Buyer cartels and private enforcement of antitrust policy

Collusion among buyers leads to social welfare losses, which provide the economic rationale for public enforcement of the antitrust law. This conduct also imposes losses on the victimized sellers, which provide the foundation for private enforcement through private damage actions. In this paper, we present a rigorous economic analysis of buyer cartels. This effort includes both full participation and partial conspiracies. We review the antitrust treatment of collusive monopsony in the United States, the European Union, and Asia, offer a measure of antitrust damages, and examine the necessary precision of the damage estimate. We also suggest that the proper use of modern econometrics should allay judicial concerns with speculation.     

Decision-making in the two-act antitrust decision problem

This paper focuses on the antitrust decision-making process as it pertains to anti-merger policy as a special case of the more general two-act decision problem. We employ the Analytic Hierarchy Process to analyze some prominent antitrust merger decision. The analysis suggests that the courts have failed to give potential competition its due when it acts to dampen any alleged market power accruing to the market leader, which in turn suggests that the defendants would be well advised to reorient the weight that they give to potential competition in designing their defense.     

The US Antitrust System and Recent Trends in Antitrust Enforcement

This paper provides a survey of recent research on the US antitrust system. First we provide an overview of the US antitrust system, describing the roles of the US Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and case law. Second, we provide a new econometric trend analysis on the enforcement of US antitrust law, showing that (1) enforcement demonstrates some trend behavior, as well as comovement with business cycles; (2) the time series of antitrust cases demonstrates two distinct episodes, which we characterize as 'pre-deregulation' and 'post-deregulation;' (3) the time series of government antitrust filings leads the time series of private antitrust filings. Finally, we describe recent economic research relevant to the area of antitrust and the impact of this research on US antitrust policy.     

Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms.     

Measuring populist discourse with semantic text analysis: an application on grassroots populist mobilization

Populism is a concept employed to qualify the political behavior of a large number of actors at a worldwide scale, with scientists classifying the latter into populists and non-populists according to dimensions such as ideology, strategy, discourse, economic policy, and even style. This article analyzes existing schools of thought on the nature of populism and argues that conceptualizing populism as a specific type of anti-elite discourse in the name of the People is both conceptually and methodologically the most coherent and useful way to understand the phenomenon. Additionally, it suggests discarding crude, dichotomous classification in favor of a gradated view of populist mobilization by means of quantifying populist discourse and observing its spatial and temporal variation. It adds value to current methods of measurement by demonstrating why and how clause-based semantic text analysis can provide optimal quantitative results while retaining qualitative elements for mixed-methods analysis. Aiming, moreover, at expanding the scope of populism studies by overcoming a narrow view that focuses exclusively at party system developments, it applies semantic text analysis to the study of grassroots mobilization during the Great Recession. Results point to the wide use of populist discourse on the part of movement activists seeking an inclusive language when framing disparate social grievances in a given constituency, a finding with important implications with regards to how populism can facilitate straddling the divide that purportedly distinguishes institutionalized party system behavior from the social movement milieu.     

And a populist New Year: global hopes and fears framework

• Get ready for more populist governments. There is now sufficiently widespread backing for global populism that at least one further victory in a major economy is very likely in the next year or so, our analysis of populist policies and support in 20 large economies shows.
• While there are no populist electoral front‐runners, many large economies have elections coming up in which populists have a decent chance of capturing sizeable votes. If you roll the dice enough times, the populist number is likely to come up somewhere – there is now around a 50% chance of a populist government in one key Eurozone country; bookmakers' odds suggest an even higher probability.
• Donald Trump's victory showed how market reaction to populism is hard to predict. Our survey provides a framework for assessing the diverse and complex channels.
• We see limited possibilities of Trump‐like, populist‐propelled fiscal expansions elsewhere in the world, which are typically market positive. Even where populist‐leaning politicians have a chance of power, they have shown little appetite for fiscal expansion.
• Globally, populist policies are focussed more on immigration, trade, and governance, which are typically market negative. As such, populist electoral victories would imply modest downward revisions to baseline growth forecasts and risk greater instability.
• Populist electoral victories in Europe would result in unsettling brinksmanship and provide an existential threat to the EU, though compromise is the most likely outcome and subsequent risks are two‐sided. For example, (i) reductions in free movement in labour could make Brexit softer; (ii) populism could challenge unhelpful pro‐cyclicality in the Stability and Growth Pact.

     

Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy

Although recognized as a defining feature of the current political era, populism and its implications for non-market strategy remain undertheorized. We offer a framework that (a) conceptualizes populism and its progression over time; (b) outlines the risks populism generates for firms; and (c) theorizes effective nonmarket strategies under populism. Our framework anchors the political risk profile of populism in three interdependent elements: anti-establishment ideology, de-institutionalization, and short-term policy bias. These elements jointly shape the policymaking dynamics and institutional risks for firms under populism. Our analysis shows how firms can calibrate two nonmarket strategies – political ties and corporate social responsibility – to mitigate populism-related risks. We specify how particular configurations of political ties and CSR activities, aimed at the populist leadership, bureaucrats, political opposition, and societal stakeholders, minimize risk under populism. Further, we theorize how the effectiveness of specific attributes of political ties and CSR – namely their relative covertness (more vs. less concealed) and their relative focus (narrowly vs. widely targeted) – varies as a function of firm type (insiders vs. outsiders) and the probability of populist regime collapse. Finally, we address how motivated reasoning may bias firms' assessments of regime fragility and resulting strategy choices.     

The wisdom of demagogues: institutions,corruption and support for authoritarian populists

This article analyses the drivers of support for authoritarian populist parties in Europe. Such parties claim to represent the interests of ordinary people against greedy and out‐of‐touch elites. Simultaneously, they reject conventional constraints on democratic policymaking. In recent years, such parties on the political left and right have been gaining influence in countries across Europe. Using a panel data set from 1980–2016, we use semiparametric Tobit models with country fixed effects to explain support for authoritarian populists. We find that large vote shares of right‐wing – but not left‐wing – authoritarian populists are associated closely to corruption. Other commonly cited explanations such as unemployment, inequality and immigration perform poorly in predicting support for populist political platforms on the political right. While a full theoretical explanation of the link between corruption and right‐wing populism remains beyond the scope of this article, we suggest that the mechanism involves political trust. Corruption weakens trust in political institutions, which populists exploit. Curbing the rise of right‐wing authoritarian populism in Europe will thus require restoring trust in the integrity of politics.     

Ethnography and the Making of “The People”: Uncovering Conservative Populist Politics in the United States

The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit vote, and rise of conservative populism in countries around the world has led to an abundance of scholarship on populism and the white working class. Much of this work seeks to explain the underlying cause of this conservative populist politics, focusing on globalization and economic precarity, racism and anti‐immigrant sentiment, or failures of political leadership. Survey data and polling analyses, in particular, explain relationships between demographics, political opinions, and voting results. Though quantitative data on the social groups or activists most involved in populist politics are important, missing from this research are ethnographies of populism that explore how local, state, and national actors influence the meaning of “the people.” In this article, I will argue that ethnography is particularly well‐suited for exploring the coming together of local and national politics and the subtle ways that economic insecurity, racism, sexism, and Islamophobia intersect in the making of “hard working taxpayers” or “ordinary folks.” I draw from research in a predominantly white, former manufacturing town in central Maine to illustrate the significance of this ethnographic approach to populism.     

Tying in two-sided markets with heterogeneous advertising revenues and negative pricing

We offer a theory of anticompetitive tying in two-sided markets when below-cost or negative pricing is possible. With the coexistence of two consumer groups (one regarding tying and tied goods as complementary and the other as independent), a tying-good monopolist may face difficulties in extracting rent under separate sales and wish to use tying to directly capture the large advertising revenue created in the complementary segment. We uncover two distinct mechanisms by which tying raises monopoly profits but reduces social welfare. Our theory of tying can be applied to real-world antitrust law enforcement, such as the Google Android case.     

Private law enforcement with competing groups

This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. We also investigate consequences when a policy maker acts to maximize a bribe instead of social welfare. Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided. Additionally, this paper shows that depending on the policy maker’s objection between rent-seeking motivation or social welfare maximizer, deterrence effects vary. This paper provides a clear mechanism that the rent-seeking motivated policy maker tends to set less severe enforcement policies than the social welfare level.     

Modern American Populism: Analyzing the Economics Behind the “Silent Majority,” the Tea Party,and Trumpism

Modern American populism (MAP) was born out of the political upheaval of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The article examines the causes of populism. Economic anxiety is found to be the main cause, but there is also evidence supporting an alternative theory that racial resentment is an important driving force behind populism. The article analyzes the role of populism in the 1972 election of Richard Nixon, the Tea Party election of 2010, and the 2016 election of Donald Trump using data provided by the American National Election Studies (ANES). There is ample qualitative evidence that economic anxiety caused the populist voting patterns that elected Nixon, Tea Party candidates, and Trump. Statistical data supported the same conclusion in the 2010 and 2016 elections, but the 1972 data were inconclusive. The data show that both economic anxiety and racial resentment played a role in the 2010 and 2016 elections, but the findings suggest that economic anxiety is the underlying factor that generates both racial resentment and support for populism.     

Rationality, Ethnicity And Institutions: A Survey Of Issues And Results

Abstract.  This paper focuses on the relationship between institutions and ethnocentrism as discussed in the rational choice literature. The institutional environment can influence both the formation and the expression of ethnic tastes by rational individuals. Ethnocentrism is likely to be mitigated by, on the one hand, a private sector characterized by a wide and competitive market with effective property right and antitrust law enforcement provided by non-ethnic institutions and, on the other hand, a public sector which is characterized by institutional restrictions on the differential fiscal or regulatory treatment on the basis of ethnicity, a redistributive system based on non-ethnic criteria and finally, the possibility for decentralized collective decision making. These insights may be of particular utility when designing the institutions of potentially divided multi-ethnic states.     

Homelessness and Inequality

Homelessness and housing insecurity in the United States are not so much a housing problem or a poverty problem as a visible sign that growing wealth inequality has left millions of people unable to earn enough to afford adequate housing. The classical economists David Ricardo and Henry George linked wealth inequality by arbitrage to unequal income and wages. The greater the inequality of wealth, the greater the inequality of income and the lower the wages at the bottom. Neoclassical economics has largely obscured this relationship. Consequently, proposals from both conservatives and liberals to address homelessness focus narrowly on housing. Ultimately, reducing wealth inequality requires national tax reform and a return to vigorous antitrust enforcement. However, cities can reduce local inequality by making property tax assessments uniform, or, better yet, by shifting to taxing land only.     

“店选网购”的竞争效应及其反垄断政策涵义

随着互联网和电子商务的发展，消费者在店商试选后以较低价格从网商购买商品的“店选网购”现象非常普遍，厂商或店商经常以其存在搭便车问题为由采取维持转售价格予以限制。本文通过构建具有横向差异化的霍特林模型，考察“店选网购”的竞争效应。研究表明，尽管“店选网购”存在搭便车问题，却能促进店商与网商间的竞争，降低店商和网商的价格和利润，使消费者从中获益，但对社会福利的影响结果是不明确的；其反垄断政策涵义是，“店选网购”具有促进竞争和存在搭便车问题的双重特性，不能简单地作为豁免维持转售价格的正当理由，而应根据实际情况具体分析。     

我国专利权行政保护机制探讨

在竞争不断加剧的国际背景下,专利权的保护水平已经成为了衡量国家综合国力的重要指标之一。专利权的司法和行政双轨制保护是我国知识产权制度的一大特色。文章通过国内外专利权行政保护的比较研究指出,在较长一段时期内,中国保持较强的专利权行政保护符合我国现阶段社会发展的需要。借鉴美国、德国及其他发达国家和地区有关专利权行政保护成功经验,改善我国专利权行政保护机制以维护国家利益和本土专利权主体的合法权益。     

Criminalizing price-fixing

We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price-fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.     

反垄断与行业管制的体制冲突与改革路径

中国垄断性行业具有"三重垄断"交织在一起的特点,理顺反垄断机构和行业管制机构之间的职权配置和法律关系就成为关键.反垄断机构和行业管制机构之间的协调运行的核心原则是依法行政和职能分离,反垄断机构与行业管制机构分权合作的多元执法体制是中国反垄断与行业管制混合体制的模式选择,并确立反垄断法的优先适用.     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

职业体育联盟制度安排的反垄断法分析

职业体育联盟起源于西方发达国家,随着市场经济的进一步深入,职业体育联盟的一些制度安排不可避免的受到反垄断法的规制,所以,职业体育联盟制度安排必须考虑反垄断法问题,考虑职业体育联盟生存的制度环境的差异性,尽量规避职业体育联盟的反垄断诉讼。