The role of the entrepreneurial encounter in the emergence of opportunities: Vallée’s Dallas Buyers Club

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explore the conceptual potential of the Deleuzian notion of the encounter in order to better understand the genealogy of opportunities. We adopt a processual perspective of opportunities. In order to translate this notion to the domain of entrepreneurship, we analysed and interpreted Jean-Marc Vallée’s Dallas Buyers Club. This film follows the creation of the first club in the United States that illegally allowed HIV-positive people to supply themselves with foreign antiretroviral drugs from Mexico or Japan. The article highlights encounters in this process that disturb the entrepreneur’s belief systems and allow him or her to be open to potential opportunity. It finally explores how the encounter may improve our understanding of the political becoming of opportunities within the entrepreneurial process.     

Money and Information

This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fraction of high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange, but not because it saves information costs.     

Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. Received: 11 December 2003, Accepted: 29 July 2005 JEL Classification: D41, D43, D51 We thank (without implicating) Prof. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Cuong Le Van for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of Calyon.     

Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment

To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist.     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

Are there major differences in the attitudes and service quality of standard and seasonal employees? An empirical examination and implications for practice

Despite the increased use of seasonal employees by organizations, few studies have been completed on the attitudes and service quality of seasonal office workers. Using Lautsch's classification model, we analyzed the organizational context in which the standard and seasonal workers in this study were employed. Hypotheses were developed based upon the organizational analysis and social exchange theory. Results from archival data obtained from a web‐based organizational survey of 205 clerical and professional workers indicated contrary to expectations, standard and seasonal employees did not significantly differ in terms of perceptions of overall job conditions, perceived organizational support (POS), or job engagement. However, seasonal employees did report significantly fewer opportunities to work on challenging tasks, less comfortable physical working conditions, and less job security than the standard workers. As predicted, standard employees reported significantly higher levels of service quality performance than seasonal employees. Additionally, job engagement mediated the relationship between POS and service quality for both the standard and seasonal employees. Implications for managing seasonal employees are discussed.     

互联互通——竞争力的关键 加强亚欧航空互联互通,促进双方经济社会关系

<正>航空互联互通——竞争力的关键航空互联互通在当今经济全球化中起着至关重要的作用。对亚欧而言,要想从各自的发展潜力中获利,在双方的经济中心区域建立频繁可靠、方便快捷的航空联系则变得至关重要。保持良好的航空互联互通,是保障亚欧各城市和各区域处于强有力竞争力位置的基本要素。不必讶异,无论是在地方、国家甚至国际的政策讨论中,互联互通都是一个越来越重要的话题。例如,伦敦某机场在讨论新增跑道时,连通新兴市     

In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area

This paper applies the DSGE‐VAR methodology to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in the data and the relative contributions of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks, namely hand‐to‐mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Econometric experiments show that a DSGE model with Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy as it yields dynamic responses close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE‐VAR model (i.e. an impact output multiplier larger than one and a crowding‐in of private consumption). The estimated share of hand‐to‐mouth consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who produces for whom in the world economy?

Abstract For two decades, the share of trade in inputs, also called vertical trade, has been dramatically increasing. In reallocating trade flows to their original input‐producing industries and countries, this paper suggests a new measure of international trade: ‘value‐added trade’ and makes it possible to answer the question ‘who produces for whom?’ In 2004, 27% of international trade was vertical trade. The industrial and geographic patterns of value‐added trade are very different from those of standard trade. Value‐added trade is relatively less important in regional trade but the difference is not more important for Asia than for America.     

Does the Quality of Institutions Limit the MENA's Integration in the World Economy?

Using a large sample of countries over the 1990s, this paper examines the extent to which institutions’ functioning disables a greater participation of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the world economy. It focuses on the impact on manufactured exports and FDI attractiveness and considers a broad index of political risk as well as indices targeted toward specific aspects of governance (corruption, government effectiveness and the rule of law). The results are robust to different econometric approaches and lend strong support to the hypothesis that the functioning of institutions may disable the participation of MENA countries in the world economy. They suggest that the impact of an improvement in the quality of institutions may result in a sensitive increase of FDI inflows and manufactured exports. That increase is comparable to the one resulting from liberalisation policies. Hence, although institutional reforms can take time, they deserve the necessary efforts given their outcomes as compared to other reforms.