企业腐败动机与“最优”腐败程度实证研究

对于企业向官员行贿动机的解释主要有两种相反的观点,一是企业为了获取政府帮助而主动行贿,二是企业在威胁逼迫条件下的被动行贿。文章从企业在应对政府和应对市场两项事务间的权衡出发,构建企业绩效与腐败强度间的二项式回归模型,通过与传统线性回归模型的比较,发现企业腐败是一种主动行为,腐败的目的是为了构建政治关系以获取相应回报。运用世界银行企业调查数据,二次项回归模型显示出绩效与腐败强度间显著的倒U型曲线关系,文章得出了企业的“最优”腐败程度并对其政策含义进行了解释。     

Regulating Supply Side Corruption

Abstract

Doing corruption-free business in developing countries is not easy. Government officials and politicians in developing countries demand monetary gains from multinational companies interested in seeking business deals in their nations. Multinational firms are willing to oblige them since they need the business in developing countries. Such unsavory business practices are extremely difficult to change. However, today more and more countries are concerned about corruption and are trying to combat it. Sociologists, political scientists, and economists have advanced various methods to combat corruption. Mainly, these methods are geared toward reducing the demand for corrupt practices. This paper using the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan suggests controlling the supply of corruption.     

Understanding the Demand-Side Issues of International Corruption

In global business, business organizations and their representatives frequently encounter corruption and may be the perpetrators, victims, or simply participants in such acts. While international corruption has existed in multiple forms for several years, many individuals, companies, nations, and international organizations are currently attempting to reduce or eliminate corrupt acts because of their harmful effects on local economies and the quality of life of citizens. Several of these corruption curtailment efforts have been directed toward the supply-side of corruption, i.e., those who make corrupt payments. In developing an understanding of corruption, however, and formulating strategies for its reduction, consideration must also be given to the demand-side of corruption, i.e., those who demand and accept corrupt payments. Accordingly, this study examined the demand-side of corruption and several related factors in the categories of government, economy and poverty, education, geography, and culture. Analysis of these factors employed the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), formulated annually by Transparency International (TI), and other sources. Several factors in each of the five categories were found to correlate significantly with perceived corruption, and strategies for addressing these issues were developed and discussed.     

Impact of host‐country corruption on U.S. and Chinese cross‐border acquisitions

Does corruption in a target country create a similar effect on cross‐border acquisitions (CBAs) by firms from a developed and a developing country? This article empirically examines the relationship between corruption and CBAs by firms from China and the United States. Based on a combined sample of 10,236 completed acquisitions over the period of 1990–2006, the authors find that both Chinese and U.S. firms make a significantly greater number of acquisitions in less corrupt countries. However, unlike the U.S. CBAs, we find a significantly positive relationship between the transaction value of Chinese CBAs and the level of perceived corruption in the target country. It is suggested that having been schooled in weaker institutions themselves, Chinese firms may find it easier to deal with corrupt conditions in target countries, giving them an advantage over firms from less corrupt countries. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in EP and IS Countries: The Role of Corruption

Corruption is understood as an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules established by the governing structures of a society. This study attempts to offer an extension to the empirical model employed by Balasubramanyam et al. (1996 ) by analysing how FDI determines economic growth within the new growth theory framework when the degree of corruption is considered. Thus, the study seeks to examine the way in which corruption can have an impact on the economic growth of developing countries whose trade strategies differ (either IS and EP). It suggests that further insight can be gained by considering how corruption might interact with the trade policy in affecting economic growth. This is examined using a fixed‐effects, simultaneous equation model for 17 countries over the period 1994–2004. The results show that the level of corruption strongly and negatively influences foreign direct investment in both IS and EP countries. However, when the corruption index is interacted with domestic investment, the influence on foreign direct investment is positive and significant for IS countries only. The most interesting outcome of the study is the effect of the interaction term between foreign direct investment and the corruption perception index on economic growth, which is found to be greater in magnitude for the EP countries than for the IS countries.     

Corruption and cash holdings: Evidence from emerging market economies

We examine the effect of corruption on cash holdings and cash value using a panel data set of 4236 firms from 16 emerging market economies. We find that the cash holdings are positively related to the corruption and by managing their cash holdings upwards, the firms can benefit in the corrupt environment by trading cash. Furthermore, cash holding adds value to the firms. However, it is insignificant when the firms are operating in high corruption environment with low investor protection. Overall, the evidence suggests that corruption play an important role in shaping the cash policies of firms in emerging markets.     

Corruption and industrial dualism in less developed countries

This paper provides an explanation for the observation that developing countries tend to have a higher degree of dualism in the size distribution of firms and a relatively smaller proportion of large firms than do developed countries. This paper builds a model where large 'formal' firms attract rent seeking activities from the government while small firms do not. In the model, there exists a 'competitive fringe' of small firms and a formal market consisting of Cournot competitors. The number of formal firms is made endogenous and is a function of the degree to which the government can extract rents. This ability to extract rents is itself posited as a function of the degree of corruption in a country's government. Thus, it is the high degree of corruption in developing country governments that contributes to the dual nature of their industrial structure. The model predicts that the higher the degree of corruption, the fewer (and larger) are the formal firms, the lower is social welfare and the greater is dead-weight loss, and the higher are government rents. An examination of the size distribution of 16 countries and their degree of corruption shows that the degree of corruption is a good predictor of the percentage of large firms in an economy.     

Rationalizing Ideologies, Social Identities and Corruption Among Civil Servants in Indonesia During the Suharto Era

This study investigated how the social identities assumed by individuals as part of their professional roles influence the nature and use of a range of rationalizations for their corruption or the corrupt acts of others. Thirty senior Indonesian public servants were interviewed about the causes and factors that perpetuated corruption during the Suharto era, and how they rationalized corrupt behavior within the role of being a civil servant. Findings revealed that corruption was routine and embedded in the daily activities and administrative structures of Indonesian public servants. Rationalizing ideologies that supported corruption included a denial of responsibility, social weighting and an appeal to higher loyalties. Central to these rationalizations were explanations around the low levels of civil service salaries, poor accountability, and corrupt leadership at senior levels of the government. However, the expression of these rationalizations varied across three social or role identities of the Indonesian civil servant: the professional civil servant, the collegial civil servant, and the corrupt civil servant. The implications of these findings for interventions in organizations in developing countries are discussed.     

Entrepreneurial Orientation and Corruption

Organizational corruption is a wide-spread negative aspect of economic activity, and a seemingly never-ending series of corruption scandals has been made public around the globe. Although research is performed in a broad variety of disciplines, ranging from psychology to management to law, a fully satisfactory explanation for the causes of organizational corruption has not been found. By looking at organizational factors as potential triggers for corruptive behavior, this study draws upon the concept of entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Diverse studies have shown that EO, as an antecedent to company performance, has a positive effect. Recent EO literature, however, indicates that EO has not only positive but also negative consequences. In this line of reasoning, this study builds upon principal agent theory and makes a first step in exploring the impact of EO on a negative aspect of business behavior, namely organizational corruption. We gathered survey data and publicly available data from 411 firms, inquiring for both acts of corruption from within the top management team over the last 3 years and the level of entrepreneurial orientation within the organization. Results show diverging effects along the individual dimensions of EO; they point to risk orientation as the dark side of EO, as it significantly increases the likelihood of corrupt behavior in companies. In contrast, innovation orientation, to a certain extent, counterbalances by reducing the likelihood of corrupt behavior.     

Corruption and private participation infrastructure projects: The influence of vicarious experience and national animosity

This paper investigates the influence of vicarious experience and national animosity on the relationship between corruption and the performance of private participation infrastructure projects. Our analysis of 27,264 projects in 114 countries from 1997 to 2013 shows that higher levels of corruption are associated with higher risk of project failure. We also find that this effect is weakened by the presence of other firms from the same industry, as firms may learn from other companies how to deal with corruption. In contrast, we find the effect is strengthened by the presence of other firms from different industries. This result is due to a lower applicability of knowledge and to an increase in national animosity and discrimination from local stakeholders.     

Influencing MNC strategies for managing corruption and favouritism in Pacific Asia countries: a multiple-theory configurational perspective

ABSTRACT

The research gap addressed here concerns how to encourage multinational corporations (MNCs) to combat corruption and favouritism. This study’s rationale is that MNCs can have a highly influential role in supporting or opposing such practices globally. The study examines how MNCs might choose flexibly among alternative strategies but could be encouraged positively. Three illustrative strategies are described in detail using theoretical propositions: (1) anti-corruption reform; (2) ‘tightrope’ balancing; and (3) tolerance for corrupt practices. A proposed multiple-theory configurational perspective is consistent with secondary data and reported cases about domestic corruption and MNC propensity to bribe focused on Pacific Asia countries.     

Anti‐Corruption and Corporate Tax Burden: Evidence from China

We examine whether the Chinese government's anti‐corruption enforcement reduces corporate tax burdens. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we find tax burdens of firms located in corrupt political leaders’ jurisdictions are lower after these leaders were deposed. An analysis of two tax policy changes shows that the reduction in tax burden is more pronounced when corrupt politicians had more power in levying taxes.     

Bribery in International Business Transactions

Globalization leads to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery. Bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries, but the supply, or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives. This study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery. The study incorporates both domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic corruption in the supplying country) and international factors (those countries’ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords) in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad. The propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms’ home countries, when the firms’ countries were signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention, and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations. Further, these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country. In terms of culture, firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less-developed nations.     

Both Sides of the Coin: Motives for Corruption Among Public Officials and Business Employees

The aim of this study is to better understand why public officials and business employees engage in corruption. Insight into individual-level explanations for corruption was obtained with the aid of a self-report survey. The results suggest that the most indicative factors of whether or not individuals are corruption-prone are as follows: the moral conviction they have to refrain from corruption; perceptions of whether their colleagues approve of and engage in corruption; and difficulties experienced in complying with the rules on corruption. This result pattern was identical for public officials and business employees alike, and as a consequence, for both sides of corrupt acts. The latter indicates that the same motives may not only underlie corruption in both private and public sectors, but also the act of corruption in its active and passive forms. The results of the current study do not provide strong support for the assumption that economic considerations—expected costs and benefits—are crucial in predicting corruption. Based on the findings that norms and the perceived opportunity to comply are dominant factors in explaining corruption, this article focuses on the practical implications for the development of anti-corruption strategies within both public and private sectors.     

Corruption’s impact on foreign portfolio investment

Corruption has significant effects on a nation’s financial markets through its adverse impact on foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Yet, the effects of corruption on FPI are nonlinear and reverse J-shaped, with intermediate levels of corruption yielding the most negative effects. Highly transparent nations, where a “level playing field” exists between foreign and local investors due to lack of information asymmetries related to corruption, attract the most foreign investment. However, at the margin, very corrupt countries attract more investment than moderately corrupt countries because a “perverse level playing field” in the former countries may put foreigners and locals on an even footing in terms of resolving asymmetric information problems. This nonlinear pattern is consistent with foreign investors’ desire to trade in markets where they are not at an informational disadvantage.     

Corruption and firm behavior: Evidence from African ports

This paper investigates how corruption affects firm behavior. Using an original and unusually rich dataset on bribe payments at ports matched to firm-level data, we observe how firms adapt to different types of corruption by adjusting their transport strategies. Our results suggest that firms respond to the price effects of corruption, organizing production in a way that increases or decreases demand for the public service.     

Corruption and firm behavior: Evidence from African ports

This paper investigates how corruption affects firm behavior. Using an original and unusually rich dataset on bribe payments at ports matched to firm-level data, we observe how firms adapt to different types of corruption by adjusting their transport strategies. Our results suggest that firms respond to the price effects of corruption, organizing production in a way that increases or decreases demand for the public service.     

Corruption,Types of Corruption and Firm Financial Performance: New Evidence from a Transitional Economy

Using a nationwide survey of provincial institutional quality and a sample of private manufacturing small and medium scale enterprises (the SMEs), this paper contributes to the literature by considering for the first time the effects of corruption on the financial performance of Vietnamese private SMEs. Interestingly, contrary to previous findings, we find that corruption when measured by a dummy variable, does not affect firms’ financial performance after controlling for heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. However, the intensity of bribery and the majority of the forms of corruption were found to have negative impacts on firms’ financial performance. Hence, a typical approach using only a dummy variable for bribery might not adequately evaluate the impact of bribe intensity or even ignores the negative impacts of some types of bribes on firms’ financial performance. The findings suggest that anti-corruption measures are vital for the development of the Vietnamese private SMEs.     

A Cross-National Investigation into the Effects of Religiosity on the Pervasiveness of Corruption

Relying on data drawn from more than 70 countries, this study examines the effects of religiosity, religious denominations, and communist heritage on the pervasiveness of corrupt business behavior. It is found that even after controlling for the effects of socioeconomic development, communist heritage and religiosity tend to promote corruption. From the principal–agent and modernization perspectives, the theoretical and managerial implications are discussed, and some avenues for future research are pointed out.