基于交易成本分析的建设交易制度创新研究

借鉴已有的经济学研究成果,主要以交易成本经济学理论为分析工具,从交易规则和交易方式两个角度对建设交易制度的交易成本构成和产生机制进行了分析,最终的目的是达到交易成本的节约。在此基础上,提出了建设交易制度的创新思路：即完善建设法规;促进工程保险和工程担保制度的发展;建立有效的建筑市场准入制度和质量体系认证制度;选择或设计科学、合理的交易方式;科学设计或安排交易合同等。     

国际贸易中的交易成本：一个文献综述

传统贸易理论所讨论的形成比较优势的成本,主要为生产成本。但是,在现实国际贸易活动中,交易成本在塑造一国比较优势时也发挥着重要作用。通过回顾国际贸易中的交易成本及其与生产成本和贸易成本的关系、国际贸易中的交易成本的影响因素及其度量、引入交易成本分析的国际贸易变化之相关文献,指出：现有文献未严格区分＂贸易成本＂和＂交易成本＂,迄今为止新制度经济学中对交易成本的测度与贸易理论中基于引力模型的贸易成本测度还缺乏必要的沟通和融合。     

产业规制的宏观交易成本分析

产业规制作为政府经济性规制的一种手段,包含着极其丰富的内容。本文针对以自然垄断理论为基础的政府产业规制行为,在概要评说产业经济学关于自然垄断之于产业规制的有关论述的基础上,认为产业规制会引致宏观层面上的厂商和消费者的交易成本。论文依据厂商是直接还是间接受产业规制影响的事实,将厂商划分为两大集群;认为这两大集群厂商与消费者集群一起共同承担着由产业规制引致的交易成本,并在此基础上对这种交易成本的宏观表现形式及其效应进行了分析。本文的主旨在于说明政府产业规制行为导致宏观交易成本这种现象的客观存在。     

造价工程师执业资格考试点评（三）

第五章工程合同价款管理（一）考试要点评析1、工程合同的类型及其选择（1）工程合同的类型。根据《建设工程施工合同（示范文本）》（GF-2013—0201）的规定,合同价格形式可分为单价合同、总价合同及合同当事人约定的其他合同价格形式。实行清单计价的工程项目应当采用单价合同。     

工程计量对合同状态的动态补偿机理研究

基于工程计量将合同状态变化分为工程变更、工程量清单缺项、工程量偏差三种类型，在此基础上，针对不同合同状态变化类型，分析得出工程计量对合同状态的动态补偿机理，最终确定基于工程计量的合同状态变化补偿数值。     

造价工程师执业资格考试点评（三）

（一）考试要点评析1、工程合同的类型及其选择（1）工程合同的类型。《建设工程施工合同（示范文本）》（GF-1999—0201）将工程合同价分为：同定合同价、可调合同价、成本加酬金确定的合同价。《建设工程价款结算暂行办法》（财建[2004]369号）文件将建设工程施工合同分为：同定总价合同、固定单价合同、可调价格合同。     

沉淀成本、交易成本与政府管制方式——兼论我国自然垄断行业改革的新方向

通过审视新古典经济学完全竞争和完全可竞争市场理想化模型可知,在市场完全条件下,没有沉淀成本和交易成本,至少可以实现帕累托次优。一旦引入规模经济(自然垄断)、沉淀成本和交易成本概念,并且这些经济变量相互作用,市场很容易失灵,不仅为私人缔约奠定了理论基础,而且还为政府管制提供了正当理由。尤其当政府管制本身遭受交易成本困扰时,就会出现"管制刃锋"问题,所以需要理性地权衡市场竞争、政府对私营企业管制和国有企业"三位一体"格局,正确处理竞争与垄断市场结构、私有与国有治理结构,以及确立政府管制结构的基本原则,对于深化我国自然垄断行业改革具有重大的理论与现实意义。     

合同签订过程中的是非

签订合同过程中的主要问题合同名称的随意使用增加了施工企业的责任。从近几年施工企业对外签订的合同来看,代表企业签约者,主要是项目经理或对外经办人员,在对外采购或租赁合同方面不会存在合同性质上的问题,主要问题出在工程的分包合同上,有的项目叫“施工合同”,有的叫“工程分包合同”,有的叫“劳务合同”,有的干脆叫“合同”或“协议”,等等,参差不齐。殊不知合同的名称直接关系到合同的性质,也是在发生纠纷时,通过诉讼(仲裁)处理时认定责任的承担及合同是否合法的重要依据。如,某施工企业通过投标获得工程后,由于人员、设备、工艺、工…     

浅析建筑施工企业如何加强建设工程施工合同管理

工程合同是施工企业经营管理的重要手段,是工程价款结算的重要依据,因此,建筑施工企业加强工程合同管理就显得尤为重要。本文结合近年来建筑施工企业在合同管理中存在的一些共性问题,通过研究分析指出企业在加强合同管理、依法维护切身权益方面的的对策和建议。     

无效合同该如何结算

一份生效的工程合同具有法律约束力,是合同履行及争议处理的依据,是承包人全过程索赔的基本依据。那么无效合同该如何结算呢?工程合同应具备双方主体合格、工程确定合法、意思表示真实、内容不应违法、符合法定程序等五个要件之后才能生效。如果工程合同不具备该五个条件之一,就会出现合同效力待定、合同可撤销甚至合同无效等法律后果。在工程实践中,问题比较突出的是合同无效     

Behavioral assumptions and theory development: the case of transaction cost economics

From a critical realist perspective, I discuss the role played by behavioral assumptions in organization theories, and use transaction cost economics as an illustrative example. Core behavioral assumptions often constitute the foundation of the mechanismic explanations of a theory, and thus should play a pivotal role in theory development. I distinguish between assumption‐based and assumption‐omitted theory testing, and show that empirical research in transaction cost economics has been dominated by assumption‐omitted testing. To establish a solid foundation for a new theory, management researchers should pay more attention to assumption‐based testing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How capital structure influences diversification performance: A transaction cost perspective

Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of trading favors

Trading favors is a pervasive business practice, especially in emerging economies. To date, a range of theories has been utilized to explore trading favors, but most extant studies focus especially on negative aspects of favors (e.g., corruption and bribery). We adopt transaction cost economics (TCE) to analyze systematically trading favors as an economizing practice serving efficiency purposes. From the TCE perspective, trading favors is a component of the relational contracting portion of transaction governance, and contributes to economizing on bounded rationality and bounded reliability. We hypothesize that trading favors will be more prevalent in (1) macro-contexts characterized by a vacuum of formal institutions as well as by excessive formal rules; (2) cultural contexts where in-group membership is highly valued; (3) high bounded rationality/low bounded reliability contexts where frequent opportunities exist for indirect reciprocity; and (4) cases whereby no asset-specific investment(s) in innovation need to be made by the supplier of the favor. Enforcement mechanisms such as in-group sanctions, access to formal contracting as a complement to favors, possibility of image scoring and incentive compatibility can function as critical components of the trading favors practice. We suggest a classification of favor trading practices based on their link to formal contracting and rate of recurrence, and describe a range of likely impacts.     

The impact of empirical tests of transaction cost economics on the debate on the nature of the firm

Transaction cost economics (TCE), as developed and operationalized by Oliver Williamson, is one of the most prominent and influential developments in the social sciences. In recent years, on the basis of many empirical studies, it has been claimed that the evidence has corroborated TCE. If so, this would have major implications for the debate between TCE and other approaches to understanding the nature of the firm. In this paper we submit the most prominent TCE empirical work to critical scrutiny, on the basis of the standards and predictions in Williamson's own writings. We find a much more mixed picture, with few studies giving unambiguous support to Williamson's TCE. Furthermore, a significant number of the studies can be reinterpreted in terms of a competence or capabilities approach. We conclude that the empirical evidence does not decisively support Williamson's TCE and we stress the importance of an empirical program of joint testing of rival theoretical approaches. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Electronic transportation marketplaces: a transaction cost perspective

Electronic transportation marketplaces (ETMs) are Internet-based mechanisms that match buyers and sellers of transportation services. With claims of reducing the administrative costs of transportation procurement to virtually nothing, the allure of ETMs is considerable. Shippers (transportation buyers) must therefore determine whether to pursue the new-founded opportunity and buy transportation services through an Internet-based intermediary or to buy services in a traditional manner. To date, there has been little structured thought on the topic to guide managers. Transaction cost economics (TCE) provides a robust framework toward this end. The TCE framework is adapted to present the procurement decision as one of “make” versus “buy.” The analysis is designed to help firms navigate their own determination to use an ETM and, when considered, the most appropriate form of ETM. The merits and caveats of ETM adoption are presented in the article.     

Integrating the resource-based view and transaction cost economics in immigrant business performance

This paper presents a new integrated framework that integrates the resource-based view and transaction cost economics to explain the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship. We extend the existing literature on immigrant entrepreneurship by identifying different types of ethnic network resources and demonstrating how these resources interact with transaction costs in the context of Chinese immigrants. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical framework which identifies mechanisms immigrant entrepreneurs use to strategically deploy resources to minimize costs and maximize performance outcomes.     

A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics

Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading perspectives in management and organizational studies, yet debate continues regarding its empirical support. In this paper, we take stock of the large body of extant research and provide a systematic assessment of empirical evidence. In all, 308 statistical tests from 63 articles, selected according to a set of clear criteria, were examined across various dimensions. We assess not only the level of empirical support for the theory, but also the degree of paradigm consensus present in the empirical literature. Our analysis shows that results are mixed: while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance). We conclude that a more thorough empirical grounding of the theory's foundation is crucial to its future development, and offer several strategies for doing this. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trust, power and transaction costs in B2B exchanges — A socio-economic approach

The advent of the Internet has enabled organisations to reconfigure their inter-organisational relationships. This study presents three frameworks to analyse the outcome that the use of Internet based electronic markets has on the nature of inter-organisational relationships: transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and an integrated framework that combines the first two. The integrated framework proposes that the nature of inter-organisational relationships depends on the interaction between the logic of transaction cost economics and the need for trust and interdependencies between exchange parties. A single case study is used to illustrate the way the three frameworks can be applied to analyse the use of electronic markets in inter-organisational exchanges. The study finds that the integrated framework provides a more complete understanding of inter-organisational relationships, and suggests a modular approach to the implementation of electronic marketplaces.     

The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.