城市污水处理行业的竞争机制与标杆价格原理

在城市污水处理行业市场化改革过程中,大量非国有企业不断进入这一行业,这使政府面临的一个新问题是,在多种所有制并存的情况下,政府如何在特定地区范围内,以相对统一和合理的价格向污水处理企业付费,从而为污水处理行业的不同所有制企业的公平竞争创造制度条件.针对这一问题,本文在简要讨论城市污水处理行业的自然垄断性和区域垄断性的基础上,分析了城市污水处理行业实现区域内竞争和区域间竞争的潜在可能性,讨论了区域间比较竞争理论及其应用价值,最后探讨了城市污水处理行业激励性标杆价格的基本原理及其应用问题.     

基于波特五力模型的VMS产品行业竞争分析

采用波特五力竞争模型对VMS产品行业竞争现状进行较为详细的分析,为该行业的中小技术型LED企业是否应该投入精力进行深度耕耘提供借鉴;同时,也丰富了国内运用营销理论对VMS产品行业进行分析的研究成果。     

基于波特模型的我国轿车行业竞争结构分析

本文运用迈克尔·波特的五个竞争力模型对我国轿车行业竞争结构进行分析,结果表明:我国轿车行业有一定进入壁垒,行业内存在替代品威胁,自主研发不足,供应商有一定讨价还价能力,消费者需求理性,行业内价格、新产品竞争激烈。最后,从政府的角度对我国轿车行业发展提出相应的结论和对策。     

浅析改进后的“五种竞争力量”模型

企业所面临的竞争越来越激烈,波特的"五种竞争力量"模型,一直是企业进行行业竞争分析和制定竞争战略的基础。中国学者借助网络分析的方法,在波特竞争模型基础上将互补产品这一因素纳入分析范畴,建立了改进后的"五种竞争力量"模型。本文对这两种模型进行了比较分析,改进后的"五种竞争力量"模型克服了原有竞争力量模型中静态和孤立的特点,使得行业竞争结构分析可以在动态和联系的基础上进行,并且可以在更宽的视野下,分析企业所面临的竞争状况,调整企业的战略。     

自然垄断行业的政府价格管制

政府价格管制问题一直是经济学界研究的重点,其中自然垄断行业的价格管制问题是政府价格管制研究的核心.该不该管制以及如何管制一直是政府面临的两大问题.根据自然垄断行业价格管制理论,自然垄断的类型可区分为强、弱自然垄断,政府对自然垄断行业的价格管制,应遵循成本约束、有利企业、投资增长、确定适当管理价格调整周期原则,以经济原理为原则,通过区域间比较竞争规制方式制定价格,探索建立多元化的价格管理方式.     

乳制品行业竞争状况分析及预测

为了了解中国乳制品行业现状,笔者通过收集乳制品行业的几个巨头的资料,运用五力模型及竞争情报搜集的基本理论等对近些年来中国的乳制品行业进行行业分析,分析行业的状况及行业未来的发展趋势、遇到的挑战和机遇,为奶制品企业制定和修改企业经营目标提供一定的资料。     

城市居民用水需求弹性实证分析

本文运用相关的经济计量模型,结合青岛市的居民用水情况,对城市居民生活用水的需求弹性进行了实证分析,并将实证分析结果与部分学者的相关研究成果做了比较分析。实证分析结果表明,包含污水处理费在内的水价的杠杆作用较大,无论是需求价格弹性还是需求收入弹性都要高于不含污水处理费的估算值。     

中外运动服装企业供应链比较研究——以耐克和李宁为例

随着社会发展和技术进步,企业之间的竞争已经从企业个体的核心竞争力之间的竞争,逐步发展成为企业整体供应链之间的竞争。本文在探讨运动服装行业的本质、基于微笑曲线的物流与供应链、费舍尔的供应链匹配模型等理论基础上归纳总结了运动服装企业的供应链特性,进而运用定性与定量的相关指标,对耐克公司和李宁公司进行了供应链的综合比较分析,由此提出国内运动服装企业供应链发展的相应对策。     

我国铁路行业价格管制的负面效应分析

我国铁路企业的价格管制由来已久,随着时代的发展,其自然垄断特性不断降低。在这种情况下,本文主要通过定性分析方法对铁路行业进行垄断维持基础上的价格管制的负面影响进行分析和论证,辨明铁路行业的价格管制对消费者,铁路企业和国家带来了极大损失。因此,放开行政性的价格管制,促进铁路行业的竞争刻不容缓。     

考虑质量与参考效应的价格竞争模型研究

价格是企业最常用的竞争策略，本文在需求价格函数的基础上，考虑消费者对质量与价格的参考效应，构建寡头价格竞争模型，分析模型参数变化对均衡结果的影响。研究结果发现，均衡价格与技术能力负相关，均衡市场需求和均衡利润与自身技术能力正相关，与竞争对手的技术能力负相关，且技术能力对均衡结果的影响存在边际效应递减特征。研究结果解释了行业技术进步带来的价格下降趋势，也从技术能力角度揭示了企业间的竞争行为，为企业制定竞争策略提供理论参考。     

基于损失函数的物流服务价格竞争模型

对完全信息静态博弈价格竞争模型和损失函数进行相关分析 ,得到两个第三方物流企业在不同的服务承诺下的价格竞争模型 ,为物流企业进行定价决策提供了依据。国内物流企业需要采取差异化的竞争战略 ,针对客户的不同需求 ,制定与竞争者不同的服务策略和价格策略     

Informality,Size and Regulation: Theory and an Application to Egypt

The paper shows how, when the enforceability of regulationsis size-sensitive, price competition can lock firms into informality and,thus, smallness, depending on the form of the production function. In thatcontext, exogenous "help" packages targeted to informal firms "promote"micro and small enterprises (i.e., increase their numbers) but do not"develop" them (i.e., foster their growth). The "help" only generates ashort-term span of abnormal profits for existing informal firms, and a long-term income transfer toward informal-market consumers. The model istested in the context of Egypt's micro and small enterprise sector.     

Input Pricing and Market Share Delegation in a Vertically Related Market: Is the Timing Order Relevant?

This paper adds to the literature on the strategic use of managers’ contracts in competition by examining whether market‐share delegation, in which managers receive rewards based on a combination of profits and market share, and the order of moves affect input pricing in a vertically related market. It shows that: (i) input pricing is not affected by delegation form and the order of moves between upstream and downstream firms under quantity competition; (ii) downstream firms obtain the same profit as in the simple Nash equilibrium regardless of delegation forms in a delegation–input price–quantity competition game; and (iii) the upstream monopolist will set input price beforehand regardless of the delegation form. Since the outcomes in our model create higher quantity and lower price in a Cournot product market, it lessens the double‐marginalization problem in such a vertically separated industry.     

Vertical Product Differentiation and Advertising

A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number of distinct market segments to enter and price. Informative advertising is used to overcome consumer ignorance about brands. In contrast to many existing models in which firms engage in price competition, the subgame perfect equilibria of the game are not characterised by the production of vertically differentiated products. Further, whilst the firms typically produce identical high quality products, in some circumstances the production of homogeneous low quality brands can be an equilibrium strategy.     

Markups,import competition and exporting

This paper analyses the relationship between markups and international trade at the firm level using a large sample of French manufacturing firms for the period 1995–2007. In particular, the paper investigates the effect of increasing import competition from China on firms' price–cost margins and the way in which exporting interacts with this effect. The results show robust evidence that firms in more direct competition with Chinese imports decrease their markups. However, firms that become exporters experience a smaller reduction in their price–cost margins. Consistent with these findings, the results also show that firms facing tougher competition from China are more likely to start exporting to avoid such competitive pressures.     

Impact of personalization and privacy concerns on information disclosure and pricing

Advances in IT have enabled some firms to offer personalized products according to the private information disclosed by consumers, while others are still offering standardized products, which brings about asymmetric competition. For consumers, disclosing private information for personalized products leads to reduced misfit cost as well as privacy loss. To illuminate the impact of consumers' trade-off between the benefit of information disclosure and the associated privacy concerns on firms' asymmetric price competition, we consider a setting where only one firm is capable of product personalization based on consumers' personal information. The capable firm makes a profit from selling the product and monetizing consumers' information. We demonstrate that as the capable firm becomes more adept at personalization, he may raise or lower the price depending on his profit foci, and an improvement in his capability does not always guarantee a higher profit. Counterintuitively, an increase in the unit misfit cost (i.e., greater product differentiation) can, under certain circumstances, intensity price competition, making both firms worse off and leading to higher consumer surplus. We also show that when consumers are more privacy-concerned, there exists an indirect effect that weakens the impact of an increase in price on the monetization of consumers’ information, and hence price competition can be mitigated and both firms can be better off. Furthermore, we demonstrate that product personalization with misfit-reducing effect always increases consumer surplus under the asymmetric competition. Our findings provide firms and policy-makers with great managerial insights.     

The impact of trade on aggregate productivity and welfare with heterogeneous firms and business cycle uncertainty

This paper presents a model with monopolistic competition, productively heterogeneous firms, and business cycle aggregate shocks. With firm-specific productive heterogeneity, weaker firms quit when faced with a negative aggregate shock. Consequently, trade does not always increase firm-level aggregate productivity as negative shocks on the home market can be compensated for by positive shocks elsewhere. Weaker firms, which would otherwise quit in autarky, can continue to operate by exporting. Despite this, trade can still improve welfare for the risk-averse consumer by reducing aggregate price fluctuations.     

Product market competition and access to credit

In this paper, we unveil a disregarded benefit of product market competition for firms. We introduce the probability of bankruptcy in a simple model where firms compete à la Cournot and apply for collateralized bank loans to undertake productive investments. We show that the number of competitors and the existence of outsiders willing to acquire the productive assets of distressed incumbents affect the equilibrium share of investment financed by bank credit. Using a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we found evidence showing that the degree of product market competition is positively correlated with the share of investment financed by bank credit only when outsiders are absent.     

Who should practice price discrimination using rebates in an asymmetric duopoly?

Price discrimination is generally thought to improve firm profits by allowing firms to extract more consumer surplus. In competition, however, price discrimination may also be costly to the firm because restrictive incentive compatibility conditions may allow the competing firm to gain market share at the discriminating firm’s expense. Therefore, with asymmetric competition, it may be the case that one firm would let the other firm assume the burden of price discrimination. We investigate optimal segmentation in a market with two asymmetric firms and two heterogeneous consumer segments that differ in the importance of price and product attributes. In particular, we investigate second-degree price discrimination under competition with explicit incentive compatibility constraints thus extending prior work in marketing and economics. Focusing on the managerial implications, we explore whether it would be profitable for either or both firms to pursue a segmentation strategy using rebates as a mechanism. We identify conditions under which one or both firms would want to pursue such segmentation. We find that segmentation lessens competition for the less price-sensitive consumer segment and that this results in higher profits to both firms. A key to understanding this result is that segmentation leads to consumer remixing. We establish the key result that if firms are asymmetric in their attractiveness to consumers, the disadvantaged firm in our model is more likely to pursue a segmentation strategy than its rival in equilibrium. We then ask whether this result prevails in practice. To this end, we explore competitive segmentation empirically and are able to verify that disadvantaged firms indeed pursue segmentation through rebates with greater likelihood.     

Sequential Product Design

I consider a model of duopoly where firms make sequential product design changes prior to price competition. I show that a socially desirable outcome is possible in this model. In equilibrium, the leader's product is less specific, implying a customer attraction strategy, and the follower's product is more specific, implying a customer retention strategy. This outcome is in contrast with the equilibrium outcome of a similar model, where simultaneous design competition takes place prior to price competition. In this latter model, the product designs are more specific and the prices are higher in equilibrium, leading to a reduction in welfare. I compare the design incentives under price competition with those in models where price collusion or merger is expected and with multi-product monopoly. In models with no price competition, less specific designs may serve to attract more customers, to improve current or future pie of monopoly profits, or to improve the outside option in bargaining game, depending on the model.