Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Semiparametric tests of conditional moment restrictions under weak or partial identification

We propose two new semiparametric specification tests which test whether a vector of conditional moment conditions is satisfied for any vector of parameter values θ₀. Unlike most existing tests, our tests are asymptotically valid under weak and/or partial identification and can accommodate discontinuities in the conditional moment functions. Our tests are moreover consistent provided that identification is not too weak. We do not require the availability of a consistent first step estimator. Like Robinson [Robinson, Peter M., 1987. Asymptotically efficient estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. Econometrica 55, 875–891] and many others in similar problems subsequently, we use k-nearest neighbor (knn) weights instead of kernel weights. The advantage of using knn weights is that local power is invariant to transformations of the instruments and that under strong point identification computation of the test statistic yields an efficient estimator of θ₀ as a byproduct.     

-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model

Q-learning is a reinforcement learning model from the field of artificial intelligence. We study the use of Q-learning for modeling the learning behavior of firms in repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Based on computer simulations, we show that Q-learning firms generally learn to collude with each other, although full collusion usually does not emerge. We also present some analytical results. These results provide insight into the underlying mechanism that causes collusive behavior to emerge. Q-learning is one of the few learning models available that can explain the emergence of collusive behavior in settings in which there is no punishment mechanism and no possibility for explicit communication between firms.     

Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price

We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a dominant strategy, we find that bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in the fixed price mechanism. For some parameter values we find that the fixed price mechanism outperforms the auction.     

Maximizing bidder surplus in simultaneous online art auctions via dynamic forecasting

This paper presents a novel intelligent bidding system, called SOABER (Simultaneous Online Auction BiddER), which monitors simultaneous online auctions of high-value fine art items. It supports decision-making by maximizing bidders’ surpluses and their chances of winning an auction. One key element of the system is a dynamic forecasting model, which incorporates information about the speed of an auction’s price movement, as well as the level of competition both within and across auctions. Other elements include a wallet estimator, which gauges the bidders’ willingness to pay, and a bid strategizer, which embeds the forecasting model into a fully automated decision system. We illustrate the performance of our intelligent bidding system on an authentic dataset of online art auctions for Indian contemporary art. We compare our system with several simpler ad-hoc approaches, and find it to be more effective in terms of both the extracted surplus and the resulting winning percentage.     

Exact and asymptotic tests for possibly non-regular hypotheses on stochastic volatility models

We study the problem of testing hypotheses on the parameters of one- and two-factor stochastic volatility models (SV), allowing for the possible presence of non-regularities such as singular moment conditions and unidentified parameters, which can lead to non-standard asymptotic distributions. We focus on the development of simulation-based exact procedures–whose level can be controlled in finite samples–as well as on large-sample procedures which remain valid under non-regular conditions. We consider Wald-type, score-type and likelihood-ratio-type tests based on a simple moment estimator, which can be easily simulated. We also propose a C(α)-type test which is very easy to implement and exhibits relatively good size and power properties. Besides usual linear restrictions on the SV model coefficients, the problems studied include testing homoskedasticity against a SV alternative (which involves singular moment conditions under the null hypothesis) and testing the null hypothesis of one factor driving the dynamics of the volatility process against two factors (which raises identification difficulties). Three ways of implementing the tests based on alternative statistics are compared: asymptotic critical values (when available), a local Monte Carlo (or parametric bootstrap) test procedure, and a maximized Monte Carlo (MMC) procedure. The size and power properties of the proposed tests are examined in a simulation experiment. The results indicate that the C(α)-based tests (built upon the simple moment estimator available in closed form) have good size and power properties for regular hypotheses, while Monte Carlo tests are much more reliable than those based on asymptotic critical values. Further, in cases where the parametric bootstrap appears to fail (for example, in the presence of identification problems), the MMC procedure easily controls the level of the tests. Moreover, MMC-based tests exhibit relatively good power performance despite the conservative feature of the procedure. Finally, we present an application to a time series of returns on the Standard and Poor’s Composite Price Index.     

He who must not be named

Landsberger et al. have studied a sealed bid first price auction with two players in which the ranking of the valuations is known. They argue that such a situation can arise in a sequential auction where only the name of the winner is revealed. In this paper we consider sequential auctions where two identical goods are sold sequentially to N players who are interested in both objects. In sealed bid auctions, no information is a priori revealed by the mechanism, but the seller can in principle reveal whatever he wants. We restrict our attention to the case where only the name of the winner is revealed to be in the context of Landsberger et al. for the second auction. The aim of the paper is to compare such a sequential auction with a simultaneous auction where both goods are sold as a bundle or equivalently with a sequential auction where no information is revealed. We first show that there exists an equilibrium of the sequential game in pure and monotone strategies. Then, the comparison of the seller's expected revenue in the two cases allows us to conclude that contrary to Landsberger et al.'s predictions, the seller can not use the information to increase his revenue. This result is obtained using simulations for a large class of distribution functions. The seller must not reveal the name of the winner between the two auctions and instead sell both goods using a simultaneous auction.Received: 31 July 2001, Accepted: 5 February 2003, JEL Classification: B44I wish to thank Laurent Linnemer, Thomas Ricke, Michael Visser and Shmuel Zamir for helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the referees and the associated editors in charge of my paper.     

Heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial correlation robust inference in linear panel models with fixed-effects

This paper develops an asymptotic theory for test statistics in linear panel models that are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and/or spatial correlation. Two classes of standard errors are analyzed. Both are based on nonparametric heteroskedasticity autocorrelation (HAC) covariance matrix estimators. The first class is based on averages of HAC estimators across individuals in the cross-section, i.e. “averages of HACs”. This class includes the well known cluster standard errors analyzed by Arellano (1987) as a special case. The second class is based on the HAC of cross-section averages and was proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). The ”HAC of averages” standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and spatial correlation but weak dependence in the time dimension is required. The “averages of HACs” standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation including the nonstationary case but they are not valid in the presence of spatial correlation. The main contribution of the paper is to develop a fixed-b asymptotic theory for statistics based on both classes of standard errors in models with individual and possibly time fixed-effects dummy variables. The asymptotics is carried out for large time sample sizes for both fixed and large cross-section sample sizes. Extensive simulations show that the fixed-b approximation is usually much better than the traditional normal or chi-square approximation especially for the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The use of fixed-b critical values will lead to more reliable inference in practice especially for tests of joint hypotheses.     

Efficiency and information aggregation in auctions with costly information

Consider an auction in which k identical objects are sold to n > k bidders who each have a value for one object which can have both private and common components to it. Private information concerning the common component of the object is not exogenously given, but rather endogenous and bidders face a cost to becoming informed. If the cost of information is not prohibitively high, then the equilibrium price in a uniform price auction will not aggregate private information, in contrast to the costless information case. Moreover, for a wide class of auctions if the cost of information is not prohibitively high then the objects can only be allocated in a weakly efficient sense, and then only if the equilibrium proportion of endogenously informed agents is vanishing as the economy grows. In spite of these results, it is shown that there is a mechanism for which there exist equilibria and for which (weak) efficiency is achieved as the economy grows in the face of endogenous information acquisition.Received: 6 August 2001, Accepted: 27 July 2002, JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82Financial support under NSF grant SBR-9507912 is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Valentina Bali for conversations out of which this project grew, and Larry Ausubel for a very helpful discussion of an early version of this paper at the 1998 summer meetings of the Econometric Society from which I have borrowed in structuring the exposition of the paper. I also thank Andy Postlewaite, Jeroen Swinkels, and an associate editor and anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.     

A note on strategies for bandit problems with infinitely many arms

A bandit problem consisting of a sequence of n choices (n) from a number of infinitely many Bernoulli arms is considered. The parameters of Bernoulli arms are independent and identically distributed random variables from a common distribution F on the interval [0,1] and F is continuous with F(0)=0 and F(1)=1. The goal is to investigate the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies, and obtain a lower bound for the expected failure proportion over all strategies presented in Berry et al. (1997). We show that the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies when 0<b1 and a lower bound can be evaluated if the limit of the ratio F(1)–F(t) versus (1–t)^b exists as t1^– for some b>0.     

Top-<Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-lists

Top-k-lists are introduced as sequences of k-dimensional random vectors with ordered components being k largest observations from a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables. Such lists changing in time are natural stochastic models of ranking tables which appear in many situations in real life, when one wants to keep a track of several best results in a given field. Here we study basic properties of top-k-lists as joint distributions, conditional structures, representations, driving examples of top-k-lists from exponential and uniform distributions, asymptotics and a relation to generalized order statistics.     

Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders

We study a keyword auction model where bidders have constrained budgets. In the absence of budget constraints, Edelman et al. (Am Econ Rev 97(1):242–259, 2007) and Varian (Int J Ind Organ 25(6):1163–1178, 2007) analyze “locally envy-free equilibrium” or “symmetric Nash equilibrium” bidding strategies in generalized second-price auctions. However, bidders often have to set their daily budgets when they participate in an auction; once a bidder’s payment reaches his budget, he drops out of the auction. This raises an important strategic issue that has been overlooked in the previous literature: Bidders may change their bids to inflict higher prices on their competitors because under generalized second-price, the per-click price paid by a bidder is the next highest bid. We provide budget thresholds under which equilibria analyzed in Edelman et al. (Am Econ Rev 97(1):242–259, 2007) and Varian (Int J Ind Organ 25(6):1163–1178, 2007) are sustained as “equilibria with budget constraints” in our setting. We then consider a simple environment with one position and two bidders and show that a search engine’s revenue with budget constraints may be larger than its revenue without budget constraints.     

Evaluation of inequivalent projections of Hadamard matrices of order 24

Screening designs are useful for situations where a large number of factors (q) is examined but only few (k) of these are expected to be important. It is of practical interest for a given k to know all the inequivalent projections of the design into the k dimensions. In this paper we give all the (combinatorially) inequivalent projections of inequivalent Hadamard matrices of order 24 into k=3,4 and 5 dimensions, as well as their frequencies. Then, we sort these projections according to their generalized resolution, generalized aberration and centered L₂-discrepancy measure of uniformity. Then, we study the hidden projection properties of these designs as they are introduced by Wang and Wu (1995). The hidden projection property suggests that complex aliasing allows some interactions to be estimated without making additional runs.     

On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry

We study a variation of Myerson’s (1981) model in which we allow for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In our set-up, an appropriate reserve price in a standard auction maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue. However, entry fees can be optimal only under some special conditions. Basically, there must be some homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the number of bidders and the auctioneer must know, to some extent, these beliefs.     

First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

Multi-level k-circulant Supersaturated Designs

In this paper we present a new method for constructing multi-level supersaturated designs with n rows, m columns and the equal occurrence property. We investigate the existence of multi-level supersaturated designs using a single generator vector and its k-cyclic permutations as rows. We find the conditions needed, in order this vector to generate a balanced supersaturated design. These conditions are simplified for the case of three level supersaturated designs. By using the proposed method three level supersaturated designs are constructed and explored. Moreover, many new, optimal and near optimal, multi-level supersaturated designs are provided as well.     

The asymptotic codifference and covariation of log-fractional stable noise

Many econometric quantities such as long-term risk can be modeled by Pareto-like distributions and may also display long-range dependence. If Pareto is replaced by Gaussian, then one can consider fractional Brownian motion whose increments, called fractional Gaussian noise, exhibit long-range dependence. There are many extensions of that process in the infinite variance stable case. Log-fractional stable noise (log-FSN) is a particularly interesting one. It is a stationary mean-zero stable process with infinite variance, parametrized by a tail index α$\alpha$ between 1 and 2, and hence with heavy tails. The lower the value of α$\alpha$, the heavier the tail of the marginal distributions. The fact that α$\alpha$ is less than 2 renders the variance infinite. Thus dependence between past and future cannot be measured using the correlation. There are other dependence measures that one can use, for instance the “codifference” or the “covariation”. Since log-FSN is a moving average and hence “mixing”, these dependence measures converge to zero as the lags between past and future become very large. The codifference, in particular, decreases to zero like a power function as the lag goes to infinity. Two parameters play an important role: (a) the value of the exponent, which depends on α$\alpha$ and measures the speed of the decay; (b) a multiplicative constant of asymptoticity c$c$ which depends also on α$\alpha$. In this paper, it is shown that for symmetric α$\alpha$-stable log-FSN, the constant c$c$ is positive and that the rate of decay of the codifference is such that one has long-range dependence. It is also proved that the same conclusion holds for the second measure of dependence, the covariation, which converges to zero with the same intensity and with a constant of asymptoticity which is positive as well.     

On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions

In a classical result, Milgrom (1981a) established that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) is a sufficient condition for the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions. We show: (1) If MLRP is violated, then for any number of bidders and objects there exists a distribution of the common value such that no increasing symmetric equilibrium exists; (2) If MLRP is violated, then for any distribution of the common value there exist infinitely many pairs of the number of bidders and the number of objects such that an increasing symmetric equilibrium does not exist; (3) There are examples where an increasing symmetric equilibrium exists even when the signal distribution violates MLRP.     

α-optimal sampling plans for lot-by-lot defects inspection

Investigations on acceptance sampling have attached rather few importance to defects inspection. For modern quality control, both the steadily increasing complexity of products and the need for differentiated cost calculation involve a clear demand for economic defects sampling in its practically most relevant form: lot-by-lot single sampling plans, where the OC (lot OC) is considered as a function of lot sizeN, sample sizen, acceptance numberc, number of defects in the lotK. Starting from an appropriate lot OC function, the present paper develops an economic cost and control model and an economic objective function for single defects sampling plans by adapting theα-optimal sampling scheme, introduced by E. von Collani for defectives inspection, to the purposes of defects inspection. A simple and accurate approximation ofα-optimal defects plans is derived by means of a Poisson approximation of the lot OC function.