Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n

This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature.     

Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states

We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor's party. In the states with the line‐item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line‐item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.     

WAGNER'S LAW: AN ECONOMETRIC TEST FOR SOUTH AFRICA, 1960‐2006

The main objective for this paper is to test Wagner's law by analysing the causal relationships between real government expenditure and real income for South Africa for the period 1960‐2006. The paper tests the long‐run relationship between the two variables using the autoregressive distributive lag approach to cointegration suggested by Pesaran et al. We use the Granger non‐causality test procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto, which uses a vector autoregression model to test for the causal link between the two. Evidence of cointegration is sufficient to establish a long‐run relationship between government expenditure and income. However, support for Wagner's law would require unidirectional causality from income to government expenditure. Therefore, cointegration should be seen as a necessary condition for Wagner's law, but not sufficient. This research does find a long‐run relationship between real per capita government expenditure and real per capita income. Results for the short‐run causality find bidirectional causality. On the basis of empirical results in this paper, one may tentatively conclude that Wagner's law finds no support in South Africa.     

R&D,financing constraints and export green-sophistication in China

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of R&D and financing constraints on the green-sophistication of Chinese firm exports. The theoretical model predicts that firms' R&D expenditure improves the level of green sophistication and financing constraints have moderating effects on firms' the export green-sophistication. The paper constructs an index of the export green-sophistication by incorporating green coefficient in traditional export sophistication. We use the data from the China industrial firm database and confirm our theoretical predictions. The financing constraints are found to have a significant moderating effects on the relationship between R&D and export green-sophistication in basic test and robustness check.     

Skill complementarities and returns to higher education: Evidence from college enrollment expansion in China

We find that the increased supply of college graduates resulting from college enrollment expansion in China increases college premiums for older cohorts and decreases college premiums for younger cohorts. This finding is inconsistent with the canonical model that assumes substitution among workers of different ages. We subsequently build a simple model that considers complementarities among workers of different ages and different skill levels. Our model predicts that the college premium of senior workers increases with the supply of young college graduates when skill is a scarce resource. The model's predictions are supported by empirical tests.     

Do excessive wage increases raise imports?: Theory and evidence

This paper uses a model of trade in vertically differentiated products to examine the effects of “excessive wage” increases (i.e. above productivity) on the volume of commodity imports. The model predicts that if the domestic country has comparative advantage in producing high quality varieties of some products, then “excessive wage” increases may result in a decrease in the volume of imports for these products. The empirical validity of the model's predictions is demonstrated with the use of disaggregated Japanese import data for the period 1967–1995. We also find that the aggregate volume of Japanese imports is not responsive to “excessive wage” changes.     

Economies of scale,resource dilution and education choice in developing countries: Evidence from Chinese households

Recent empirical studies suggest that the negative correlation between the quantity of children within a family and their educational attainment, which is widely observed in developed countries, is inconsistent or even rejected in developing countries. This paper aims to integrate these divergent empirical results into a unified theoretical framework by introducing scale economies into the classical model of Becker and Lewis (1973). As a result, the “anomaly” of an observed upward or an inverted U-shaped relationship can be expected as the scale economies effect dominates when there are few children in a family. Using data from the China's 1990 and 2000 censuses, this study further tests some hypotheses induced from the model. Educational attainment increases with sibling size at first and then drops. Children with one or two siblings achieve the highest education during the period our sample covers. The inverted U-shaped correlation is more robust for rural subsamples, for older cohorts and for economically underdeveloped regions and groups, which is consistent with the prediction of the model.     

Model Uncertainty,Political Learning,and Institutions: A Broader View on Mancur Olson's Theory of Institutional Sclerosis

In his Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that politically stable countries suffer from declining growth rates caused by the growing influence of distributional coalitions that accumulate over time. The empirical literature supports the notion of a negative relationship between a country's duration of political stability and its growth rates but finds only weak support for a negative influence of distributional coalitions on growth. This paper sketches a simple model of party competition under model uncertainty, which may explain this mixed empirical picture. It shows that politically stable democracies are less well equipped to adjust to shifts in their economic environment than democracies with a shorter history of political stability. In a further step, the paper relates the major theme of this theory and Olson's theory to the more recent literature on institutions and growth. Directions for further research are discussed.     

Global value chains,firms, and wage inequality: Evidence from China

How does participating or moving to more upstream in the global value chains (GVCs) affect the premium paid to skilled compared to unskilled labor within firms? In this paper, we develop a model of heterogeneous firms with intermediate trade and two skill inputs, in which we apply the fair wage hypothesis to predict the wage premium changes according to firms' GVCs activities. The model predicts that firms' backward GVC participation, as measured by the share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR), has an ambiguous impact on wage inequality of skills, which depends on the relative importance of “FVAR-labor substitution effect” and “FVAR-profit effect.” However, moving to upstream sectors in GVCs, as measured by the export varieties' upstreamness (or average distance from final use), raises a firm's wage premium. Using detailed Chinese firm-level data from 2000 to 2006, we develop a Mincer-type empirical model to study the wage premium changes associated with FVAR and upstreamness. We find robust empirical evidence that the rise of wage inequality in China mainly arises from moving to more upstream sectors rather than changing GVC participation.     

Productivity,financial constraints and outward foreign direct investment: Firm-level evidence

This paper studies the relationship between the financial constraints and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) of Chinese enterprises. First, we construct a theoretical model and develop a series of hypotheses to analyze how productivity and financial constraints influence firms' OFDI decisions. Then we construct a multivariate index to measure internal and external financial constraints. Using Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database as well as the Database of OFDI Firms in China, our empirical finds that both productivity and financial constraints have important impacts on firms' OFDI decisions. In addition, the marginal effect of the financial constraints increases as firms' productivity rises; an effect felt more to the private enterprises than state-owned enterprises. Empirical results also indicate that external financial constraints affect the firms' OFDI decisions more greatly than the internal financial constraints.     

Occupation-specific human capital and local labour markets

Most skills acquired through on-the-job training may be specificto an occupation and therefore transferable to some but notall firms. This paper explores the relationship between thesize of the local market for an occupation-specific skill andjob-training outcomes. The Stevens (1994) model of trainingpredicts that as market size increases, job turnover increasesand training becomes more general. I test these predictionsusing data on blue-collar workers and variation in market sizeacross US metropolitan areas. The empirical results supportthe theoretical predictions and the impacts are most relevantat low levels of market size.     

工业企业社会责任、市场关注与绿色技术创新——基于企业规模的调节作用

为探究工业企业社会责任、市场关注度、企业规模与绿色技术创新的内在联系，基于2013—2020年A股上市的工业企业面板数据进行分析，研究结果显示，工业企业社会责任对绿色技术创新的影响存在正向效应，其中市场关注度发挥正向中介效应，企业规模能够强化企业社会责任对绿色技术创新的促进作用，为促进工业企业绿色技术创新提供新的视角和经验证据，也为“双碳”目标的实现提供一定的政策启示。     

Electoral Incentives,Public Policy,and the New Deal Realignment

This paper develops a model of the effects of electoral incentives on policy, then applies the model to the New Deal realignment. In the model, policy is the outcome of an agenda-setter game between the president and legislators. Specifically, the president sets policy subject to legislative approval. The president's ability to concentrate benefits in states with high electoral payoffs depends in part on his or her power to influence legislators' prospects for reelection. Regression analysis shows that New Deal spending and roll call voting patterns in the House of Representatives support the model. Historical accounts of other aspects of New Deal policy, including labor and civil rights issues, are consistent with the model. Together, the theoretical results and the empirical evidence help to explain several striking features of the policy and politics of the 1930s, including (i) why a government dominated by the Democratic Party would provide high benefits to swing states and much lower benefits to the traditionally Democratic South, (ii) why favoritism of swing states increased from the 1933-1934 period to the 1937-1938 period, (iii) why favoritism of swing states decreased from 1938 to 1939, and (iv) why, with the rise of the conservative coalition in Congress in the late 1930s, it was the representatives from traditionally loyal Democratic districts that created the strongest Democratic opposition to Roosevelt and the New Deal.     

Idiosyncratic Information,Moral Hazard,and the Cost of Capital

This paper examines the effects of idiosyncratic accounting information on a firm's cost of capital. By embedding a moral hazard problem into a multifirm asset‐pricing model, I show that moral hazard distorts the sharing of idiosyncratic risk but does not affect the sharing of systematic risk in the economy. A firm‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the firm's cost of capital even though it does not affect the implied cost of capital inferred from publicly traded shares. Moreover, an economy‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the risk premium for idiosyncratic risk but increases the risk premium for systematic risk, resulting in an ambiguous net effect on the firm's cost of capital. These results provide alternative explanations for the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between information quality and the cost of capital.     

INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2007: THE PRESIDENCY,LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

This article begins by reviewing the politics of the presidency, including the relationship between the president, the political parties and the House of Representatives (DPR). Referring to survey data, it analyses the dynamics of public support for President Yudhoyono, and takes a preliminary look at the 2009 presidential election. It also discusses the manoeuvring between Indonesia's two largest parties, Golkar and PDI-P, in the context of recent debates in the DPR concerning a package of draft political laws.

Indonesia is undergoing continual reform with regard to local, as well as national, politics. The introduction of direct elections for heads of government at the local level is a major political development that may help accelerate democratic consolidation. Based on an examination of local election results, this article concludes that the advent of direct elections has fuelled the formation of unprecedented cross-ideological political alliances. It appears that the ideological polarisation of national politics is often no longer reflected in provincial and local politics.     

Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence

Committee decision making relies on the competence of its members. The individual's competence is driven by the pre-meeting efforts. These investments constitute a public good and, consequently, free riding is a concern. We build off of previous theoretical results which point out that as committees grow in size, free riding becomes more severe. However, experimental and empirical research suggests that individuals are willing to make voluntary contributions. This motivation should lead to increased effort when the number who benefit increases. To differentiate between these hypotheses we explore experimentally the effect that changes in group size have on competence investment decisions in a committee setting. Decision problems differ by whether the expansion increases the number of voters on the committee or the number who are affected by the committee's decision. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that as committees grow in size there is a reduction in effort invested. We find some evidence of an adverse reaction to non-contributing beneficiaries is observed as well. Heterogeneous responses arise and are explored.     

Health,education, and economic growth in China: Empirical findings and implications

This empirical analysis examines the augmented Mankiw, Romer and Weil's model which considers both health and education in human capital in the framework of Chinese economy. We consider the relationship between per capita real GDP growth and the physical capital, human capital, and health investment in the production function. Panel data models are used in the estimation based on the provincial data from 1978–2005. The empirical evidence shows that both health and education have positive significant effects on economic growth. The results also show that the interaction of health and education stock will not reduce their impact on growth and there is perhaps a trade-off between two forms of human capital investment.     

Private Information Production,Public Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital: Theory and Implications*

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.     

Political institutions,resources, and war: Theory and evidence from ancient Rome

How does a governing coalition’s size affect the extent and type of violence in society? The model developed here predicts that larger coalitions are less likely to fight for private goods (e.g., plunder) than for public goods (e.g., defense), yet this substitution need not reduce the overall scale of fighting. That prediction is tested by investigating how Rome’s transition from Republic to Empire affected military patterns. The raw data and three empirical tests suggest that the Republic engaged in more battles overall and that Republican battles had more of a public goods component. This study furthers our empirical knowledge about the ancient world while bringing data to bear on contemporary debates about the causes of peace and war.