Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Online channel strategies under different offline channel power structures

This study explores the manufacturer's marketing and pricing strategies for online channel under different offline channel power structures. Through these strategies, the manufacturer sells products through an offline retailer and an e-tailer. The manufacturer decides the cooperation mode with the e-tailer by the reselling or the agency selling mode and the pricing strategy on the basis of the power structures, i.e., vertical Nash structure (VN), manufacturer Stackelberg structure (MS), and retailer Stackelberg structure (RS). We find the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode when the commission rate is less than the given threshold. As long as the commission rate is more than another threshold, the manufacturer selects the online reselling mode under the VN structure; however, the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode under the other two structures. As well, the offline wholesale price is higher under the MS structure than those under the VN and RS structures. When the manufacturer selects the online agency selling mode, the offline retail price is highest under the MS structure, and the online retail price is highest under the VN structure. Meanwhile, consumers can always obtain a higher surplus in the online agency selling mode under all offline power structures.     

Price and quality decisions in a vertically-differentiated supply chain with an “Online-to-Store” channel

Because of the prevalence of “Online-to-Store (OS)” channel, customers can purchase differentiated products online and pick up in-store. We develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to study the impact of an OS channel on quality levels, demands, prices, and profits of a manufacturer and a retailer in a supply chain. We assume that the retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower. The manufacturer produces and sells two products with vertically-differentiated quality levels to the retailer who in turn sells the products to customers through a Store channel, an Online channel, or an OS channel. The retailer incurs a handing cost if the OS channel is available, and consumers bear a shipping cost and a transaction cost when the products are purchased from the Online and Store channels, respectively. We find that the manufacturer should reduce both products’ quality levels and wholesale prices, whereas the retailer can increase the selling prices for a relatively small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. When the products are available both online and in-store, however, the quality levels, wholesale prices and selling prices might increase for a small shipping cost and a not too small handling cost. Compared to the case in which both products are available online only with the OS channel, adding the Store channel is always beneficial for both parties. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between the handling cost and the increased market demand for the retailer. Moreover, the quality levels, the wholesale prices of both products, and the selling price of the low-quality product would decrease, while the selling price of the high-quality product increases for a sufficiently low transaction cost and a not too small shipping cost.     

An omnichannel approach to retailing: demystifying and identifying the factors influencing an omnichannel experience

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that influence an omnichannel experience. Omnichannel is an emerging approach to retailing that responds to the changing nature of how customers shop in alternation between online and offline shops, and the increasing use of digital devices (e.g. smartphones and tablets), as a consequence retailers are focusing and establishing a seamless integrated approach to their services. Omnichannel is now a hot topic in retailing but there is a lack of empirical studies into the factors that influence an omnichannel experience. Using a mixed methods approach, we propose and empirically test a conceptual model that identifies four factors influencing an omnichannel experience: brand familiarity; customisation; perceived value, and technology readiness. We conceptualise omnichannel to include three key channels; in-store, online and mobile. Two hundred and forty-six questionnaires were collected and analysed using PLS-SEM and 11 interviews were carried out with marketing/ omnichannel professionals. Our results indicate that brand familiarity has a strong influence on omnichannel (in-store, online and mobile) while perceived value has a negative impact on the mobile experience. Our results show that retailers need to consider multiple factors, such as brand familiarity, customisation, perceived value and technology readiness as influencing factors of an omnichannel experience, and plan the use of multiple touchpoints simultaneously to enhance their overall customer’s experience. Although this study demonstrates the significant factors influencing an omnichannel experience, questions remain regarding the exact use of each touchpoint by customers and the extent of overlap between the touchpoints. which .     

Price,online coupon,and store service effort decisions under different omnichannel retailing models

This paper explores three omnichannel retailing models—that is, a Buy-Online, Pick-Up In-Store (BOPS) model, a Showroom model, and an Interactive model (a model that combines the characteristics of BOPS and Showroom)—under which the retailer offers coupons online and invests in service efforts offline. For each omnichannel retailing model, three coupon distribution scenarios (i.e. no coupon, coupon with a common value, and coupon with a different value) are discussed to investigate coupon promotion policies and omnichannel operation strategies. Profits in the omnichannel system and under each model are compared by deriving three decision values: price, coupon value, and service effort. The key findings show that the retailer achieves profit improvement when the incremental purchasing reaches a large value. In addition, a great service effort coefficient leads to a high price, service effort, and retailer profit. The service effort and coupon value in the Showroom model are the largest among the three omnichannel models, while its profit is the lowest. Conversely, although the retailer invests less in service effort, and the price and coupon value are not too large in the BOPS model, the retailer still gains the highest profit. Additionally, in the BOPS model, it is profitable for the retailer to distinguish the coupon value for the online-only and BOPS channels when consumers are less sensitive to the online-only channel’s coupon. However, in the Interactive model, the retailer derives increasing profit by providing coupons with a common value for the online-only and BOPS channels.     

Pricing,greening, and transparency decisions considering the impact of government subsidies and CSR behavior in supply chain decisions

In this paper, we analytically model different government subsidy strategies in a supply chain manufacturing and selling a green product. We model the interaction between greening degree and transparency level set by a manufacturer and its impact on not only the supply chain, but also consumers and the government. The supply chain is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer can choose two different strategies. First, he only cares about his production profit; and second, he concerns with CSR in addition to his production profit. We develop a new transparency-based index of consumer satisfaction to model how the market reacts to manufacturer CSR decisions. The government decide three different subsidy strategies. A three-stage Stackelberg game model is developed and solved to analytically derive managerial insights. As a result, if the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the greening degree and transparency level in CSR concerns strategy are higher than when the manufacturer is not concerned with corporate social responsibility. In addition, when the transparency cost coefficient is sufficiently high, the profit of supply chain members and government are equal in both strategies. We give a real-world example of Iranian brick industry.     

基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制

基于制造商共享契约前后的收益分配模型,根据Stackelberg动态博弈思想,从整个供应链收益最大化视角,分析制造商与零售商的共享收益合作区间,提出了基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制。研究结果表明,制造商采用共享收益分配机制可使整个供应链系统得到协调,并在实践中具有可操作性。     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

基于需求与储量相关条件下的供应链协调研究

供应链模型由一个制造商和零售商组成,其中制造商向零售商供应商品,零售商面临客户的商品需求与储量相关。在该模型中,制造商欲通过批发价和储量成本补偿方式来协调分散式供应链并赢利,使供应链分散式时的系统总储量等于集中控制时的储量水平。假定商品需求是依赖储量的函数和一个储量成本补偿。在单个零售商情形下,制造商需要增大批发价及支付给零售商的储量成本补贴来协调整个渠道并盈利。当两个及多个零售商竞争时,假定市场需求依赖于总储量水平,零售商按照储量比例分割市场。     

Pricing coordination of a dual-channel supply chain considering offline in-sale service

With the rapid development of e-commerce, the problem of pricing conflicts between online and offline channels has become increasingly prominent. And the in-sale service has become an important factor influencing consumers' purchase decisions. To study the impact of in-sale service, this paper establishes a dual-channel supply chain model considering offline in-sale service. Using Stackelberg's game theory and backward induction, it solves the optimal pricing of supply chain members and makes comparisons in both cooperative and non-cooperative situations. Finally, it coordinates the supply chain through a two-part tariff contract. The results show that (1) The optimal wholesale price and offline retail price are positively correlated with in-sale service quality. And the opposite of the optimal online direct selling price. (2) With the quality of in-sale service improving, the retailer's profit will increase and then decrease but the manufacturer's profit will always decrease under non-cooperation. The total profit of the supply chain will rise and then fall under cooperation. (3) The two-part tariff coordination maximizes profits with the manufacturer reducing the wholesale price and the retailer paying a transfer cost. (4) Cooperative decision is better than the non-cooperative decision in terms of the supply chain as a whole.     

The impact of information sharing and bullwhip effects on improving consumer services in dual-channel retailing

Data sharing among the supply chain players can be an exceptionally significant factor for the retailing industry. In this consideration, an improved retailing methodology for a dual-channel supply chain with a single retailer and manufacturer is built under the bullwhip effect and asymmetric data sharing. Retailer provides asymmetric information to the manufacturer regarding demand to increase their profit. In this scenario, measuring the bullwhip effect is essential in retailing strategy. By adopting an online-to-offline retailing strategy, industries can earn more profit and increase the satisfaction level of customers. The present study focuses on dual-channel retailing, where the demand for the product in both channels varies with the selling price. Keeping in mind the goal of sustainable development, an advanced transportation strategy is utilized in this study, along with some carbon emission costs. Autonomated inspection is utilized to identify defective products. Finally, centralized and decentralized profit functions are formulated for this study. Several cases and numerical examples are provided to validate this study. It is clear from the numerical findings that information sharing within the players provides 1.26% more profit compared to a decentralized case. Due to asymmetric information, which leads to the bullwhip effect, the retailing system faces loss. Thus, information sharing is 0.19% beneficial for dual-channel retailing. Sensitivity analysis for key parameters ensures the findings' applicability in the real world.     

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Emergence of the Internet as a new distribution channel has led to increasing attention by researchers to dual-channel supply chain in recent years. In this paper, pricing and ordering decisions are investigated on a dual-channel supply chain which consists of monopolistic manufacturer and duopolistic retailers. The market is assumed to be controlled by the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer becomes leader and the two retailers act as followers. Due to establishing this new structure, different game-theoretic models including Bertrand, Collusion, and Stackelberg are developed to analyze pricing strategies under the various interactions between the two retailers. Then, the equilibrium decisions are compared under the considered scenarios and valuable managerial insights are presented. We found that the various games do not have any effects on the manufacturer’s responses. The retail prices given by the Collusion game are higher than by the other games. In the Collusion model, demands in the retail channel are lower than in the other games. Moreover, the manufacturer and retailers receive respectively the lowest and the highest profits under the Collusion game.     

基于特征分析的逆向供应链激励机制设计研究

逆向供应链是我国重点发展的回收再制造产业的重要组成,是解决资源紧缺和环境污染双重难题的重要途径。首先,研究针对我国逆向供应链中存在非正规回收商充斥市场的结构不合理现象进行研究,发现主要是由于逆向供应链的信息不对称、产品异质性、环境外部性和资产专用性等特征。其次,在特征分析基础上构建理想状态和逆向供应链特征影响下的均衡模型,研究发现低回收再制造水平的非正规回收商是非最优均衡的结果。再次,研究以逆向供应链前端、中端和后端为逻辑顺序,设计了信息甄别传递、提前延迟、违约惩罚和集聚合作四种激励机制,以激励约束逆向供应链的正规回收再制造行为。     

非营利性第三方在闭环供应链构建中的作用

文章以再制造为例,研究了非营利性组织参与回收下的闭环供应链决策,并与营利性第三方回收企业参与下的闭环供应链决策进行比较.分析表明,非营利性第三方回收组织的参与不仅可提高制造商与零售商的利润及闲环供应链的总体收益,增强制造商进行回收再制造的积极性;而且能够提高产品的回收再制造率,降低废旧产品对环境的影响效应.文章从政府、企业及行业角度,提出了非营利性回收机构的组建方法.     

供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。     

Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays use online technology to engage in direct sales. The mix of retailing with a direct channel adds a new dimension of competition and complementarity to a product's distribution channels. Our model focuses on the strategic role played by the retail services in a dual-channel competitive market. The manufacturer uses a direct channel as an effective tool to motivate the retailer to improve its retail services and profits from it. While operated by the manufacturer to motivate retailer to perform more effectively from the manufacturer's perspective, the direct channel may not always be detrimental to the retailer because the retailer can obtain a lower wholesale price from the manufacturer and a higher sales volume from the improved retail services. In our research, our results suggest that the improved retail services effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict and improve the supply chain performance in a competitive market.     

Manufacturer encroachment with competing dual-purpose online retail platforms

This study investigates the manufacturer encroachment strategy within a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and multiple competing dual-purpose online retail platforms who value profit and consumer surplus. We examine the strategic interactions among manufacturer encroachment, platform dual-purpose concern, and retail competition. Some interesting results are obtained. First, with a single platform, the manufacturer's encroachment incentive exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with respect to the platforms' concern of consumer surplus. However, with multiple competing platforms, the increased concern of consumer surplus and retail competition intensity dampen the manufacturer's encroachment incentive. Second, manufacturer encroachment benefits platforms (supply chain) only when the platform's concern of consumer surplus is low and commission fee is moderate (low enough). Moreover, the increased retail competition intensity and the platform's concern of consumer surplus further aggravate the detrimental effect of manufacturer encroachment on the platforms and supply chain. Third, the dual-purpose concern of the platforms may hurt consumer surplus, whereas the increased retail competition intensity may contrarily alleviate this adverse effect to some extent. Finally, the profits for the platform and supply chain and consumer surplus are non-monotonic with respect to the platform's concern of consumer surplus.     

不同市场力量下的再制造闭环供应链决策研究

本文建立了由一个制造商和两个竞争零售商组成的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型,研究了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈等三种市场力量结构,研究和对比了三种市场力量结构下的均衡回收率、批发价、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润。研究结果表明：零售商的回收率在市场无领导者时最高,在制造商领导的市场中最低。批发价格在制造商领导时最高,最小的是零售商领导情形。零售价在制造商领导时最高,最小是市场无领导者情形。消费者和整个行业均受益于无领导者的市场结构。然而,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者。在具市场领导的市场结构下,消费者和整个行业偏好零售商领导的市场结构。     

再制造闭环供应链研究综述

分析国内外再制造闭环供应链的研究现状及进展文献综述发现,国外研究主要从闭环供应链回收管理、考虑产品生命周期的逆向供应链、再造品利润分配策略及再制造竞争问题、再制造管理、库存控制问题几个方面进行综述;国内研究主要从闭环供应链定价策略及其协调和其它方面进行综述。国外对再制造闭环供应链的研究是多方面、多角度的,但尚未形成系统的体系;国内的研究主要侧重对闭环供应链定价、利润分配等经济角度的研究,而缺乏其它方面的深入研究。如何系统地构建与实际相近的闭环供应链模型体系,并增加实证研究,是未来闭环供应链研究的方向。     

Do you think that the home delivery is good for retailing?

Order placing and delivery always play a significant role in any business industry. Nowadays, most customers want useful products at their doorstep without visiting any retail store. In this current study, an advanced dual-channel supply chain model is constructed for a single product with two players. Customers can order online or offline from the retail store. In contrast, retailers use only offline mode to take the product from the manufacturer, and retailers charge a different amount for delivery. To optimize profit and satisfy the consumers, retailers only provide a free transportation service when customers order a certain quantity. If customers order less than the desired amount, a transportation charge will be applied to the customers. Contrary to the existing research, demand for the products varies with the selling price online and offline and is also affected by the free home delivery service. Manufacturers use a single-setup multi-delivery (SSMD) transportation strategy to enrich the system's profit. To make the study more applicable, all unit costs are considered fuzzy. Signed-distance defuzzification technique is adopted to defuzzify the fuzzy values. Finally, the total profit of the supply chain is optimized along with the optimized value of the decision-making variable through an uncertain optimization technique. Numerical experiments are carried out along with sensitivity analysis to show the applicability and optimality of this study. Though the crisp data set provided a 0.72% better result compared to the fuzzy data set, but fuzzy data set provided a more realistic result. Numerical results prove that the home delivery service provided 14.59% better profit. Finally, it can be stated that the home delivery policy with some charged amount based on ordered quantity is the best retailing strategy for the dual-channel supply chain.