The Cost Effectiveness of the UK's Sovereign Debt Portfolio*

This paper provides a recursive empirical analysis of the scope for cost minimization in public debt management when the debt manager faces a given short‐term interest rate dictated by monetary policy as well as risk and market impact constraints. It simulates the ‘real‐time’ interest costs of alternative portfolios for UK government debt between April 1985 and March 2000. These portfolios are constructed using forecasts of return spreads based on a recursive modelling procedure. While we find statistically significant evidence of predictability, the interest cost savings are quite small when portfolio shares are constrained to lie within historical bounds.     

Fiscal policy,debt constraint and expectations-driven volatility

Imposing some constraints on public debt is often justified regarding sustainability and stability issues. This is especially the case when the ratio of public debt over GDP is restricted to be constant. Using a Ramsey model, we show that such a constraint can however be a fundamental source of indeterminacy, and therefore, of expectations-driven fluctuations. Indeed, through the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, income taxation negatively depends on future debt, i.e. on the expected level of production. This mechanism ensures that expectations on the future tax rate may be self-fulfilling. We show that this is promoted by a larger ratio of debt over GDP.     

Time Consistent Collection of Optimal Seigniorage: A Unifying Framework

This paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations. It develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage, which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature. In addition, the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the Ramsey principle. We show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature, i.e. the Friedman rule of optimal deflation, [moderately] positive inflation, and seigniorage maximizing inflation, are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem. The paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion. As possible solutions to the time consistency problem, we consider reputational forces, institutional reforms that establish central bank independence, and specific ways of asset and debt management. In particular, it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by Persson, Persson, and Svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality, although this did not hold in their model.     

Government debt spillovers in a monetary union

This paper presents estimates of the impact of debt issued by one government in a monetary union on the yields of the bonds issued by other governments in the union. These debt spillovers may occur if there is a risk of monetary accommodation, implicit or explicit inter-jurisdictional bailout provisions, or interdependent revenues. The analysis empirically distinguishes between two channels through which debt spillovers may affect bond yields: currency depreciation risk and default risk. Data on the yields of individual Canadian provincial government bonds for the period 1983–2005 are employed. No evidence is found of debt spillovers between provinces, but a one percentage point increase in the central government's debt to GDP ratio raises the yield on provincial government bonds by 4.2 basis points—2.9 basis points by increasing the expected depreciation rate of the Canadian dollar and 1.3 basis points by raising the risk of provincial government default. These results imply that a rise in the Canadian central government debt to GDP ratio from 0.25 to 0.58, equivalent to the rise that occurred between 1983 and 1995, would lead to an increase in provincial government bond yields of approximately 140 basis points.     

Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of economic integration on the vertical structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a model of fiscal federalism, where economic integration is assumed to affect central government tax revenues. The main findings are that when an increase of the impact of economic integration brings about a reduction in central government tax revenues, under certain conditions: (a) it reduces central government expenditure; (b) it reduces general government expenditure; (c) it increases local taxation; (d) it increases the degree of public sector decentralization. Quite interestingly, these results are consistent with different patterns of local public spending and grants to local government.     

Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a relatively better store of value. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. A key finding from a policy perspective is that indexation has implications for welfare comparisons of IT and PT.     

Fiscal and monetary interdependence

Where classical economics integrates the quantity theory of money with the concept of Ricardian equivalence, the tendency of recent macroeconomic presentations is to focus either upon money and inflation or upon taxation and debt. That neglect of classical monetary–fiscal integration is surprising, given an initiative by the International Monetary Fund that set credit, money, and fiscal policy within a single structure. This article places those ‘credit counterparts of broad money’ in the context of the Great Depression and the recent global financial crisis. The upshot is a set of conclusions: that, to counter the prospect of deflation, quantitative easing is a weak policy response; that fiscal deficits are better; and that cuts in taxation are preferable to increased government spending.     

Public versus private provision of liquidity: Is there a trade-off?

To what extent is public debt private liquidity? Much policy advice given in the aftermath of the financial crisis rests on the assumption that increasing public debt relaxes borrowing constraints of private households. This is the case for ad-hoc debt limits, which are exogenous to public policy. Instead, if debt limits are fully endogenous, as e.g. in the case of the natural borrowing limit, public debt has no impact. We assume that borrowing limits arise because of limited contract enforceability and are therefore determined as equilibrium outcomes. Using an incomplete markets economy in which households are subject to uninsurable earnings shocks, we show that public debt provides some liquidity, but less so than it would if constraints were imposed ad-hoc. We show that generating borrowing constraints as an equilibrium outcome substantially alters the answers to other important questions, such as for the welfare effects of government debt or its impact on real economic activity.     

Optimal fiscal policy under learning

This paper characterizes optimal fiscal policy when agents learn about future taxation. A benevolent and fully rational government chooses taxes on labor income and state-contingent bonds to finance public spending, considering that private agents form their expectations through a learning algorithm. Facing a trade-off between distortionary taxes and distorted expectations, the Ramsey planner chooses the policy that minimizes the total cost of distortions. The analysis produces two main results. First, the government will use fiscal variables to manipulate expectations, reducing taxes and issuing debt at times of pessimism and doing the opposite at times of optimism. This speeds up learning. Second, the expectation-dependent fiscal plan is also history-dependent, and it prescribes taxes that are not as smooth and more persistent than under rational expectations. These findings are robust to alternative learning algorithms.     

On the cost-benefit of the regionalisation of the National Health Service

In this paper we analyse in formal terms the desirability of the regionalisation of a National Health Service. The policy consists of a devolution process, i.e. the increase in the health services provision to be decided by a region and financed by an increase in its revenues. The change is a marginal one, as it regards the part of supply of the health services exceeding a minimum standard, which for purposes of equity is maintained uniform in the national territory. As the central government is responsible for this component of the provision of health care (a federal “mandate”), the level of the said component is chosen by this authority and financed by federal taxation. Moreover, the government also applies an equalisation scheme based on the difference between a standard level of tax revenues and the revenues which the region is deemed able to raise for this purpose. Within the theoretical context of welfare improving reforms with distortionary taxation, we derive two conditions which focus on the regional, as well as the social, convenience of regionalisation. Received: May 5, 1999 / Accepted: January 21, 2000     

Government debt,learning and the term structure

Does a change in the public׳s holdings of government debt affect the term structure of interest rates? Empirical analysis using a VAR model indicates that a rise in these holdings of the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases both the three-month and ten-year U.S. nominal yields in a statistically significant manner. The maturity composition of debt is also found to matter: innovations in holdings of long-term debt affect the term structure, while increases in short-term debt affect inflation expectations. These effects of changes in holdings of debt on the yield curve can be derived in a general equilibrium model in which the government issues exponentially-maturing riskless debt, financed by lump-sum taxes, and the optimizing agents are adaptive learners. On calibrating the average maturity of debt in the model to match that of U.S. Treasury debt since the 1980s, I find that positive innovations in government debt lead to increases in asset yields. This is because agents do not learn the principle of Ricardian equivalence exactly, and perceive increases in holdings of government bonds as a rise in their net wealth. Imposing rational expectations on the agents eliminates this channel, and changes in holdings of government debt have no effect on yields. The learning model also implies that as the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases, and the average maturity of debt becomes longer, the agents become less likely to learn that Ricardian equivalence holds.     

Long-term interest rates,risk premia and unconventional monetary policy

We study two kinds of unconventional monetary policies: announcements about the future path of the short-term rate and long-term nominal interest rates as operating instruments of monetary policy. We do so in a model where the risk premium on long-term debt is, in part, endogenously determined. We find that both policies are consistent with unique equilibria, that, at the zero lower bound, announcements about the future path of the short-term rate can lower long-term interest rates through their impact both on expectations and on the risk premium and that long-term interest rate rules perform as well as, and at times better than, conventional Taylor rules. With simulations, we show that long-term interest rate rules generate sensible dynamics both when in operation and when expected to be applied.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Exploring tax evasion in the context of political uncertainty

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make should it come to power. But each government, before it could make its decision, would need to know the choices of the agents who would, for example, produce tax revenues. This informational tension is resolved endogenously. We derive the resulting level of tax evasion in society and the optimal choices made by the potential governments. We examine how changes in governmental structure would affect the level of tax evasion, and how that, in turn, would affect a particular form of capital flight.     

Mineral Taxation, Mineral Revenues and Mine Investment in Zambia, 1964–83

A bstract . The relationship between mineral taxation, mineral revenues , and investment in existing and new mine capacity in Zambia during 1964–83 is examined. By the mid-1970s the Zambian copper industry was incapable of producing investible surpluses which could be appropriated by government partly because of unfavorable movements in real market prices for mining inputs and mineral output, partly because the mineral taxation systems applied since 1964 had deterred mine investment. This situation can only be remedied by changing the cost structure of Zambia's copper production, requiring major investments in modernization of existing, and development of new, mines. A tax system is suggested which offers a workable compromise between the need to obtain revenues for development and to ensure continued investment in mining.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

Interdependent capital structure choices and the macroeconomy

This study shows that capital structure choices of US corporations are interdependent across time. We follow a two-step estimation approach. First, using a large cross-section of firms we estimate year-by-year average capital structure choices, i.e., the average firm’s percentage of new funding that is secured through debt, its term composition, and the percentage of new equity represented by retained earnings. Second, these time series are included in a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive model in which three factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding conditions, and prices, are included. We test for the interdependence between optimal capital structure decisions and for the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. Results show there is a hierarchical order in which firms make capital structure decisions. They first decide on the share of debt out of total new funding they will hire. Conditional on this they decide on the term of their debt and on their earnings retention policy. Of outmost importance, macroeconomic factors are key for making capital structure decisions.     

Optimal monetary policy under incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty: A long-run perspective

This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy by changing real returns of nominal bonds via variation in expected inflation. Optimal expected inflation is procylical and on average higher than without uncertainty. Simple inflation targeting rules closely approximate the optimal monetary policy.