Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions

This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.     

Fixed margin price undercutting: An adequate entry strategy in a market with switching costs?

Purpose We try to determine the best strategy for entering a market with switching costs that is initially served by a monopolistic incumbent. Findings We show that an offer to undercut the incumbent by a fixed margin (FM) dominates traditional entry with a binding price offer (BO) as this conditional pricing strategy restrains the ability of the incumbent to block entry by limit pricing. Combining FM with a price ceiling (PC) insures customers against future price increases and turns out to be optimal for markets with elastic demand as long as cost uncertainty is not an issue. Conclusion Using a more elaborate entry strategy may facilitate entry in markets with switching costs. However, as these strategies may decrease welfare, they should be closely monitored by antitrust authorities.     

Price discrimination and the emergence of secondary markets

A frequently used explanations for the emergence of secondary markets for live entertainment and the ability of resellers to charge a markup over face‐value prices is that promoters do not price discriminate optimally. We test this hypothesis empirically, using instrumental variables techniques on a sample of 45 popular music concerts and find that secondary market markups are not caused by the level of price discrimination used by promoters on primary markets. The experience and success of the artist drive both primary market pricing and secondary market markups, which are consistent with theories of social influence and pricing of complementary products.     

Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment

In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.     

Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books in International Transfer Pricing

We study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multinational duopoly with price competition in the final product market. We find that the firms in a duopoly can benefit from strategically using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives. According to our results, the practice of one set of books should be the prevalent accounting method in markets with a small number of competitors and similar products.     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

Structural Analysis of Electricity Demand and Supply Interactions*

We specify a structural asymmetric vector error‐correction model to identify and estimate the demand and supply functions in hourly day‐ahead wholesale electricity markets. In doing so, we provide, inter alia, new insights into a well‐established but unresolved issue concerning the extent of the demand elasticity to price in these markets. We show that whilst demand appears to be inelastic in the short‐run, the quantity traded on the market is significantly influenced by the price level and responds to previous disequilibria in the supply curve through an asymmetric error‐correction mechanism, reacting to a positive disequilibrium but not to a negative one.     

Share,price and category expenditure—geographic market effects and private labels

Focusing on the interaction between national brands and private labels, this paper has two main empirical contributions: (i) a simultaneous system of demand (share), price and expenditure equations is estimated, and (ii) differences in the structure of the local geographic market are incorporated into the analysis. The former represents an important step in understanding the complete nature of private label and national brand interaction, while the latter is important for understanding the impact of the local retail environment on market behaviour. IRI scanner data from 1991 and 1992 are used to estimate a five‐equation system across 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets. The results suggest that concentration at both the manufacturer and retailer level can significantly affect private label and national brand price. However, while increased retailer concentration is associated with higher national brand and private label prices, higher manufacturer concentration is associated with higher national brand but lower private label prices. Increases in national brand advertising has the effect of raising national brand price and share, but lowering private label price and share. This is consistent with previous research and suggests that advertising and local market conditions play a significant role in the ability of national brands to price at a premium over private labels. Finally, marketing decision variables, such as display activity and private label distribution, can have an important impact on total category expenditure. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Customization with Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a duopoly market with heterogeneous consumers. The firms initially produce vertically differentiated standard products located at the end points of the variety interval. Customization provides ideal varieties for consumers but has no effect on quality. The firms first choose whether to customize their products, then engage in price competition. We show that the low‐quality firm never customizes alone; customization becomes more likely as the difference between the firms’ qualities increases; and less likely as the fixed cost of customization increases. We extend the base model by relaxing two important assumptions—uniform pricing and exogenous quality. The main conclusions with uniform pricing continue to hold when price customization is allowed. In the second extension the firms’ qualities are endogenously determined. We show that the firms choose to be either substantially differentiated in quality or nondifferentiated.     

Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency

The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the downstream industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the downstream industry and examines the effects of permitting third‐degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare. We identify situations where permitting price discrimination leads to either higher or lower wholesale prices for all downstream firms. These findings are driven by upstream profits being discontinuous due to costly entry. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe inefficiency in production.     

AN ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE BEHAVIOUR OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

Using frequency distributions of daily closing price time series of several financial market indices, we investigate whether the bias away from an equiprobable sequence distribution found in the data, predicted by algorithmic information theory, may account for some of the deviation of financial markets from log‐normal, and if so for how much of said deviation and over what sequence lengths. We do so by comparing the distributions of binary sequences from actual time series of financial markets and series built up from purely algorithmic means. Our discussion is a starting point for a further investigation of the market as a rule‐based system with an algorithmic component, despite its apparent randomness, and the use of the theory of algorithmic probability with new tools that can be applied to the study of the market price phenomenon. The main discussion is cast in terms of assumptions common to areas of economics in agreement with an algorithmic view of the market.     

Equal risk pricing under convex trading constraints

In an incomplete market model where convex trading constraints are imposed upon the underlying assets, it is no longer possible to obtain unique arbitrage-free prices for derivatives using standard replication arguments. Most existing derivative pricing approaches involve the selection of a suitable martingale measure or the optimisation of utility functions as well as risk measures from the perspective of a single trader.We propose a new and effective derivative pricing method, referred to as the equal risk pricing approach, for markets with convex trading constraints. The approach analyses the risk exposure of both the buyer and seller of the derivative, and seeks an equal risk price which evenly distributes the expected loss for both parties under optimal hedging. The existence and uniqueness of the equal risk price are established for both European and American options. Furthermore, if the trading constraints are removed, the equal risk price agrees with the standard arbitrage-free price.Finally, the equal risk pricing approach is applied to a constrained Black–Scholes market model where short-selling is banned. In particular, simple pricing formulas are derived for European calls, European puts and American puts.     

The Impact of Consumption Hassle on Pricing Schedules

A curious phenomenon in the retail pricing of many product categories (e.g., tuna, frozen orange juice, and tomato paste) is the existence of quantity surcharges. A related curiosity is the existence of both discounts and surcharges within the same product category. To explain the former phenomenon, extant research invokes heterogeneity in consumption parameters, heterogeneity in search costs, or concern for retail price image. To the best of our knowledge, there is no received explanation for the latter phenomenon. We add to this rich stream of work by proposing a novel explanation for quantity surcharges. Our explanation is based on the notion of consumption hassle. We analyze a market that is heterogeneous in a hedonic parameter that influences valuations as well as the effective cost of the consumption hassle. We then derive consumer choices (small pack, large pack, or two small packs) taking into account Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints. In the absence of consumption hassle, we obtain two segments with one purchasing the small pack and the other purchasing the large pack. Moreover, the optimal pricing for the seller involves quantity discounts. However, with the introduction of consumption hassle, the market potentially splits into three segments: one purchasing the small pack, another purchasing two small packs, and the third purchasing the large pack. Moreover, the optimal pricing for the seller involves quantity surcharges. Overall, our analytical findings offer an additional explanation for the phenomenon of quantity surcharges. More importantly, they offer a rationale for the existence of multiple pricing schedules within the same product category by explicitly recognizing variations in consumption hassle. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact on the pricing process of costly active management and performance chasing clients

One of the necessary features of markets to produce efficient pricing is competition between information-based investors who quickly impound new information into price. However, a significant proportion of funds invested in today’s equity markets are in the hands of managers who pursue a style that utilises little or none of the available information. We simulate such a market where the funds are being managed using the following three investment styles: fundamental, momentum and index. We confirm that the major pricing anomalies that have been highlighted previously in the literature are a natural consequence of competition between managers utilising these three investment styles. More importantly, we show that this situation is unlikely to change as long as markets continue to be dominated by costly active managers with clients who pursue outperformance.     

Markets under the Microscope: Making Scientific Discoveries Valuable through Choreographed Contestations

This paper breaks new ground by revealing and conceptualizing the marketization of science as a process that transforms scientific discoveries and markets through a series of choreographed contestations: moments of valuation that occur when different social worlds collide. We follow a scientific discovery, from the moment it entered an incubator, to uncover how valuation practices and market devices enact and contest diverse social values (i.e., what is worth doing) to generate economic value (i.e., what is worth paying for) at the science‐market‐entrepreneurship nexus. In contrast with commercialization of science studies that focus on institutional arrangements, this study explicates the practices and devices used by multiple market actors to transform a scientific discovery into a marketable object. In so doing, we characterise choreographed contestations and the mechanisms through which they operate to explain how specific valuations are performed to work out innovative next steps that unfold the marketization of science.     

Value and liquidity under changing market conditions

Papers studying the liquidity of a market tend to focus on decisions involving the trade-off between the selling price and the time-till-sale for a given set of market conditions. This paper characterizes market conditions using a price-probability locus; a change in market conditions is some combination of changes in the level and/or slope of this locus. I show how the effect of either type of change on price and on the probability-of-sale can be decomposed into those commonly associated with an increase in the value and those which involve a substitution between price and probability. Two adding-up conditions restrict the set of possible predictions. Though the discussion focusses on real estate market, where scarcity is rationed by a mechanism which combines search and bargaining, the same ideas apply to markets with other types of selling mechanisms.     

Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets

Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.     

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF GASOLINE RETAILING: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE

Abstract This paper surveys the empirical literature on gasoline retailing, which has been growing rapidly over the last three decades, possibly in response to antitrust and regulatory concerns and increased availability of pricing data. Studies of both pricing and non‐price decision variables are considered. In general, it is found that crude oil prices are the primary driver of national price movements over time. However, market structure has been identified as playing a role in price dynamics, equilibrium selection and price differentials across markets and stations. The economic literature emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity across stations and coordination problems faced by retailers. Several directions for future work are suggested, including the development of theory and demand estimation using high‐frequency station level data.     

Spoils from the Spoiled: Strategies for Entering Stigmatized Markets

Stigmatized markets are those where either the products/services, or the consumers, or both, have been collectively, negatively stereotyped and devalued by one or more stakeholder audiences in ways that discredit the overall market. Many stigmatized markets exist, and many flourish, yet little systematic attention has focused on entry into such markets. Our article addresses this gap by conceptualizing various strategies for entering stigmatized markets. We further present propositions regarding the market‐level factors that can influence which of these strategies firms will choose to employ. The contributions include: conceptually clarifying the nature of stigmatized markets; identifying additional types of entry strategies relevant for entering stigmatized markets; theorizing the conditions under which firms would choose one entry strategy over another; and opening up for consideration the effects that market entry may have on stigmatized actors in targeted markets.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.