Bending the rules,breaking the rules: How corruption and lobbying affect the investment market selection of Swedish firms

There is stark evidence that many policies which influence firm gains from engaging in FDI (such as tax and trade policies) are targeted by lobbying groups and that corruption can be an important determinant of market attractiveness. The scarce research that exists on firm behaviour, corruption and lobbying shows that these activities can be regarded as alternative, and interdependent, influence forms. This paper provides the novel contribution of investigating how the market infiltration of corruption and lobbying affects the firm's investment decision. We identify the interdependent effects using census data for Swedish manufacturing firms that allows a complete identification of the firm's market selection. Our results reveal that these private–public sector links influence the firm's investment decision differently, as market selection is deterred by corruption and stimulated by lobbying, and that they function as substitutes. We show that the stimulating lobbying effect largely can be attributed to its interdependency with corruption, which suggests that firms are more shielded from corruption in lobbying environments. Further investigation reveals that the corruption and lobbying effects are not always representative of larger firms: The largest firms are undeterred by corruption in markets where lobbying forms an integral part of the business environment and larger firms are not stimulated by lobbying in markets largely void of corruption.     

Board gender diversity and firm performance: The moderating role of firm size

This paper investigates the relationships among board gender diversity, firm performance, and firm size. Our paper provides new insights into the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance by examining whether firm size alters the impact of board gender diversity on firm performance. We use a panel data from A-share-listed non-financial firms in China to examine the relationship during the period of 2007–2012. Our finding demonstrates that the gender diversity on the board has a positive impact on firm performance if and only if the value of firm size is less than some critical value. In addition, we also find that firm size may undermine the positive impact of board gender diversity on firm performance. This paper contributes to the literature by offering a contingency approach to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance as well as shedding light on the relationship in the context of a developing economy.     

The value impact of international and industrial diversifications on public‐listed firms in Malaysia

This study examines the relationship between firm value and both international and industrial diversification involvements for a sample of 267 listed firms in Malaysia over 2001–2009. We find no evidence that international diversification has any significant impact on the firm value but industry diversification locally slightly increases firm value, even after controlling for the degree of ownership concentration. Our research further indicates that without any diversification involvement, family ownership presents lower value than foreign and government ownerships; and with industrial diversification family ownership presents significant higher value than foreign and government ownerships.     

Policy takers or policy makers? The lobbying of global banking regulators

Do financial sector groups act as passive policy takers, or do they ‘shape’ the policies to which they are subject? This article responds to this question with three arguments pertaining to the policy shaping power of the financial industry when it comes to international financial standards. First, industry groups confront a number of additional challenges when it comes to lobbying international regulatory bodies, which tend to be more opaque in their decision making and more difficult to hold accountable when they make unpopular decisions. Second, while these groups are sometimes able to shape financial regulatory policy, the extent of this influence is more partial and contingent than most depictions suggest. The third argument advanced is that since the global financial crisis, business groups have had many of their traditional lobbying tools adversely affected, making lobbying a more uphill battle than before. Financial industry groups are able to influence the governance of their own activities and act as ‘policy shapers’ some of the time, but are less strongly positioned in this role than many existing depictions seem to suggest.     

On the optimal mix of corporate hedging instruments: Linear versus nonlinear derivatives

We examine how corporations should choose their optimal mix of linear and nonlinear derivatives. We present a model in which a firm facing both quantity (output) and price (market) risk maximizes its expected profits when subjected to financial distress costs. The optimal hedging position generally is comprised of linear contracts, but as the levels of quantity and price‐risk increase, the use of linear contracts will decline due to the risks associated with overhedging. At the same time, a substitution effect occurs toward the use of nonlinear contracts. The degree of substitution will depend on the correlation between output levels and prices. Our model also allows us to provide insight into the relation between a firm's derivatives usage and its transaction‐cost structure. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:217–239, 2003     

Firm performance and boardroom gender diversity: A quantile regression approach

We investigate the relation between firm performance and boardroom gender diversity using quantile regression methods. Using annual data on over 3000 US firms from 2007 to 2014, we show that the presence of women on the board has a positive effect on firm performance, and this effect varies at different parts of the performance distribution. Critically, we demonstrate that the presence of women directors alters the dispersion of firm performance. Our quantile regression results suggest that female directors have a significantly larger positive impact in high-performing firms relative to low-performing firms. The board gender diversity effect is not homogeneous as assumed in previous research. In addition, we account for the endogenous selection of women to the board. Using instrumental variable quantile regression, we find that in general there is a positive correlation between firm performance and board gender diversity. Overall, we suggest that boardroom gender diversity has an effect on both the conditional mean and the dispersion of firm performance, and quantile regression adds value to the empirical examination of the performance impact of board gender diversity.     

An empirical analysis of the relationship between hedge ratio and hedging horizon using wavelet analysis

In this article, optimal hedge ratios are estimated for different hedging horizons for 23 different futures contracts using wavelet analysis. The wavelet analysis is chosen to avoid the sample reduction problem faced by the conventional methods when applied to non‐overlapping return series. Hedging performance comparisons between the wavelet hedge ratio and error‐correction (EC) hedge ratio indicate that the latter performs better for more contracts for shorter hedging horizons. However, the performance of the wavelet hedge ratio improves with the increase in the length of the hedging horizon. This is true for both within‐sample and out‐of‐sample cases. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:127–150, 2007     

Protection and jobs: explaining the structure of trade barriers across industries

This paper develops a model of protection and tests it using US data, including new protection measures. We find that protection in an industry increases with its employment but not with its level of output. We also find that lobbying entails significant transactions costs. We have limited evidence that industry characteristics, such as the number of firms and geographical concentration, affect protection. Nested tests imply that assuming lump-sum rebating of import revenues or rents is justified. The results also suggest that US policy makers weight a dollar of campaign contributions about 15% more heavily than a dollar of national income.     

‘Dollar’ debt in Colombian firms: are sinners punished during devaluations?

During the 1990s, the performance of several emerging economies was linked to their access to foreign capital. Colombia was no exception, experiencing a boom and bust cycle associated with an initial period of real exchange rate appreciation followed by a sharp depreciation. Although several studies have discussed the recent underperformance of the Colombian economy, few attempts have been made at analyzing firm-level data. We rely on information for a large sample of firms during 1995–2001 and examine the determinants of foreign indebtedness and the effects on firm performance of holding dollar debt amid real depreciations (i.e. the so-called ‘balance sheet effect’). In our data set, matching does seem to take place to the extent that firms in more open sectors and exporting firms have higher shares of dollar debt. Our estimations also reveal a negative balance sheet effect on firms’ profitability, while the effect on investment is generally not significant.     

Transmission of Risk-Averse Behavior in Small Firms

Small-sized firms are typically more entrepreneurial and engage in more innovation and risk-taking behavior. For that reason they are considered the engines of future economic growth. One policy for stimulating such activity is to provide government contracts for small firms. However, such contracts as typically written result in increased risk-averse behavior on the part of small firms out of a desire by government officials to shift the risk to the firms. This, in turn results in a reduced level of innovative and entrepreneurial activity. To eliminate the disincentive to engage in innovation and entrepreneurial activity, government needs to bear the risk associated with such contracts. One possible solution, given the natural risk aversion of elected officials, is to engage in a portfolio approach to small firm contracts by which the government can diversify away some of the risk.     

The political economy of non‐tariff measures

This paper examines the extent to which non‐tariff measures (NTM s) are set for protectionist purposes. Our main focus is on developing countries. Overall results show that NTM s reflect protectionist forces, in particular for those that have been subject to trade concerns at the World Trade Organization (WTO ). For the other measures, there is no evidence that protectionism is the driving force behind their adoption, suggesting that their determinants may be associated with legitimate goals such as consumer health and safety. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the participation of national business groups at the Ministerial Conferences—the highest authority of the WTO —is positively associated with the probability of adopting NTM s.     

Firm heterogeneity and aggregate business services exports: Micro evidence from Belgium,France, Germany and Spain

This paper uses detailed micro data on services exports at the firm–destination–service level to analyse the role of firm heterogeneity in shaping aggregate services exports in Belgium, France, Germany and Spain from 2003 to 2007. We decompose the level and the growth of aggregate services exports into different trade margins paying special attention to firm heterogeneity within countries. We find that the weak export growth of France is at least partly due to poor performance by small exporters. By contrast, small exporters are the most dynamic contributors to the aggregate exports of Belgium, Germany and Spain. Our results highlight the importance of firm heterogeneity in understanding aggregate export growth.     

Outside directors,firm life cycle,corporate financial decisions and firm performance

We investigate whether directors with multiple outside board directorships are related to corporate financial strategy across firm life cycle stages. Using a large sample of firms from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, we find that when the number of directors with multiple board seats increases, firms' level of cash holdings rises, capital expenditure declines, selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses increase, and firm performance decreases. We further demonstrate how the relationship varies across different stages of their life cycle. Our findings have significant implications for policy makers, regulators and stockholders in GCC countries and in other emerging markets.     

我国信息技术投资对企业盈利性的影响

本文通过分析影响利润的主营业务收入与费用支出,研究了我国上市公司IT投资对企业净利润的影响及其滞后效果,发现IT投资对主营业务收入的增长有显著且持续的作用,但IT投资也带来了企业费用的增加;IT对净利润的贡献逐年递增,在投资后第三年呈现显著效果;与此同时,IT投资对这几项经营指标的影响远远大于非IT投资。另外,在行业差异的分析中发现非制造业企业的IT投资绩效明显好于制造业企业,可带来持续显著的主营业务收入与净利润的增长。     

中外合资企业控制权分配与绩效关系的实证研究

合资企业契约的不完备性决定了控制问题是合资企业的核心问题,合理的控制权结构可以帮助合资企业的母公司实现自己的战略目标,并且保持竞争优势。与之前研究不同的是,本文通过引入分割控制的概念,利用106家中外合资企业的数据对控制权分配与绩效之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,合资企业的中方只对某些经营活动进行控制的分割控制,最有利于合资企业的中方实现战略意图。     

Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm

We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. the duopoly comprises a typical managerial firm with a sales delegation and a socially responsible firm (CSR firm) with a linear combination of social welfare and quantity as its managerial delegation contract. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium market structure changes from the case wthere both firms adopt sales delegation contracts to the case wthere one of the firms becomes a CSR firm, after the owners of the firms select their strategic contracts. We show that two market structures that are asymmetric with respect to their strategic contracts can become equilibrium market structures under the pure strategic contract class. Furthermore, we consider a unique mixed strategy equilibrium to examine how the risk domination between the two asymmetric equilibrium market structures affects equilibrium selection. there, we find that the competition wthere the firm with the sales delegation and the CSR firm have a price contract and a quantity contract, respectively, risk-dominates the competition wthere the firms have a quantity contract and a price contract, respectively. Finally, by deriving the order of social welfare among the four subgames, we show that the social incentive does not coincide with the private incentive in the robust equilibrium with respect to risk domination in the endogenous selection game of the strategic contracts of the asymmetric duopoly with the firm with a sales delegation and the CSR firm.     

Executive Entrenchment in Founder‐Managed Firms: An Empirical Study from China

We study the relationship between past firm performance, ownership concentration, board independence, and industry competition on the likelihood of dismissal for both founder and nonfounder executives using a panel data set of Chinese founded firms during 1999–2007. Results indicate a persistent presence of entrenchment of founder executives. Compared with the founder, the nonfounder executive is more likely to be dismissed following periods of poor firm performance combined with ownership concentration and board independence except under high levels of industry competition when founder executives are more likely to be held accountable through dismissal by independent boards.     

Protective Excise Taxation

In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. Excise taxes may emerge in political equilibrium when domestic firms and unions lobby for protection and the government is unable to use alternative protective policies because of international agreements. In so far as the government is prepared to exchange tax revenues for political contributions, under some conditions the excise tax rate will be higher than the one chosen without lobbying.     

Government Contracts and Contractor Behavior

The U.S. government embraces the concepts of privatization and market competition, but the realm of contracting shows that it has not always been able to put its principles into practice. Although the contracting system is supposed to be open and competitive, in recent years the government has often awarded contracts with little or no competitive bidding, has chosen to award mostly cost-plus type contracts that force the government to assume more of the risk, and lacked efficiency in monitoring and overseeing private contractors. While the number and value of contracts have increased, the workforce to oversee these contracts has been reduced, preventing the government from adequately enforcing compliance with the contractors, and the government has not made use of past performance evaluations in its contracting system. Private contractors that do business with the U.S. government are for the most part well-established firms with ample resources and inside contacts; many contracts are still being awarded on preferential treatment and to the larger and well-established contractors.     

政府补贴与股价崩盘风险

本文以中国A股市场2007－2014年上市公司的数据为样本,基于企业寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响,旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系;在制度环境水平较低的地区,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;在产业政策支持的行业,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;进一步分析表明,企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明,管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。