliances can be effectively managed through formal governance mechanisms within embedded networks requires further investigation. This study uses social network analysis to identify personal, ownership, and technology networks in 141 semiconductor firms in an OEM-based industrial cluster in Taiwan that feature different types of OEM-led alliances and the prevalence of Guanxi. We find that relational embeddedness based on personal ties and structural embeddedness based on ownership ties support the employment of formal governance mechanisms. We also pay particular attention to the moderating role of network embeddedness in diminishing the relationship between transaction hazards and formal governance mechanisms. By identifying the embeddedness context in the governance of alliances, our research contributes to a better understanding of the ways in which formal governance mechanisms are contingent on the network embeddedness of OEM-based industrial clusters in Taiwan and other similar Asian economies.     

Formal governance mechanisms, relational governance mechanisms, and transaction-specific investments in supplier-manufacturer relationships

This study addresses the question of how to design governance mechanisms so that local suppliers are encouraged to make transaction-specific investments in foreign manufacturing firms. Suppliers' transaction-specific investments can increase the efficiency of production for foreign manufacturing firms operating in a host country. However, it can be difficult to induce suppliers to make specialized investments, because of the numerous hazards associated with such investments. Basing its conclusions on the results of a survey of Taiwanese firms using Chinese suppliers, this study examines the effectiveness of both formal governance mechanisms (i.e., contractual agreements and financial commitments) and relational governance mechanisms (i.e., calculative and benevolent trust) in inducing suppliers to make specialized investments. We find that both formal governance and relational governance mechanisms affect suppliers' tendencies to make specialized investments. Additionally, we find that calculative trust acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between formal governance mechanisms and transaction-specific investments.     

Does peripheral knowledge complement control? An empirical test in technology outsourcing alliances

While the normative logic for forming technology outsourcing alliances is that such alliances allow outsourcing firms to specialize deeper in their domain of core competence without being distracted by noncore activities, recent empirical studies have reported the puzzling phenomenon of some firms continuing to invest in R&D in domains that are fully outsourced to specialized alliance partners. An underlying—and widely made—assertion that can potentially reconcile this contradiction is that ‘peripheral’ knowledge (specialized knowledge in the domain of outsourced activities) complements control in technology outsourcing alliances. However, this assertion is untested; and empirically testing it is the objective of this research study. Using data from 59 software services outsourcing alliances, we show that such peripheral knowledge and alliance control are imperfect complements: peripheral knowledge complements outcomes‐based formal control but not process‐based control. Thus, outsourcing firms might sometimes need knowledge outside their core domain because such knowledge facilitates effective alliance governance. Our theoretical elaboration and empirical testing of the assumed complementarities between peripheral knowledge and control in technology outsourcing alliances has significant implications for strategy theory and practice, which are also discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product innovation through coopetition in alliances: Singular or plural governance?

This study researches how firms can improve their product innovation in coopetition alliances through alliance governance. Our survey-based study of 372 vertical alliances in the medical device industry contributes to a clarification of prior studies' contrasting findings on product innovation when coopetition is present in alliances. Our results show that the singular use of relational governance improves product innovativeness in vertical alliances that experience growing levels of coopetition. In contrast, the singular use of transactional governance reduces product innovativeness with growing coopetition. When firms apply both relational and transactional governance as plural governance, vertical coopetition alliances get access to new ways to improve their product innovativeness.     

Organizational differences,relational mechanisms,and alliance performance

In studying the antecedents of alliance performance, one stream of research has underscored the alignment between partners' characteristics whereas another has concentrated on relational mechanisms such as mutual trust, relational embeddedness, and relational commitment. We integrate these two perspectives by examining how congruence of the partners' cultures and organizational routines facilitates the emergence of relational mechanisms in non‐equity alliances. Our analysis of 420 non‐equity alliances in the information technology industry demonstrates how differences in partners' internal task routines undermine relational mechanisms that in turn impact alliance performance. Partners who acknowledge their latent differences can overcome some of these negative consequences. We advance alliance research by studying the performance implications of alliance partners' organizational differences and by demonstrating how these effects are mediated by relational mechanisms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparing the resource‐based and relational views: knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances

We compare resource‐based and relational perspectives to examine competitive advantages within the context of vertical learning alliances. Previous research has shown that through such alliances suppliers acquire knowledge to forge new capabilities and attain performance improvements. We ask whether such improvements are exclusive to the learning partnership, or are available in other average partnerships of this supplier. We posit that the extent to which such performance improvements are partnership exclusive depends on whether the newly forged capabilities lie entirely within the supplier firm's boundaries, or at the learning dyad level. As such, we untie two forms of performance improvements arising from learning dyads. While the resource‐based view helps explain the performance gains learning suppliers deploy across average partners, the relational view reveals the additional performance edge that remains exclusive to the learning partnership. Based on empirical evidence from a survey of 253 suppliers to the equipment industry, we find that partnership exclusive performance (i.e., ‘relational performance’), the true source of learning dyads' competitive advantage, is a function of suppliers acquiring know‐how within the dyad, developing dyad‐specific assets and capabilities, and structuring buyer‐supplier relational governance mechanisms. We discuss implications for research and practice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Achieving relational governance effectiveness: An examination of B2B management practices in Taiwan

This study examines the antecedents of relational governance effectiveness in a country context where the prevalence of Confucian values is expected to create a culturally ingrained preference for relational governance. We also explore whether different management practices are better predictors of relational governance effectiveness under different collaborative inter-firm relationship configurations. Results from an analysis of 182 alliance relationships in Taiwan, a dynamic newly developed economy, reveal that, generally, demonstrating trustworthiness, establishing just and fair procedures, and building effective platforms for connectivity are management practices that are good predictors of relational governance effectiveness. The multi-group analysis provided more nuanced insights. The findings suggest that different inter-firm relationship configurations require different subsets of management practices. Building effective platforms for connectivity is a strong predictor of relational governance effectiveness in equity-based alliances with foreign partners. In equity-based alliances with domestic partners, establishing fair and just procedures is emphasized. In contractual alliances with foreign partners, ensuring contractual clarity and building effective platforms for connectivity are found to be facilitators of relational governance effectiveness. Last, contractual alliances with domestic partners seem to rely on a portfolio of management practices encompassing demonstrating trustworthiness, establishing just and fair procedures, and building effective platforms for connectivity.     

Alliance portfolio diversity and firm performance

In this paper, we offer a comprehensive alliance portfolio diversity construct that includes partner, functional, and governance diversity. Grounding our work primarily with the resource‐ and dynamic capabilities‐based views, we argue that increased diversity in partners' industry, organizational, and national background will incur added complexity and coordination costs but will provide broadened resource and learning benefits. Increased functional diversity results in a more balanced portfolio of exploration and exploitation activities that expands the firm's knowledge base while increased governance diversity inhibits learning and routine building. Hypotheses were tested with alliance portfolio and performance data for 138 multinational firms in the global automobile industry during the twenty‐year period from 1985 to 2005. We found alliance portfolios with greater organizational and functional diversity and lower governance diversity were related to higher firm performance while industry diversity had a U‐shaped relationship with firm performance. We suggest firms manage their alliances with a portfolio perspective, seeking to maximize resource and learning benefits by collaborating with a variety of organizations in various value chain activities while minimizing managerial costs through a focused set of governance structures. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social power as an antecedence of governance in buyer-supplier alliances

Buyer-supplier alliances require certain governance mechanisms to be successfully controlled and coordinated. However, relatively little is known about how power differentials between the actors affect the applicability of those governance mechanisms. This paper follows the assumption that different sources of social power among firms directly influence the governance mechanisms and indirectly their performance. Our study utilizes a sample of 250 European firms to test the influence of four social power sources on three different governance mechanisms. We find different influences of social power on certain governance mechanisms. Suppliers' perception of buyers' coercive power leads to stronger contractual governance and stronger buyer directives but reduces the use of relational norms. Reward power only relates to contractual governance. Expert power steers towards buyer directives and relational norms. Referent power stimulates the development of relational norms. A cluster analysis of power types provides additional insights and enriches our managerial implications.     

Governing collaborative activity: interdependence and the impact of coordination and exploration

We examine the performance implications of selecting alternate modes of governance in interorganizational alliance relationships. While managers can choose from a range of modes to govern alliances, prior empirical evidence offers limited guidance on the performance impact of this choice. We use an agent‐based simulation of interfirm decision making to complement empirical studies in this area. Our results point to a complex interplay between interdependencies, governance structures, and firms' search capabilities. Different patterns of interdependence create varying needs with respect to coordination and exploration, while at the same time different governance modes, coupled with organizational search capabilities, supply varying degrees of these factors. Firm performance in an alliance relationship improves when the needs and supplies of coordination and exploration are matched. We find situations in which stronger organizational search capabilities can backfire, leading to lower exploration within the alliance relationship, and hence to lower firm performance. Moreover, we show that for higher levels of interdependence, coordination can become more critical for firm performance than exploration: unless it is tied to coordination, exploration can be ineffective in alliance settings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Network governance: A cross-level study of social mechanisms,knowledge benefits,and strategic outcomes in joint-design alliances

Drawing on multiple-level embedded case study research of eight dyadic joint-design alliances and 14 collaborative ventures within them, this study sheds light on how value, in the form of common and private benefits, is created in interorganizational relationships. To do so, I focus on network governance (i.e., interorganizational coordination based on social networks) and its outcomes. As a result, I advance a cross-level model of how a system of reciprocally influencing network-level (i.e., structural) and dyad-level (i.e., relational) social mechanisms affects the propensity of allied organizations to engage in knowledge-intensive activities that yield considerable knowledge-based benefits and strategic outcomes at the alliance and firm levels. I conclude that simultaneous consideration of structural and relational embeddedness can enrich our understanding of network-based forms of organization and their impact on the outcomes of interorganizational cooperation. Although the system of social mechanisms needs to be understood as an interconnected whole, practicing alliance managers are advised to leverage different social mechanisms depending on the specific knowledge benefits they intend to achieve.     

Strategic alliance contracts: dimensions and determinants of contractual complexity

In contrast to prior studies examining strategic alliances as discrete governance structures (e.g., alliances vs. M&A, equity vs. non‐equity agreements), we investigate their particular contractual features. The analysis examines the dimensionality of the contractual complexity construct and investigates the determinants of firms' adoption of various contractual provisions. We find two underlying dimensions of contractual complexity, based upon the enforcement and coordination functions of different contractual provisions. The evidence reveals that firms' usage of particular contractual provisions is a function of asset specificity as well as whether the alliance's duration is pre‐specified or open‐ended. The findings also speak to the debate surrounding the roles of prior ties and trust for alliance governance. Firms that have collaborated with each other in the past are not less likely to negotiate enforcement provisions; rather, repeat collaborators are less likely to adopt contractual provisions that are informational in nature and are geared to the coordination of the alliance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mitigating the Challenges of Partner Knowledge Diversity While Enhancing Research & Development (R&D) Alliance Performance: The Role of Alliance Governance Mechanisms

This article explores the answers to the following unresolved research question: How do firms mitigate the collaboration challenges associated with partner knowledge diversity and enhance alliance performance? The study provides an alliance performance enhancing framework by identifying two types of partner knowledge diversity: (1) technology base diversity and (2) R&D process experience diversity, and links them with R&D alliance performance. Additionally, the moderating effects of the two types of alliance governance mechanisms (i.e., interactive and contractual mechanisms) were examined to investigate which alliance governance mechanism is conducive to mitigate the collaboration challenges and enhance alliance performance. Using a data set of 316 alliances in the biopharmaceuticals industry, the study found that a moderate degree (not too low or high) of technology base diversity between alliance partners contributes more to R&D alliance performance. Similarly, there was also an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D process experience diversity and alliance performance; too much diversity in R&D process experience may increase the likelihood of partner opportunism, and therefore negatively affect alliance performance. Additionally, the results showed that alliance governance mechanisms played different roles in alliance collaboration; while the contractual alliance mechanisms help reduce relational uncertainty (e.g., opportunism), the interactive mechanisms promoting a more intensive interaction between partners mitigates task difficulty and facilitates complex technology activities. These findings extend the knowledge-based view (KBV) of strategic alliance and advance research on alliance governance design.     

The legitimacy of strategic alliances: an institutional perspective

Drawing on an institutional perspective, this paper suggests that strategic alliances serve an important legitimating function for firms and that this role, mediated by alliance governance structure and partner selection preferences, has a significant influence on firm and alliance performance. A theoretical framework is proposed that identifies five types of legitimacy associated with strategic alliances and the specific conditions under which legitimation may be an important outcome of strategic alliances. Propositions are developed to explain when firms are most likely to enter into alliances for legitimacy purposes and how the legitimating role of strategic alliances contributes to firm and alliance performance. The paper concludes with a summary and implications of a legitimacy‐based view of alliances. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowledge sharing and safeguarding in R&D collaborations: The role of steering committees in biotechnology alliances

Research Summary: This research contributes to alliance governance research by demonstrating how partners' administrative controls in nonequity collaborations regulate knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board‐like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. We illuminate governing committees as an important, albeit neglected, instrument for administrative control in the governance of non‐equity alliances, and we demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior. This study extends alliance governance research beyond the implications of the equity‐nonequity dichotomy to consider a wider and richer gamut of governance instruments available to address the challenges associated with knowledge transfers in alliances. Managerial Summary: Non‐equity alliances are important vehicles to collaborate with external partners, particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry and other high‐tech sectors. To guide these collaborations effectively, partners can use the contract to custom‐build jointly‐staffed managerial units with clearly demarcated decision‐making responsibilities. We demonstrate that these organizational mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that governing committees also safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a partner values a firm's knowledge highly, or it possesses the required ability to absorb and assimilate a firm's knowledge. Our results imply that contractually‐defined managerial interfaces provide a channel to regulate knowledge‐sharing in collaborative alliances.     

Does technological modularity substitute for control? A study of alliance performance in software outsourcing

Although control is presumed to be necessary to curb opportunism, its implementation in alliances can be costly and challenging. Paradoxically, some contemporary firms have counterintuitively developed successful alliances without extensive formal control. A widespread but untested assertion that might help reconcile this contradiction is that technological modularity reduces the need for alliance control. The objective of this study is to develop and test this assertion. Using data from 120 software outsourcing alliances, we show that, process control, outcome control, and modularity independently enhance alliance performance. However modularity and control are imperfect substitutes: modularity lowers the influence of process control but not of outcome control on alliance performance. Our theoretical development and empirical testing of the interactions of alliance control with modularity has significant implications for strategy theory and practice, which are also discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.