双边道德风险条件下的收益激励与信息租金——基于有信息委托人的视角

文章特征化了一个在投资能力方面具有私人信息的委托人,和一个在努力水平上具有私人信息的代理人,在联合生产产品时所面临的双边道德风险问题。为研究结构性信息不对称对收益激励的影响,建立了双边道德风险奈件下的收益激励模型。研究结果表明,在风险中性的委托人和严格风险规避的代理人联合生产产品时,激励努力的次优契约可以达到,只是不能为代理人提供完全的保险;在双边道德风险条件下,隐藏信息不再是有信息的局中人的最优策略,而私人信息的交换与共享可以促成次优转移均衡的实现,这说明和单边的信息不对称造成的单边道德风险相比较,结构性的信息不对称并不一定使得双边道德风险问题更严重。     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.     

经营者激励与业绩评价

现代企业所有权与经营权的分离产生了委托代理关系。委托代理理论认为,只要存在委托代理关系,就要有激励机制。文章分析了激励机制的内涵和作用、激励机制与业绩评价的历史演进,指出激励机制的建立需要业绩评价系统的要素为前提,激励机制的实施和报酬契约的执行需要以业绩评价系统的输出结果为依据。针对我国企业业绩评价与经营者激励存在的种种问题,强调坚持公平公正原则是解决问题的关键。     

不完善激励工资契约、团队成员流动与互助合作：职业声誉关注的角度

团队业绩导向的不完善激励工资契约和团队成员流动的综合作用对团队成员的职业声誉关注、最优激励工资契约和团队成员的互助合作的影响依赖于团队成员的风险规避程度。当团队成员的风险规避程度足够高时,团队成员的职业声誉关注效应受到激发,委托人通过提高对团队成员互助合作的显性激励强度可以有效促进团队成员的互助合作,而且团队成员的最优互助合作努力水平向上扭曲的程度随着团队成员流动的可能性提高而提高。     

风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约的分选决策

基于行为经济学视角,通过现场实验观察了具有异质性偏好的代理人对不同激励合约的选择决策,旨在探讨风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约选择决策的关系.研究发现,在具有相同激励强度的两种可变激励合约下,个体生产力水平并没有显著差异,影响激励合约选择决策的重要因素是对风险的感知,激励合约用于调节不同主体间的主观感知风险配置.结果显示,感知自己是高生产力的代理人倾向于避免与搭便车者合作而带来的损失,而感知自己是低能力的代理人则倾向于选择与高能力者合作的激励合约而增加个体收益;而无论是高能力者还是低能力者,当面对环境的不确定性对收益的巨大扰动时,都不约而同的选择了团队激励合约,这种对合作的偏好会随着扰动的增大而增强.同时,实验进一步证明了,人们对搭便车风险的主观感知与真实的搭便车风险之间存在一定的认知偏差,且该对个人生产力抱持乐观态度的代理人更倾向于选择个体计件激励合约.当企业因面对绩效工具的准确性不高,或绩效结果不确定性较大而不得不采用团队计件时,可以通过调节认知偏差的方式来改变代理人的主观预期,从而强化激励合约的自选择.     

经理人市场隐性激励机制探析

经理人市场隐性激励,是指通过经理人市场竞争与声誉机制,而形成的一种内生于企业经营者的自我驱动性激励。目前,在企业经营者激励问题的研究上,我国理论界对于国企经营者的年薪、奖金、期权、期股等显性激励手段已有较为充分的探讨,而针对激励机制的另一重要方面——通过经理人市场这只无形的手而实现的隐性激励的系统研究却显相对不足。本文将在概述隐性激励理论的基础上,分析经理人市场对我国企业经营者隐性激励的作用现状,并对如何构建合理的经理人市场隐性激励机制进行对策探讨。     

When Do Firms Adjust Bonus Targets Intrayear? Evidence from Sales Executives' Targets*

This study investigates when and why intrayear bonus target revisions occur. This is important as intrayear target revisions occur regularly in practice but are not well understood. Specifically, we analyze two potential drivers of intrayear bonus target revisions: reduced managerial incentives owing to managers dropping out of the incentive zone of their piecewise defined bonus function and potential spillovers from planning target revisions that reflect changes in performance expectations during the year. We also investigate the effects of organizational characteristics on intrayear bonus target revisions. Using data collected from sales executives via multiple waves of surveys, we find evidence for both predicted drivers. In addition, consistent with our predictions, we find that the levels of delegated decision authority, intrafirm interdependencies, and information asymmetry negatively moderate the positive association between reduced managerial incentives and revision likelihood. Our paper contributes to the target setting literature by being the first study to investigate intrayear bonus target revisions and shed light on when firms commit to not revising such targets intrayear.     

企业治理之合约安排视角研究

本文基于合约安排的视角对企业治理进行了研究．主要通过激励合约设计．分析代理人剩余分享系数、努力变量、激励变量、努力成本和激励成本等变量之间的相互关系及其经济意义，从而得出了一些主要的基本结论：第一，委托人设计的激励合约具有一定的状态依存性。第二，委托人的监管效率是合约设计的重要因素，且监管本身具有概率性。第三，委托人要关注边际业绩分享系数的作用，进而必须关注“剩余标的”本身的选择。第四，一旦委托人也对产出做出自己的贡献，代理人的风险中立性就不能保证带来最优的结果。第五，委托人“先行一步”的优势是激励合约效率最大化的重要因素。     

Private Predecision Information,Performance Measure Congruity,and the Value of Delegation*

We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.     

考虑讨价还价和经理能力的有效激励研究

在委托代理理论中,由于委托人与代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化,且他们之间存在着信息不对称、契约不完备等不确定性因素,委托人应对代理人进行有效的激励和引导,使其充分发挥自身的能力,达到企业业绩最优。本文建立了一个动态的经理激励合同设计模型,假设经理在完成第一期任务后,可以与委托人重新谈判,进而对经理的有效激励问题进行了研究。根据计算和分析得出,经理能否得到满意的固定薪酬对经理人的行为选择和企业的长期业绩有重要的影响。     

European Business Fluctuations in the Austrian Framework

The Austrian theory mainly deals with analyzing the effects of an increased credit offer on productive structures. In this respect, we propose to link long-term growth cycles to various short-term interest rate gaps. Are European Business Cycles affected when a fall in the money market rate disrupts agents’ expectations of inflation? Using the hypothesis that individual speculation is motivated by the difference between short-term real interest rates and their natural levels, we argue that Wicksellian interest rate gaps can account for a high proportion of long-term fluctuations in four European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). We present specific dating methods and filters used in order to distinguish between short-term and long-term growth cycles. The Wicksellian incentives we constructed are then significantly linked to long-term business fluctuations. Under the hypothesis of adaptive expectations of inflation, our results are enhanced.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Notes on implicit contracts and the racial unemployment differential

In this article the application of the implicit contract model to black-white inequality is critically evaluated. The discussion revolves around the analysis of Grossman and Trepeta, who view black employment instability as resulting in part from a higher propensity of blacks to renege on implicit contracts. That approach is shown to be theoretically implausible and empirically inconsistent with the data on quit behavior by blacks. As an alternative, a reputational model in which employers have incentives to renege on risk-shifting contracts is discussed.     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

Horizon‐Induced Optimism as a Gateway to Earnings Management

Recent work in accounting suggests that managerial optimism can lead managers to escalate income‐increasing earnings management. In this paper, I examine how a fundamental attribute of the earnings management setting—the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal—serves as one potential source of managerial optimism. I conduct two experiments to test whether the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal systematically induces optimism that increases participants’ propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to accruals‐based earnings management and to real earnings management, holding constant incentives, agency frictions, and the information environment. My results indicate that, independent of their innate optimism, the time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal likely encourages managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current‐period earnings management through strong future performance. This optimism, in turn, likely increases managers’ propensity to engage in both forms of earnings management.     

Volatility behavior of exchange rate future contracts

The increasing globalization of economies and the concurrent increase in the risk of currency exposure has stimulated the development of new instruments to allow both investors and traders to hedge their currency risk. The expansion of these derivatives, however, has raised some concerns. This paper studies the determinants of the dynamics of exchange rate future contracts as a means to identify the sources of such concerns. By using a mean-exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (M-EGARCH) model for five different future contract lengths and six developed economies, it is found that an M-EGARCH(1,1) effectively describes the exchange rate futures' daily dynamic. Sign, size, and persistence effects on the volatility of future contracts are all significant, thus providing important information to both policy makers and market participants.     

市场化进程、企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益

制度环境是影响我国高管薪酬契约发挥激励作用的重要因素,本文以市场化进程为背景,检验企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的关系,并探究市场化进程对上述关系的影响。研究发现：由于我国上市公司高管隐性薪酬契约普遍缺乏有效设计和监督,企业上期绩效与本期高管过度隐性私有收益负相关;随着市场化进程深入,民营企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系显著缓解,并且当民营企业高管权力较大时,市场化进程能够更加有效地抑制企业绩效与高管过度隐性私有收益之间的负相关关系,但是上述关系在国有企业中并未得到有效改善。进一步检验发现,市场化改革促使企业绩效和高管现金薪酬之间的相关性不断提高。本文的研究结果有助于揭示市场力量在提高高管薪酬契约激励有效性时发挥的作用及遇到的困难,为抑制国企高管过度隐性私有收益提供合理建议。     

CEO Hedging Opportunities and the Weighting of Performance Measures in Compensation Contracts

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.     

论房地产中介服务合同的性质与法律适用

司法实践及房地产交易实践中普遍存在的视房地产中介服务合同为居间合同的看法并不妥当。房地产中介服务合同并非合同法规定的有名契约,也非契约联立,而应为居间合同、委托代理合同、委托合同构成的混合契约。房地产中介服务合同在法律适用上应采取类推适用主义,分别类推适用居间合同、委托代理合同及委托合同的相关规则,但类推时应把握当事人缔约目的在于委托房地产中介完成房地产交易活动的意图,以寻求类推适用的和谐,避免类推结果的冲突。