我国养老基金的投资模式

人口老龄化对养老保险制度提出了严峻的挑战,"统账结合"的基金缺口将通过国有股减持来弥补.而出于保值增值的需要,具有积累或部分积累性质的养老基金有必要进入资本市场,并具备了一定的进入条件.相应地,养老基金的投资模式也要进行多样化的投资选择,以达到保值增值的目的.     

建立养老基金投资绩效评价体系

养老基金积累了庞大的资金规模,大量的养老基金进入金融市场进行投资管理,实现养老基金的保值增值。养老基金投资收益绩效评价,是客观科学评价养老基金政策效率、投资运营、委托人权益保护、社会监督效果的前提。根据养老基金投资的风险收益特征,在构建养老基金投资组合选择理论模型及其资产定价理论模型基础上,可以系统构建养老基金投资绩效评价有关的基金分类方法和标准、业绩基准、风险调整收益分析模型、归因分析模型,形成相对完整的养老基金投资绩效评价体系。     

政府对养老基金投资管制的国际比较与借鉴

我国养老金制度改革后,个人账户基金虽然已经建立,但由于现阶段资本市场的诸多不利因素对养老基金投资的安全性构成了巨大的威胁。因此,一直以来,政府对养老基金投资实行极为严格的管制政策,致使我国养老基金资本通过投资实现自我保值、增值的改革目标难以实现。借鉴OECD国家政府的养老金投资管制模式,我国政府必须适度放宽投资管制,这样对于推动养老基金尽快进入资本化运作,实现资本自我增值具有现实意义。     

促进社保基金投资实体性公共项目的对策建议

<正>随着我国社保基金规模的不断增长,社保基金亟需开拓新的投资运营渠道以实现保值增值。一、我国社保基金投资运营问题凸显社保基金是社会保险事业的物质基础,实现社保基金保值增值是保持社会保险事业可持续发展的重要途径。近年来,我国社会保障事业快速发展,社保基金积累规模不断扩大。根据人力社保部《2013年全国社会保险情况》,截至2013年底,我国社会保险基金资产总额累计为47727亿元,其中城镇职工基本养老     

社保基金该不该入市

随着中国人口老龄化步伐的加快,中国养老问题日益受到社会的关注。而社保基金占养老资金中很大的一份比重,因而其保值、增值问题也日益受到人们的关注。本文从社保基金保值、增值角度出发,探讨社保基金入市的原因与益处,并对社保基金入市风险提出控制的措施与建议。     

浅谈养老保险基金如何有效地投资于资本市场

发达国家的实践表明,资本市场是养老基金实现保值增值的重要载体和途径。笔者认为我国的养老基金、资本市场发展和完善的必然趋势,在于提高养老基金的投资效率。创建良好的市场环境,完善养老基金监管体系和监管机制,保证养老基金的投资最终实现低风险下的收益最大化。     

试论通胀形势下我国养老基金投资运营模式的改进

长期以来,我国的养老基金投资方式以银行存款为主,投资报酬率很低,在通胀肆掠的年代,养老基金缩水严重。与此同时,欧美一些国家的养老基金投资却取得了骄人的业绩。他们的养老基金投资运营方式值得我们借鉴。我相信,只要加强法制建设,规范资本市场,引入竞争机制,及时抓住一些投资亮点,我国养老基金的增值保值完全有保障。     

确保养老保险基金的保值增值

养老保险由现收现付体制改为个人帐户与社会统筹相结合,势必积累一笔规模庞大的养老金.这笔资金,由谁管理,怎样管理,直接关系到职工养老费能否按时按数发放,是养老保险改革顺利进行的关键问题之一.但是长期以来,由于政出多门,管理分散,大大提高了养老保险的交易费用,致使基金管理效率低下.因此,我们应从多方面着手,采取综合措施,以确保养老基金的保值增值.     

我国养老保险基金的投资运营问题探讨

为实现保值增值目标,养老保险基金进入资本市场投资成为必然选择,但养老保险基金运行模式及管理机制的不合理造成了基金不能保值增值。本文认为必须推动养老保险和资本市场的协调发展,提高养老保险投资运营的效率,实现投资效益的最大化。     

退休保险基金投资运营及其审计

一、退休保险基金保值增值需要对其进行有效投资运营退休金基金投资是利用其收入和支出的时间差和数量差,对积累的闲置资金进行充分运用,以实现其保值增值的目的。所以,退休保险基金的完整、安全关系到退休保险目标的实现和社会的安定。我国逐年积累的退休保险基金是为几十年后     

我国城镇基本养老保险个人账户定位剖析

我国基本养老保险个人账户资金规模要适度,由劳动与社会保障部统一管理。为提高职工缴费的积极性,关键在于提高个人账户的收益率,实现有效保值增值。我国基本养老保险个人账户的"空账"实质是以不明晰的债权形式存在。当前所讨论的"做实"个人账户,实质是个人账户资产存在形式的转换。对于历史"空账",不应该立即"做实",而应比较机会成本与效益,逐步"做实"。而对于新缴纳的个人账户资金,则应明晰产权,不能随便挪用,但当统筹基金不足时,可以有偿使用。个人账户待遇以自身平衡为原则。     

中国养老保险制度的困境与发展对策

中国养老保险制度的改革滞后于经济与政治体制改革。主要体现在保险的覆盖面 ,基金的征集、管理、运营等方面 ,对养老保险的可持续发展构成了严重的障碍。根据我国的国情及经济发展状况 ,在廓清理论框架的前提下 ,加大个人帐户的比重 ,提高养老基金的运作效率 ,在此基础上扩大养老保险的覆盖范围 ,使养老保险系统在我国经济与政治生活中发挥其应有作用     

论我国基本养老保险基金进入资本市场的方式选择

随着资本市场的完善 ,养老基金进入资本市场已经提上议事日程。但养老基金入市选择的方式 ,根据我国实际情况 ,能进入资本市场运作的只有个人帐户基金 ,投资受益人应是职工本人。如果由国家劳动和社会保障部作投资主体 ,不管是直接入市还是间接入市 ,都有许多弊端。如果职工作投资主体采用信托的方式入市 ,则可以克服这些弊端。     

黑龙江省煤炭基地养老保险制度研究

黑龙江省煤炭基地在发展迅速的同时,如何走出一条适合煤炭基地发展的养老保险之路,是当前亟待解决的问题。黑龙江省煤炭基地养老保险制度存在着基本养老金倒挂现象,养老保险基金空账运营,养老保险覆盖面低等问题。完善黑龙江省煤炭基地养老保险制度,应积极推进养老保险扩面和征缴工作,建立多渠道筹集养老保险基金的机制,发展企业年金制度,规范管理社保基金,促进覆盖城乡基本养老保险体系建设进程的加快。     

黑龙江企业年金基金平衡模型问题研究

依据企业年金体系和社会福利之间的互动关系,从宏观和微观两个方面论证黑龙江省发展企业年金的积极意义,尝试着运用实证分析法,将经济学原理和社会实践相结合,通过对国内外以及黑龙江省企业年金的发展历史进行分析,以借鉴历史的经验教训,对制约企业年金尤其是黑龙江省企业年金发展的瓶颈问题进行实证研究和规范性分析,从企业年金运营模式、监管模式以及一些配套措施等方面提出政策建议,以加快发展企业年金市场,促进企业年金尽早真正成为黑龙江省多层次社会养老保险体系中"第二支柱"。     

储蓄的生命周期现象与养老保险

近年来 ,中国寿险业务有了很大发展。但相对而言 ,农村寿险业务进展缓慢。研究和开发农村寿险市场 ,提供与农村居民相宜的寿险产品 ,具有一定的现实意义。本文通过对苏南农村居民的储蓄动机与行为的调查 ,揭示了农村居民的储蓄生命周期现象 ,并探讨了其蕴含的“商机”及养老保险产品的雏形     

Growth patterns of the European venture capital industry

Although the European venture capital industry has become nearly as important as its American counterpart, little research has been done to describe its nature and importance. This study gives in the first place an overview of the importance of the venture capital industry in the major European countries. Thereafter, we look for funding and investment patterns in the different European countries. We hypothesize that there is a difference between countries in which the venture capital industry is just emerging, and those where the venture capital industry is since long established.The data are mainly, but not solely, taken from the yearly statistics of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and cover the period 1984–1989. The characteristics we look at are: (1) the sources of the funds flowing into the industry, broken down with respect to investor type and geographical location of the investor; and (2) the investments, broken down with respect to investment stage (using the EVCA definitions of the different stages), geographical location, degree of syndication, and industrial sector of the investee companies. In Europe as a whole, the most important group of investors are the banks (28%), the pension funds (17%), and the insurance companies (12%). Banks dominate the Swiss industry (48%); corporate investors dominate the German, Swedish, and Portuguese industries, whereas these are nearly completely absent in Denmark (2%), Ireland (4%), and the United Kingdom (5%). Eighty percent of all venture capital funds are raised domestically, 7% in another European country, and the remaining 13% in a non-European country.Almost half of the European investments (44%) are made in the expansion stage; management buy-outs (MBOs) account for another 36%. Only 14% is invested in seed or start-up companies, much less than the 30% in the U.S. Half of the venture capital investments in the United Kingdom are buy-outs. The highest start-up investment activity takes place in Austria and Spain. On average, more than half (54%) of the invested amount in Europe is syndicated, but only 6% internationally, while 10% is invested internationally.We also search for similarities and dissimilarities in the characteristics of the sources of funds and of the investments. The hypothesis is that a growth pattern can be distinguished, determining the maturity of the venture capital industry in a particular country. The characteristics that we think would discriminate most among the different industry stages are the importance of government agencies, pension funds, and insurance companies (sources of funds); of start-up, later stages, or MBO investments; and the percentage of international and syndicated investments. Cluster analyses show that there is a growth pattern, but it is less clear than expected. Characteristics of mature industries are a bigger size, relative to the gross national product of the country, the presence of pension funds and insurance companies as investors in the industry, the syndication of the deals, and the absence of the government as an investor, in the 1980s, investments in management buy-outs are mainly done by the mature industries. No pattern can be distinguished for the investments in early or later stages.The major implication from this study is the fact that the European venture capital industry cannot be approached as a single, undifferentiated industry. Each country has its own structures, institutions, and policies, which make the venture capital industries in the different countries have unique characteristics. Moreover, the European venture capital industry has different characteristics than the American industry; this has to be taken into account when comparing both industries.     

New CEOs Pursue Their Own Self-Interests by Sacrificing Stakeholder Value

Short-term performance increases that are sometimes observed after CEO successions may be evidence of self-interested behavior. New CEOs may cut allocations to long-term investment areas such as research and development (R&D), capital equipment and pension funds in an effort to drive up short-term profits and secure their positions. However, such actions have unfavorable consequences for some stakeholders. This study provides evidence that both R&D and pension funding are reduced subsequent to a succession, even after accounting for industry trends. The expected short-term profitability increases are also observed.A major implication of these results is that boards of directors and other interested parties should carefully monitor the actions of new CEOs with regard to their treatment of R&D and pension funding if they would like to prevent such actions from occurring. This study also highlights the need to investigate other potential self-interested behaviors of new CEOs.     

The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper traces the growing power of pension funds to provide managerial oversight of the firms they hold in their investment portfolios. Increasingly pension funds are exercising their legitimate rights as owners to raise the corporate governance standards of the firms they invest in. Within corporate governance generally, pension funds are shifting their attention away from managerial accountability and toward measures that increase transparency in firm-level decision-making. Pension funds use transparency to ensure that shareholders are the primary interest being served by the firm. Transparency not only aligns managers and owners, it also raises issues of firm behaviour that allow other stakeholders to engage the corporation more broadly. I contend that secrecy is economically inefficient. When organizations are opaque and interests are secret, decision-making can and does distort efficiency. I examine recent pension fund corporate governance campaigns with particular reference to the California Public Employees Retirement System. Dr. Hebb is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard University and the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. She is researching the role of US public sector pension funds and urban revitalization as lead investigator on a two-year Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grant. Her doctoral work at Oxford University examined the impact of pension fund corporate engagement on the corporate governance, social and environmental standards of firm behaviour. She was a Clarendon Scholar at Oxford University and was awarded the prestigious William E. Taylor Fellowship (2003) from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Government of Canada. Dr. Hebb is also a recipient of the York University Schulich School of Business National Research in Financial Services and Public Policy Scholarship (Canada). Dr. Hebb is also the Director of the Capital Strategies Program at the Carleton Centre for Community Innovation (3ci), Carleton University, Canada. Here her work focuses on the financial and non-financial impact of pension fund economically targeted investment in Canada as part of a three-year SSHRC Initiatives in the New Economy grant.     

The Risk-Return Relationship of Pension Funds With Investments in Hedge Funds

This article investigates if investing in local hedge funds improves the risk-return relationship of Brazilian pension funds. Investment in hedge funds by pension funds is growing elsewhere, with an increasing utilization of a multiplicity of hedge funds specialized in specific strategies or niches. We analyzed the performance of a typical pension fund allocation in Brazil as well as alternate allocations that included hedge funds. We used robust estimates of the covariance matrix to mitigate the errors in variables that are problematic in the inputs of the optimization. The results show that hedge funds improve the risk-return relationship of the typical pension fund allocation, contribute to a higher accumulated return at the end of a one-year period, and reduce portfolio rebalancing. Investments in hedge funds ease reaching the typical 6% annual return target with less risk exposure.