Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

Measuring the effects of fiscal policy

Measuring the effects of discretionary fiscal policy is both difficult and controversial, as some explicit or implicit identifying assumptions need to be made to isolate exogenous and unanticipated changes in taxes and government spending. Studies based on structural vector autoregressions typically achieve identification by restricting the contemporaneous interaction of fiscal and non-fiscal variables in a rather arbitrary way. In this paper, we relax those restrictions and identify fiscal policy shocks by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances. We use this methodology to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks in the U.S. before and after 1979. Our results show substantive differences in the economy׳s response to government spending and tax shocks across the two periods. Importantly, we find that increases in public spending are, in general, more effective than tax cuts in stimulating economic activity. A key contribution of this study is to provide a formal test of the identifying restrictions commonly used in the literature.     

What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks?

We propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions. Specifically, we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock, while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock. We explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects, i.e., that a current fiscal policy shock changes fiscal policy variables in the future, but not at present. We construct the impulse responses to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks, corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit‐spending, deficit‐financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion. We apply the method to US quarterly data from 1955 to 2000. We find that deficit‐financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve GDP, with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional GDP per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does the nationalization of party systems affect the composition of public spending?

Do political institutions shape the structure of public spending? Based on a sample of elections in eighteen Western European countries over the period 1970–1998, this paper shows that governments’ margin of maneuverability to design and implement fiscal policies depends on the level of party linkage or the nationalization of party systems, defined as the extent to which parties are uniformly successful in winning votes across districts. The mechanism behind this argument is that in weakly nationalized countries there are additional transaction costs to change the structure of budgets as a consequence of the survival of local parties and interests. Therefore, the composition of public spending is more rigid here than in highly nationalized countries.     

Growth,deficits and uncertainty: Theoretical aspects and empirical evidence from a panel of 27 countries

We examine the relationship between fiscal deficits and per-capita income growth in a panel of 27 European countries, allowing for perceived risks, in terms of fiscal sustainability, associated with additional government spending. Such risks are proxied by the conditional variability of manufacturing production and stock market returns and by the unconditional variability of two survey-based economic-sentiment indicators. To help clarifying how fiscal variables impact on growth and to provide a point of reference for the interpretation of the empirical results a structural growth model is first identified. We find evidence of an asymmetric relationship, in that fiscal deficits give rise to adverse growth effects if they coincide with high uncertainty regarding the prospects of the economy and no significant negative growth effects in the low-uncertainty case.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果分析

研究目标：分析不同资本账户开放程度下的中国财政货币政策效果及福利效应。研究方法：将内生化的政府支出（税收）政策以及包含汇率的价格（数量）型为主的混合货币政策一并纳入一个小型开放的DSGE模型。研究发现：随着资本账户的逐步放开，财政政策方面，减税政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越好，政府支出政策刺激经济增长和促进就业的效果越来越差；货币政策方面，国内货币政策的调控效果及利率上升的跨期替代效应减弱。从社会福利损失的角度分析表明：无论是与内生化的政府支出（税收）政策组合还是与财政赤字政策组合，价格型为主的混合货币政策始终优于数量型为主的混合货币政策。研究创新：考察在高、中和低三种资本账户开放背景下中国不同财政货币政策组合的相互作用和经济效应。研究价值：为资本账户放开过程中合理地使用财政货币政策组合提供理论参考。     

WHICH FISCAL MULTIPLIERS ARE REGIME‐DEPENDENT? A META‐REGRESSION ANALYSIS

We analyse whether estimated multiplier effects are systematically higher if the economy suffers a downturn. For that purpose, we conduct a meta‐regression analysis on a unique data set of 98 empirical studies with more than 1800 observations on multiplier effects and control for regime‐dependence of the multiplier. We find that spending multipliers are much higher (by about 0.7–0.9 units) during a downturn. Tax multipliers are not sensitive to the economic regime, and generally lower than spending multipliers. Finally, for all spending categories other than government consumption, the multiplier significantly exceeds one during downturns.     

我国货币财政政策存在区域效应的实证分析

货币财政政策是现代国家干预经济的两个最重要的宏观调控政策，关于它们的研究文献数不胜数，但是长期以来一直没有对两政策实施后的区域效应给予足够的重视。本文结合目前我国东中西三大经济地带的经济发展已经存在明显差距的现实，通过两地区的简约化模型对1978-2004年间我国货币政策与财政政策在东部和中西部两个样本地区的作用进行了实证分析，结果表明，我国货币财政政策确实存在区域不对称效应，特别是货币政策，具有明显的区域影响差异。     

Efficiency of Regional Public Investment: An NPV-Based Spatial Econometric Approach

This paper develops a new methodology of spatial econometric modelling for regional public investment in local economies. The approach, based on the financial concept of net present value of cash flows, can be applied in the analysis of regional public investment with long-term financial inputs and outputs. With local public revenues related to spending in the model, one can observe economies of scale of investment with possible saturation effects and a marginal investment multiplier, explaining the extent to which public investment costs translate into public revenues. The main advantage of the proposed model is to behave counter-cyclically due to accumulation over the periods and to cover multi-period investments as well as postponed effects. This paper gives an example of public investment efficiency in Polish NUTS-5 municipalities regions.     

The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from the United States

We estimate state‐dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor‐augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time‐varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.     

The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from the United States

We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor-augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.     

中国财政政策规则及其体制稳定性分析

本文构建了内生捕捉我国财政政策体制变化的财政规则,并对产出缺口稳定动机和债务稳定动机反应进行了分析。基于马尔科夫转换财政政策反馈规则的实证估计表明,不同体制下,财政赤字与政府债务和产出缺口之间存在不同的政策反应关系;与基于不变参数识别的规则相比,体制转换财政规则能更好地追踪我国财政赤字的时间序列行为。这意味着,假定财政政策体制总是固定的货币政策规则研究以及基于不变财政体制框架VAR度量财政政策冲击高频率效应的实证研究都应慎重。     

Fiscal policy in good and bad times

In this paper we analyze whether the effect of fiscal policy differs across the business cycle. To tackle this question, we use a regime-switching error-correction framework, where nonlinearities are only modeled in the short-run and have no impact on the long-run equilibrium. Regime specific shocks to government revenue and government purchases are identified using sign restrictions. Linear combinations of the impulse responses of these basic shocks are used to construct a deficit-spending shock and a deficit-financed tax-cut shock. We find that active spending policies have a stronger impact in recession, with multipliers exceeding unity, and should be preferred to deficit-financed tax-cuts.     

REAL‐TIME DATA AND FISCAL POLICY ANALYSIS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal policy analysis based on real‐time data. This literature can be broadly divided into four groups that focus on: (1) the statistical properties of revisions in fiscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants of projection errors by governments; (3) the reaction of fiscal policies to the business cycle and (4) the use of real‐time fiscal data in structural vector autoregression (VAR) models. It emerges that, first, fiscal revisions are large and initial releases are biased estimates of final values. Secondly, strong fiscal rules and institutions lead to more accurate releases of fiscal data and smaller deviations of fiscal outcomes from government plans. Thirdly, the cyclical stance of fiscal policies is estimated to be more ‘counter‐cyclical’ when real‐time data are used instead of ex post data. Fourthly, real‐time data can be useful for the identification of fiscal shocks. Finally, it is shown that existing real‐time fiscal data sets cover only a limited number of countries and variables. For example, real‐time data for developing countries are generally unavailable. In addition, real‐time data on European countries are often missing, especially with respect to government revenues and expenditures. Therefore, more work is needed in this field.     

Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?

This paper explores the budgetary implications of the independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) in the European Union (EU). We employ a dynamic panel model for the period 2000–2019 and find that these fiscal watchdogs have a positive and significant influence not only on government budget balance for the EU member states, resulting in smaller government budget deficits, but also on countries’ compliance with fiscal rules, results that hold across alternative fiscal balances. IFIs appear to have a beneficial impact on fiscal performance and compliance with numerical targets in countries with poorly designed fiscal responsibility norms but weaker influence when fiscal rules are less binding (well-designed fiscal rules). The findings remain significant regardless the year of accession to the EU (old vs. new members) or euro-area status (euro-area vs. non-euro-area members). However, we document that IFIs play a larger role in countries that established these monitoring bodies before 2013, indicating that experience matters in IFI performance. Also, our findings show that the influence of IFIs remains if we take into account institutional reforms in which their mandates were extended with different powers and tasks, which has a positive and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, we find that, under the circumstance of systemic and banking crises, these institutions are associated with improved fiscal outcomes, reflecting their increased concern about the path of public finances and their role in reducing budgetary forecasting biases. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications and models, including alternative measures of the government budget balance and after controlling for a set of institutional characteristics and for potential endogeneity in the estimations.     

The effects of public spending externalities

We conduct a positive analysis on the effects of ‘externalities’ produced by government spending. To this effect, we estimate, using U.S. data, an RBC model with two salient features. First, we allow government consumption to directly affect the marginal utility of consumption. Second, we allow public capital to shift the productivity of private factors. We provide an identification analysis that supports the strategy adopted for estimating the parameters governing these two channels. On one hand, private and government consumption are robustly estimated to be substitute goods. Because of substitutability, labor supply reacts little to a government consumption shock, so the estimated output multiplier is much lower than in models with separabilities. On the other hand, our results point towards public investment being ‘unproductive’.     

The policy mix in the US and EMU: Evidence from a SVAR analysis

We use a SVAR approach to the effects of fiscal and monetary policies, as well as their interactions (policy mix) for the US and the Euro Area (EMU). Overall, our results show that these two cases are different from each other. First, while in the case of the US there is evidence of Keynesian monetary policy, the same is not true in the case of the EMU. Second, considering the effects of the global economic and financial crisis, there is evidence of non-Keynesian fiscal policy in the case of the EMU (expansionary fiscal consolidation), while it does not hold in the case of the US. Third, there is evidence supporting the traditional inverse relationship between monetary policy interest rates and inflation in the case of the US, whereas in the case of the EMU there is a price puzzle (frequent in SVAR studies). Fourth, the baseline model seems to be robust in the case of the US, when considering the effects of the economic and financial crisis 2007–2009, while the opposite holds in the case of the EMU. However, in both cases, the policies seem to act as complements. Another similarity appears when analysing the relationship between public spending and taxation, where there is evidence supporting a fiscal retrenchment.     

DESIGNING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED FISCAL SYSTEM

Abstract When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.