动拆迁中利益主体关系协调研究

协调三者利益冲突的关键,是握有公权的政府应当回归至中间人的位置,在公正的天平上衡量三者利益,保护弱势群体利益,实现社会公平和公正。要协调好被拆迁人、房地产开发商和政府三者之间的利益,以及被拆迁人利益、房地产开发商利益与公共利益,可从完善政府拆迁政策、把握好房地产开发商的介入时机等方面寻求解决对策。     

从购房者、政府、商业银行与开发商的三重博弈关系研读房地产行业

一、购房者、政府、商业银行与开发商的三重博弈框架 在房地产行业里进行利益博弈的主体很多,从重要性角度看,核心主体是购房者、政府、商业银行和开发商。购房者提供住房购买需求,商业银行为购房者的购买需求提供住房按揭贷款,政府提供土地和行政管理服务,开发商提供住宅产品。购房者、商业银行和政府都要和产品提供者开发商打交道,在房地产行业纷杂的多重利益关系中,他们和开发商的利益博弈关系是最重要的,厘清这三重博弈背后的逻辑,能够更好地理解行业现状和更好地预判行业前景,也能更好地解读行业的波动。     

房地产业中政府与开发商的博弈分析

房地产业中政府与房地产开发商之间的关系既是行业主体关注的重点,也是国家如何加快房地产业发展步伐的核心问题。近年来,国内外专家研究房地产行业开发商与政府的行为的很多,但大多仅停留在对现象的描述,不够全面。本文以博弈论及信息经济学理论为依据,分析了房地产业开发商与政府的利益博弈,建立了存在政府监管情况下开发商行为选择的“监管博弈”模型,并且求解出纳什均衡解。在此基础上,给出了应对房地产市场各种情况的治理对策,以实现加快城市建设步伐、保证社会经济的协调、健康和长远发展。     

德国：独特的价格评估体系

德国的土地实行私有制,但是各级政府对土地的使用都有严格的规划,哪些土地只能用作住宅区,哪些土地只能用作商业区,甚至建筑与空地的面积比等,开发商都必须遵循政府的规划。但政府并不规定房地产价格,房地产价格取决于市场,市场上的房地产价格不是开发商说了算的,而是取决于独立的房地产价格评估机构。德国的房地产评估独立于政府之外,评估员只对自己负责,并不考虑政府、委托人以及个人的经济利益。房地产评估主要分为两类。一类是独立的私人评估专家。这些评估师或者评估员有不同的资历认证,有的是当地工商协会认定的,有的是银行认定的,也…     

房地产市场供给锁定型市场结构研究

我国当前土地供给制度和一些房地产政策正在促使房地产交易市场形成区域性寡头垄断.在这种市场结构下,地方政府从出让土地中增加财政收入,开发商通过制定高房价获得超额垄断利润,最终消费者利益受损.供给锁定型市场结构的研究表明:政府能通过行政或市场手段对房地产市场进行适当改造,使因垄断产生的超额利润在政府、开发商和消费者之间进行...     

如何从根本上解决高房价的问题？

房价问题几乎已经成为了中国老百姓最为关心的一个问题。但历次对于房地产市场的调控总是难以达到效果,这其中最大的因素在于——房地产行业并不是在一个真正的市场运作环境中。从各方的角色来讲：土地出让者,是地方政府;房地产开发商,是企业主体;而买房的老百姓,则是最终的消费主体。显而易见,既做裁判员又做运动员的地方政府,与开发商之间的利益关系明显趋于一致,     

如何解决购物中心经营方式中存在的问题

购物中心的经营如何做好房地产开发商与消费者、承租者三者利益的平衡,最终将商业地庄的前期运作,投资与开发转化成稳定的现金流与收益,是房地产开发商所必须要考虑的关键,也是房地产开发商在运营过程中的行为指导依据。     

城中村改造利益相关者利益均衡分析

本文运用利益相关者理论和博弈理论探讨城中村改造中政府、房地产开发商和村民三者之间的利益诉求和博弈关系,通过建立博弈模型对各方的利益均衡关系进行分析,发现经济利益是三方的矛盾焦点,要加快城中村改造进行,政府要营造透明、公正和合理的博弈格局,提供优惠政策吸引开发商主动参与改造,保障村民合法权益和后续保障,引导村民自觉主动参与改造,引入有力的外部监督机制,建立平等的利益交换机制,实现各方合理的利益,实现各方利益共赢.     

浅析房地产风险的内容及规避对策

房地产项目开发涉及决策、前期、建设、销售四个阶段,主要相关利益者包括竞争对手、银行、顾客、建设方、中介公司、政府等六大类。开发商在项目经营的每一个环节都会和不同利益相关者发生利益冲突。往往这种利益冲突是项目风险的重要直接来源,因此,从项目风险管理的角度来看,减少和各个相关利益主体之间的内在冲突,努力为项目建设创建良好的内外部环境,有利于项目风险降低。     

浅谈商品房预售中不法行为的防范

《城市房地产管理法》关于商品房预销售许可制度条款的确立，规范了我国商品房预售行为，在促进房地产市场健康发展、保障购房者合法权益等方面起到了积极的作用。但是，目前仍有个别房地产开发商为谋取非法利益，钻消费者对房地产相关法律知识不太了解的空子，采取种种不法手段利用商品房预售给消费者设置圈套，严重损害消费者的利益。对此，广大消费者和政府有关部门必须起高度重视。     

Government debt and fiscal execution efficiency

Governments have used deficit policies in recent years, yet many still face fiscal debt problems. Thus, this research uses Range Directional Measure Dynamic Directional Distance Function model with negative data to explore the financial efficiency of local governments in Taiwan from 2011 to 2018. This article has three major contributions: (1) The research uses RDM Dynamic DDF model with negative data to solve the problem of negative values on input and output data and uses dynamic models to make up for the deficiencies of past research. (2) Due to the differences in regions, local governments have different fiscal budgets. Therefore, this article uses the Wilcoxon Test to explore the efficiency differences of local governments in different regions. (3) This article analyzes the impact of central subsidies and government deficits (debts) of local governments on fiscal efficiency, and discusses the efficiency of government fiscal execution. The results are as follows. (1) Seven counties and cities with the best efficiency, and seven local governments with poor efficiency. (2) The fiscal performances of outlying islands and eastern local governments are better than those of western local governments. (3) Kaohsiung City has the highest accumulated debt and Tainan City exhibits poor financial performance.     

论地方政府行为效用导致的区域产业政策趋同

在区域经济的发展过程中,地方政府之间日益激烈的竞争必然会造成区域之间的产业政策趋同。这对于区域经济的协调发展和长远发展极为不利。应当通过提高中央政府的宏观调控水平,强化地方政府的责、权、利边界,引导地方政府在区域产业政策中体现差异性。     

On the effects of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and rent-seeking

This paper deals with the influence of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and on rent-seeking activities of local interest groups. It employs a model where households differ with respect to their endowments with the immobile factor land. Local governments decide about the level of productive infrastructure in their jurisdiction. According to their land endowments, different households benefit to a different degree from infrastructure. This redistribution effect of local infrastructure gives households an incentive for rent-seeking. As this paper shows, capital mobility and fiscal competition between local governments have an influence on the equilibrium level of rent-seeking. Rent-seeking expenditures increase with the introduction of capital mobility in a broad class of cases.     

大学生创业中地方政府角色定位缺失与对策

地方政府在大学生创业过程中扮演什么样的角色,对大学生是否参与创业以及大学生创业是否能够取得成功至关重要。然而,目前地方政府在大学生创业中的角色定位是缺失的,其角色缺失主要表现在以下三个方面:一是创业政策制定者角色的缺位;二是创业协调监督者角色的错位;三是创业服务者角色的虚位。因此,地方政府必须做到:创业政策制定者角色要补位;创业协调监督者角色要正位;创业服务者角色要实位。只有这样,地方政府才能够在大学生创业过程中扮演好自己的角色。     

地方政府土地出让目标取向研究

目前我国地方政府在土地出让中,以土地收益极大化和招商引资作为双元目标取向,对地方财政、土地资源配置和社会稳定等造成不利影响.借鉴国际经验以及按照政府的双重身份和科学发展观的要求,地方政府土地出让的目标应为促进城市土地合理利用和适度土地收益,应采取相应政策措施消除地方政府土地出让目标扭曲的客观基础,促进土地出让目标和行为的合理化.     

The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis

Private governments, found in planned developments and condominiums, are increasingly common methods of delivering local services to residents. This paper provides the first empirical study of their impact on local public finance. A novel data set of homeowners' associations allows construction of a panel of private governments in California. Panel methods test whether public expenditures respond to private government prevalence. Estimates indicate that local governments lower spending moderately in response to private government activity, consistent with strategic substitution. The paper then examines various mechanisms to explain this downloading and shows that the substitutability between public and private providers is key to which services are downloaded. Evidence also suggests that the economies of scale in service production in small cities temper the offloading of public services to private governments.     

地方政府债券违约风险形成机制及防范——基于委托代理问题的分析

就地方政府债券而言,在地方政府和居民之间涉及两类委托代理问题:债权债务的代理问题和公共政策的代理问题。地方政府依凭中央政府的"父爱心理",具有向上转移债务的动机,导致地方政府债券规模人为扩大;地方政府"经济人"特性促使其有意识地运用公共债务追求自身利益而罔顾公共财政风险。这些都隐藏着潜在风险无限增加的可能性。可以从建立相应的法律法规制度、居民退出机制、地方政府内在约束机制、事前制约机制、事后监督机制以及深化政务公开制度来防范信用风险。     

Why Do Some Multinational Firms Respond Better Than Others to the Hostility of Host Governments? Proximal Embedding and the Side Effects of Local Partnerships

Using a multiple-case study of alleged expropriations reported before the World Bank, we examine how multinational companies (MNC) react to the escalating hostility of host governments. Our study reveals how different choices regarding the interaction with local nonmarket stakeholders – which we refer to as proximal vs. mediated embedding – shape how managers respond to these disputes by affecting their ability to collect, process and interpret information, and to act upon it in a way that effectively mobilizes local and international support. In contrast to the prevailing view that local partners in international joint ventures shelter MNCs from abuse from political authorities, our findings show that primary reliance on local partners to manage the local nonmarket environment can actually reinforce a liability of outsidership and even create a ‘liability of insidership’, to the extent that relying on local partners prevents the MNC from establishing quality connections with a broad range of nonmarket stakeholders, reducing its alertness and responsiveness to hostile acts from host governments.     

The effects of an environmental accountability system on local environmental governance and firms’ emissions

The Chinese central government introduced the environmental accountability system (EAS) policy in 2006 to encourage local governments to execute environmental policies appropriately. However, the effects of this EAS policy have not been investigated at the firm level. In this study, we first measured the environmental governance intensity of local governments by calculating the environment word portion (EWP) of the annual governments’ work reports and found that local governments increased their efforts after the EAS policy implementation. We then constructed a continuous difference-in-difference (DID) strategy to estimate the effect of the EAS on firms’ emission and found that firms significantly reduced their sulphur dioxide (SO₂) emission under the regulation intensity of local governments after the EAS policy. The reductions are mainly because of the private, non-export, labour- and capital-intensive firms. The EAS policy may encourage firms to reduce coal usage, design more products, decrease capacity investment and even withdraw from the market, thus reducing pollutant emission. Finally, we tested firms’ response in various polluting sectors and found that the EAS policy may cause local governments to fail in distinguishing low pollution sectors from high pollution sectors.     

Central government control and fiscal adjustment: Norwegian evidence

Norwegian local governments that violate the balanced budget rule are placed in a register. The consequence of being in the register is that the budget and resolutions to raise new loans must be approved by the county governor, the central government’s representative in the county. Local governments in the register are subject to stronger central government control and must tighten their budgetary policy in order to be removed from the register. The findings suggest that local governments in the register improve their operating surplus, mainly due to cost reductions.