基于差异化定价的快递包装纸箱回收策略研究

针对快递包装纸箱废弃严重及回收难的问题,研究了生产商对物流服务商与第三方回收商采取差异化定价回收的决策问题,并利用合作系数讨论了在不同合作程度下,生产商利润、物流服务商利润、第三方回收商利润以及供应链回收率的差异。研究表明,生产商与物流服务商的利润关于差异回收策略存在对称性的特征,并且二者利润随合作系数改变产生一致性的增减变化;而供应链的回收率与第三方回收商的利润则随合作程度的增加而增加。物流服务商的加入,增加了快递包装纸箱的回收可操作性,避免单一回收渠道产生回收惰性,并刺激了第三方回收商的积极性,在实现社会福利的同时,也实现了低碳环保的目的,为物流行业的可持续发展提供了参考意义。     

洛阳推行商品质量先行赔偿制

继’96洛阳百日质量行之后,洛阳市有关部门联手推出了产(商)品质量先行赔偿制。 质量先行赔偿制的主要内容是:成立洛阳市受理消费者产(商)品质量责任申诉先行赔偿中心,并筹集部分资金建立赔偿基金(有条件的大型商业企业自己建立基金),今后消费者凡在市区内固定摊位上购买的商品,有购物凭证,并属技术监督行政     

质量成本管理优化控制与决策

在质量成本的控制中,本文着重研究了成本的构成,分别建立了购买商、供应商的质量成本和个人理性约束成本及其模型.对质量成本的决策,主要讨论了购买商、供应商的管理质量成本收益.按不同信息,建立了成本收益决策模型.通过仿真计算,获得质量成本和成本收益优化值.     

基于委托代理的供应链质量管理激励策略

利用委托代理模型建立了供应链质量管理的激励模型，从购买商对供应商质量管理监管的角度出发，探讨了不同风险态度下最优激励合约的设计问题，求出了模型的最优解并进一步讨论其影响因素。最后，拓展分析了声誉激励的效果，为寻求有效的供应链质量管理提供理论依据。     

优质产品两手造

质量控制已成为决定生产型企业利润的最重要因素,生产商为实现质量控制可谓各显神通,但是许多厂家发现,质量控制其实可以通过具有针对性的科技手段来实现。如何实现,请读者仔细阅读本文。     

带有订单量和运输量折扣的供应链三方企业协调

考虑由供应商、运输服务提供商和购买商三者构成的供应链,市场需求是依赖于产品销售价格的随机变量,建立带有订单量和运输量双重折扣下供应链中三方企业的优化决策和协调模型。通过理论分析得到：提供订单量和运输量双重折扣可以促进供应链协调,同时提高供应商、运输服务提供商和购买商三方企业的利润。最后用算例验证了相关结论。     

建设项目动态联盟中的激励模型设计与分析

根据委托——代理理论,设计了建设项目动态联盟中总包商对分包商的激励模型;通过比较在信息对称与信息不对称情况下激励模型的解,分析了总包商与分包商的特质、外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素对激励报酬强度系数的影响,并对激励模型进行了拓展研究;通过模型分析及结论,提出了建设项目动态联盟中设计激励机制必须考虑的因素。     

考虑客户满意度的发动机再制造物流网络设计

将客户满意度纳入到发动机回收再制造物流网络设计中,构建了一个多周期动态混合整数规划模型,研究物流网络中设施的位置、数量、库存以及相应物流量。采用Lingo11.0进行数值算例分析,研究表明,客户满意度权重变化引起了生产商最大利润和系统最大利润的变化。     

有问必答

清泰南苑某女士问: 2004年2月20日我购买了某品牌的娑罗双漆板,购买时商家请我在安装地板时铺上防潮层(防潮膜),我认为自己住的是九楼,楼高不会潮湿,无需使用防潮膜。结果不到一个月普遍出现瓦形状变形,部分地板表面有裂隙。我于2004年3月25日向有关部门投拆,要求厂商赔偿,引起对地板质量的争议。     

产品成本内生化的企业定价选址博弈分析

运用三阶段博弈模型研究了双寡头厂商面对需求非对称、产品成本内生时的定价选址决策问题,并分别分析了供应商Nash谈判参数的变化对生产商均衡位置以及均衡利润的影响.研究发现,与产品成本外生的情形相比,供应商的存在改变了生产商的均衡位置.当某一供应商的相对谈判能力增强时,与之形成双边垄断关系的生产商就会远离其垄断市场,均衡利润将会减少,而竞争对手则会靠近其对应的垄断市场,均衡利润将会增加.两个生产商之间的均衡距离会随供应商谈判能力的增强而缩小.     

Learning to bid in sequential Dutch auctions

We propose an agent-based computational model to investigate sequential Dutch auctions with particular emphasis on markets for perishable goods and we take as an example wholesale fish markets. Buyers in these markets sell the fish they purchase on a retail market. The paper provides an original model of boundedly rational behavior for wholesale buyers׳ behavior incorporating learning to improve profits, conjectures as to the bids that will be made and fictitious learning. We analyze the dynamics of the aggregate price under different market conditions in order to explain the emergence of market price patterns such as the well-known declining price paradox and the empirically observed fact that the very last transactions in the day may be at a higher price. The proposed behavioral model provides alternative explanations for market price dynamics to those which depend on standard hypotheses such as diminishing marginal profits. Furthermore, agents learn the option value of having the possibility of bidding in later rounds. When confronted with random buyers, such as occasional participants or new entrants, they learn to bid in the optimal way without being conscious of the strategies of the other buyers. When faced with other buyers who are also learning their behavior still displays some of the characteristics learned in the simpler case even though the problem is not analytically tractable.     

基于寄售库存的供应商能力选择与分配问题研究

研究寄售库存协作中供应商的能力选择与分配问题，在需求对价格敏感的假设下，分别考察了固定分配和浮动分配两种能力分配机制，结果显示，购买商在两种分配机制下的收益比较结果取决于参数的取值。但对供应商来说，在浮动分配机制下至少可以获得和在固定分配机制下一样多的收益。     

Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality

Why is it so common for the seller to provide guarantees that say “Satisfaction guaranteed or your money back” along with the sale of a product? Newly introduced goods and mail-ordered products are usually sold with such guarantees. In honoring money-back guarantees, why is it a common business practice to pay back exactly the purchase price rather than a portion of it? In this paper we study the informational role and optimality of the common business practice of money-back guarantees in a signaling model with quality uncertainty and risk-neutral buyers. We find that money-back guarantees and price together completely reveal a monopoly firm's private information about product quality, Moreover, the private information is revealed at no signaling cost. Furthermore, we show that in terms of the level of monetary compensation specified by a guarantee, price is the profit-maximizing level of monetary payback in case of product failure.     

Buyer brokerage: Experimental evidence

This paper offers an experimental investigation of two commission structures for buyer brokerage. One commission structure is the currently used structure in the industry where both the seller’s broker and the buyer’s broker each receive a percentage of the sales price as their compensation from the seller. In an alternative commission structure, while the seller’s broker still receives a percentage of the sales price from the seller, the buyer’s broker is compensated by the buyer and the compensation is inversely related to the sales price. We find that how the buyer’s broker gets compensated has significant implications. While both commission structures yield a similar probability of reaching an agreement, the alternative commission structure yields a lower price and a longer time to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the alternative commission structure achieves a better alignment of the interests of the buyer and the buyer’s broker without affecting the earnings of the players in the transaction. We also find that the improvement in the alignment of interests is more significant for female buyers than for male buyers. Furthermore, a higher listing price by the seller and a higher initial bid price by the buyer each lead to a significant increase in the negotiated price.     

供应链中基于质量控制的契约模型分析

供应链中的业务外包策略充分发挥了供应链节点企业的核心竞争力，但同时存在产品质量难以控制的问题。本文通过构建以价格折扣和质保金为参数的契约模型，分析了制造商在非对称信息条件下对业务外包产品进行质量控制的最优契约设计问题。     

Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers?

This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out‐of‐market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. Published 2014. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.     

Transfer prices and incentive contracts in vertically-integrated divisionalized companies

This paper studies a divisionalized firm with sequential transfers in which central management wants to motivate two division managers who receive predecision information. Central management can only contract on the observables price, cost and quantity. Starting with the optimal compensation schemes as a benchmark, the paper considers the question whether using transfer prices to substitute for price and cost, respectively, can replicate the optimal solution or not. This is to say, whether using an aggregate measure comes at a loss. The results are dependent on the design constraints (i) single or ‘dual’ transfer prices and (ii) simultaneous design of the reward functions or exogenously given reward functions. Basically, only in the case that central management is restricted to given reward functions, and wants to use the same single transfer price for both divisions, there is a loss relative to the benchmark solution. In the other cases, generally, there is enough latitude to design the available functions to mimic the benchmark. The paper goes on to discuss special cases. First, it finds conditions when purely cost-based transfer prices are optimal, and second, it derives explicit solutions for given linear compensation schemes over divisional book profits.     

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity. Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999     

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.